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ABSTRACT
The main purpose of this thesis is to answer the question: what kind of social security
provision for old people should be applied to tackle the problem of economic
insecurity arising from the structural change of both economy and population in
Taiwan? In order to answer this question, both desk study and empirical research
have been undertaken. The desk study began with a general review of the concept of
social security, followed by a case study of the British provisions, and then came to
the main study of Taiwan.
The data of the study came mainly from governmental statistical data and available
research reports from both public and private sources. Many crucial but unavailable
data were collected by the author's research which including a mail questionnaire
survey in Taiwan and a minor regional interviewing survey in Taipei City. All findings
are developed in related chapters. The process of the empirical study was, firstly, to
clarify the general background such as the demographic, economic, political and social
situation, and the special situations and needs in repect of family, economy and health
of the elderly. Secondly, an intensive analysis of the existing provisions of Taiwan
was made. Special emphasis was put on social insurance. Finally, based on these
research findings, several options for changes for both short-term and long-term aims
were suggested.
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The subject of this thesis is concerned with social security for the elderly in
Taiwan. This subject is chosen because not only is there still no adequate pension
provision for the majority of old people yet but also the level of existing lump sum
retirement payments is on average very low. Most old people must depend on their
children. But rapid change in the economic structure has led to the following
questions: ajfamily support becomes more difficult; b)enough savings for old age is
not possible for all; and cjwages for the old themselves may not be available.
Moreover, in Taiwan nowadays only 17% of employed people remain in agriculture. On
the contrary, there has been a big increase in the last 30 years in secondary and
tertiary industries. Though there are some wage-earners in agriculture and many small
self-employed in secondary and tertiary industries, the trend will be more and more
people in wage employment in the future. With a consequent increase in vulnerability
to sickness, injury, disability, death and the fluctuations of the labour market. The
potential insecurity will affect old people's welfare as it can affect their family support,
their savings and their own access to wages.
Furthermore, the proportion of old people in Taiwan is set to greatly increase and
may well be as high as the UK and West Germany today within 3 to 4 decades.
Facing the change of the structure in both economy and population which has
affected most countries as they have become more economically and industrially
developed, there must be some reliable income maintenance provisions to tackle the
problem of economic insecurity of the people. However, it is not an easy question to
answer, because all kinds of income maintenance provisions have their own merits
and limitations. Even within the field of social security, there are not only many
sub-fields or sub-provisions such as social assistance, social insurance, and universal
allowance for options, but also even several alternatives in each sub-field. They also
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have their own merits and limitations. All options are subject to not only objective
social and economic circumstances, but also the subjective value-judgements of
society.
For above reasons, there will be a general discussion on the framework of income
maintenance in chapter 2. However, because the objective of this thesis is to discuss
the income security of the elderly, so a discussion of the meaning of 'old age' and its
measurements will be given in the beginning of this chapter. As the provisions of
social security will play more importance role in Taiwan in the future, referring to
Professor Kaim-Caudle's Comparative Social Policy and Social Security, Midgley's
Social Security, Inequality, and The Third World and ILO's Into the Twenty-First
Century: the Development of Social Security, I try to explore their possible patterns,
inherited basic characteristics and the consequences of different financing methods in
detail. A static theoretical analysis might not be clear enough to demonstrate the
vast implications of social security, so this is followed by a small dynamic case study
on the British social security system in chapter 3. As Britain is one of the oldest
welfare states in the world, her affluent experiences in both theoretical approach and
practical administration, especially the Beveridge Plan, may not only deepen our
understanding in the theory of social security but also give some lessons for social
security reform in other countries including Taiwan. So chapter 2 and chapter 3 should
be considered together.
The substantial part of the thesis, chapter 4 to 9, however, is concerned with
Taiwan in all aspects relevant to social security. Chapter 4 is about the research
methods and research process. The research is in two parts: a mail questionnaire
survey in the Taiwan area and another minor regional interviewing survey in Taipei
City. The findings are developed in different chapters. As the social security system
not only must be based on the existing conditions of a society but also be integrated
with them, a discussion on the general background of Taiwan and its demographic,
economic, political, and social situation is necessary. This is provided in chapter 5.
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While old people will be a large proportion of the population in the near future, the
difficulties of meeting this increased need will be foreseen. However, it cannot be
assured that there is no problem for them at present when their proportion is still
very low. So a general discussion on the situation and needs of old people today is
made in chapter 6. In chapter 7, an overall description of existing social security
provisions in Taiwan is given. Apart from the family, as primary social insurance has
the largest number of beneficiaries in social security in Taiwan, so a detailed analysis
of this provision is further made in chapter 8. After making clear all general and
special situations in Taiwan, in chapter 9 the further task is to set out some options
for change, particular attention is given to establishing a revised form of a social
security system which has specific Chinese characteristics by drawing on the
TripeopHsm of Dr. Sun Yat-sen.
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CHAPTER 2
OLD AGE AND INCOME MAINTENANCE: A FRAMEWORK
2.1. Introduction
'Old age' is a natural process in our lives. Due to the great dissimilarities in
cultural value and socio-economic background, the experience of old age in different
countries may differ greatly. The difference might range from deep misery to great
fortune. In the field of social security, old age is a very distinct contingency.
Therefore, the concept of 'old age' will be fully discussed first.
Secondly, after the meaning or definition of old age is made clear, some popular
measurements of old age are introduced. By these measurements, the situation of the
elderly or the ageing of the population can be described in a more accurate way.
Thirdly, the needs of the elderly will be discussed. The needs of the elderly are
different from the younger age groups in many aspects. This is the reason why a
special emphasis is given to the problem of income insecurity of the elderly.
Fourthly, the main focus of this chapter is to discuss income maintenance for the
elderly. The discussion will be not only to illustrate the coverage of income
maintenance, but also to explore the merits and limits of each source of income of
the elderly. As a world trend, social security has been the main provision of income
maintenance for the elderly, so a further discussion of the provisions of social security
will be made in detail, including their function and limitation, as well their side effects
on economic activities.
Finally, for the purpose of this thesis, in order to discuss some options for change
in social security in Taiwan in the future, a discussion of the criteria for choice will be
essential and necessary.
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2.2. What Is Old Age?
'Old age' is both a very distinct and uncertain state in our lives depending on what
point of view is adopted. If 'old age' is defined as a state when people are up to and
over a certain calendar age such as 60 or 65, then old age will be a very distinct state
because all people will be in old age as soon as they are up to that age; but if 'old
age' is defined as a state of disability due to senility or the loss of ability to work,
then it will be very uncertain. Because old age is such a complex phenomenon, there
is a new discipline gerontology to pursue it. In gerontology, according to James
Birren, the concept of 'old age' can be broken down into three aspects: biological age,
psychological age, and social age (Puner, 19). Of course, all of them are related to
calendar or chronological age, but not consistent with each other. The state of
'oldness' in biological age is that the normal function of some or all organs will
become weaker than before. The skin becomes wrinkled and the hair turns grey or
white, and the like. In psychological age, a man will becomes less flexible in
perception, learning, feeling, emotions and behaviour. Lastly in social age, after
several decades of playing certain roles, the lives of many old people will turn to be
stereotyped, so there will be more difficulties in role adjustment, social participation,
etc. Moreover, the socially created barriers such as retirement age, either formally or
informally, will also influence the situation greatly. These three types of age are not
only not consistent with chronological age, but also not consistent among themselves.
For example, some people might be very old in biological age, but still very young in
psychological age; or, on the contrary, their psychological age might be older than
their biological age.
In the field of social security, a special concern is put on the earning power of
labour of the people. Generally all people will gradually lose their earning power as
they really grow 'old', no matter at which age. Finally their earnings will be
insufficient for their needs if they have no other sources of income from other
productive factors such as capital or land. In the past, due to the loss of productive
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ability and the lack of productive capital, the elderly in Eskimoan society had to be
killed or kill themselves in order to reduce the pressure of food. So it is definitely a
misery to be old in that kind of society.
On the contrary, in Chinese society, due to the rural culture based on agricultural
economy, the holdings of property are mostly in the hands of the elderly or the
eldest, so there develops a high cultural value to respect the elderly. In traditional
Chinese society, the oldest member in a family or a community is always the person
who has the highest status. If there is any dispute in family or community, he will be
the arbitrator. In a banquet he will take the most honourable seat. It is a general norm
that the younger should respect the elder in traditional China and in modern China
too. In daily language we always use 'old' before one's surname such as 'Chan', 'Chen'
and 'Chin' or some other general name such as 'teacher', 'boss', 'brother' and
'husband' when we greet any person. In this case the word 'old' does not really mean
'aged', it means 'respectable' or 'honourable'. Moreover, in Chinese society there are
two kinds of very common invitation: the red and the white. We use the red colour
invitation to invite guests to join our wedding and birthday parties for celebrating and
use the white colour one only if we invite guests to join a funeral ceremony. But if
the member of a family dies at an age of over 80 years, the invitation will be red
again. In this case, on the way to the graveyard the family will let off firecrackers to
celebrate their luck to have had such a long lived old member. People also join this
kind of funeral in a happy mood. Unfortunately, this custom of respecting the elderly
cannot be easily maintained in modern industrialized society. Even income insecurity
has gradually become a significant problem for the elderly in Taiwan.
No matter in which kind of society, in order to tackle the problem of income
insecurity, there is usually a legal age for people to retire and receive benefits. So, the
retirement age has come to be conventionally defined as 'old age' of the people in
social security because only after that age are people entitled to old age
benefits(Tinker, 9-14; Guillemard, 152; Markides & Mindel, 12). Comparatively, 'old age'
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is a relative constant concept and 'retirement age' is more changeable, so they are
not necessarily consistent. There is evidence that many industrial countries nowadays
tend to adopt a lower or flexible retirement age policy under the influences of mass
unemployment, labour-saving technological innovation, the baby boom after the War
and the cheaper labour of young people (Guillemard, 153). But in case of labour
shortage owing to economic boom, the retirement age will be set higher voluntarily or
even compulsorily. In both cases, the difference between old age and retirement age
will be enlarged. Even if retirement age is universally accepted as the working
definition of old age, there still is the question of how to decide a retirement age.
There are at least two main opposite theories, disengagement theory and activity
theory, debating about the policy of retirement or the broader theories of ageing
(Hendricks and Hendricks, 107-116; Parker, S., 52-62).
The main idea of disengagement theory is to give a fixed age of mandatory
retirement and to enable the elderly to become fully disengaged from their jobs. So,
from the positive point of view, this measure will enable the elderly to commence a
new fresh life of hobbies and leisure. But from a negative point of view,
disengagement theory seems to be based on the assumption that people by nature do
not like to work. At least, they will become bored and tired of their work after a long
term of engagement. So a fixed retirement age is functionally an instrument, on one
hand, to force able-bodied people to work and, on the other hand, to force old
disabled workers to retire. In addition, as Stanley Parker (151-2) and Chris Phillipson
(Guillemard, 128) summarized, there are more positive points in favour of the fixed
retirement age in disengagement theory such as (1) equal treatment, avoiding the
pitfalls of judging retirement according to individual merit or circumstances; (2) saving
face, this is a good excuse for both the able-bodied who do not like to work and the
disabled who want to keep working to retire; (3)planning ahead, a compulsory
retirement age enables employees to plan ahead for their retirement or next career;
(A)promotion opportunity, providing a means of promotion for lower level personnel.
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The main idea of activity theory on the other hand is voluntary or flexible
retirement and flexible life styles. It seems to assume that people like to work as long
as they are able-bodied, therefore, there should not be any compulsory retirement
unless they are really disabled or it's voluntary. Based on flexible life styles, 'work,
leisure and education' are well-integrated parts in one's life. There is no clear-cut
disengagement between them. At least their arrangements are changeable over time
depending on personal circumstances. As there is no definite relationship between
age and capacity, older people are not certainly less capable than the younger, so,
under fixed retirement age policy, it is either an economic waste to force the capable
elderly to retire if they still want to work or an economic inefficiency to retain the
disabled or less well suited young to work merely because they are not up to
retirement age. Only a flexible retirement policy can solve this problem. However, as
Phillipson (1982:36, 155) and other academics (Gillemard, 135-6) pointed out, the
political and economic environment of a society would greatly influence the expected
function of flexible policy. For example, because of increasing rigidity within the labour
markets of capitalist societies, the flexibility will only be operated on the employers'
terms. Under these circumstances, flexibility may increase, rather reduce, the feeling
of insecurity.
As mentioned above, the merits and limits of these two theories are exactly on the
opposite sides, ie, the merits of disengagement theory can overcome the limits of
activity theory, and vice versa. In this situation, theories themselves cannot decide
which theory is more appropriate. It can be decided only by the adequacy of old age
provisions and the real attitude of the people. Firstly, if there is no adequate old age
provision as a basis, the discussion of fixed or flexible retirement will be meaningless
or even could be a misery for the retired with fixed retirement if they have no other
sources of income. Secondly, if and only if adequate old age provision is available, or,
if a society is affluent enough to afford an adequate old age benefit, will the option of
choice depend on the real attitude of the people. If most or even only a bare majority
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of working people are dissatisfied with their occupations, then a fixed retirement
policy will be reasonable, otherwise a flexible policy will be better. Briefly, the political
adoption of a policy is dependent on not only the objective social and economic
conditions, but also the subjective attitude and willingness of the people.
According to Social Security Programs Throughout the World 1985, a report
published by the United States Department of Health and Human Service, apart from
10 without any civil provision, all 132 countries or areas with old age programs have
fixed retirement ages. The lowest retirement age is as low as 40 years for both men
and women in the Solomon Islands. The second lowest one is 45 years in Swaziland
and Uganda. Nepal does not even fix an age for retirement. On the other side, the
highest retirement or benefit age is 70 years in Hong Kong. The second highest one is
67 years in Denmark, Iceland and Norway. And the third highest one is Ireland's 66
years. As for the most popular retirement ages, the first one is 60 years (both sexes)
in 26 countries; and then 60-55 (man-woman) years and 55 years (both sexes) in 24
countries respectively; 65 years (both sexes) in 17 counties; 65-60 (man-woman)
years in 16 countries; the remaining ages have very few countries (see Table A2.1 in
Appendix).
Nevertheless, firstly, it will be a misunderstanding to conclude that all countries in
the above table unanimously have only a fixed retirement age and a general old age
provision. In fact, it is not the case. Evidence shows that some countries such as
USSR and Taiwan do have special, conditional provisions for people to retire early. So
this table indicates only the normal or regular cases of retirement. As for flexible
retirement ages, it is in fact difficult to show on the table due to its great variety.
Secondly, it is also true that only the minority of welfare states and some socialist
states have general provisions for the elderly. Most other countries have provisions
for only some of their old people. For those countries giving cover to only a small
number of old people, a discussion of retirement age will not be very meaningful.
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However, the great difference of retirement ages can bring us some thoughts on
the adequacy of retirement age. Firstly, retirement age may be adjusted to match our
financing ability to set up an adequate old age provision. For example, the number of
beneficiaries may be reduced by raising the retirement age. Secondly, a retirement age
should not make the life expectancy at retirement age too small, or there will be too
few old retirees entitled to benefits. For example, there will be more people entitled to
old age benefits for a country with life expectancy at retirement age of more than 10
years than another one with less than 5 years. Thirdly, in order to take account of
financing ability of a society, a good retirement policy should begin at a relatively high
retirement age, and then gradually lower it until reaching the limit of the financing
ability of a society. However, from the point of individual retiree, because people
psychologically prefer their retirement payments to be increased rather than to be
reduced, so it will cause less frustration to set a low retirement age and then allow
people to retire later with an increment of pension than to set a high retirement age
and then allow them retire early with a reduction of pension.
Furthermore, there is also a distinctive difference in age between men and women.
In 51 countries, including Taiwan, the age of women is lower than that of men. The
difference is from 1 year to 5 years. Generally, the basic assumption is that women
become older and weaker quicker than men, so they will lose their earning power
earlier than men, and so their age should be lower. Another social reason is that the
wife is on average younger than her husband, so with a lower age for women the
couple can then retire simultaneously, in the same year (DHSS, 1985a:ll2). However,
these are not strong reasons any longer. Not to mention the fact that the life
expectancy of women is on average higher than men. Because most work in modern
industrialised societies is not dependent on physical labour any longer, so there will
not be much difference in the labour participation between men and women any more.
Secondly, the range of age differences between spouses is so large that no single
difference can suit all of them. Particularly, since many women are single, divorced.
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widowed, cohabitants or even older than their husbands, this will greatly nullify the
social reason. From a more general point of view, as a fixed lower retirement age for
women or a higher retirement age for men could be explained as a measure either in
favour of them or against them, ie, sex discrimination, just depending on their
willingness to work. It will be a favour when they are already tired of work, or a
deprivation when they are fond of it. So it could be a better policy to adopt an equal
treatment between men and women as many scholars suggest (ILO, 1984a:50-53;
Fogarty, 1980:29; NCC, 187).
2.3. Some Measurements of Old Age
As mentioned in the previous section, old age is a relative concept. In gerontology,
it is quite common to define 65 years as old age [Puner, 17), but, in the field of social
security, it seems to be quite acceptable to use retirement age (or pensionable age)
as the definition of old age. If the retirement age is also defined as 65 years, then
there will be no difference between gerontology and social security. Suppose we
accept 65 years as the definition of old age, then there are several measurements
which can be used to indicate the situation of old age. The first most direct one is
the actual number (N) of old people. For example, in 1984 the number of old people
was 922 thousand in Taiwan, 1,425 thousand in Sweden, 8,387 thousand in the UK and
11,956 thousand in Japan. The number of old people in different countries or even
different stages within a given country might differ greatly. Unfortunately, this
measurement cannot give us very good general lessons.
The more meaningful measurement is the percentage (%) of old people in the total
population. Under this measure, the percentage of old people between two different
countries may be quite similar even though their numbers differ greatly. Generally,
under a growing or increasing population, the percentage of old people in a country
tends to be low. The greater the increasing rate, the lower the percentage. On the
contrary, the lower the increasing rate, the higher the percentage. Whenever a Zero
Population Growth (ZPG) is reached, life expectancy will play an important role in the
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change of the percentage of old people in the population. In case of ZPG, when we
have a higher average life expectancy, that means that more people will be able to
live into old age, so the percentage of old people will be higher. Moreover, if we
define a lower age as old age, then more people will be classified as old people; only
if it is on the contrary, will the number of old people be less. Assuming the state of
ZPG has been in operation for a long time, ie, the society has reached a demographic
'steady state', then, according to this relationship between life expectancy and the
definition of old age, a table of percentage of old people can be constructed (see
Table 2.1).











60 | 8.3 | - -
65 15.4 | 7.7 - -
70 21.4 | 14.3 1 7.1 -
75 36.7 ! 20.0 j 13.3 6.7
80 | 31.3 | 25.0 | 18.8 12.5
Note: Assumes ZPG is a demographic 'steady state'.
Source: constructed by the author
Under the condition of ZPG, according to Table 2.1, if the 'age' of old age is
defined as 60 years and the average life expectancy is 65 years, then the proportion
of old people will be 7.7%; if the average life expectancy is 70 years, then the
proportion is 14.3%; if 75, then 20.0%; if 80, then 25.0%. But if the definition of old
age is raised to 65 years and the average life expectancy is 70 years, then the rate of
old people will be 7.1%; if the life expectancy is 75, then the rate is 13.3%; and if 80,
then 18.8%. Therefore, the percentage of old people can be reasonably estimated
under ZPG.
Although an absolute ZPG state is very difficult to achieve or to maintain, this ideal
type is a very useful criterion to judge the accuracy of the forecast of old people.
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Many scholars estimate of old people aged 65 and over as more than 20, 25 or even
30 per cent in the future. For example, a study estimates that old people in the USA
will be 23% in 2035 (Guillemard, 56). Facing this forecast, according to Table 2.1, even
if its assumption of average life expectancy is as high as 80 years, as long as its
population is still increasing or does not reach ZPG yet, it will be in theory impossible
to have a percentage of old people higher than 18.8%. The estimate of 23% in the
USA in 2030 is possible only if the USA has a decreasing population. Otherwise, either
in a 'steady state' or a increasing population, this estimation is definitely wrong. In
another study of the US Social Security Administration (DHHS, 1979:91), it forecast
that the population aged 65 years and over in ten industrial developed countries
would be about 17-18% in 2050. This estimation is quite similar to our ZPG
hypothesis. However, this estimation will be too high if the US population still keeps
growing due to high birth rate or high immigration. Furthermore, Table 2.1 can also
be used as an equation to estimate the last unknown figure among 'old age': average
life expectancy or the percentage of old people in the total population. For example,
suppose we already know that the population in Sweden is quite stable, near to the
state of ZPG, and its percentage of old people aged 65 and over is about 17%, so,
according to Table 2.2, we can estimate its average life expectancy as around 78
years.
Another common measurement to indicate the economic dependency of old
people of a society is old dependency ratio, the ratio of old people to working age
people from 15 to 64 years. Originally, this ratio was used to express numerical
relationship between the 'productive' and 'old non-productive' or 'old dependent'
components of a population (Guillemard, 58). Its actual range of age is decided by the
definition of 'productive' and 'non-productive'. As 'productive' age can be logically
defined as 'working age', so it is quite appropriate for some academics to define
'productive' or working age people from 18 to 64 (Guillemard, 58) or 20 to 64 years
(Chen, et al, 1986; Hsiao, et al, 1983). Of course, if we want to pursue this
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measurement more accurately, the old dependency ratio can be strictly defined as the
ratio of old people to actual 'labour force' or even to actual 'employed labour force' as
long as the data are available. There is no problem to do so in theory. According to
empirical international data, under the conventional definition, the range of this
measurement was from less than 10 to more than 30.
The last measure to indicate the situation of old people is ageing index, the ratio
of old people to non-working age young people under 14 years. Because the number
of young people under 14 is directly influenced by births, so its number is more
changeable and more uncertain. Comparatively, the numbers of old people and
working age people are more stable and estimable, so the characteristic of ageing
index is more sensitive than old dependency ratio. Its range can be from less than 10
to more than 100 under the conventional definition.
Z4. The Needs of The Elderly
Like all other people, the elderly also have to eat, to wear clothes, to require
accommodation, to travel, to see a doctor, etc. Generally, all these needs can be met
as long as they have sufficient income. But, unfortunately, as most old people will
retire or become less capable to work, so their income will be interrupted or at least
gradually decrease. Especially so in developing countries as there are no personal
social services to meet the special needs of the elderly, all needs must be met by
their personal or family income. Under such circumstances, income maintenance or
income security is certainly the most vital issue for the elderly. This issue will be
discussed in detail in the next section in this chapter.
Apart from income, the needs of the elderly may differ from the young in several
aspects. Firstly, food, many old people must have special diet. They cannot or must
eat some kinds of food, or they have to eat them in special ways of cooking due to
health condition or illness. In many cases, some old people may not be able to cook
by themselves.
15
Secondly, clothing and accommodation the elderly have to wear more and thicker
clothes when they become weaker and less active. In addition the elderly also stay at
home longer, so their heating expenditure will be higher than other people's in the
winter. When they grow older, many of them will be more disabled, so many
housework tasks such as cleaning and laundry will become more difficult for them.
They might need additional safety facilities in their houses. More seriously, they even
have to move into special institutions.
Thirdly, transportation apart form those who are bedfast or housebound, the
elderly have more time to travel. But, on the other hand, many old people may be too
old to use public transportation and have to rely on private cars. In special cases, they
might be unable to drive private cars and have to hire a car with driver.
Fourthly, health services though no period of life is free from illness or disability,
there is clear evidence that the elderly have a greater incidence of both acute and
chronic diseases than younger age groups. However, compared to younger people,
there are more chronic diseases than acute ones in older people (Hendricks and
Hendricks, 171). Moreover, the elderly patients also differ from the young in their
morbidity and types of diseases. For old people, due to the control of diseases such
as measles, influenza, tuberculosis and gastroenteritis, and the improvement of public
sanitary and medical sciences, not only is the average life expectancy greatly
increased, but also new primary diseases such as malignant neoplasms (cancer), heart
diseases, cerebrovascular diseases, atheroselerosis, arthritis rheumatism come to be
the diseases which are more difficult to prevent and to recover from. Furthermore,
they not only have a multiplicity of diseases but always an aftermath of impairments
and disabilities (Shanas, 9-10, 20). All these indicate that the elderly need not only
more health services, but also more expensive ones. Especially, this need will be
intensified as old people grow older and their health situation becomes worse
(Shanas, et al, 1968:36,52). In countries such as Taiwan where health services are not
public or universally insured, the medical expenditure is certainly a heavy burden on
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families with old people.
However, the needs of the elderly are not confined to only the above special
individual needs. There are also social needs for the elderly to participate in various
activities in their communities or societies. The characteristics of activities could be
recreational, religious, political or altruistic ones. The participation in activities itself is
not only a cause of benefit to their health, but also a good indicator to gauge their
health.
2.5. The Income Maintenance of The Elderly
2.5.1. The Coverage of Income Maintenance
As Mike Reddin has mentioned, the coverage of income maintenance can be very
wide (Griffith, 83). The widest view of income maintenance schemes could range from
individual self-help through the collectives of private insurance to the occupationally
based collective responses; from the workings of local authority income benefits and
the court's role in compelling income transfers, to the major state social security
systems and the tax treatment of them all. That is, from informal to formal, from
private to public, from individual to collective, all sources of income can be included.
Analytically, the sources of income of the elderly can be listed as follows;
(1)employment (2)savings, (3)investment (4)family, and (5)sociai security. Each source
or provision has its merits and its limits. The application of any provision must be
based on not only our subjective value-judgement, but also the objective
socio-economic conditions.
Normally, the most direct and effective income provision for the elderly is
employment. Of course, the status of employment can be further divided into
employer, the employed and self-employed. As the scale of the enterprises of
employers is certainly relative large, so this kind of enterprise could be a reliable
source for employers. There would not be much income insecurity problem for them.
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Their problems mainly come from the larger external economic environment.
Comparatively, apart from the very extreme cases such as employers employing only
one unskilled worker or the very wealthy self-employed, the financial status of
self-employed will be on average much more disadvantageous than employers,
because whenever the self-employed themselves become sick or disabled, there will
be a financial crisis. As for the employed, their status is worse, because they will be
compulsorily retired when they are up to retirement age even if they are still
able-bodied, capable and willing to work. Although retired persons are free to
re-undertake another jobs, either full-time or part-time, to earn their living, many of
them will fail to do so because jobs are not always available for them in modern
industrialised society, especially, if a society is in mass unemployment. As for
employers, they are only the minority of the elderly. The majority of them are
self-employed and the employed.
Secondly, as employment is not a safe income provision for the majority of old
people, the other possible substitute is savings. Compared to investment, savings is a
kind of indirect investment through financial agencies. People save some income
when they work. Even the employers can also save some for their worst outcome,
bankruptcy. The more they save, the safer their income provision. Of course, there is
still a risk of inflation to erode the value of their savings if they deposit their money
in only financial agencies such as bank, building society and insurance company. But,
however, the most serious 'flaw' of this provision is that it will be meaningless or
helpless for the elderly who are low income earners (for whatever reasons) and have
no surplus income to save, or, even have some surplus but it is not high enough to
save for an adequate provision (Reddin, 1978:35-37, 1985:33-34).
The third possible income provision for the elderly is investment. That is, the
elderly engage in 'productive' activities by themselves directly before or after
retirement. This provision has the same limits as savings, ie, unavailable for the low
income earners. Compared to savings, because the money of investment is used in
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buying stock or real estate, so this provision can be inflation-proofed by the
appreciation of the property. If the elderly are originally employed, then they can also
invest to establish their own enterprises and become self-employed or even
employers if their capital is large enough. In this case, their risk will be similar to or
the same as employers.
The fourth source of income for the elderly is their family, mainly children.
Theoretically, the provision by children not only can avoid shortcomings of previous
provisions, but also can reinforce the solidarity between parents and children.
However, this provision is by nature inapplicable to the elderly who are single or
married but without children. Even for those who are married and have children, if
their children are non-adult, disabled, unemployed or on low income, this provision is
still unworkable. Lastly, even if their children earn enough money, they may not be
willing to support their parents, then this provision is still in vain.
Finally, the other provision which can avoid the above limitations for the elderly is
formal social security. Firstly, because there are several sub-provisions within the field
of social security which are based on different principles and financing methods, so
many kinds of needs may be met by certain provisions of social security. In theory
and in practice, social security shall have the function to prevent family from
breaking-up owing to financial crisis. Of course, compared to other provisions, social
security also has its own limits or side effects. Because most provisions of social
security are administered by public authorities, either central government or local
authorities, so the provisions could not be certainly available if the political climate is
not in favour of them. Secondly, for provisions such as social assistance and
universal allowance, in theory the entitlement to provisions is open to all people. Due
to the huge number of beneficiaries, the benefit level could be very mean if there is
no relative affluent economy to support this provision. Even where there are no such
political and economic problems, because the benefits of social security are generally
paid directly to the individuals, so there may be a side effect to alienate the original
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intimate relationship of family or community owing to the decline of interaction which
is in the form of personal mutual financial helps among their members. Without this
kind of interaction, intimate relationship would decrease or even disappear. Although
the intimate relationship between family members could be fostered and strengthened
by other types of interaction, it is no doubt that financial mutual help is the most
significant one. As for the merits and limits of different provisions in the field of
social security, they will be discussed in detail in the next section.
In summary, as each provision has its merits and limits, so the best policy for the
elderly to maintain their income should be to help them to have multiple sources of
income. The more sources they have, the safer their income maintenance.
2.5.2. The Provisions of Social Security
The term 'social security' has become popular since it was used in the USA
legislation, the Social Security Act of 1935 (ILO, 1984b:3). For analytical reason, in
theory the field of social security can be divided into three sub-fields: income
security, employment security and 'ability security' (see Figure 2.1). 'Ability security'
here means the necessary standard of health, skill and knowledge for a man to live or
to work. Normally 'ability' is the pre-condition of 'employment', and 'employment' is
the pre-condition of earnings or income. If there are adequate and sufficient
education, training and health care to make all, at least most, adult people ready for
employment, then it will not be a difficulty for such people to be employed through
the service of employment. If most people are employed, apart from the minority of
low-income receivers and the people with special needs, there will be no income
problem for the people any longer.
But, in practice, generally, 'ability security' is provided by health policy and
education policy, and 'employment security' is provided by employment policy in
social policy. So social security is restricted to only 'income security' in many
countries. However, apart from the countries such as the UK and the USSR where
Figure2,1TheieldofS ciale urity AbilityEmploymentInc e Securityc rity
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health services are public or universal services, health services are conventionally
included in the field of social security. For example, the ILO definition of social
security formally confirms this convention. According to the definition of ILO, the
provisions of social security should have the function of (a)granting curative or
preventive medical care, (b)maintaining income in case of involuntary loss of earnings
or important part of earnings, (c)granting supplementary incomes to persons having
family responsibilities (Kaim-Caudle, 1973:9; Midgley, 82). Generally, most western
welfare states tend to adopt this narrow definition of social security.
According to Prof. Kaim-Caudle's study of ten countries, he classifies the
provisions of social security into eleven types of different schemes and illustrates in
detail the schemes in each type (see Figure 2.2) (1973:8-11). Midgley admits that this
is the most comprehensive typology of provisions in the social security field, but he
criticizes this typology as too broad and unwieldy. For this reason, he introduces a
new classification of only four provisions of social security, ie, social assistance, social
insurance, employer liability and social allowances (83-85). This classification is similar
to Myers' one without his 'subsidized voluntary insurance' (7) and is followed by Dixon
but he adds 'provident funds' (1986:5). But according to Midgley, because there is not
much difference in basic features between provident fund and social insurance, so he
does not classify provident fund as an independent provision (84). Based on the same
reason, the author further classifies employer liability also as a special branch of
social insurance. Therefore, the provisions of social security in this thesis are further
simplified as only three main categories: social assistance, universal allowance (ie,
Midgley's social allowances) and social insurance. Of course, except social assistance,
the provisions of social security can be further classified into two or three
sub-provisions or sub-patterns respectively. Generally we can distinguish these three
main provisions by two criteria: (1) the sources of financing and (2) the conditions of
entitlement to benefits. Firstly, social assistance and universal allowance are financed
by general revenue (ie, taxation), but social insurance is financed by contributions.
Figure2.2ClassificationofS ialecurityProv sion SocialSecurityProvisions Statutory
Non-statutory













Secondly, the entitlement to benefits is decided by 'financial test' (or 'pecuniary test')
in social assistance but it is not necessary in universal allowance. As for social
insurance, its entitlement is decided mainly by contribution records.
Generally, the main criterion to distinguish social assistance from universal
allowance is financial test. If the financial test takes all sources of means such as
earnings and capital into account to assess one's entitlement, then this test is called a
'means test'. But if it takes account of only earnings, then it is an 'income test'. So,
comparatively, 'means test' is more severe than 'income test'. Most existing social
assistance benefits such as Britain's SB (or IS), FIS (or FC) and HB must pass a means
test. But the proposed new schemes such as negative income tax (NIT), tax credit and
benefit credit seem to require to pass an 'income test' only. Whenever the financial
test is replaced by a non-financial or non-pecuniary test such as tests of residence or
age, then the provision will be transformed into a universal scheme, not social
assistance any longer.
In universal allowance, the existing schemes are only child benefit in a number of
countries, old age pension in New Zealand, Canada and Denmark and disability
allowance in Finland (Midgley, 101). Their beneficiaries are restricted to children, the
elderly and the disabled only. So, strictly speaking, as their coverage is not the whole
population of a country, they are not real universal allowances. The real universal
allowance provisions should be 'basic income' or 'social dividend' which will cover the
whole population of a country. However, the public health services in the UK and
USSR are real universal services though they are not covered in the field of social
security. In order to get a precise concept, the author defines the universal services
which providing for only children, old people, etc, as sub-universal allowance, and the
proposed provisions such as 'basic income' and 'social dividend' as all-universal
allowance As there are no actual all-universal allowance schemes at present yet, we
may use 'universal allowance' to mean only 'sub-universal allowance' conventionally.
In that case, we may entitle them as 'universal child benefit' or 'universal old age
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pension'.
In the field of social insurance, in principle, all schemes or provisions as long as
they are financed by contributions, either by employers or employees or both of them,
should be included. Employer liability and provident fund are therefore classified as
social insurance, not as independent schemes in this thesis any more, because they
are contributory schemes. Due to the diversity of the covered schemes and for the
sake of analysis, a classification of the covered schemes in social insurance is
necessary. For the purpose of classification, there are several criteria available. For
example, if the classification is based on the character of the management body, then
those schemes managed by public bodies can be classified as 'public social insurance'
and others managed by private bodies will be classified as 'private social schemes'.
Or, if it is based on benefit level, then the schemes can be classified as 'flat-rate
social insurance' and 'earnings-related social insurance'. Or, finally, based on the point
of their basic character and principle, then the covered schemes might be classified
into two sub-provisions: primary and secondary.
'Primary social insurance' includes all public schemes such as Nl in Britain, OASDHI
in the USA and LI and GEI in Taiwan. Moreover, it also includes the schemes such as
industrial injury, occupational diseases and unemployment insurance which are entitled
'employer liability' by many academics such as Midgley and Dixon. Generally, primary
social insurance emphasizes the traditional principles of social insurance such as risk
pooling, mutual aid and redistribution. The purpose of this sub-provision is to provide
basic protection for the insured persons. It emphasizes the criterion of 'primary
adequacy' rather than 'secondary adequacy' and its benefits are generally flat rate or
mildly earnings-related. The meanings of 'primary adequacy' and 'secondary adequacy'
will be discussed in section 6 in detail.
As regards 'secondary social insurance', although it is also contributed to by both
employers and employees like primary social insurance, compared to the primary
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schemes, it emphasizes the actuarial principle rather than those of risk pooling,
redistribution and adequacy- It includes schemes such as occupational schemes,
mandatory private insurance and provident funds which are in fact a kind of
compulsory saving scheme for the employed to provide benefits in relation to their
earnings. In many ex-British colonies the role of provident fund, a provision of
secondary social insurance, is much more significant than that of primary social
insurance.
After listing different provisions of social security, the question that follows is
which provision should be chosen to provide services for different contingencies. If
we view different provisions of social security as different ways to provide a variety of
benefits, then only after we have a general understanding of the characteristics,
functions and limits of different provisions, can we have a sound basis to make our
options. For the sake of simplicity, the author tries to make such an discussion based
on only three main provisions or three main ideal types of social security.
As the choice between universality and selectivity is a very important issue in the
field of social policy (Jones, et al, ch 3; Reddin, 1970b, 1978, 1981), I use these two
concepts to construct a continuum as a framework to explain the features and
function of the three main provisions of social security. Within this continuum, if the
right end is the extreme degree of selectivity and the left end is the extreme degree
of universality, then social assistance will be located at the right third of the
continuum, universal allowance at the left third of the continuum, and social insurance
at the mid. Comparatively, because there is a strict financial discrimination, ie, means
test, in social assistance, so the actual beneficiaries in social assistance are generally
very selective and limited although its application is open to all citizens no matter
they are out of or in work. For example, in Britain SB (supplementary benefits) or IS
(income support) is available for the people who are out of work, FIS (family income
implement) or FC (family credit) is available for the family whose breadwinner is in full
time job On the other hand, in theory the benefits of universal allowance will be paid
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to all citizens equally without any discrimination, so its population of beneficiaries can
reach the highest level.
The feasibility or applicability of each provision has a close relation to its benefits
expenditure. If the expenditure of a provision is too high, there will be little chance for
it to be implemented without corresponding financing ability. Compared to financing
ability, however, benefit expenditure is easier to be managed or regulated. So we
would like to discuss the feasibility of each provision by its potential magnitude of
benefit expenditure. The provision with lower benefit expenditure will be more feasible
than that with higher benefit expenditure.
Then, how about the benefit expenditure of each provision? Because the benefits
expenditure of each provision is directly decided by the number of beneficiaries
(coverage) and the level of benefits (benefit) of each provision, so whenever these two
elements, coverage and benefit level, can be compared, then the total benefits
expenditure of each provision also can be compared.
From the point of coverage, because the coverage of universal allowance is the
whole population, so its coverage is definitely larger than social insurance or social
assistance. As for social insurance and social assistance, if their benefits are
relatively low at the level of subsistence, then, on one hand, in social assistance most
people will be able to contribute and, on the other hand, in social insurance most
people will not be able to pass the means test, so the coverage of social insurance
will be larger than social assistance. But if the benefits level are relatively high, then
the coverage of social insurance will not certainly be larger than social assistance any
more.
From the point of 'benefit', the levels of each provision could vary greatly and
irregularly. Each one could be either the highest one or the lowest one. Only if they
are flat rate, then their benefits expenditure can be compared according to their
coverage. So, in case of flat-rate benefit, we can safely conclude that universal
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allowance is the most expensive one, social assistance is the cheapest one and social
insurance is in the middle.
Finally, from the point of view of the administrative cost per beneficiary, social
assistance is the most expensive one due to its complicated formality of means test,
and universal allowance is the cheapest one because no means test is necessary. As
for social insurance, because its contributions test is generally not so complicated as
means test, so it will still be in the middle.
Apart from the economic ability of a society to finance certain provision, the
function and side effects of different provisions are also very important factors in the
making of social security policy. Historically, social assistance has a very long Poor
Law tradition. In earlier times, as the level of industrialisation was very low, there was
no significant structural unemployment. Most cases of poverty were believed to be the
result of personal faults. Since a great majority of people were poor, the principles of
work ethics, less eligibility (or wage stop) and the strict tests of means, income, work
and residence were common. So are they even today. Under this tradition, not only
will the level of benefits be very low, but also the number of beneficiaries will be very
small. Although the administrative cost per beneficiary of social assistance is much
higher than other provisions, its amount is much less than the benefit itself. So the
conditions of a very small number of beneficiaries and a very good targeting of
coverage will make social assistance provision the most economical one in social
security.
However, because social assistance is financed by the general revenue of the
government, so in theory its entitlement to application should be open to all residents
in a country whether they are in or out of work. Recently, in Britain even the
voluntarily unemployed are also entitled to help though their waiting period is much
longer than that for the involuntarily unemployed. As long as one can pass the
necessary means-tests, anyone can get a help from this provision. For the same
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reason, as this provision is financed by general revenue, the beneficiaries are not
obliged to contribute anything, so the receiving of these kinds of benefits is actually
like a form of 'public charity' or 'free lunch' at the point of consumption. As the
entitlement to benefits is decided by means tests, as shown in Figure 2.3, if the tests
are not strict enough, then, for those whose income are less than OA or OB, waste,
abuse and disincentive to save and to work are the inevitable results. In this case,
though the theoretical benefit expenditure should be area of OAE or OBE, the actual
expenditure will be the area of OAEB (ie, the total of OAE and OBE) due to the
disincentive effect caused by the high marginal tax rate up to 100%. Therefore, in
order to avoid these side effects, a stricter test policy to lower the poverty line is
necessary; but this measure will cause other undesirable side effects such as
stigmatising, discouragement of personal saving and low take-up. This is the dilemma
of social assistance. It is clear that the criterion of test (OB) for the qualification of
assistance is the most crucial point of social assistance.
Furthermore, in a very poor society, in theory there would be even a vicious circle
effect in the implementation of social assistance. As most people are poor, they would
go to apply for assistance and would not care about the stigma and inferiority at all.
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All of them would pass the tests. So the number of beneficiaries would be very large.
This financial burden would be an overload for government. In order to reduce the
number of beneficiaries, the tests must be much stricter than before. Finally, the level
of assistance would be forced to decrease to a meaningless low level. Nevertheless,
when a society becomes more developed and more affluent, social assistance will turn
out to be an unpopular provision, in that time a more popular one will be social
insurance.
Comparatively, social insurance is a further development of private commercial
insurance but it adds the element of compulsion in order to meet the principles of
large numbers, risk pooling, mutual help and income redistribution which we want to
achieve. It is a provision not so selective as social assistance. However, if a sense of
solidarity and a relative affluent economy are lacking in a society, the creation of this
kind of provision will be impossible, because people will either not like to pool the
risk or have no surplus money to contribute. As social insurance is a contributory
provision, its benefits are the earned right from its obligation of contributions, so the
problems of stigmatising and work disincentive in social assistance can be avoided.
Only the contingencies such as unemployment and sickness which can be made to
occur on purpose can be abused and cause work disincentive. Fortunately, it is
technically possible to discourage these effects by using longer waiting period and
stricter registration. Nevertheless, social insurance faces its own problems or limits.
The most important one is its exclusion. It is liable to have an exclusion of both
contingencies and coverage.
Firstly, as social insurance protects its insured persons only from prescribed or
contracted contingencies, all other un-prescribed or un-contracted contingencies are
excluded from its obligation. Secondly, in theory as social insurance is contributory
on an employment base, except short-term sickness and unemployment, all residents
who are long-term unemployed, self-employed or employed by small enterprises or
employed in un-paid, irregular and part-time work, especially those people who are
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not in the labour force, are always excluded, because either their contributions are too
uncertain or the cost of collection of their contribution is too high. Research evidence
demonstrated that this weakness was more serious in developing countries
(MacPherson, 1985). Thirdly, for all newly-established schemes, as there is a period of
maturation or transition, those whose working lives are not long enough to cover this
transition when the law is first passed or the system is inaugurated will be excluded.
Or there will be tremendous windfall gains reaped by those who are already elderly
and this will destroy the insurance character of the system as a whole (Burns, 30-32).
Unless there is a substantial government subsidy, this exclusion cannot be easily
tackled. In one word this exclusion is the vital weakness of social insurance.
Apart from this major weakness, there are other more minor shortcomings. Firstly,
social insurance is generally based on the actuarial principle, so even if a person is
included in a programme, he is still not entitled to any benefit if his length of
contribution or working is not sufficient. Secondly, primary social insurance is based
on the assumed needs and the assumed ability to contribute. So, in case of the flat
rate system, the contributions may be too high for low income people to pay. As for
the benefits, either earnings-related or flat rate, they may be insufficient for the
special needs. That is, social insurance can guarantee benefits but not the amount of
the benefits (Shragge, 29). These shortcomings greatly weaken the expected function
of social insurance. Especially, these weaknesses might be even worsened and
distorted in many developing countries in the third world. Because the majority of the
population in those countries are in primary industry or agricultural sector and all
social insurance schemes include only better-off industrial workers who are in
secondary and tertiary industries, their schemes thus reinforce and amplify the
economic inequality by transferring resources from the lower income farmers to the
higher income industrial workers (Midgley, ix, 2, 185, 190). This is another undesirable
adverse function of social insurance in many developing countries.
As both social assistance and social insurance have their weaknesses and
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shortcomings, the other option of provision without all these shortcomings is the
universal allowance. Because this provision is financed by general revenue and its
benefits are exempted from all kinds of economic tests, so it can overcome the
problems of exclusion and stigmatising. In theory all residents and contingencies
should included. For example, the proposed 'social dividend' or 'basic income' is the
ideal type of universal allowance. According to the description of Deacon and
Bradshaw, a social dividend is such that 'everyone in society receives a dividend or
payment by virtue of citizenship. The payment may vary by family composition, age or
status. This payment is tax free, but all other income is taxable The purpose of
social dividend is to abandon the distinction between taxes and benefits, abolish the
problems of means-tested benefits and do away with the unemployment trap'
(182-183). As long as the benefit level is not high enough to cause substitution effect,
there will be no fear of discouraging people from working. So this is really a very
good proposal to replace both social assistance and social insurance.
The main problem of universal allowance is that its benefits expenditure will be
extremely high if we want to provide an adequate benefit which can meet the needs
of beneficiaries. That will be beyond the financing ability of existing taxation systems,
not to mention the low taxation ability in developing countries. On the other hand, if
we want to restrict the cost according to the capacity of taxation system, then the
benefit level will be too low to meet the needs of most people. So the problem is still
there. Furthermore, for working and paid population, it is also an unnecessary
administrative waste to pay them basic income on one hand and to impose taxes on
them on the other hand. And it is technically difficult to find a way or at least it will
be a very elaborate and costly tax system. If we plan to tax less or to pay benefits
less in order to avoid administrative waste, then the basic income will be able to be
paid only in lump sum at the end of the fiscal year as tax. This kind of revised
universal allowance will be no different from negative income tax or social assistance.
The difference between them is that tax-financed social dividend or basic income can
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avoid the disincentive to work because its benefits are exempted from tax. Of course,
the tax needed to finance the system will be extremely high if the level of benefits is
to be paid at an adequate level (see Figure 2.4).
So, a tax-financing universal allowance scheme is efficient only at the level of
sub-universal allowance such as child benefit and old age pension if and only if all
their beneficiaries do not earn high enough to be liable to be taxed. Any way to
administer an all-universal scheme can be efficient only if it can avoid the above
administrative waste. As the author will discuss in chapter 5, to shift the financing
source of the scheme from taxation to economic production could be a feasible
alternative.
2.5.3. The Financing Effects of Social Security
Technically, financing is the input of social security. There are two sources of
financing in social security, that is, taxes and contributions (or premiums). When the
financing resource is tax, its base in general includes all sources of income such as
earnings, interests, rents and profits though the tax rates among them might differ
greatly. As income transfer is the main means to achieve most aims of social
security and progressive tax is the most effective way to collect large amount of
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revenue from the rich, the progression of its tax is the main concern of many
scholars. Generally direct tax is more progressive than an indirect one, so most
scholars prefer direct tax to indirect one. In the field of indirect tax, the progressivity
will be very low or even negative if the taxed subjects are only consuming daily
necessary goods. In the field of direct tax, the progressivity also differs greatly
according to the type of rate and the level of threshold. The rate can be prescribed
as the progressive rate, proportional rate and regressive tax including flat rate tax
such as poll tax. Comparatively, poll tax is the most regressive one among the three
types of tax. As for the threshold, under a fixed tax rate the higher the level of
threshold, the more progressive the tax is.
Another financing source of social security is contributions. Compared to tax,
contributions are imposed only on the earnings of labour in employment. Generally
they are shared by employers and employees, and occasionally with a share or
subsidy from government. For some special contingencies such as industrial injury and
unemployment, the contributions might be borne by only employers. There is the
problem of shifting, ie, the real incidence of contribution might be finally shifted from
the employers to the employees, or even from the producers (including both
employers and employees) to the individual consumers (Reddin, 1977, 1978, 1983;
Griffith, 81-101). The shifting will be conditioned by the elasticity of demand for
products and the wage level of the employed.
Traditionally the management of contributions is based on a funded system. Under
this system the accumulated funds are the best basis to guarantee the long-term
benefits in the future. An advantage is that its huge amount of funds can be used for
public or economic investment. Moreover, because there is an actuarial principle in
the management of the fund, there is an incentive to prevent irresponsible benefit
rises and careless risk rises (ILO, 1984a:88-89). This will be helpful in preventing a
financial crisis. Unfortunately, in the modern money economy this system faces a
ubiquitous threat, inflation. For this kind of threat, we may consider or use the gains
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or profits of the investment from the contributions fund as a resource to compensate
the loss in capital value caused from inflation. But, as Morgan (35-37) argued, the
function of this method will be greatly reduced after retirement, because, on one
hand, there will be a stop in contributions and, on the other hand, there will be a
claim of benefit, so it will be very difficult to expect the profits from the fund to be
able to keep up with inflation and to index its benefit accordingly. In most cases,
inflation will erode the value of the funds of contributions in the long run. In the
worse outlook, if the financing is in deficit due to unsound actuarial condition or other
reasons, then the system will in fact be no different from the pay-as-you-go system.
Another different way to tackle the problem of inflation is to abandon the funding
of the contributions and to use instead the pay-as-you-go system. That is, this year's
contributions pay for this year's benefits (Kaim-Caudle, 1973:133; ILO, 1984a:85-86;
DHSS, 1985a:l2; Morgan, 30-31). Technically, in pay-as-you-go system we consider all
long-term contingencies such as child, old age and disability as short-term
contingencies which are shorter than one year, so it is theoretically rational to use
this year's contributions to pay for this year's benefits. And next year's benefits will
be paid by next year's contributions. Under this system, the loss of benefits value in
inflation can be compensated flexibly by raising contributions. However, its new risk
or new uncertainty is that, because the level of benefits is dependent on not only the
willingness of existing contributors but also their economic ability to contribute, so
the level of benefits is not guaranteed. Further, the real level of benefits is also
dependent on the political power of the beneficiaries. Whenever the financing system
of a provision does not have its contributions funded any more, then its contributions
will not be different from a tax, because contributions are also compulsory. For this
reason, in some countries such as the USA contributions are formally called a 'payroll
tax', a kind of earmarked tax.
However, there are several differences between payroll tax and general revenue.
First, the base of contributions includes only earned income; capital gains and the
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other sources of income are excluded. Second, in many countries there is no
allowance for contributions, sometimes even no threshold; all earnings are obliged to
contribute. Third, the contribution rate is either proportional or flat-rate; progressive
rates are not common. Fourth, there is always a ceiling to exempt all earnings over
that level. Due to these differences, the progressivity of contributions is much less
than general tax. For this reason, some scholars suggest that contributions could be
abolished and substituted by general revenue (ILO, 1984a:89-90).
Due to the improvement of living standard and the progress of medical services,
on one hand, the life expectancy of people has been significantly increased, more
people can live into old age, ie, the percentage of old people increase; on the other
hand, family planning or birth control has been more effective, less babies have been
born nowadays and will continue to be so in the future, ie, both old dependency ratio
and ageing index will increase. So we can reasonably expect that the ratio of
contributors to pensioners will significantly decrease in the future. This means that,
on one hand, the expenditure of the provisions will grow; on the other hand, its
revenue will be reduced. So, under pay-as-you-go system, the change of this ratio
certainly means a change of the financial obligation of the future contributors.
According to a tabular form presented by Prof. Kaim-Caudle (see Table 2.2), we can
clearly calculate out the financial burden, ie, contribution rate, of the future generation
if the ratio of contributors to pensioners changes given a certain replacement rate in
a pay-as-you-go system. For example, under the replacement rate of 1/3, if the
current ratio of contributors to pensioners is 8-1, then the contribution rate will be
only 4.0%; but if ratio is reduced to 3-1, then the contribution rate will increase to the
level of 10.0%. This table will be fully used in chapter 8 to calculate the financial
burden in Taiwan if a pension scheme is established based on pay-as-you-go
principle.
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Table 2.2 The Contribution Rate of Social Security Pension (%)
Ratio of Earners|
to Pensioners
Ratio of Pensions to Net Earnings




2-1 | 5.9 6.7 7.7 9.1 11.1 114.3 | 20.0 | 25.0
3-1 | 4.0 4.5 5.3 6.3 7.7 110.0 | 14.3 118.2
4-1 ! 3.0 3.4 4.0 4.8 5.9 1 7.7 | 11.1 114 . 3
5-1 2.4 2.8 3.2 3.8 4.8 1 6.3 | 9.1 111.8
6-1 2.0 2.3 2.7 3.2 4.0 1 5.3 | 7.7 110.0
7-1 | 1.8 2.0 2.3 2.8 3.4 1 4.5 | 6.7 | 8.7
8-1 1.5 1.8 2.0 2.4 3.0 1 4.0 | 5.9 | 7.7
9-1 1.4 1.6 1.8 2.2 2.7 1 3.6 | 5.3 | 6.9
10-1 | 1.2 1.4 1.6 2.0 2.4 1 3.2 | 4.8 j 6.3
Note: If
x = the amount of gross earnings,
a = the amount of contributions,
n = the number of earners,
na = the amount of pensions,
x-a = the amount of net earnings,
then,
ratio of pensions to net earnings=pensions/net earnings=na/(x-a)
=1/5 or 1/3, etc.
Source: Kaim-Caudle, 1986:91
If social security contributions are considered as a kind of special earmarked tax,
ie, payroll tax, then we can use 'tax' as an indicator or operational definition of the
cost of social security. As 'all systems of taxation have effects on the economy' (ILO,
1984a:88), we should have a clear idea how this 'tax' (including general taxes and
contributions) will influence the economic activities of individuals and the domestic
market. Firstly, from individual point of view, the reaction to the increase of 'tax' could
be one of the following options. An individual may a) keep consumption unchanged
and reduce savings; or b) keep savings unchanged and reduce consumption; or c)
reduce both consumption and savings. The second possible reaction could to work
harder or longer in order to maintain the original level of consumption and savings
after being taxed (Kaim-Caudle, 1986:97). The third possible reaction is to work less
in order to avoid paying more 'tax' and to opt for more leisure (the 'substitution effect'
of the rising of 'tax'). If the 'income effect' is stronger, then the second reaction will
be choice of individuals (Hemming, 11-12). Actually much evidence shows that the
37
black economy is also a very attractive choice for the people (Gelber, et al; Painton
and Malkin; Rosa, 1982:62; Parker, H„ 1982:59-60).
Secondly, from the viewpoint of the aggregate households, in the long run the rise
of 'tax' may have two different effects: 1)it may finally erode the tax base and lead to
the reduction of tax revenue, so it will lead to an economic recession; 2)it may
increase or at least maintain national consumption and demand through paying equal
amount of benefits to beneficiaries, so the economic prosperity can be maintained and
an economic recession can be avoided. In the first case, the effects will be caused
through the following possible paths though they are not all justified and conclusive
(see Figure 2.5).
1)lf the rise of 'tax' raises the cost of labour and its products, it will reduce the
competitive power of the enterprises. Some less competitive enterprises will be
unable either to pay higher wages or to raise the price of their products, so finally
they will go bankrupt. Other competitive enterprises will adopt new policies to develop
labour-saving technology in order to maintain their profits, so redundancies and
unemployment will go up (Aaron, 53-56; ILO, 1984a:86-87).
2)lf the rise of 'tax' reduces the aggregate savings, either individual enterprises or
the whole market, the investment will be seriously retarded. Economic recession will
inevitably result (Aaron, 51-52).
3)lf the rise of 'tax' reduces the amount of consumption, either family or national,
this will lead to the insufficiency of aggregate demand, this could cause a recession
of the economy.
4)When the rise of 'tax' is in order to provide more benefits and to promote the
level of benefits, if the benefit level is high enough to cause malingery, early
retirement, traps of poverty and unemployment, and the disincentive to work and to
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In the second case, although the rise of 'tax' will increase the cost of labour and
production and even reduce the savings and consumption of the tax-payers directly,
on the other hand, it will greatly increase national consumption and demand because
most benefits are paid to pensioners and low income people. This will compensate
for the previous loss of savings and consumption. In this case, social security will
have an important role in reducing recession because it keeps up demand. But
because it is only a redistribution of income and consumption, so from the whole
society point of view, though they can maintain the level of demand, this should not
be considered as a way to create wealth. Finally, as social security expenditure is
only one item of all government expenditure, the rise of 'tax' is not all for social
security, so it is quite unfair to accuse social security of being responsible for the
recession of the economy (ILO, 1984a). All assumptions need to be examined carefully
with evidence.
Z6. The Criteria for The Assessment of Provisions
As mentioned in the previous section, in both income maintenance and social
security there are several provisions which have different merits and weaknesses.
These factors, either merits or weaknesses, are certainly very important for some
provisions to be more popular than others. However, in the discussion of the options
for the reform of income maintenance or social security provisions, some more basic
criteria are useful or even necessary to justify our actions. There are many criteria
available for this purpose. For example, McClements(68), Musgrave(243), Buchanan and
Flowers(75) applied two criteria, efficiency and equity, in their studies. Le Grand and
Robinson(1-2) raised four criteria, efficiency, equity, freedom (or liberty) and altruism
in their study though they in fact mainly used the same two criteria: efficiency and
equity. Knapp(70) even raised five criteria: efficiency, equity, autonomy, liberty and
diversity. However, in this thesis the author tries to apply the four criteria equity,
adequacy, economic efficiency and simplicity raised by H. Parker (1984:52-54) as
the basis of his discussion. But, the criterion of 'simplicity' is renamed as
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'administrative efficiency' in this thesis.
According to the dictionary, the descriptive definition of 'equity' means a state of
being fair and just; 'adequacy' means a state of being enough and sufficient;
'economic efficiency' means being effective and producing; and 'administrative
efficiency' means being easy, simple and effective in administration. Explicitly, all of
them are comparative and relative concepts. There must be other more concrete
indicators as standards to compare, then the state of each criterion can be objectively
judged whether they are equitable, adequate, efficient and simple or not. That is, apart
from these formal definitions, we need to define 'operational definitions' or 'working
definitions' for them, especially for the criteria which are more subjective such as
'equity'.
2.6.1. Equity horizontal and vertical
Compared to other criteria, 'equity' is highly value laden. To judge the equity of a
situation or an event can be based on many other criteria or even sub-criteria
independently or interdependently as long as those criteria or sub-criteria are
desirable. As Mehr and Cammack (656) analyzed, the concept of equity can be divided
into three elements: reasonableness, impartiality and fairness. Any violation of these
three elements will contradict the criterion of equity. Positively, as Le Grand and
Robinson (9, 223-226) have mentioned, the criterion of equity will be fulfilled if the
following conditions or standards can be satisfied.
1. Full equality mainly about the equality in outcome and
results, e.g. every member of society should have the same
income; everyone should have equal treatment for equal health
care needs; everyone should receive equal education subject only
to their abilities; everyone should have equal rights before the law;
everyone should have equal voting rights.
2. Minimum standard no person should fall below a socially
specified minimum level of income or consumption; every family
should live in a decent house with all the basic amenities even
though some families would have better quality housing than
others.
3. Equality of access mainly about the equality of conditions
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and means, e.g. everyone should have equal opportunity to access
services and to accept education; procedural justice such as lottery
is also included.
4. Inequality some members of the society should be
distributed different income according to need, desert, merit; some
individuals should be distributed more income due to their extra
efforts, sacrifice and savings.
5. Equality, but not... all kinds of equality are justified as long
as they do not trade off or contradict with other criteria or
objectives such as efficiency, incentive to work, liberty, simplicity,...
As equity itself can imply so many desirable criteria or objectives, each option is
possible. Based on this reason, in this thesis because the author has decided to apply
H. Parker's four criteria, equity, adequacy, economic efficiency and simplicity, to judge
the scheme of social security, so the objective of 'minimum standard' can be included
in the criterion of 'adequacy'. So, according to the operational definition of Le Grand
and Robinson, the discussion of the criterion of equity will be based on 'equality' and
'inequality' in this thesis. As both 'equality' and 'inequality' could be equitable (fair) or
inequitable (unfair), so 'equality' and 'inequality' by themselves cannot be judged
equitable or inequitable any longer. The judgement of equity must be accompanied by
further more specified 'situations' or 'pre-conditions' of equality or inequality.
In the field of social security, the criterion of equity can be applied to both its
financing side about the imposition of taxes and contributions and its benefit side
about the distribution of benefits (both in cash and in kind). On both sides the
possible options are to impose taxes and to distribute benefits equally or unequally.
For example, as H. Parker (1984:53) mentioned, "equity in this context is taken to mean
equal treatment, between men and women, married and single, young and old. It
means treating each person as an equal citizen. It means neither penalising nor
favouring marriage. It means disability benefits according to the extra costs incurred
by the disabled person, not according to the cause of the disability or the contribution
record", explicitly, she was applying 'equality' as the sub-criterion to define 'equity'.
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Her definition is consistent with many scholars such as Knapp (73), Musgrave (244),
Buchanan and Flowers (95, 97), Hemming (10-11), Culyer (1973:87), Due and
Friedlaender (205). All of them agree that it is fair and equitable to treat people equally
if they are in equal situations and circumstances. That is, either 'equals are treated
equally' or 'equal treatment for equals' is equitable. This type of equity is entitled
horizontal equity. Universal allowances and all kinds of flat-rate schemes are based on
or in pursuit of the criterion of horizontal equity.
But, on the other hand, when H. parker (1984:53) mentioned, "but it [equity] does
not mean the same benefit and/or tax relief right across the board, because equity
does not mean sameness. Some people need more money and some less in order to
live at the same equivalent living standard. For instance, an adult needs more than a
child, and an old or disabled person needs more than some one who is able-bodied",
she seemed to apply the sub-criterion of 'inequality' to define 'equity' because the
beneficiaries are treated unequally. That is, either 'unequals are treated unequally' or
'unequal treatment for unequals' is equitable. This corollary is entitled vertical equity
by the above academics. For all provisions of social security, as long as the
treatments are different and unequal, they are based on or in pursuit of the criterion
of vertical equity.
From the standpoint of 'treatment' itself, in theory there is no contradiction
between horizontal equity and vertical equity. Problems arise owing to the
categorization of the targeted group or population. If the whole population of a
country is considered as one homogeneous category by the standard of citizenship,
then the principle of horizontal equity is applicable. On the other hand, if the
population is categorized by many standards such as sex, age, marital status,
employment status, educational attainment and economic status, then the population
will be classified or divided into numbers of categories. As all categories are more or
less different from each other in some standards, so these categories should be
treated by the principle of vertical equity. But within each category its members are
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alike and homogeneous, they should be treated equally by the principle of horizontal
equity again. For any targeted group or category, the application of the equity
principle is dependent on how the group or population is classified.
Both on the financing side and benefit side, the equality or inequality of treatment
can be in amount or in rate (%). For example, flat-rate taxes, flat-rate contributions
and flat-rate benefits are equal treatments in amount. If taxes, contributions and
benefits are related to a given percentage (e.g. proportional rate) of people's earnings,
then the treatments are still equal in rate, but they are not equal in amount any more.
Comparatively, the equality or inequality of treatments in amount is more feasible on
the benefit side than on the financing side, but that in rate is more feasible on the
financing side than the benefit side. Especially, in the case of unequal treatment in
rate, the increasing rate will be progressive, and the diminishing rate will be
regressive.
Nevertheless, the discussion of equity is not restricted to only the aspect of
'treatment'. The discussion has been extended from 'treatment' to 'the outcome of
treatment'. Analytically, 'treatment' is the means of social security, and 'the outcome
of treatment' is the end of social security. So, 'treatment' can be equal or unequal,
but 'the outcome of treatment' should be in ideal equal. In social security an equal
outcome of treatment will be more acceptable as 'equity' than an unequal one.
Conventionally, according to many academics such as McClements (52, 97-119), Culyer
(1980:153) and Knapp (73-74), the equal outcome of treatment on the benefit side is
still entitled 'horizontal equity'. In theory the equal outcome of treatment on the
financing side can also be entitled 'horizontal equity' without any doubt, but no writer
uses this term yet. Generally, the common indicator of the outcomes of treatment are
'living standard' on the benefit side and 'sacrifice of marginal utility' on the financing
side. As 'horizontal equity' can be of both treatment aspect and outcome aspect, in
order to distinguish its difference, the author tries to define the horizontal equity in
'treatment' aspect as 'means horizontal equity' and that in 'outcome' aspect as
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'outcome horizontal equity' (see Table 2.3).
Table 2.3 The Dimensions of Equity
Side

















































Under this new definition, there is a close relationship between vertical equity and
outcome horizontal equity. Because in general the final goal of vertical equity is to
achieve outcome horizontal equity, so vertical equity is the necessary condition of
outcome horizontal equity. Whether the condition of vertical equity is sufficient for its
goal or not is dependent on its adequate degree of inequality, neither too much nor
too little.
In financing aspect, if the inequality of income and wealth distribution is very
significant, the fulfillment of means horizontal equity will be impossible. In practice the
principle of vertical equity or outcome horizontal equity is much more feasible than
that of means horizontal equity. In fiscal terminology, the principle of vertical equity
is transformed into the principle of 'ability to pay'. As Buchanan and Flowers (98-99)
have argued, though the principle of vertical equity or 'ability to pay' has been widely
accepted in the fiscal systems in many countries, there is a hard question about the
differences of tax liabilities, especially in the case of progressive tax. The main
supporting theory for the principle of 'ability to pay' is the principle of least sacrifice
or minimum aggregate sacrifice. It assumes that the total utility enjoyed by each
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individual increases at a diminishing rate as more income is received. That is, the
marginal utility of income declines as more income is added. So the collection of a
pound in tax from the high-income receivers will reduce their total satisfaction less
than a similar collection of a pound from the low-income receivers. Hence, more
taxes should be collected from high-income receivers in order to equal their total
sacrifice from tax to that of low-income receivers, ie, to equalise the sacrifice of
marginal utilities between the rich and the poor.
However, this theory is not solid enough scientifically and analytically to defend
the principle of 'ability to pay', because not only the magnitude of individual utility
cannot be cardinally measurable, but also utilities cannot be compared interpersonally.
Moreover, as Due and Friedlaender (207) and Culyer (1973: 66-68) have argued, there
is no significant evidence that the law of diminishing marginal utility applies to
income as a whole. As a person's income rises, it may be argued that his desires rise
as fast or faster. In other words, as people's tastes do differ, their marginal utilities of
money income will differ. So this theory is not very solid. Actually, the principle of
'ability to pay', especially its progressive taxation, is in fact defended on grounds of
public consensus or political coalition formation, because only this measure can
collect more revenue efficiently. Nevertheless, the principle of means horizontal
equity can still be applied to the aspect of financing if the amount or the rate of taxes
or contributions can be small enough to let all people have enough abilities to pay.
For example, the flat-rate contributions of British National Insurance scheme before
1959 was the well-known case though they [contributions] were applied to only
wage-earners.
According to above discussions, a temporary conclusion can be drawn as follows.
As the judgement of vertical equity is based on 'inequality' and that of horizontal
equity, both means and outcome, is based on 'equality', so, the 'unequal treatments' in
progressive tax can win the highest rank in vertical equity (including outcome
horizontal equity) and the lowest rank in means horizontal equity; as for the 'equal
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treatments' in amount (e.g. flat rate taxes) and in rate (e.g. proportional taxes) in
relation to equal citizenship will be able to win the highest rank in means horizontal
equity and the lowest rank in vertical equity (including outcome horizontal equity); as
for proportional tax, it will be in the middle in both types of equity.
In benefit aspect, both types of horizontal equity and vertical equity are applicable
to all types of provision. In theory all flat-rate benefits are based on means horizontal
equity principle. Implicitly, the implementation of this principle assumes that the needs
of people are equal. But in practice people's needs are different due to the differences
of age, sex, health, income, geographical region, et al. So if the distribution of benefits
is according to needs, then it will be no different to say that it is based on the
principle of vertical equity.
Another principle of distributive justice is the distribution according to Rawlsian
maximum, ie, to maximise the welfare of the least well-off person (Culyer, 1980:63).
According to this principle, it is socially just to distribute the greatest benefit to the
least advantaged. However, Rawls does not propose this principle independently and
unconditionally. The principle of positive discrimination in favour of the
underprivileged to ensure equality must be consistent with other two concepts or
conditions of 1)equality in basic liberty and 2)equality of opportunity for advancement
(Culyer, 1980:63; Jones, et al, 13). Otherwise, many undesirable disincentive effects
might occur.
As discussed above, if the discussion is concentrated on the treatment or
distribution of benefits, no matter based on the standard of 'equality' or 'inequality', in
theory social assistance will be able to win the highest rank in vertical equity and the
lowest rank in means horizontal equity; universal allowance will win the highest rank
in means horizontal equity and the lowest rank in vertical equity; as for social
insurance, it will be in the middle in both types of equity. But, if the judgement is
based on the final outcome of equivalent living standard, then social assistance will be
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able to win the highest rank in outcome horizontal equity due to its high elasticity in
deciding the amount of benefit, universal allowance will get the lowest rank in this
'equity', and social insurance will be still in the middle.
Z6.Z Adequacy primary and secondary
The formal definition of 'adequacy' in the dictionary means the state of being
enough and sufficient. In the field of social security, it [adequacy] means financial
resources or revenue are sufficient to finance the benefits which are sufficient 1)to
reduce or eliminate poverty, 2)to meet needs of the people and/or 3)to maintain
income. To be brief, 'adequacy' means both sufficient revenue and sufficient benefit.
However, for the third objective, its main idea is to maintain (one's) benefit level in
relation to one's previous earnings in order to keep on one's customary living
standard. Generally, apart from very few short-term benefits, it is very difficult with
long-term benefits to maintain their level as high as one's previous earned income.
Instead they are only a percentage such as 50% or 60% of one's earnings. So, it is a
vital problem to argue on what ground this percentage or its equivalent amount can
be decided. Its reasonable ground is to prevent poverty (absolute or relative) or to
meet needs (primary or secondary). For example, a pension maintaining 50% of
income might merely be enough for low paid to avoid absolute poverty, but could be
high enough for well paid to meet secondary needs. If so, the discussion of this third
objective can be included in the first two objectives. Especially, as we will discuss
later, the objective of 'maintaining income' can be fully included within the objectives
of 'reducing relative deprivation' and 'meeting secondary needs'. Therefore, if 'poverty'
and 'needs' can be well-defined, then the 'adequacy' of benefit can be decided. And
after the adequacy of benefit is decided, then the 'adequacy' of financing can also be
decided. So the discussion of this criterion, adequacy, will be based on mainly
'poverty' and 'needs'.
Generally, 'poverty' is the state of lacking of the 'resources' to maintain an
absolute or relative standard of living. These 'resources' are classified by Townsend
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(88) into five categories: cash income, capital assets, value of employment benefits in
kind, value of public social services in kind and private income in kind. The way to
reduce or eliminate poverty is to provide or transfer more 'resources' to the poor.
However, to transfer 'resources' to the poor is not only a way to reduce or eliminate
'poverty', but also a way to meet 'needs' of the people. Though the concept of 'needs'
is broader than 'poverty', both of them can be absolute or relative. Theoretically and
practically, 'poverty' can also be defined by 'need' as the state of failing to meet the
absolute or minimum level of 'needs' or failing to meet relative deprivation 'need'. So
there is a close relationship between 'poverty' and 'needs'.
Historically, 'poverty' was first defined scientifically by Seebohm Rowntree in 1899
in his classic study of poverty in York. His 'primary poverty' or 'absolute poverty' was
defined as an income "insufficient to obtain the minimum necessaries for the
maintenance of merely physical efficiency" (Townsend, 33; Mack and Lansley, 17). This
absolute minimum standard of poverty was physiologically decided by minimum cost
for purchasing the necessary food and in turn the items and the amount of food were
further decided by the basic standard of nutritional adequacy which was derived from
dietary science.
Though this absolute definition of poverty is theoretically possible, there are many
difficulties in practical operation. Firstly, because the minimum nutritional requirement
was decided by the experts, and the dietary customs were socially and culturally
decided by the people, so there was a great gap between them, not to mention the
difficulties in calculating minimum costs to purchase them. Secondly, in market
economy the prices of food are mainly decided by the equilibrium of demand and
supply. They change not only over time but also between different areas. No price of
food is fixed universally and permanently. So the minimum income to meet basic
physical need is questionable. For these reasons, Mack and Lansley (28) argued that
even Rowntree's definition of absolute 'primary poverty' was in fact also relative.
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As the conception of absolute poverty is in practice inappropriate, a new relative
standard of 'deprivation' or even 'inequality' is applied. That is to say, the definition of
poverty is developed from the concept of 'subsistence' (including 'starvation') to that
of 'deprivation', and finally to 'inequality'. As both 'deprivation' and 'inequality' are
relative, they are derived from the comparison of the lowest quintile or decile to the
remaining parts of a society. The difference is that in 'deprivation' the items for
comparison are mainly those in relation to the community's style of living which is
customary to the majority of the people. When one's income is not sufficient to have
such customary life as a normal member of the community, he is deprived. This is
also Townsend's definition of poverty (31). He has established a table of deprivation
index of 12 items which is derived from his questionnaire of 60 indicators of the 'style
of life' (see Table A2.2 in Appendix). Later, Mack and Lansley (ch 3) also established
another different 'deprivation index' table of 35 items (see Table A2.3 in Appendix).
When people lack of the items of high degree of necessity, they are seriously
deprived.
As mack and Lansley (43) have mentioned, although the relative definition of
poverty is more advantageous than the absolute one, however, the socially and
culturally decided 'living style' is subjective and changeable. Many questions follow.
First, the measurement and treatment of poverty require not only value judgements
but also a factual knowledge of the society. A person may have in mind a certain
standard of living, but he might wrongly estimate the income needed due to lack of
experience of living at that standard. Second, as price level is changeable over time
and between different areas and even districts, a fixed income level, even in a very
short term, cannot certainly fulfil a common standard of living. Even Rowntree himself
also realised this price problem, so he used three different methodologies to estimate
the minimum income to relieve poverty: 1)he used the expert approach to deal with
food; 2)the public opinion approach to deal with clothes; and 3)the actual expenditure
approach to deal with housing (Mack and Lansley, 46).
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In summary, apart from the 'inequality' concept of poverty, there are at least two
levels of poverty in social security or social policy: absolute 'subsistence' and relative
'deprivation'. As poverty is a relative concept, the treatment of poverty can also be
based on different policies. Comparatively, absolute poverty could be eliminated
because it has a physiologically fixed poverty line. But relative poverty would be
reduced only and could never be eliminated because by definition there will be one
tenth or one fifth of low income people being poor unless the ratio of the highest
fifth to the lowest fifth or the highest tenth to the lowest tenth is very small. The
question of relative poverty is quite similar to that of inequality. So the adequacy of
the resources to eliminate or reduce poverty can also be classified into two types:
primary adequacy in relation to absolute poverty and secondary adequacy in relation
to relative poverty.
As discussed above, 'poverty' is demonstrated as a very complicated concept,
however, 'needs' is not a simple one either. As mentioned in section 4, the coverage
or the quality of 'needs' of the elderly is quite different from the younger group of
people. In order to construct 'needs' as the basis of the criterion of 'adequacy', the
author tries to extend the discussion of 'needs' from quality to quantity in this section.
Basically, 'needs' itself can be studied from many aspects, But many studies mainly
emphasise one aspect of 'needs'. For example, Marx's and Marxist theory of needs put
emphasis only on the historical nature of needs (Roos, 72). In their theory the only
original independent need is the 'need' for survival, which implies the fulfilment of
such needs as eating, drinking, shelter, etc. In order to fulfill this need, men have to
produce material goods, but when men enter into material production, the production
itself begins not only to affect and alter their needs, but also to create new needs.
This is an inevitable contradiction within a capitalist society: on one hand, it creates
higher-level needs, but on the other hand, it cannot satisfy them (Taylor-Gooby and
Dale, 222). This Marxist analysis reveals the fact that needs are hierarchical and
developmental.
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However, it is not easy to establish a hierarchy of needs. In spite of many efforts,
we have no perfect hierarchy yet. According to Maslow's study, his well-known
hierarchy of human needs is classified as five levels as follows: 1)physiological needs,
2)safety needs, 3)love and attention, 4)esteem needs and 5)needs for self-actualisation
(Lindgren, et al, 47). According to Roos' comments (69), only the first three needs
could be autonomous and independent of society, and the last two needs are clearly
inseparable from society and are socially created. So Roos rejects the last two needs
as the real basis of welfare theory. However, Maslow's analysis is mainly based on
the physiological and psychological levels of individuals. Many social and cultural
needs cannot be included. So a more valid classification is necessary.
As the hierarchy of needs is a useful concept, in order to avoid Maslow's
restrictions, a more general terminology for the hierarchy will be helpful. In his
lecture on Tripeoph'sm in 1924, Dr. Sun Yat-sen classified the living standard of the
people by the example of clothing and food into three levels (Hsu, 470): 1)necessity
level people must have food to eat and clothing to wear, or they will suffer
physically; 2)comfort level the pursuit of people for delicious food and fit
clothing to make life comfortable and pleasant; and 3)luxury level people seek for
rare and expensive food and clothing for beauty and refinement. He said the
responsibility of government was to help people to satisfy their needs at the first level
in the first stage. As Mencher has described, "luxuries become comforts, comforts
become necessities" (McClements, 53), so 'necessity-comfort-luxury' is a hierarchy of
consecutive levels, the 'needs' in relation to 'necessity' can be defined as primary
needs, the 'needs' in relation to 'comfort' as 'secondary needs', and the 'needs' in
relation to 'luxury' as 'tertiary needs'. Or, more briefly, the 'needs' in relation to
'comfort' and 'luxury' can be defined as 'secondary needs'.
Generally, the items of food, clothing and shelter are certainly those of
'necessities'. But in many cases, these items themselves can be demonstrated as the
items of 'comforts' or even 'luxuries' just depending on their quality and price. In order
52
to clarify this ambiguity, a theoretical interpretation would be helpful. For example, we
may prescribe that, only the items such as food, clothing and housing which are
aimed to satisfy physiological needs and to maintain the biological processes of the
organism as 'necessities' or 'primary needs' or 'basic needs'. As for the items, even
food and clothing, if their function or purpose is to satisfy higher levels of
psychological, social and cultural needs and to enable the beneficiaries to belong and
to participate as a full member of the community, then they are defined as 'comforts'
or 'luxuries', or 'secondary needs'. Finally, referring to the discussion of 'poverty', for
the reason of theoretical consistency, it is better to classify 'needs' into only two
categories: primary needs and secondary needs If so, the benefits which can satisfy
'primary needs' may be named as primary adequacy, and those can satisfy 'secondary
needs' as secondary adequacy.
In the field of social security, because the 'adequacy' of financing is dependent on
whether its methods can raise sufficient revenue to finance its benefits, and in general
tax system is separate from benefit system, so it is not necessary to further classify
the criterion of adequacy in financing aspect. In financing aspect, theoretically,
because its rank is decided by the efficiency or financing ability of different methods
to collect sufficient revenue to finance the scheme, so, if none of them can collect
sufficient revenue, then all of them are not adequate. However, the method which can
collect more revenue will have more chance to win the better rank. In contributions,
practically, because earnings-related methods can collect more revenue than the
flat-rate ones, so the rank of the former is better than the latter. In taxation, generally,
because progressive tax can collect more revenue than proportional tax, and
proportional tax can collect more revenue than regressive one, so the rank of
progressive tax is better than that of proportional tax, and the rank of proportional tax
is better than that of regressive one.
On the benefit side the rank of 'adequacy' is not certain and decisive. That is, the
benefit of a provision could be at any level, either the highest one or the lowest one.
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Some tax-financed benefits such as those of social assistance or universal allowance
could be very low owing to ideological, historical or even political reasons. Even so,
the remaining social insurance is not certainly better. In theory the benefits of social
insurance could be better because its benefits are actuarially calculated according to
contributions. But in practice, just like the rates of tax, the rates of contributions are
generally politically decided, so its benefit level will be influenced by the political
decision. As the benefit level of all three provisions are directly or indirectly politically
decided, there is no definite conclusion which benefit will be higher than the other.
That is, there is no definite rank on the side of benefit.
Furthermore, in some countries such as Britain the provision of social assistance is
always designed as a supplementary benefit of other main provisions such as social
insurance, so it will be meaningless to compare the level of benefits between different
provisions. Only in a pure theoretical analysis the maximum benefit of social
assistance should be less than social insurance and universal allowance if we want to
encourage people to work harder and longer and to use social assistance as the last
resort of social security.
As the definition of 'poverty' or 'needs' has a close relation with the level of
'adequacy', the criterion of adequacy could be achieved if the operational definition of
'poverty' or 'needs' is given. Although our long run goal is to achieve both 'primary
adequacy' and 'secondary adequacy' however, the first priority should be put on
'primary adequacy' because it is the inseparable basis for the pursuit of 'secondary
adequacy'.
Z6.3. Economic Efficiency
In economic affairs, 'efficiency' formally means the following two aspects: firstly
and positively, it means an increase in productivity, ie, more outputs (eg, goods or
services) can be produced under the same or even less inputs (eg, costs, resources or
labour); secondly and negatively, it means a decrease of waste, ie, the same amount
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or quality of outputs can be produced with less inputs. Because there is also the
criterion of 'administrative efficiency', so 'economic efficiency' in this thesis will not
include the efficiency of the administration of income maintenance or social security.
As social security is not purely a kind of productive activity, the criterion of 'economic
efficiency' mainly concerns the disincentive effects of the distribution of both taxes
(including contributions) and benefits in the system. Of course, more emphasis will be
put on the side of financing because all adequate benefits or resources must depend
on a good base of taxation or contributions.
In the field of social security, the special definition for 'economic efficiency' is that
both its adequate revenue (either taxes or contributions) and its adequate benefits will
leave sufficient incentive for the current and future beneficiaries to spur them on to
further efforts, at least not to encourage them to be dependent psychologically and
morally. To be brief, as Hemming (15-16) has stressed, it is to minimise the
disincentive effects of social security system. However, this is still a very abstract
concept, we need to give it a more concrete 'operational definition'. According to
H. Parker (1984:54), her operational definition of 'economic efficiency' in the field of
social security are the 'marginal tax rates' in the financing side and the 'replacement
ratios' in the benefit side. It is true that the disincentive effect will be very significant
if the marginal tax rates are very high, eg, if they are higher than 80%. Apart from
universal allowance, a high rate of 'replacement ratio' or 'replacement rate', say over
0.9 or even only over 0.8, will also have the same disincentive effects in benefit side,
especially for the people who engage in unpleasant works.
Furthermore, in benefit side the application of 'withdrawal rate', for example the
means testing in social assistance and earning rule in social insurance, will also
greatly discourage the people (including the elderly) to work or to save. Obviously, it
will greatly reduce the 'economic efficiency' of social security. Nevertheless, apart
from the earning rule for retirement such as in Britain, in social insurance the effect of
'withdrawal rate' of contingency-tested benefits is neutral because all beneficiaries are
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in theory disabled to work owing to sickness, old age or other contingencies. Even
contingencies such as unemployment and sickness which have the hazard to be
abused can be effectively avoided by strict preventive measure such as a longer
waiting period, stricter registration and medical certificate. But for universal allowance
benefits recipients, there will be no such disincentive because 'withdrawal rate' is not
applied to them.
In financing aspect, the possible taxation methods are mainly regressive tax (e.g.
poll tax), proportional tax and progressive tax. According to 'ability-to-pay', both in
average rate and in marginal rate, comparatively, regressive tax will be the one which
can collect the smallest amount of tax, proportional tax can collect more, and
progressive tax will be the most one. So, to analyze the effects of these three
methods of taxation is in fact no different from analyzing the effects of tax-increase
or tax-decrease. As the author has mentioned in the previous section, from the point
of view of individuals, in case there is an increase in the average rate of taxes there
could be at least three different reactions: 1)work the same with a change in the ratio
of consumption and saving; 2)work more due to the income effect; 3)work less due to
the substitution effect. So, before judging the effects of different taxation methods, its
pre-condition, either income effect or substitution effect, must be made clear. If the
pre-condition of income effect occurs, then proportional tax will have a stronger
effect than regressive tax to force people to work more, and progressive tax will have
stronger effect than proportional tax to force people to work more. But if the
pre-condition of substitution effect occurs, then the effects will be opposite:
proportional tax will have a stronger effect to induce people to work less than
regressive tax and to induce people to work more than progressive tax.
From the point of marginal tax rate, in theory the disincentive effects will be high
if the marginal rate of tax is high, otherwise, it will be low. Viewing the marginal rate
of different type of tax, the possible marginal rate of regressive tax could be very low.
For example, it will be zero in flat-rate poll tax for the income over tax level. In
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proportional tax the marginal rate will be the same as the rate of proportional tax, ie,
it is constant. But in progressive tax the marginal rate will be increasing. As
progressive tax could have the highest marginal rate of tax, it would have the
strongest disincentive and win only lowest rank in the criterion of 'economic
efficiency'; regressive might have the lowest marginal rate of tax, so it would have the
lowest disincentive to work and win the highest rank in the criterion of 'economic
efficiency'; as for proportional tax, its rank will be in the middle.
In the aspect of benefit, its two indicators, replacement rate and withdrawal rate,
are applied to only social assistance and social insurance; they have nothing to do
with universal allowance. As both replacement rate and withdrawal rate will more or
less have some disincentive effects in social assistance and social insurance, so
disincentive-free universal allowance will be able to win the highest rank in the
criterion of 'economic efficiency' under these two indicators. Under withdrawal rate,
in theory this rule is applied to all cases in social assistance, but it is only
occasionally applied to the contingency of retirement in some countries such as
Britain in social insurance, so the rank of social insurance should be higher than social
assistance. But under the rule of replacement rate, though a high rate will certainly
have a strong disincentive effect, unfortunately, because there is no steady level of
benefits in both social assistance and social insurance, moreover, there is no general
valid trend either, so their rank is uncertain.
2.6.4. Administrative Efficiency
This criterion indicates all main aspects of administration such as 'administrative
economy', 'administrative simplicity', 'administrative effectiveness', and 'administrative
costs' as long as they are related to the efficiency of administration. The
administration which can meet this criterion will be the one whose efficiency is high
and cost is low. It will not only be easy for the people to access and understand but
also easy for the administrators to run and administer. So the question here is how an
administration can be made more efficient and more economical. As 'administrative
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efficiency' is basically an economic concept, so the following two principles of
economic management can be applied to answer this question.
The first principle is 'the minimum scale of economy' or 'economies of scale', ie,
the scale or the size of an enterprise must be reasonably large in order to reach its
optimal or most economic state. It deals with the matter of quantity. In economic
production, only mass production can effectively reduce the cost of units and the
price of goods, provided a mass market also exists. In the field of social security, the
way to increase its 'administrative economy' or 'administrative efficiency' is to extend
its coverage to include the whole population of a society. At least, the larger the
better. Only in a system with large numbers of participants can the probability of the
occurance of certain contingencies be stable and assessed, then its costs can be
estimated and its management can be scientific. The possible limitation caused is that
the cost of collection of taxes and contributions will be greatly increased if the
number of self-employed is very large such as in Taiwan.
The second principle is 'the division of labour'. It deals with the matter of quality.
In economic production, the material production of certain goods is carried out by an
assembly line in which the work is divided into numbers of simple parts and
undertaken by different workers, so its efficiency can be greatly improved. In the field
of social security, although the division of labour is not so delicate as material
production, the provisions of benefit may be divided into several departments or even
several schemes, at least the benefits can be divided into two types of benefit: benefit
in cash and benefit in kind. Different benefits or services provided by separate
schemes may be a way to make the administration easy and efficient.
Furthermore, the complexity of the administration of different social security
provisions also differs greatly. For example, the administration of universal allowance
is much simpler than that of social insurance, and the administration of social
insurance is much simpler than that of social assistance, so the administration of
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social security will be simpler and easier if we apply more schemes of universal
allowance than those of social insurance and social assistance.
In financing aspect, the rank of 'administrative efficiency' is decided by the costs
of tax and contribution collection. The less the better. Generally, flat-rate taxes and
contributions are much easier to collect than the earnings-related, proportional and
progressive ones. Flat-rate taxes or contributions can be collected at any time in the
fiscal year, so regressive or poll tax will win the highest rank, progressive ones will
win the lowest and proportional ones will be in the middle. As for contributions, the
rank of flat-rate ones will be better than earnings-related ones. Of course, people may
argue that, because a poll tax is collected from everyone and earnings-related tax
(including contributions) only from wage-earners, so it is not necessarily simpler or
cheaper to have a poll tax, due to the huge number of tax-payers. This argument
could be particularly true if the total dependency ratio is very high. So more evidence
is needed to justify this argument.
In benefit aspect, obviously, universal allowance has the simplest procedure or
formality to provide benefits, so it can win the first rank. On the contrary, the
administration of social assistance is the most complicated one, so its rank is the
lowest. As for social insurance, it will be in the middle.






A B C F-R E-R
Vertical Equity 3 2 1 2 1
Means Horizontal Equity 1 2 3 1 2
Outcome Horizontal Equity | 3 2 1 2 1
Adequacy 3 2 1 2 1
Economic Efficiency 1 2 3 1 2
Administrative Efficiency | 1 2 3 1 2
Note: A = flat rate or regressive (e.g. poll tax)
B = proportional
C = progressive
F-R = flat-rate * |The rank of '1 ' is better than
E-R = earnings-related | The rank of '2 ' is better than
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Table 2.4.2 The Function Rank of The Criteria: Benefits
Criterion SA SI (F-R E-R) UA (SUB ALL)
Vertical Equity 1 2 ( 2 1 ) 3 ( 1 2 )
Means Horizontal Equity 3 2 ( 1 2 ) 1 ( 2 1 )
Outcome Horizontal Equity 1 2 ( 2 1 ) 3 ( 1 2 )
Adequacy - - ( ~ " ) - ( - " )
Economic Efficiency 3 2 ( 2 1 ) 1 ( 2 1 )
Administrative Efficiency 3 2 ( 1 2 ) 1 ( 2 1 )
Note: SA = Social Assistance
SI = Social Insurance
UA = Universal Allowance
F-R = flat-rate
E-R = earnings-related
SUB = sub-universal allowance
ALL = all-universal allowance
* The rank of '1' is better than '2'.
The rank of '2' is better than '3'.
2.7. Conclusion
The elderly are the people of old age. In turn old age is generally defined as 65
years in gerontology or retirement age in the field of social security. So it might not
be consistent with the 'oldness' of people in biological age, psychological age or
social age. In the field of social security, both disengagement theory and activity
theory have their points in retirement age. But the feasibility of disengagement theory
seems to be higher than activity theory. The evidence also shows that most countries
with social security provisions have fixed retirement ages.
As both gerontology and social security tend to fix a given age as old age, so the
state of old age can be measurable. The popular measurements are (l)number,
(2)percentage, (3)old dependency ratio, and (4)ageing index. Among them, percentage
is the most common one. As the number of population cannot be increased
unlimitedly, it will approach a ZPG state in the future. Moreover, because the average
life expectancy is also quite stable, so the percentage of the elderly is estimable
under ZPG.
Although the elderly have common needs as all other people, they do have their
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own special needs which are really different from younger age groups. Generally, on
one hand, because they tend to have more additional expenditure due to special
needs and, on the other hand, because they tend to earn less due to retirement or the
loss of earning ability, so there must be some special provisions to tackle their special
problems.
In most cases, the elderly will be able to meet their needs as long as they have
sufficient income. So income maintenance becomes the vital issue for the elderly.
Briefly, there are five sources of income for the elderly: (l)employment, (2)savings,
(3)investment, (4)family, and (5)social security. Unfortunately, all of them by nature
have their limitations. The status of employers is only confined to very small number
of old people. The majority of employees and self-employed are forced to stop their
employment owing to retirement or disability. Savings and investment are not
possible for the elderly of low income or with a large family. As for family, it is not a
reliable support for the elderly if their children are also of low income, not to mention
those who are single or married but without children. Even if there is social security
provision, it is restricted by political and economic conditions and sometimes might
have the side effect of alienation.
Social security can be classified into three main patterns: social assistance, social
insurance and universal allowance. Briefly, the main merit of social assistance is it is
relatively cheap and effectively targeted, yet its main weaknesses are the effect of
stigmatising and disincentive, and administrative expense. The merits of social
insurance is that it can avoid the limits of social assistance because its entitlement to
benefit is an earned right. Unfortunately its limit is its exclusion in both contingencies
and coverage. Lastly, universal allowance can overcome all disadvantages of social
assistance and social insurance, but its own limit is its benefit expenditure will be very
high if its benefit level is as high as those of social assistance or social insurance.
However, when a social security provision is used for the elderly, the common
condition to provide them a benefit is that they must qualify for the requirement of
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age or retirement. We find that not only the retirement ages but also the provisions
adopted by each country differ greatly due to different social and economic
conditions.
As the payments of social security is a kind of income transfer or income
redistribution, it will certainly have some positive or negative effects on economic
activities. Its paths of influence has been illustrated in detail from every possibilities.
This framework can be used as a guide for further empirical studies.
Finally, the author tries to apply Parker's four criteria, ie, equity, adequacy,
economic efficiency and simplicity (renamed as 'administrative efficiency'), as the basic
standards to assess the option and planning of income maintenance in Taiwan.
Among them, the criterion of 'equity' is the most complicated one. Their related
characteristics and the ranks of function in income maintenance and social security
are explained in the text. They will be fully referred to in chapter 9.
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CHAPTER 3
THE SOCIAL SECURITY IN BRITAIN
3.1. Introduction
As described in the previous chapter, there are many ways to maintain the income
of the elderly in order to meet their needs or to keep them from poverty. Although
each source of income has its shortcomings and limitations, comparatively, social
security is the most reliable one. Therefore, after the theoretical discussion in the
previous chapter, this form of provision will be pursued more thoroughly by an
empirical study of British social security in this chapter.
Compared to its own very early stage or other less developed countries, the level
of British social security benefits nowadays is really quite generous. Correspondingly,
expressed as a percentage either of GNP (or GDP) or of government expenditure, its
expenditure social security is also very high. As the expenditure on social security is
decided by the number of the beneficiaries and the level of the benefits though they
are in turn decided by other more specified elements, so it seems to be reasonable to
judge the achievement of social security by these two main elements. Of course, the
benefits of social security can be divided into numbers of items. But, in this chapter,
the analysis will be based on the framework provided in previous chapter.
From many aspects, economic, political, social or cultural, Britain and Taiwan are
two quite different societies, so it is not practical to expect Taiwan to transplant
British provision of social security either at present or in the future. However, as
Britain is an old advanced welfare state, many lessons, either positive or negative,
might be learned from its experiences in the implementation of different types or
patterns of social security. As the aim of this thesis is to raise some options for
change in Taiwan, such experiences, especially the Beveridge Plan, might be of great
interest. For any reform, a general and comprehensive review is necessary for its
policy consideration.
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The review of British experiences will be divided into three stages: before
Beveridge, the Beveridge Plan and after Beveridge. And finally comes an introduction
to the actual provisions. As for the discussion of provision, the purpose is to
understand British social security from the aspect of its administration.
In the stage of 'after Beveridge', a special emphasis will be put on the
phenomenon of 'pension politics' or 'political see-saw' which has lasted for over 30
years in British social security. This issue strongly inspires the author to search for
some ways to avoid such uncertainty. In order to achieve this objective, the author
also tries to make a general review of the series of policy debates between two main
parties in British social security provision. Of course, because of the purpose of this
thesis, most emphases will be put on old age provision.
3.2. Before Beveridge
The origin of the British social security system lies in the Poor Law, going back at
least to the 14th century. Some set the origin of the British Poor Law in the Act of
1388, the 12th of Richard II. This Law, the Act of 1388, was not only to try to fix
wages but also to prevent vagabondage which resulted from the decay of the feudal
system in the 13th century. Afterwards, there followed several similar Acts to deal
with the same problem with different measures. For example, in the 1576 Poor Relief
Act, the concept of 'setting the poor to work' was applied. The able-bodied had to
work in return for the relief. However, these measures were restricted to private,
religious, or charitable levels only. There was no public relief for the poor until the
Poor Law Act of 1601, the 43rd of Elizabeth (Fraser, 31-33; Clarke, 7-20).
The Act of 1601 was the most famous one in the British Poor Law history. It
recognised that poverty was not totally the result of individual error, either idleness or
improvidence. This Act obliged the justices of peace to appoint officials, ie, overseers,
in each parish to give relief and hospitals to the poor and empowered them to levy a
local tax on property for this purpose. The poor were identified as three main groups
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to be dealt with by three different sorts of treatment. Firstly, the impotent poor such
as the aged, the chronic sick, the blind and the lunatic were to be accommodated in
'poor-houses' or 'almshouses'. Secondly, the able-bodied were to be set to work on
hemp or some other appropriate material in the 'workhouse' (really a workhouse
without the meaning of punishment and disgrace). And thirdly, the able-bodied who
were persistent idlers and refused to work were to be punished in a 'house of
correction' (Fraser, 33). [However, 'house of correction' was still not the 'workhouse'
with the implication of humiliation and disgrace. The 'workhouse' concept, established
in 1697, was originally called 'pauper manufactory' or 'corporation of the poor', and
became the workhouse test only after the Act of 1723 (Clarke, 22; Fraser, 35).] This
Act was extremely harsh in order to prevent wandering beggars and vagrants.
Though the Act of 1601 provided the basic legislation for well over 200 years,
throughout, the principle underlining the Act was local relief, locally administered for
local people.
The Act was legislating for the whole country and was centrally regulated after the
amendment of 1834 by the new Poor Law Commission(ers). Better care was provided
for children (orphans), but the principle of 'less eligibility' was also applied. This
principle implied that the applicant's 'situation on the whole shall not be made really
or apparently as eligible as the situation of the independent labourer of the lowest
class' in order to discourage the able-bodied to rely on the relief(Gilbert, 14).
Moreover, under this principle, pauperism or poverty meant more than misfortune, it
also implied a moral failing or disgrace (Gilbert, 21; Hennock, 1968a). Quite explicitly,
this generally-held attitude towards the poor was strongly influenced by the writings
of classic liberals such as Malthus and Ricardo (Gilbert, 161). In theory the Poor Law
would provide the means of avoiding extreme destitution in the workhouse. But in
practice the overwhelming majority of paupers (about five out of six) were relieved
outside the workhouse (Fraser, 51-52). Furthermore, two other sources of help were
available for the needy.
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Firstly, voluntary help and charity were provided to those felt to be sufficiently
deserving by voluntary organizations such as the Charity Organization Society. This
Society coordinated a whole host of charities, but for the needy to ask for help was
seen as individual failure, so their help was degrading and not popular (DHSS,
1985a:lll59; Smith, 17-18). Secondly, collective self-help was provided by friendly
societies, trade unions and co-operatives. Among them friendly societies were the
most important.
Typically friendly societies which were founded in the second and the third
quarters of the nineteenth century were a manifestation of the Victorian ethic of
providence and self-help. And the membership of a worker in a friendly society was
also a symbol of his independence and responsibility. In return for a contribution of
between 4d and 8d a week, the society gave sick pay, ordinarily around 10s a week,
medical care, usually provided by a physician under contract to the society, and a
death benefit of L10 or LI 5, enough for a 'respectable' funeral. By the end of
nineteenth century there were nearly 24,000 registered societies and branches and
about from four and a quarter to four and a half million members, which equalled
roughly half the adult male population of Great Britain. Because of the huge number of
friendly society members, it was said that they were the backbone of the English
nation (Gilbert, 165-167).
Nevertheless, the provisions of friendly societies were not designed for old age
because very few people could live into old age when friendly societies were created.
But by the last two decades of nineteenth century, because of medical and sanitary
science and improved standard of living, an increasing number of their members were
able to live into old age. Most of them could not work, but did not die. So the
contingency of old age was conventionally treated as sickness by friendly societies.
All old age pay was paid in the form of 'sick pay'. The reserve funds of most
societies were exhausted by this measure, and more than a half of societies admitted
that they were facing serious financial difficulties around the turn of twentith century
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(Gilbert, 170).
Because of moral objections and the fear of competition for the limited savings of
the workers, both the Charity Organisation Society and friendly societies, especially
the latter, strongly opposed any kind of compulsory contributory schemes, either for
sickness or old age. So the first such scheme proposed by the Reverend Canon
William L. Blackley in 1878 was quietly put to death even though later he gave up
advocating sick pay and proposed only old age pension which was not provided by
friendly society(Gilbert, 161-164). In order to avoid the same opposition, Charles Booth
proposed his universal non-contributory, tax-supported pension in 1891, but his
proposal failed to be accepted owing to its ruinous expensiveness (Gilbert, 182).
Finally the first British Old Age Pension was established in the form of social
assistance in 1908. Because this new pension scheme was non-contributory, it could
avoid objections from friendly societies; and because it was non-universal, it was not
too expensive to provide.
The 1908 Act was the first real departure from the Poor Law to help elderly people
though it was criticised that its pension was too low, its pensionable age was too
high and its means test was too severe (Kaim-Caudle, 1973:166-67). The Act came
into effect from 1 January 1909. It was a pension of 5 shillings (or 25P) per week to
be paid to those who were over 70 years of age and had an income less than 21
pounds a year; a reduced pension was paid to those with income between L21 and
L31. Apart from means test, tests of character, residence and work were also applied
(Kaim-Caudle, 1973:166; Smith, 21). The applicant for a pension was required to prove
that he had not been in prison within ten years (later reduced to two years in 1911).
He was also required to be a British subject and to be a resident of the UK for twenty
years. Apart from not receiving poor relief since January 1, 1908, he had to be
'habitually' employed in the trade of his choice. Contributions to a friendly society
were accepted as an adequate fulfilment of this industry (or work) test (Gilbert,
222,225)
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Two years later, the first British social insurance scheme was introduced in 1911
which consisted of two parts: unemployment insurance and health insurance. The
former was administered by the Board of Trade until 1917 and then by the Ministry of
Labour; and the latter was administered by registered Friendly Societies. The health
insurance covered the following areas of needs (Smith, 21):
a) the cost of medical treatment of the insured only,
not the family, by general practitioners;
b) sickness benefits 10 shillings per week for 26 weeks;
c) disability benefits;
d) maternity benefit;
e) right to treatment in a sanatorium.
Unemployment insurance assumed that a man would pay contribution whilst employed
and draw out benefit when unemployed. This scheme was not only quite limited in its
coverage, it covered only 2.3 million skilled workers in 7 industries: building,
construction, shipbuilding, mechanical engineering, ironfounding, vehicle construction
and sawmilling, but also very limited in its benefit, its level was only 7s per week up
to a maximum of 15 weeks (Fraser, 172-3).
In 1925 there was a major change in the character of pension provisions. The
Widows', Orphans' and Old Age Contributory Pension Act of that year was formally
extended to cover widows and orphans and granted a contributory old age pension of
50p a week to all people who were covered by health insurance, including wives, at 65
without means test. The cost of this contributory pension scheme was shared equally
between employers and employees. Moreover, when contributory pensioners reached
70, they were entitled to a non-contributory pension without test. By the end of the
1930s there were more than two thirds of all persons over 65 and about four fifths of
all persons over 70 receiving state pensions. Although the pension rate was still 50p
a week, its purchasing power was 40% greater than that in 1919 because of the fall of
prices (Kaim-Caudle, 1973:167).
In 1934 the Unemployment Assistance Act was introduced to tackle the mass and
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long-term unemployment problem caused by the world recession in the interwar
years, because not only had most unemployed people exhausted their legal insurance
benefits but the unemployment insurance had also exhausted its fund after many
changes in arrangement. The pensionable age of women for contributory pensions
was reduced from 65 to 60 in 1940 (DCE, 1954:2,48).
3.3. Beveridge Plan
Due to the piecemeal growth and reform in the field of social security, in 1941 no
less than seven government departments were directly or indirectly concerned with
administering cash benefits for different kinds of needs. For example, unemployment
insurance was supervised by the Ministry of Labour, national health insurance by the
Ministry of Health and the Department of Health for Scotland; non-contributory
old-age pensions were administered by the Customs and Excise, contributory old-age
pensions by the Ministry of Health and supplementary pensions by the Unemployment
Assistance Board. In addition workmen's compensation was supervised by the Home
Office; war victims and their dependants were relieved by the Ministry of Pensions,
while the civilian disabled, widows and orphans were insured by the Ministry of
Health. Furthermore, there was a nation-wide network of local authority committees
which paid means-tested public assistance to persons in need (Harris, 378). Therefore,
not only their benefits were financed in a number of different ways, but also their
benefit level and coverage differed greatly. Such a variety of systems not only caused
much overlapping and duplication of services, but failed to make provision for many
people in need. These facts demonstrated that a general reform to integrate these
separate schemes into one unified scheme was urgent and necessary.
There was a 'great leap forward' in British social security after the presentation of
the Beveridge Report, Social Insurance and Allied Services, which was published on
1st December 1942. It was the product of dissatisfaction with the results of the past
arrangements. The main problem that Beveridge wanted to attack was 'want' or
'poverty'. Based on several surveys, the facts showed that between three quarters and
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five sixths of all want was due to the interruption or loss of earning power caused by
unemployment, sickness, old age and death; the remainder was due to failure to relate
income or earning to the size of family (7). Beveridge envisaged that a comprehensive
social insurance scheme which was based on the six principles could solve most of
the problems. The principles were 1)flat rate of subsistence benefit, 2)flat rate of
contribution, 3)unification of administrative responsibility, 4)adequacy of benefit,
5)comprehensiveness and 6)classification (121-22) to cover all the main contingencies
such as unemployment, sickness and old age that would cause the interruption or loss
of earnings.
However, due to the great difference in the length of unemployment, the size of
family and the degree of being sick or injured, it would be beyond the ability of social
insurance to tackle the extreme cases of these contingencies. Therefore, the approach
of Beveridge was based on the following three assumptions (120). Firstly, there
should be universal child allowances whether the wage-earner was in or out of work
in order to eliminate family poverty due to large families. Secondly, there should be a
high level of employment, or at best full employment, maintained by government
policy; mass and long-term unemployment ought to be avoided. Thirdly, there should
be comprehensive health and rehabilitation services in order to avoid heavy medical
expenditure and maintain a healthier population. Only after all these three
assumptions were really satisfied, could Beveridge's attempt to rely on social
insurance be realised.
Apart from the main provision of social insurance that would meet the basic need
by flat rate of benefits at subsistence level, Beveridge also set a second tier of the
safety net, social assistance which was a national scheme taking over from local
assistance, to meet the special needs of the minority of people and those who were
unable to qualify for insurance benefits. As for the personal additional needs, they
should be met by voluntary insurance and other personal provisions. These three
provisions, social insurance, social assistance and voluntary insurance, were the three
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methods of social security in Beveridge's plan (120). Comparatively, Beveridge
expected social insurance to deal with the majority of people and social assistance to
deal with the remaining minority. Among the insured, the better-off could make more
provisions through voluntary insurance.
Under such an arrangement of logical consistency, the Plan should have been able
to tackle all problems of poverty. But after implementation, it was only partly
successful. What was its weakness? Although it involves hindsight to review the basic
policy of the Beveridge Plan nowadays, some new lessons could still be drawn from
the discussion.
At first, we want to discuss the question, 'Why was the Beveridge Plan constructed
on the basis of social insurance?' As mentioned in previous chapter, there are three
methods, ie, social insurance, social assistance and universal allowance, to provide
benefits in social security. Especially, as the Plan was to provide flat rate benefits to
all targeted people, based on the criterion of 'administrative efficiency', universal
allowance could be a much more efficient way to do so. The reason Beveridge did not
take this method might be explained by the same reason that he rejected
pay-as-you-go system. He tended to treat non-contributory benefits as 'Santa Claus
State' (Harris, 416). As for the reason why he also objected social assistance as the
main provision of social security, that could go back to his days on the Morning Post
and his youthful denunciation of means tests, behavioural tests, and all forms of relief
that stigmatised the recipient and discouraged personal savings (Harris, 417). Most of
his committee also agreed with him for the same reason (Shragge, 46). Moreover,
from the point of view of the whole society, Britain was a country with a long
tradition of 'classic liberalism' (or 'laissez-faire'). The virtues of self-reliance,
individual's freedom, competitive free enterprise and minimal government intervention
are long upheld by Adam Smith, Thomas Malthus, David Ricardo, John Stuart Mill and
Herbert Spencer (Ozawa, 2-4; Parker, J., 4-10). For classic liberals, their favourite
provision would be social assistance. On the other extreme, there were radical
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marxists and socialists to pursue for an all-out egalitarian society by means of
revolutionary class struggle to overthrow all private ownership systems.
Facing these two extremes, there developed the 'new liberalism' advocated by
Henry George, A.C. Pigou, R.H. Tawney and John Maynard Keynes. On one hand, they
highlighted the importance of interdependence among individuals, cooperation in
human endeavour, egalitarianism in allocation of resources, and willingness to accept
a certain amount of governmental intervention for redistributing resources from one
segment of society to another which were essential to the ideal of socialists (8-10)
and, on the other hand, they did not totally object to the virtues advocated by classic
liberals (George and Wilding, 1984:42-52). For new liberals, their new approach was
based on existing private capitalist system. As Beveridge was a cautious new liberal,
or 'reluctant collectivist', it was not surprising that the Beveridge Plan would turn out
to be a mixture or a compromise of both sides. In Taiwan, as will discuss in the later
chapters, there is no strong tradition of 'classic liberalism', so its future approach
could be somewhat more radical than Beveridge.
Technically, the supreme feature of social insurance is that its benefit should be
closely related to its compulsory contribution. That is, the right of benefit should be
theoretically earned or derived from the corresponding contribution. More simply,
social insurance should be contributory based on an actuarial principle. Because both
contribution and benefit of social insurance can be either flat rate or earnings-related,
so the possible combinations of contribution and benefit can be listed out as the
following four ones:
1. flat rate contributions to finance flat rate benefits,
2. earnings-related contributions to finance earnings-related benefits,
3. earnings-related contributions to finance flat rate benefits, and
4. flat rate contributions to finance earnings-related benefits.
Among these four cases, the last one was not only the most regressive but politically
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undesirable, so it was definitely objected to by all people. The third one was the
most progressive, it was welcome by new liberals but rejected by Beveridge as a
'Santa Claus State' (Harris, 416). So the remaining options for Beveridge were only the
first one and the second one. However, because the second one was exactly the same
as the existing private insurance, and because Beveridge also wanted to fulfil another
policy objective: to encourage the development of private saving, voluntary insurance
or voluntary thrift (389), he would not be happy to allow a giant, monopolistic state
scheme to compete with numbers of small private schemes (416), therefore, the
second option would also be excluded. Finally, the only option left to be chosen was
the first one: flat rate contribution to finance flat rate benefit.
It was true that flat rate insurance scheme had great advantages of familiarity and
administrative simplicity (MPNI, 9). But its inherited weaknesses were as follows.
Firstly, from the point of contribution, in principle it should fall equally on the incomes
of rich and poor. It would be no financial problem for the better-off, but it would hit
the poorest hardest. In order to relieve the financial burden of the poor and to
maximize the coverage of protected population, the level of contribution has to be set
at a level as low as possible (SSSS, 10). Unfortunately, no matter how the shares
were allocated among employers, employees and state, in theory a low contribution
would lead to its logical result: low benefit. Then, from the point of benefit, as its
principle was to provide a benefit of adequacy at least up to the level of subsistence,
so the level of contribution should be high enough reasonably to finance such an
adequate benefit. So the principle of adequacy was contradictory to the principle of
comprehensiveness in Beveridge's social insurance scheme.
Even for the benefit itself, its level was also not easy to be fixed owing to the
definition of 'subsistence' and 'adequacy'. For example, when the factor of rent was
taken into account, this question became very difficult. Should the meaning of
'subsistence' be restricted to only physiological level, or should it be extended to
include some elements of psychological or even social needs? In underdeveloped
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countries, there could not be very much objection to defining 'subsistence' at only the
physiological level due to lack of necessary financing ability to afford more. But there
would be a great disagreement in developed countries to do so. In the field of social
insurance, 'rent' is a formidable or even an unconquerable problem. As Beveridge (77)
and his committees (Harris, 397) pointed out, rent varies markedly not only between
regions but between similar accommodation in the same town and even the same
street, not to mention extreme cases. No single amount of rent could be appropriate.
Under these circumstances, if actual rent was paid, then that would imply not merely
the poor to subsidise the rich but a measure to frustrate owner-occupiers. But if only
an average rent was paid, as Beveridge did, then it would be too much for rural area
and too little for the urban area. Both cases demonstrated- inefficiency. As the
character of rent or housing is so different from social security, it should be dealt
with by a special housing policy, not by a social security policy. The current Tory
Government's encouraging of more people to become owner-occupiers is a better
policy to tackle the problem of rent. However, this policy was valid or effective only
in the long term. In the short term, there would still be a big problem in the poor
being able to pay rent or to repay loans to buy houses. In that case, the side effects
of housing benefits could be less if they were paid in kind rather than in cash, and
through social assistance rather than through social insurance.
According to his plan, Beveridge was in favour of a totally funded method for his
social insurance scheme. He explicitly turned down Keynes' suggestion to run the
scheme by a pay-as-you-go method and some witnesses' proposal to finance the
scheme by a surcharge on income tax (ie, earmarked tax) for fear of losing the
attribute of insurance (107). Only if the insurance scheme is fully funded, then the
benefit or pension right can be firmly earned and established. And only such kind of
earned right can be freed from all kinds of bureaucratic discretion. On the other hand,
in case of the pay-as-you-go system, because it is through redistribution between
generations, the financing of the old age pensions of this generation will totally fall on
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the next generation, so the change of the population size of each generation will
greatly influence the ratio of earners to pensioners. When this ratio decreases, if we
want to keep pension level unchanged, then the pension burden of earners or
producers (including employers and employees) will increase; but if we want to keep
the contribution level unchanged, then the pension level of pensioners must be
reduced or there will be a deficit in the scheme. It will be a political struggle in each
stage to reach a compromise between pension right and contribution obligation (or
more generally, tax obligation). More briefly, under such circumstances, it is the
government in power that defines the level of benefits; all political promises are not
certainly guaranteed in the future (Shragge, 152; Dilnot, et al, 29). The current Tory
Government's modifying the SERPS pension levels set by the previous Labour
Government in SERPS is the best example. Explicitly, it was his dislike of
administrative 'police supervision' and uncertain pension right, his belief in
psychological value of contributory insurance, and his desire to build up an unalterable
pension right earned through personal contributions and to encourage voluntary
action and thrift, which made Beveridge wholeheartedly espouse a fully funded social
insurance scheme building up within a period of 20 years.
Finally, it could be a good idea to take a general review of the whole plan for
social security which had been laid down by Beveridge in his Report. In general, the
main objective of his Plan was to tackle the problem of 'want' or 'poverty' without
discouraging voluntary thrift and saving. Was his Plan of three assumptions, three
methods and six principles effective to achieve this aim? This question needs to be
explored thoroughly. According to the concepts in the previous chapter, Beveridge's
terminology of 'assumptions', 'methods' and 'principles' confuses rather than clarifies.
In theory, the possible basic methods or patterns of social security are mainly three:
social assistance, social insurance and universal allowance. As described previously,
the three 'assumptions' in Beveridge Plan are in practice the 'universal allowances'
both in cash (e.g. family allowance) and in kind (e.g. health and employment services)
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in the author's typology. So the design of the Beveridge Plan was to arrange social
insurance as the 'main tier' of social security, and then to arrange universal allowance
as its 'front tier' and social assistance as the 'spare tier'. As all these three tiers of
social security are inseparable parts in his plan, explicitly, Beveridge tried to establish
an integrated system though he had a strong preferential attitude to social insurance
and explicitly disliked social assistance.
As mentioned in the previous chapter, the weaknesses of social assistance are its
administrative expensiveness, stigmatising and discouraging voluntary thrift and
saving, so it is not a ideal method to tackle regular long-term contingencies. If we
have to use it, its maximal level of benefits had better not be higher than social
insurance, or a strong side effect of discouraging voluntary saving will be caused. As
for social insurance, its main weakness is exclusion, both in coverage and in
contingencies, because irregular contingencies will ruin its actuarial principle and the
people with low income or without income will be unable to contribute. In theory, as
mentioned before, social insurance can provide either flat rate or earnings-related
benefits to protect the insured from both long-term and short-term contingencies by
flat rate or earnings-related contributions, but their consequences are different. As for
the administration of social insurance, it can be managed by a unified single scheme
or numbers of separate small schemes. The greatest merit of a unified scheme is the
economy of administrative cost, and its shortcoming is the loss of economic
efficiency in the investment of its fund due to the decrease of competition. As for the
latter, its shortcomings are the expensiveness in administration and the retard of
labour mobility; and its merit is the efficiency in investment. In public social
insurance, as Beveridge was in favour of unified single administration, he saw such a
scheme as a great advantage over private small insurance enterprises if they also
provide the same services. Because there were already many private insurance
enterprises to provide earnings-related benefits for long-term contingencies such as
old age, so, in theory, in order to avoid unfair competition between giant, monopolistic
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public social insurance and small private social insurance enterprises, there should be
a functional division between public and private insurance. One of the options of
division is that the newly established public social insurance may concentrate itself on
only flat-rate benefits for long-term contingencies. Moreover, in order to combat or
prevent poverty, the level of flat-rate benefits should be adequately high up to or
even over poverty line. And then all private insurance schemes provide benefits on
top of this flat-rate public benefit voluntarily.
Compared to social insurance and social assistance, there is no means test and
contribution test nor have their side effects in universal allowance. In theory universal
allowance is a good method to provide flat rate benefits for regular long-term
contingencies such as childhood and old age if we want to achieve the criterion of
administrative efficiency. But for the purpose of encouraging private voluntary actions
and the sake of maintaining the attribute of insurance, Beveridge rejected a universal
allowance as the provision for old age. However, nowadays many scholars such as
Reddin (1985:29-31) are in fact implicitly in favour of universal allowance in social
security, because, when the availability of employment becomes uncertain at present
or in the future, not only are contributions not a reliable and sufficient source to
finance the provision of social insurance any longer but also the coverage of social
insurance will be greatly reduced or even become a privilege of the minority.
Whenever the financing of social insurance does not totally rely on contributions and
its entitlement to benefits is also not totally decided by a contributions record, then
the scheme has in fact shifted towards a universal scheme already. At least, it has
been shifted to the mid-way house.
Theoretically, Beveridge's 'assumptions' are in fact the author's 'universal
allowances'. The difference is that only children's allowances are benefits in cash, and
health and employment services are benefits in kind. The matter of in-kind benefits is
more complicated than cash benefits. In the field of social policy, like housing and
education, health and employment are also independent branches parallelled and
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closely related to social security. Nevertheless, in the field of universal allowance, its
main weakness is that its benefit expenditure will be very high or even too high to
afford if its benefit level is at a high flat rate. This flat rate is generally and politically
decided according to the financing ability of a society, so whether this flat rate is
adequate or not cannot be certainly guaranteed.
As mentioned above, the framework of Beveridge Plan can be summarised as
Figure 3.1. According to this framework of social security, it is helpful to make clear
many moot points in Beveridge Plan. At first, as there already had been many quite
strong private earnings-related insurance schemes such as occupational schemes, and
as Beveridge also wanted to encourage voluntary actions, this was the reason why he
set only flat rate provisions in his social insurance scheme because he wanted to
avoid competition between them. Nevertheless, although he also realised the limitation
of exclusion in social insurance, he could not but leave these excluded groups of
persons to social assistance despite its disincentive effects. Moreover, as mentioned
before, as the availability of employment is not always guaranteed at all times,
especially the later evidence showed that full employment would cause the problems
of labour shortage and inflation both in wage and in price (Crossman, 8), so his plan
was dependent on a basis which was not very solid and certain, because too much
emphasis was put on social insurance which in turn relied on the pre-condition of full
employment.
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Figure 3.1 Beveridge's Framework of Social Security





















* = for voluntary actions






Apart from the purpose of encouraging private voluntary actions, taxing ability and
substitution effects might be the main practical restrictions for modem societies not
to apply universal allowance as main provision for the elderly because most schemes
are tax-financed. Even child benefits are generally designed as supplementary
scheme and not enough by itself. However, as a society becomes more affluent,
nowadays not only the value-judgement of some conservative writers can agree that
even the people who are idle, foolish or improvident should not be allowed to starve
(Morgan, 15), many more liberal people are even campaigning for an all-universal
allowance such as basic income or social dividend (BIRG). So, an all- universal
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allowance for all people might be still too radical, but a sub-universal allowance for
the elderly at the level of physiological subsistence should not be radical any longer.
3.4. After Beveridge
Following the presentation of Beveridge Report, the Family Allowance Act was
passed in 1945; the National Health Act and the National Insurance Act (including
industrial injuries) were passed in 1946; and the National Assistance Act was passed
in 1948. All these social legislations were carried out by the post War Labour
Government. However, they did not totally follow Beveridge's original plan, there were
several departures in these Acts from Beveridge's proposals (DHSS, 1985a:lll64). Firstly,
the departure in the Family Allowances Act was that it rejected Beveridge's
recommended level of 8 shillings (1 shilling = 5 pence) for each child after the first
and adopted a weekly rate of only 5 shillings. Secondly, the main departures in the
National Insurance Act were as follows; a)unemployment benefit was paid only for a
limited period, up to 12 months, not paid indefinitely; b)the full flat-rate old age
pensions were introduced immediately, the 20-year's phasing-in period was dropped
(Dilnot, et al, 17); c)the benefit level was assessed as 131% of Rowntree's 1938 level,
higher than Beveridge's recommendation of 125%; but after taking account of the
influence of inflation, the real benefit in 1948 was only three quarters of Beveridge's
recommendation; that is, the real benefit level was one quarter less than the
Beveridge Plan (Shragge, 44-45); d)the level of industrial injury benefits was as high as
the war pension. Thirdly, the departure in the National Assistance Act was that the
assistance included the actual cost of housing; this cost made the benefit level of
assistance much higher than that of insurance benefits which included only average
rent of 10 shillings. So a large number of insurance beneficiaries also qualified for
assistance benefits (DHSS, 1985a:ll31). This practical measure widely deviated from the
relationship between social insurance and social assistance in which Beveridge (141)
espoused that the benefits of social assistance should be less desirable than that of
social insurance in order to encourage voluntary actions. Because some of these
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departures were very critical, Beveridge's integrated planning was in fact greatly
distorted, so he should not be held responsible for most of the failures though he
could be criticized as being politically unrealistic.
For example, first, the dropping of the 20 years' phasing in period of transition was
in fact to change Beveridge's financing method of social insurance from a funded
system into a pay-as-you-go system. Because a pay-as-you-go system is in fact to
treat all contingencies as only short-term ones, so all contingencies can be pooled
within a short period of time such as one year. In theory no concern is necessary to
pay for the future though there is a commitment of payment for long-term
contingencies such as old age and disability. Simultaneously, no benefit can be
guaranteed without a strong sense of social solidarity and political credit. Under a
funded system, if the collected contributions can be invested in the form of capital,
then its benefit right will be able to be inflation-proofed in some degree, at least its
interest from fiscal agencies will be able to compensate the loss from inflation to
some degree. That is, the benefit right in the funded system might suffer some loss
from inflation, but this right is solid and guaranteed. But under the pay-as-you-go
system, because ail contributions are in the form of cash or money, so its benefits are
barely exposed to inflation. Its only remedy is to index the contribution, ie, to request
the current contributors to pay more. In summary, we use capital gains and dividends
to tackle inflation in the funded system, and use the method of indexation of
contributions in the pay-as-you-go system. They are two different ways to tackle the
same problem. If we can accept the above interpretation, then it is quite unfair to
criticize Beveridge for not taking account of inflation.
Second, as Beveridge expected, in the long term the low benefit at only
subsistence level would have the function to encourage people to develop better or
additional private provisions for their future needs. The great development of
occupational pension schemes after Beveridge could be its true result. However, in
short term, low insurance benefit was the force to push more people to rely on
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assistance (Shragge, 52), especially, if social insurance benefit was lower than social
assistance.
After the Labour Government, there followed 13 years' of Tory Government from
1951 to 1964. During this long period, one significant change in the Beveridgian British
social security for elderly people was the introduction of a limited earnings-related
element to the National Insurance Act of 1959. Why was this new change introduced?
That was the effect of the dropping of a 20 years' maturity period, because this drop
violated the actuarial principle of 'insurance' and let the people who had not
contributed or were in fact unable to contribute long enough to qualify their pensions
right at its inception. In the early stages, there was still some surplus in the fund
because many pensionable people continued working due to the labour shortage after
the War. But there was a drop in the excess of receipts over payments in the fund
from 1952 to 1958. Finally, there were deficits from 1959 to 1961 (Shragge, 71). So, it
was this financial crisis which pushed the Tory Government to find a new source to
finance the system. As Government did not want to subsidise from general revenue,
and it was in fact impossible to raise the flat rate contributions without suffering
low-income earners, so the only possible way to finance the system was to levy
earnings-related contributions adding to the original flat rate one. Correspondingly,
an additional earnings-related benefit was also provided.
This new Act came into operation in 1961 and was entitled 'Graduated Pension'.
According to its White Paper, Provision for Old Age, presented by Boyd-Carpenter, the
aims of this Act were to achieve the following three objectives: 1)to place the National
Insurance scheme on a sound financial basis; 2)to institute provision for employed
persons who cannot be covered by an appropriate occupational scheme to obtain
some measure of pension related to their earnings; 3)to preserve and encourage the
best development of occupational pension schemes (MPNI, 13). Nevertheless, this
change demonstrated that, on one hand, the flat-rate contributions were not sufficient
to finance the scheme and, on the other hand, the flat-rate benefits were not
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sufficient to meet needs.
However, though the graduated pensions was very poor, this new addition of
earnings-related elements would still compete with existing private schemes and was
contradictory to another traditional, cherished objective of Tory party: to encourage
voluntary thrift and saving. According to the Government Actuary's first survey of
occupational pension scheme membership in 1959, as membership was as large as
8.75 million, so the 1959 Act allowed occupational pension schemes to 'contract out' if
an employer could demonstrate that they offered employees pensions equivalent to
the maximum available under the state graduated scheme in order to avoid
competition or even contradiction. Contracting-out employers and their employees
were exempted from earnings-related contributions, paying only the flat-rate part
(DHSS, 1985a:lll1). Nevertheless, this graduated pensions was not inflation-proofed and
did not cover the self-employed, so it was seriously attacked by the opposition and
finally replaced by the new State Earnings-Related Pension Scheme (SERPS) on 5 April
1975 although the rights to graduated pension already earned were preserved.
Before the repeal of 'Graduated Pension', Britain experienced two changes of
government and two proposals for change in British pension policy. The first one, the
Crossman Scheme or National Superannuation, was introduced in 1969 by the Labour
Government. In order to provide a really adequate pension by right from contributions,
the scheme proposed to abolish the flat rate part and, totally base it on a
pay-as-you-go system, to create a comprehensive and fully earnings-related scheme
in both benefits and contributions, with the partnership of existing occupational
pensions and private means (SSSS, 1969:11-12). Although the measure of
'partnership' was actually the same as the Tory's 'contracting out', this new reform
was more radical than the previous 'Graduated Pension'. As mentioned before, the
earnings-related scheme would unavoidably have the problems of either excluding low
income earners or providing them with inadequate pensions. For the newly established
scheme, there was also the problem of valid contribution records for existing
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pensioners (Shragge,131). Crossman tried to use the method of negative income tax
(NIT) to guarantee all pensioners would receive their benefits up to a guaranteed
adequate minimum. Unfortunately, this attempt failed due to the Inland Revenue
refusal to have income tax assessment used in this way. In addition, Inland Revenue
also did not have the information on rent and capital which were necessary for NIT
operation. In addition even the old age pensioners and low income earners did not like
the idea of their stigma being removed by filling in tax forms (Crossman, 17-18).
Furthermore, because the reform was started too late, the scheme failed to become
law due to the fall of the Labour Government the next year.
The second change was the 1971 Joseph Scheme which was expressed in a White
Paper, Strategy for Pension, under the Tory Government. Generally, the main
difference between the Crossman Scheme and the Joseph Scheme was that the
Crossman Scheme tried to reform the pension scheme within the field of social
insurance by an earnings-related approach, but the Joseph Scheme wanted to
maintain the 1959 Boyd-Carpenter Scheme and tried to put more emphasis on social
assistance. Within this new scheme, there was a significant shift of principle from
Beveridge's universality or universalism towards the Tory tradition of selectivity
(Shragge, 135). Apart from the main policy consideration, there were also some minor
provisions and some administrative improvements in this scheme. For example,
universal old age pensions were provided for those over 80 years. Pensions would be
reviewed every 2 years (originally 5 years; and reduced to one year in the formal Bill)
to tackle the problem of inflation. Pension rights were to be preserve with job mobility
in occupational schemes. And finally, contributions would be collected directly through
the PAYE system. Nevertheless, this Tory proposal adopted the previous Labour idea:
to set a fully earnings-related contribution though they still preserved the original
dual benefits one flat rate, one earnings-related. As for the low income earners
who earned less than one quarter of the average adult male manual worker wage,
they were left to the responsibility of social assistance (Shragge, 137). Joseph's
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scheme did become law, but was repealed in 1974 on the return of a Labour
government, before it could be implemented.
Finally, many real changes in pension provisions were made in the 1975 Social
Security (Pension) Act which was proposed by Barbara Castle in the 1974 White Paper,
Better Pensions. Having experienced consecutive failed attempts at social security
reforms of the 1969 Crossman scheme which putting more emphasis on
earnings-related social insurance and equal income redistribution and the 1971 Joseph
scheme which putting more emphasis on means-tested social assistance and market
operation, pension policy had really become a 'political football' or 'political see-saw'.
In order to avoid such uncertainty. Castle produced a scheme of compromise between
Labour and Tory, between public and private. Apart from Labour's own cherished fully
earnings-related contributions and benefits, the Tory's private provisions based on
market operation were also incorporated and even strengthened. To be brief, the
central focus of SERPS was to improve pension level by 1)full inflation-proofing for
both public and private pensions, 2)assessing amount of pension based on the best 20
years' earnings, 3)equal treatment of women and men, and 4)a guaranteed minimal
pension for all in order to free all pensioners from relying on social assistance (DHSS,
1985a:lll2—4; SSSS, 1974:5; Shragge, 143). Under this new scheme, for all insured
persons whether they are contracted out or in, their final due amounts of additional
earnings-related pensions will be not much different because the SERPS will make up
the difference. However, for those who are contracted out, they and their employers
may take the advantage to pay a lower rate of contribution on the earnings that count
towards additional pensions by the form of tax allowance or tax subsidy. Owing to
practical difficulties, the self-employed were still excluded from the SERPS.
After the Conservative Government came into power in 1979, there was another
modification in the compromised British social security. In their original proposal in
the Green Paper, Reform of Social Security, the long run goal of the Tory Government
was to abolish the SERPS for those who will retire in the next century though the
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pension rights of those who will retire before this century would still be honoured,
and to retain only flat rate state pension and earnings-related private occupational
and personal pensions. Because the financing of generous SERPS is based on
pay-as-you-go method, so all the financial burden will be shifted to the working
population in present and future generations. There is no more right for this
generation than for future generations to prescribe the pension level and contribution
rate in the future. That is, no pension level can be guaranteed under the
pay-as-you-go system. However, the Tory Government was forced to preserve this
scheme in their Whit Paper, also entitled Reform of Social Security, half a year later in
view of wide opposition from big business such as Confederation of British Industry
(CBI), pension firms and the large number of small private employers and their low
income earners, because it is more expensive for them to set up their own private
scheme than to participate in the public one. Instead of abolishing the SERPS, the
Government are trying to reduce the emerging costs of SERPS pensions in the
following three ways. Firstly, the pension will be based on a lifetime's earnings,
instead of on the best 20 years, and will be calculated as 20% of earnings, rather than
25%. Secondly, widows and older widowers will be able to inherit up to half, rather
than all, their partner's SERPS pensions. Thirdly, the contracted-out occupational
schemes are required to be responsible for inflation-proofing guaranteed minimum
pensions in payment up to 3% a year, the remaining difference will be still made up
by SERPS (DHSS, 1985b:4). All private pensions, both occupational pensions and
personal pensions are still able to contract out of SERPS by guaranteeing a level of
contribution of 4%, rather than a level of benefit (DHSS, 1985b:4-5, 14-16). So the
financial uncertainty of employers is relieved.
In the field of social assistance, according to the proclamation of the White Paper,
the objective of reform is to hold a rein on its rising expenditure by providing efficient
and responsive system of financial help which not only meets genuine needs but also
encourages independence. Before 1988, there were three main provisions in British
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social assistance system: supplementary benefits (SB), family income supplement (FIS)
and housing benefits (HB). All of them had their own means tests, so their
administration was complicated in different degree depending on the numbers of
benefits and beneficiaries. The larger the numbers, the more complicated the system.
In a study by Reddin in 1968 (1970a, 9; and Midgley, 89), were as many as 3,146
means-tested benefits in all local authorities. Even in a recent widely quoted figure
provided by the National Consumer Council (NCC), there were still as many as 45
means-tested benefits (Dilnot, et al, 25). In order to simplify the administration, the
pioneer measure was to except further tests for the elderly and the older long-term
unemployed who have continually received benefits for two years and allow them to
renew their benefits automatically.
In the formal reform in Reform of Social Security, two major changes are made.
The first change is that all means-tested benefits will be assessed by using basic
rules in particular as regards 'net income' which is after tax and national insurance
contributions (DHSS, 1985b:21). The second change is that people with capital of more
than L6,000 will not be eligible for any benefit. Capital between L3,000 and L6,000 will
be assumed to produce a weekly income of L1 for each L250 which will be taken into
account at net income in assessing entitlement to income-related benefits (DHSS,
1985b:26). But later this upper limit of capital is raised to L8,000 for housing benefits.
The second reform is that SB has been replaced by Income Support (IS). Contrary
to Family Credit (FC) which is replacing the former FIS, the applicants of the IS are
restricted to the people who do not work or work under 24 hours a week. The main
object of this reform is to simplify the administration of the scheme by providing a
basic rate of benefit, 'personal allowance', with additions, 'premiums', for particular
groups families, lone-parents, pensioners, higher pensioners, disability and severe
disability. For example, the personal allowances are L33.40 for single person over 25
years old (including the elderly) or lone-parent aged 18 years or over; L51.45 for a
couple aged 18 years old or over (including the elderly). Additional 'premiums' will
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depend on personal situation (DHSS, 1988; leaflet NI196). For special or emergency
needs, people will be able to get help from the new Social Fund (SF) in the form
either of a loan or of a grant. As for HB, its administration is also simplified by
reducing the number of tapers— the rate at which benefit is withdrawn as incomes
rise— from six to two. But, on the other hand, everyone will be expected to make
some contributions of at least 20% to their own domestic rate (DCE, 1988:11275).
In the field of universal allowance, there are no major changes. A very minor
change is that the coverage of child benefit and invalid care allowance is slightly
extended. In child benefit the benefit is made payable to young people who continue
to be educated at home after the age of 16. In invalid care allowance the benefit is
extended to married women.
In the whole period of After Beveridge Age in British social security, particularly in
the field of pension policy, many changes have been experienced. Some of them were
major, and some were minor. All these policy changes were deemed to find out a
stable and efficient way to achieve the original goal of social security. Nonetheless, in
British society, because its social security policies were formulated through its own
special political machine which was driven by the elected party, so it was necessary
to understand the basic ideologies or values of its parties at first, then we could
understand the force and trend of its social security policy. In general, there were
two quite different, sometimes even opposite, types of orientation in the two main
political parties in Britain. On one hand, the Labour Party explicitly favoured collective,
state-provided benefits based on a universal basis. On the other hand, the Tory Party
tended to favour the social provisions linked to the market, supplemented with state
aid, and based on the principle of selectivity (Shragge, 29). More briefly. Labour
emphasized public unified pay-as-you-go provisions which have the advantage in
administrative efficiency, and the Tories emphasized private separate funded ones
which have their merit of efficiency in investment. Because these political arguments
and struggle mainly occur in the field of long-term contingencies and pensions, so
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they are described as a 'political see-saw' or 'pension polities'.
The direct result of the 'political see-saw' is the uncertainty of pension policy.
Although this uncertainty is quite undesirable in a democratic society, it is by nature
unavoidable in social security system as long as the element of income transfer or
income redistribution is involved. In a democratic society like Britain, because both
benefit expenditure and taxation (including contribution) are determined by politicians,
so there is a strong force to push the politicians, on one hand, to raise the level of
benefits and, on the other hand, to retard or even to reduce the rate of contributions.
So its unhappy result is to cause a financial crisis (in forms of deficit and/or
borrowing) for the social security system or, at the worst, to cause an economic
recession through serious inflation. This is a common finacial problem for many
western welfare states.
As benefits (B) must be financed by some financial sources, mainly taxation
(including contributions), so they (benefits) can be considered as the direct function of
Taxation (T), ie,
B = f(T),
The above problems, both financial crisis and economic recession, can be avoided
only if this equation can be maintained in balance. Facing this social security
financing equation, from technical point of view, this balance can be achieved only by
a thorough actuarial calculation by professional experts; but from democratic point of
view, the operation of this equation should be under the control of the politicians, so
there is a theoretical contradiction between politicians (e.g. MP) and civil experts. In a
democratic society, because both sides are generally decided by the non-expert
politicians, so it is difficult for them to achieve the balance of the equation. But in a
non-democratic society, though both sides are decided by government, unfortunately,
the government officials are not certainly experts, so the balance is still not easy to
achieve.
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As Taiwan is also a democratic society, there will be the same finacial problem in
Taiwan in the future. However, this problem could be easier to solve in Taiwan
because its political system is in theory based on Dr. Sun Yat-sen's Theory of
Separation of Political Power and Administrative Ability, which will be pursued in detail
in chapter 5, in which political power belongs to the people and administrative ability
(or administrative power) belongs to the government. This division of labour between
politicians and government experts will provide a possible way to an adequate balance
of the equation. According to Dr. Sun's theory, the politicians are empowered by the
people (or more accurately, the electorate) to have the priority to decide only one side
of the equation, either to decide the level of benefits or the rate of contributions (or
tax), and the government are empowered to decide the other side of the equation, so
the aim will be able to be achieved, because only the professional experts in
government have the ability and knowledge to actuarially calculate out a proper figure
to balance this equation. It is beyond the ability of political parties or the members of
parliament to play such a role. The adequate role for them is to decide whether we
need a pension or not, or only to decide what the level of the scheme should be. The
remaining decisions in the other side of the equation shoule leave to the government
experts.
3.5. The Actual Provisions
Since the end of nineteenth century, old age has been the major provision of
social security in Britain. Many different proposals have been raised, and many
different schemes have been applied in order to find out the best way to tackle this
contingency efficiently and satisfactorily. In Britain, nowadays, special needs of the
elderly are generally met by various benefits in kind such as education, health service,
employment service and personal social services which are provided by the other
branches of social policy, so it will be sufficient for standard social security benefits
to meet all other common needs of the elderly.
Britain is one of the oldest advanced welfare states in the world, and her social
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security expenditure was as high as 12.5% of GNP and 26.4% of general government
expenditure in 1986 (see Table 3.1). When we analyse the social security expenditure
in terms of categories of beneficiaries, around a half of it goes to the elderly (see
Table 3.3). In fiscal year statistics (from April to March next year), we also can see that
the expenditure on social security is far higher than any other social welfare service
and amounts to as much as total expenditure of all the others together. The total
welfare expenditure is about a half of government expenditure (see Table 3.2). These
figures strongly demonstrate the importance of the role of social security in this
country and the elderly in social security.


















1976 t H5 340 2 051 42.6 9.2 21.6
1977 129 463 2 303 43.2 9.8 22.7
1978 149 913 2 666 41.6 10.1 24.2
1979 j 172 642 3 073 43.2 10.3 23.9
1980 | 199 439 3 541 45.9 10.7 23.4
1981 | 218 672 3 880 48.6 12.1 25.0
1982 ! 236 656 4 195 49.7 13.1 26.4
1983 S 260 338 4 624 48.4 12.3 25.5
1984 I 279 353 4 949 48.1 12.4 25.7
1985 ! 305 42 6 5 394 48.1 12.3 25.6
1986 | 323 775 5 704 47. 4 12.5 26.4
Note: GNP=GDP(income-based) + residual error +
net property income from abroad
=National Income + capital consumption
Source: 1) CSO, 1987:45, 1988a:240, 242.
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Table 3.2 Social Welfare Expenditure in Britain
general social welfare expenditure 1
government | 1









1981-82 120.1 23.8 | 10.6 9.9 2.6 | 1.9 | 10.5
1982-83 132.6 | 24.5 | 10.5 9.6 2.0 | 1.8 | 10.8
1983-84 140.3 25.1 | 10.5 9.6 2.2 | 2.1 | 11.0
1984-85 150.0 | 25.4 | 10.5 9.3 2.2 | 2.1 11.4
1985-86 158.2 ! 26.2 | 10.5 9.1 1.9 | 2.1 j 11.4
1986-87 164.8 | 26.9 | 10.9 9.5 1.6 | 2.4 11.0
1987-88 172.6 i 26.9 | 11.4 10.0 1.4 j 2.3 j 10.9
(estimated) 1 1 1
1988-89 183.0 | 26.5 | 11.3 9.4 1.3 | 2.2 | 10.5
(Planned)
Notes: A = social security
B = health and personal social services
C = education and science
D = housing
E = employment
Source: DCE, 1987:130, 1988:132.
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Table 3.3 Social Security Expenditure by Beneficiaries





% % % % % %
1978-79 | 15 870 | 55.1 15.8 8.6 4.3 15.8 0.4
1979-80 j 18 780 | 53.9 14.8 7.8 4.0 19.0 0.4
1980-81 j 22 680 | 53.5 14.0 11.2 3.7 17.1 0.4
1981-82 j 27 690 | 51.8 13.3 14.5 3.4 16.6 0.4
1982-83 | 31 620 | 51.0 12.9 15.8 3.2 16.6 0.4
1983-84 j 34 840 | 50.7 12 .7 16.4 3.0 16.8 0.4
1984-85 | 37 760 | 49.8 13.3 16.8 2.9 16.9 0.4
1985-86 | 41 210 | 49.7 13.6 16.9 2.7 16.8 0.3
1986-87 | 44 130 | 49.6 14.4 16.5 2.6 16.6 0.3
1987-88 | 45 940 j 50.4 15.3 14.9 2.5 16.7 0.3
(estimated) 1
1988-89 | 47 450 | 50.4 15.7 14.4 2.4 16.9 0.2
(planned)
Note: l)The 'total' excludes some special payments to
certain groups of claimants but includes rate
rebates which are not public expenditure
2)'A' includes SB paid to men under retirement age
but over 60.
3)'E' includes child benefit, one-parent benefit,
FIS, maternity benefit, and SB paid to one-parent
families and to people looking after elderly parents.
4)A = elderly people
B = sick and disabled people
C = unemployed people
D = widows and orphans
E = family
F = housing benefit paid to people in work
Sources: DCE, 1984:1185, 1985:11171, 1986:11233, 1987:11241,
1988:11267.
In British official statistics social security benefits are classified as contributory
benefits and non-contributory benefits. And non-contributory benefits are further
classified as income-related benefits and not income-related benefits. According to
the definition in the previous chapter, the contributory one is social insurance; the
non-contributory and non-income-related one is universal allowance; and the
non-contributory and income-related one is social assistance. Their detailed benefits
































a)for those aged 80 and over








1.Supplementary benefit (abolished, April 1988)
a)supplementary pension
b)supplementary allowance
Income support (from April 1988)
2.Family income supplement (abolished, April 1988)
Family credit (from April 1988)






Table 3.4 Value of Basic Weekly Benefit Rates in Britain










1-1: single 1.30 | 2.00 I 4.00 11.60 | 27.15 | 38.30 | 41.15
couple 2.10 | 3.25 | 6.50 19.50 j 43.45 | 61.30 | 65.90
I-2-a: single | ! - - 11.60 j 26.00 | 38 .30 | 41.45
XIi<niH 1.80 | 2.75 | 5.625 18.60 | 38.00 | 53.60 | 57.65
1-4: single 1.30 | 2.00 1 4.00 9.80 j 20.60 | 30.45 | 32.75
couple | 2.10 |
1






II-l 0.25 | 0.40 ! 0.40 1.50 | 4.74 | 7.00 | 7.25
II-3 ; ! - ; ! 3.00 | 4.55 | 4.90









III-1-a:single| - | 12.00 | 27.15 | 37.50 |
couple| - - 1 18.85 | 43.45 | 60.00 |
III-1-b:single | 1.20 | 1.875 | 3.80 9.60 | 21.30 | 29 .50 !
couple| 2.00 | 3.15 I 6.275 15.65 | 34.60 | 47 .85 |
IS: single,25+j - - ! j ; - | 33.40
couple 1 - 1 - - - j 51.45
111-2:1 child j - - 1 31.50 | 67.00 | 97.50 !







purchasing 1 1 1 1
power,1980=100 j 780 | 600 | 450 196 | 100 1 71 | 66
Note: The figures in IS are personal allowances •
Sources: DHSS, 1988c:118 ; 1988 : leaflet NI196; DCE, 1988 : II274.
According to the above classification, we try to demonstrate their values by selected
basic benefit rates in different years (see Table 3.4). By these rates we can get a
general idea about the benefit level in Britain. Benefit levels were substantially
increased during these decades even after allowing for erosion by inflation. Inflation
should be a strong factor causing the rise of the expenditures of social security.
In Britain as the poverty line adopted by the Ministry of Social Security is basic
scale rates of SB plus rent (Townsend, 1983:41), and as the benefit levels between
social insurance pension and social assistance pension are almost the same, in many
years the latter is even higher than the former, so the levels of basic state pension
are certainly lower than the official poverty line. As many as 27-28% of insurance
pensioners also had to claim national assistance or supplementary benefits in 1960s
(CSO, 1971:89). Even today there are still over a half of pensioners eligible for
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supplementary pensions though only two thirds of these actually claim them
(Phillipson and Walker, 202). The situation seems never to change over decades. This
is one reason why additional earnings-related pensions were introduced in 1961 and
1975. According to the latest reform, old age pension paid by Income Support (IS)
consists of allowances and premiums which per week total L44.05 (33.40 + 10.65) for a
single person and L67.70 (51.45 + 16.25) for a couple respectively. The differences
between the new IS pensions and social insurance pensions is even larger than
previous years. Only a general improved financial situation in insurance pensions,
both public and private, will enable more old people to avoid applying assistance
benefits.
According to Table 3.3, about a half of social security expenditures were paid to
the elderly in 1987-88. As the amount of the expenditures is decided by the number
of beneficiaries and the level of benefits, so the estimation of pension expenditure
could be derived from the number of the aging population and the level of old age
pensions. In Britain the elderly people age 65 years and over was only about 5% of
the total population in 1900s, then it rose to about 10% in 1940s, and recently rose to
15% in 1980s (see Table A8.2 in Appendix). That is, during the last 8 decades, the
proportion of old people in Britain has increased 5% for every 4 decades. (This does
not mean it will be still the same in the future.) As the number of the aging
population is mainly determined by 'population growth' (influenced by births and
immigrants) and 'life expectancy', so if the population stops growing and the life
expectancy rises, then the proportion of old people will increase. However, due to the
limitation of natural resources and the living space of the earth, the most possible
population trend in the future would be the ideal type of Zero Population Growth
(ZPG), or a fluctuation around the ZPG. If ZPG can be achieved in the future, then
because births and deaths will be roughly equal in case of ZPG, so life expectancy will
play an important role in the change of the aging population in the future. Viewing
the world population trend, Sweden is clearly approaching to this ZPG; Britain is also
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rather near this object though population growth here has been fluctuating. In the
case of ZPG, the proportion of old people of a society will eventually be decided by
average life expectancy and the definition of old age. When the average life
expectancy increases, more people will be able to live into old age, so the number of
old people will increase. And if we define a lower age as old age, then more people
will be classified as old people. If it is on the contrary, then the number of old people
will be less (see Table 2.1).
Viewing the British population projections, we find that the population is forecast
to grow up to a peak during 2030s and then to decline gradually (see Table 3.5). This
is the special consequence of the baby boom of the 1950s and 1960s (Silburn, 29).
That is, the babies born in that time fairly predictably will be in their old age in 2030s.
Although baby boom will be repeated every 2-3 decades, they will become weaker
and weaker, and finally they will disappear. So this baby boom phenomenon of the
spiral growth of elderly population may be only a particular case. Although the size
of future generations is not so sure as existing and past generation, they still
demonstrate a quite stable average size. In the long run the normal case would be the
approach to the aim of ZPG. According to the model in Table 2.2, because the average
life expectancy in UK is not as high as 80, so the proportion of old people aged 65
years and over will not be able to be as high as 18%, which is only possible to
achieve in demographical steady state, of the total population. Especially, as long as
the population of the UK is still mildly increasing, its proportion of old people will be
less than the figures in Table 3.5. In the field of social security, old age will be a
problem only if it is a period of economic dependency because the elderly are totally
withdrawn from the labour market. So it is quite suitable to define pensionable age
'old age' in western welfare states such as UK, West Germany and Scandinavian
countries from the point of social security. If pensionable ages are defined as old
ages and if they are different by sex, then the situation will be a little more
complicated. In this case we have to estimate the proportions of different sexes
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separately, and then make an average. For example, In Britain as the pensionable ages
are 60 years for female and 65 years for male, so the proportion of pensionable
people of the total population will fall in between the rate of old people aged 65 and
over and that of 60 and over.











1975 56.2 | 7.9 1 9.6 | 14.1 17.1
1980 56.2 | 8.4 9.9 | 15. 0 i 17.6
1985 56.6 | 8.6 | 10.2 ! 15.1 ! 18.0
1986 56.8 | 8.7 ! 10.3 ! 15.3 18.1
1991 57.5 j 9.0 | 10.5 1 15.7 1 18.3
1996 58.3 | 9.1 I 10.5 ; 15.6 18.1
2001 59.0 | 9.2 ; 10.6 j 15.6 ! 18.0
2006 59.3 | 9.3 ! 10.9 | 15.6 ; 18.3
2011 59.4 | 9.6 ! 11.5 1 16.2 i 19.4
2016 59.6 | 10.4 12.1 | 17.5 | 20.3
2021 59.9 j 10.8 1 12.7 | 18.1 I 21.2
2025 60.0 | 11.3 13.4 j 18.8 ! 22.3
2026 60.0 | 11.4 ! 13.6 j 19.1 I 22.6
2031 60.0 | 12 .3 ! 14.3 20.6 ! 23.9
2036 59.6 | 12 .8 14.4 j 21.4 ! 24.1
2041 59.1 | 12 .4 13.9 j 20.9 i 23.5
2046 58.6 j 11.8 ' 13.4 j 20.1 ! 22.8
2051 58.1 | 11.4 1 13.1 19.5 I 22.5




Table 3.6 The Expenditure of Social Security in Britain
year
million
Total SI UA SA A I
1
SI UA SA A
1978-79 16 401 10 601 2 579 2 525 696 | 64.6 15.7 15.4 4.2
1979-80 19 377 12 206 3 632 2 741 798 | 63.0 18.7 14.2 4.1
1980-81 23 483 14 843 3 987 3 579 1 073 | 63.2 17.0 15.2 4.6
1981-82 28 582 17 213 4 628 5 468 1 273 | 60.2 16.2 19.1 4.5
1982-83 32 451 18 593 5 118 7 358 1 3811 57.3 15.8 22.7 4.3
1983-84 35 159 17 709 5 671 8 231 1 548 | 56.1 16.1 23.4 4.4
1984-85 38 114 20 777 6 183 9 430 1 724 j 54.5 16.2 24.7 4.5
1985-86 41 478 22 309 6 545 10 795 1 783 j 53.9 15.8 26.0 4.3
1986-87 44 416 23 983 7 000 11 496 1 937 | 54 .0 15.7 25.9 4.4
1987-88 46 401 24 939 7 324 11 907 2 2311 53.7 15.8 25.7 4.8
Note: SI = social insurance
UA = universal allowance
SA = social assistance
A = administration
Sources: DCE, 1984:1182, 1985:11166-167, 1986:11224-225,
1987:11234-235, 1988:11260-261.
As old age benefit has been a necessary provision for old people in modern
societies, it is our aim to provide it efficiently and effectively. From this point of view,
administration cost is one of the good indicators to evaluate the efficiency of the
provision. By definition, administration cost is the cost to provide benefits. In Britain
this cost is about 4% to 5% of total benefit expenditure (see Table 3.6). If we examine
it in details, we can also figure out the cost of each benefit. As the cost of provision
can be indicated by either a percentage of expenditure or a value per beneficiary, so
the factors that will influence this cost could be the following ones:
1. the total expenditure of benefit the higher the expenditure, the
lower the cost (expressed as a ratio);
2. the character of tests— the tests of benefits are many, the less
and the simpler the tests, the less the staff, and then the less the
personnel cost;
3. the length of payment the longer the payment, then the less
the tests and the less the staff cost;
4. the number of beneficiaries the larger the number, the lower
the cost (expressed as a ratio).
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Based on these criteria, it will be very useful to help us to understand the reason why
the administrative cost of some benefits are so expensive and some are comparatively
economical (see Table 3.7). Generally most supplementary benefits are short-term
benefits, and their tests are also very complicated, so their personnel cost will be
extremely high. This is the reason why supplementary benefits are the most expensive
one in both measures. In addition to the fact that the number of beneficiaries is not
very large, the same reasons are applicable for unemployment benefit, so it is the
second most expensive one. As for child benefit and retirement pension, both of
them not only are long-term payments but also have a very large number of
beneficiaries and very simple non-income tests, so they are two of the most
economical ones.





B C D E
1-1 i 16 584 | 233 1.4 9 400 0.50
1-2 & 5 | 2 625 | 110 4.2 1 025 2.05
1-3 ! 800 | 24 3.0 410 1.10





12 7.3 115 2.00
II-l & 3 | 4 602 | 89 1.9 12 965 0.15
n-2 ; 422 j 12 2.8 395 0.60
II-4 j 686 | 24 3.5 555 0.85





18 3.1 295 1.15
III-l 7 446 | 839 11.3 4 755 3.40
III-2 130 | 5 3.8 205 0.45
III-4 | 4 636 148 3.2 7 270 0.40
Note:A = total benefit expenditure in million pounds
B = total administration cost in million pounds
C = B as % of A
D = total number of beneficiaries (1,000)
E = average weekly administrative cost per beneficiary




After a study on the development of the British social security system, the most
central aspect is Beveridge's framework of social security according the context of his
report. The cornerstone of this framework is social insurance. That is, this framework
has social insurance as its main tier of provision, universal allowance as its front tier,
and social assistance as spare tier. Parallel to social insurance, there are numbers of
private voluntary schemes. Referring to the experiences in policy changes and reforms,
the author tries to organize all the different related elements such as contingencies,
time, financing, test and benefits into a rational figure. According to this framework,
the author can thoroughly comment on not only the merits and weaknesses of
Beveridge's original proposal, but also the success and failure of later development in
the whole period of after Beveridge stage.
In addition, there is some similarity in the development between Britain and
Taiwan. The British experience in social security provisions is really worth learning
and referring to. First of all, the piecemeal constructed pre-Beveridge British social
security was similar to that in Taiwan nowadays. For example, many similar schemes
are administered by different government departments or agencies; they have in
common problems of administrative inefficiency and financial difficulties. The
experience in making the Beveridge Plan might provide a vivid mirror for future reform
in Taiwan.
Referring to the Beveridge Plan, the pre-condition or 'front tier' of a universal
health services is the most important one in Taiwan. It is worth taking more
consideration. As for the conditions of family allowance and low unemployment, they
are not so urgent in Taiwan because nowadays both family planning which leads to
the decrease of family size and economic growth which increases the income of the
family are still very effective. So they can be put in the second priority in the planning
of social security in Taiwan. Moreover, viewing the lessons of Beveridge and
subsequent reformers, as all three main provisions of social security have their own
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merits and limitations, so it would be better to have a new attitude to treat them
equally without any preference or discrimination. The application of each provision
had better be based on their merits rationally. Then, a fully efficient scheme might be
achieved.
In summary, the most meaningful lesson learned from the study of this chapter is
to construct a rational framework of social security (as Figure 3.1). According to this
framework, the main flaw of Beveridge Plan was that he put too much emphasis on
social insurance. So his plan would not overcome the weakness of social insurance,
exclusion. Though this exclusion could be solved by social assistance, however, for
long-term contingencies such as old age and disability, universal allowance would be
better than social assistance form the point of administrative efficiency and
disincentive effects. Of course, in order to achieve the criterion of horizontal equity,
the benefit levels of universal allowance are not necessarily flat-rate in order to
achieve equivalent living standard for all beneficiaries. Based on universal allowances,
the benefits of social insurance and private insurance may be provided on top of
them. As for short-term and regular contingencies, it is the obligation of social
insurance to provide either earnings-related benefits by earnings-related contributions
or flat rate benefits by flat rate or earnings-related contributions. But if there are
already many strong private earnings-related insurance schemes, then there should be
another division of labour between public social insurance and private ones. Finally,
all irregular contingencies such as flood, drought, earthquake and hurricane, no matter
long-term or short-term, will be left to social assistance. They are protected by
need-related provisions.
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CHAPTER 4
THE METHODS AND PROCESS OF STUDY
4.1. Introduction
The contents of this study can be roughly divided into two aspects: desk study
and field study. In theory they are of the same importance, but in practice this study
is dependent more on desk study which is based on official statistical data, study
reports and related literature to answer the basic questions of this thesis than on
self-financed field study which mainly aims to collect the data which are not available
from the previous sources to explore the unanswered questions. Due to the lack of
resources, it was financially impossible for the author to conduct a large scale field
study. This was the reason why the author had to depend more on desk study than
on field study. However, even in field study the cost of different methods could differ
greatly. For example the cost of an interview research is much higher than a
questionnaire research in money, labour and time. Nevertheless, expensive methods
cannot be avoided or discarded due to their special advantages and function. So, the
application of field study methods will be further dependent on the amount of
resources available.
4.2. The Desk Study
In theory, as social insurance is the main social security provision in Taiwan, so,
both in desk study and field study, the author has to put more emphasis on this
provision than others. But, 'Is a social insurance oriented social security system a
good one or an adequate one for Taiwan?" Explicitly, this question is not able to be
answered by only the data of Taiwan any more, so the coverage of desk study in this
thesis needs to include the construction of a general theoretical framework of social
security in chapter 2 and the related case study of social security in Britain in chapter
3. Only under the direction of a general theory of social security, then the specific
desk study of social security system in Taiwan could be meaningful and constructive,
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not to mention the more specific field study-
In Taiwan there are three main separate, independent social insurance systems, ie.
Labour Insurance (LI), Government Employees' Insurance (GEI) and Military Insurance
(Ml), so the first step is to conduct a desk study of these social security provisions in
Taiwan. Their historical development and current structure is explained after reviewing
the related literature such as legislative communiques where all legislative changes
are well-recorded. The second step is to make clear its operation and function by
studying its periodical annual statistics. However, more emphasis would put on the
latter. In Taiwan, as the information of Ml is confidential, only the statistics of LI and
GEI are available in the field of desk study. Apart from the data of structural changes,
the most reliable sources of operational data in social insurance are available from the
following two sources: 1) Statistical Data for Taiwan-Fukien Area published by the
Bureau of Labour Insurance for Taiwan-Fukien Area ROC (BLITF) and 2) Statistical Data
for Government Employees' insurance published by the Central Trust of China (CTC).
As for the data of social assistance, the main source is Statistical Abstract of interior
of the Republic of China published by the Ministry of Interior (MOI). All these sources
of data are published annually.
However, there is a small difference in the methods of the compilation between
two social insurance statistics though it does not matter in most cases. The annual
statistics of GEI are compiled on a monthly basis. Its annual statistics are the
aggregate of twelve months' sub-totals of a year, so the episodes of hospitalisation
which extend over two months will be doubly counted. So there will be a risk to
under-estimate the cost of hospitalisation if we apply these figures without any
adjustment (Kaim-Caudle and Chin, 29). Comparatively the compilation of the
statistical data of GEI is much more detailed than that of LI, so the former is more
useful and valuable than the latter.
The secondary sources for general background study of Taiwan are mainly
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published by the Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics (DGBAS)
and the Council for Economic Planning and Development (CEPD), Executive Yuan. For
example, many regular sampling survey reports such as Social Indicators of the
Republic of China Yearbook of Labour Statistics, Monthly Labour Statistics, Report on
the Survey of Personal Income Distribution in Taiwan are published by the DGBAS, and
many regular and irregular reports such as Taiwan Statistical Data Book, Projections of
the Population of Taiwan Area Social Welfare Indicators An Integrated Planning for
Social Welfare System in the Republic of China and A Study on the System and
Expenditure of Social Welfare in the Republic of China are published by the CEPD.
Their titles can clearly indicate the kind of data they provide for the general
background. Comparatively, more planning functions are undertaken by the CEPD.
Furthermore, basic demographic data in Taiwan-Fukien Demographic Fact Book which
are annually published by the Ministry of Interior (MOI) and health data in Health
Statistics of the Republic of China which are also annually published by the
Department of Health (DOH) are both very important. Many academic studies by
university scholars such as
- The Social and Psychological Adjustments of the Elderly in Taipei
City by Tang, et al,
- A Report on the Survey of the Needs and Manpower of Old People
in Taipei City by Bai, et al,
- A Study on the Old Age Welfare of the Republic of China by Hsiao,
et a I,
- Tackling the Issue of Ageing of the Republic of China by Chen, et al,
- A Study on the Living and Medical Treatments of the Elderly in
Taiwan by Cheng,
- Cost and Provisions of Health Services in the Republic of China on
Taiwan: 1979-1981 by Kaim-Caudle and Chin,
- Household Comparison, Extended Kinship and Reproduction in
Taiwan: 1973-1980 by Freedman, et al
are also referred and used.
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4.3. The field Study
As mentioned before, the objective of the author's field study was to collective
some crucial data which were not available in existing official and academic sources.
Although the field study was of small scale due to the lack of resources, it still
consisted of two parts:
1. a postal questionnaire survey of persons recently retired from the
two main social insurance schemes, LI and GEI,
2. a small interview survey of persons retiring five years earlier.
In the postal survey, the author tried to collect the needed data to answer several
pieces of vital information which had been raised during the previous year's desk
study. They were as follows.
1. the ratio of insured wage to actual wage,
2. the reasons for choosing certain type of retirement payment,
3. the management of retirement payments,
4. the sufficiency of income after retirement,
5. the reasons for joining or not joining RGEI,
6. health situation and expenditure,
7. participation and activities,
8. special personal difficulties.
These questions are raised because of the following reasons:
(1) We learn from the literature and the statistics that the insured wage is only a part
of the gross earnings of the insured persons both in GEI and LI though they should be
equal by law, ie, the ratio of insured wage to gross wage should be 1 or 100%. If the
contributions can be collected according to gross earnings, the revenue of the
systems could be greatly improved. And it is also a reliable way to increase the level
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of benefits. So the ratio of insured wage to gross earnings is a vital point here, we
want to not only make sure the size of the ratio but also make clear its reasons.
(2)Apart from some retirees retired from GEI and Ml who may have the opportunity to
choose an occupational pension, all old age benefits in GEI, LI and Ml are paid in lump
sum. At the point of production, a large amount of lump sum payment could be used
to invest or to help children to study, to buy a house or to establish a business. But
at the point of consumption, if retirement benefits are paid in lump sum, we will face
a great uncertainty because we do not know our own life span. Even if we use it to
invest, the risk of loss is still there. So lump sum payment is not seen as a
satisfactory type of old age provision from many aspects. As there is an option
between lump sum and pension in public occupational old age provision and the data
of GEI retirees are also available, so it is important to understand the choices made
between lump sum and pension payments for those people who have such a choice.
And then we can examine that wether the option of pension is welcome or not.
(3)At present because all old age insurance benefits are paid in lump sum and the
majority of public occupational benefits are also opted in lump sum, so the way and
the efficiency of their management (ie, how do they deal with this big amount of
money? eg, to save or to invest?) of retirement payments will be a crucial financial
issue in retirement life. So what is its real function is our concern.
(4)Sufficiency of income in retirement is clearly an issue needing evidence. And it is
quite clear that the actual social assistance level is too low to use as poverty line, so
the figures deriyed from the author's survey might be seen as a subjective self-judged
one for the retirees in Taiwan. In chapters 6 and 7, the author will discuss this issue
thoroughly.
(5)The social insurance provisions in Taiwan are not only comprehensive, but also
employment-related. Whenever an insured person retires and receives his retirement
benefit, he will be excluded from the insurance system and lose his entitlement to all
other benefits, including his health insurance services as well. As a man will need
more health services when he grows older, so the need of health insurance should be
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very urgent for the retired. The operation of voluntary health insurance for retirees in
GEI give a chance to test this hypothesis. If the participation rate is not as high as we
expect, then we have to explore its reasons.
(6)For the retirees in LI, there is no chance for them to join any social health
insurance. They are responsible for all the medical expenditure by themselves, so their
actual burden is our great concern.
(7)Apart from those who continue to engage in part-time jobs or even full-time jobs,
the retirees will have plenty of spare time. If they do not find something interesting
to do or to participate, they will suffer from a loss of identification or the sorrow of
loneliness. This will be of great harm to their health and their lives. So we are
interested to investigate this issue and see if it is satisfactory or not.
(8)Although every person and family has their own special difficulties, when they are
common to the majority of people, then they become new social problems. We try to
explore possible new social problems in the future through this question.
Facing these separate questions which can not be answered by the existing
statistics and literature, they are meaningful and can be integrated together only
under the general framework presented in the desk study. So a specific field survey to
collect these data is required. As mentioned before, there are two parts in this field
study: postal questionnaire survey and interview survey. Generally, the first priority in
the postal survey design was to make those questions look simple and easy in order
not to frighten the respondents, no matter what survey methods were used. My
strategy was that all complicated concepts or abstract ideas were divided into several
simple parts or real daily events in order to avoid ambiguity. For example, the ratio of
insured wage to actual wage could be a complicated concept for many respondents,
so I tried to collect this data by asking the respondents their actual wage, insured
wage or contributions separately, and then to calculate their ratios by myself.
Moreover, the health situation would be also a quite abstract or very subjective idea
for many respondents. In order to make this question more objective and empirical, I
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tried to judge this situation by the frequency of visiting a doctor. As for the other
single idea questions, I just asked the respondents directly by using open-ended
questions in order to shorten the length of the questionnaire. As for the interview
survey, its questions were generally the same as the postal questionnaire, but more
additional related intensive questions would be flexibly asked the interviewees.
Especially about the questions of personal difficulties, every person would have
different needs and difficulties. Moreover, more illustrative and qualitative material
could be collected by this kind of survey.
As the focus of this study is the social security provisions of old people in Taiwan,
the above questions would be more meaningful if the survey was applied to the whole
population of old people. But because this study is a one-person-conducted study,
the problems of sample-drawing and research financing would be formidable tasks for
the author if such a survey was conducted. Moreover, because the samples must be
drawn from the household registration offices where the population records are kept,
and unfortunately those offices are locally allocated throughout the whole country, so
it will be far from the ability of one person to conduct such a large scale survey. For
feasibility, the coverage of survey was restricted to only retired persons because all
old age benefit application forms of GEI and LI within ten years were preserved in
their archives in Taipei City. However, when the samples were only drawn from LI and
GEI, this would mean that: 1)the population was confined to people who were in the
two biggest social insurance schemes, and 2)the minority of samples were not
certainly up to 'old age' because there was a provision for early retirement which
could allow some insured persons to retire at an age younger than 50 years.
After the coverage of population had been chosen, the issue of how to draw the
samples was the next task. In theory the samples had better be drawn from all ten
years' retirees, but there would be a problem of a high non-delivery rate due to death
and moving if we did so, because we know that the moving rate of residence would
be very high in recent years due to the rapid economic development and other
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reasons. For example, in my interview research in 1986, the interviewees retired only 5
years earlier than the samples I actually drew, the non-delivery rate was as high as
45% in GEI and 56% in LI even after deleting the number of 'not at home', 'door-bell
broken' and 'refusal'. It was 10 time's more than the mail samples. In order to avoid
such a problem, the coverage of samples was further restricted to only the retirees
who retired in the latest year(ie, 1984), about 10 to 22 months before the time of the
survey (October, 1985). Under such modifications, the feasibility or even the efficiency
of research will be certainly improved. However we will confront new shortcomings by
doing so. For example, some of the insured persons in GEI might opt to retire at the
completion of 25 years' service, so many of them could be younger than 50 years old.
For this group of retirees, they are definitely not 'old' within 15 year's period. So the
samples might be biased by this group of retirees. Therefore, this factor must be
taken into account in the interpretation of the data.
Apart from the issue of sampling coverage, the other important issue was to
decide what kind of survey method should be used. As mentioned above, this is a
single-person-conducted research without available research grant, so it was
impossible for me to choose the interview method as the first priority to collect data
though this method was more advantageous than other methods in many aspects. For
example, the proper respondents can be reached; the completeness, accuracy and
intensiveness of data can be guaranteed; and the problems of illiteracy and low
cooperation rate can be overcome. However, the interview method is very expensive
in several aspects: money, time and labour. Generally, they are interrelated to each
other. In an interview survey, as there must be a qualified or competent interviewer to
visit each respondent, we need to recruit such a group of interviewers. If competent
persons are not available, then the work of training is necessary. So we need time to
train them and money to pay them. After the interview survey is put into operation,
the interviewers need money and time to travel to reach their interviewees who live
separately in different places. If the number of interviewers is very small, it will take a
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longer time to finish the interview (Young, Pauline V., 222-225; Adams and
Schvaneveldt, 214). For this reason, the method that I might use had to be very
cheap and labour-saving, so the method of a mail questionnaire was finally chosen
because it was not only the most economical one but also the most efficient
one(Moser, 176).
Nevertheless, the author realised that a mail questionnaire also had its own
disadvantage. The biggest disadvantage would be that its response or return rate
would be very low (Moser, 177), particularly if there was no gift or other rewards to
thank the respondent for his co-operation. There are many reasons for non-response.
The most objective one is illiteracy or low education. If most respondents belong to
this group of population, this method will not be feasible. The next one is
non-delivery, perhaps because the mailing address is not correct or the respondent
has moved elsewhere or other reasons. However, more important reasons could be
the subjective ones. People just do not like to take time to fill up and to reply to a
mail questionnaire because they think it is meaningless and useless to do such things.
It is particularly true if the sample is from the general population, rather than of a
special group. In such cases, it is a convention to require the researcher to aim at a
response rate of at least 30 or 40 per cent. Only the response rates of the samples of
special interest groups could be reasonably high. In many cases, they could be higher
than 80 per cent (Moser, 179). The second disadvantage is that the respondents
might misunderstand the meanings of the questionnaire or forget to answer some
very important questions. Apart from gifts or rewards, the only thing that the
researcher can do to increase the response rate is to send a follow-up letter to
remind and to persuade respondents. There could be some effects, but not certainly
so (Moser, 182; Adams and Schvaneveldt, 206). Moreover, because the questionnaire
is the only and the final source of data, and because the survey is generally
anonymous, so if there is any incomplete reply, there will be no way for the
researcher to make up such missing data. In order to avoid these disadvantages, the
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questionnaire must be very short and simple. However, this measure would cause
another new disadvantage: the collected data would be relatively limited.
The practical questionnaire survey was put into operation in October 1985 when I
returned to Taiwan. Several things I had to do almost simultaneously. The most
urgent one was that I had to apply for permission from the two insurance authorities
of GEI and LI to draw samples from their archives by the name of the institute I serve.
It took about one week to be granted permission. The second urgent thing was to
choose a reliable printing shop to print the questionnaires, envelopes and an attached
letter. Including proofreading, it took about three weeks to prepare three thousand
questionnaires.
In 1984 although the number of retirees in LI (19,630) was almost three times
larger than that of GEI (6,631), for the purpose of comparative study, I drew 1,000
samples from GEI and only 2,000 samples from LI. Both sets of archives were
relatively conveniently located in suburban Taipei. However, the time available at GEI
was shortened by two hours due to traffic conditions. Therefore, the task of
sample-drawing took three weeks to complete. As the archives are confidential, I had
no idea how the files were stored in the archives before I saw them. In GEI archives,
every 50 cases were put into a hard file box. The total was about 133 boxes in 1984. I
drew eight samples from each box by equal distance until I got 1,000 samples. In LI
archives, each file box consisted of 100 cases. Eleven samples were drawn from each
box until 2,000 samples were reached.
After the samples had been drawn and the questionnaires had been printed, many
persons were invited to help me to write the addresses on the envelopes. Including
the tasks of folding the questionnaires, inserting the questionnaires into the envelopes
and sticking stamps on the questionnaires and the envelopes, it took another three
days to finish this labourious work.
As soon as I posted these questionnaires, I returned to Britain in some haste at
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the beginning of November 1985, otherwise my re-entry visa would expire. I trusted
one of my colleagues to collect the returned questionnaires for me and asked him to
post them altogether to me at the end of the year. I received the questionnaires in
January 1986. After sorting out the results, the non-delivery rate was quite low. It was
only 4.2% in GEI and 5.3% in LI. But the valid response rate was not very satisfactory.
It was 41.3% in GEI and only 25.6% in LI though its total effective response rate was a
little better (see Table 4.1). The result of LI being much lower than GEI could be
explained by the fact that most retirees in LI were poorly educated or even illiterate. It
could be a difficulty for them to answer a questionnaire by writing. If this hypothesis
is true, it will mean that the illiterate or low educated samples are under-represented.
Therefore, more prudence is needed in the interpretation of the data.




Total population | 6,631
1
| 19,630
Total samples | 1,000
1
| 2,000
Total effective samples | 958
1
1,894
Total returns | 420 532
a)Invalid return i o I 6
b)Late returns i 7 '8
Valid returns 413 512
Non-delivery 42 106
a)address unclear or invalid 22 59
b)address changed 15 45
c)deaths 2 2




Total effective response rate (%) | 43.8 28.1
Valid response rate (%) j 41.3 | 25.6
As there was a high rate of non-response, it could cause a problem of the validity
of the samples. Fortunately there were some corresponding data available from the
official statistical data in GEI. A test of the validity of GEI samples was therefore
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possible. The direct way to test the hypothesis of the likelihood or the similarity
between my sample and population is to measure their location (or position) and
dispersion (or spread). Because only the population means of age, insured wage,
months of payment, and size of lump sum payment are available, so the test of the
sample can be based on only these four variables. According to GEI statistics, the
population means of the above four variables are: age, 60.73; insured wage,
NT$10,248; months of payment, 32.43; lump sum payment, NT$332,341. And according
to the author's research, the corresponding sample means are: age, 62.98; insured
wage, NT$10,280; months of payment, 32.63; lump sum payment, NT$332,285 (see
Table 4.2). In normal case, because we do not know population mean, so we use
standard error as a test to justify sample mean as population mean. But in our case
here, as we already know both sample mean and population mean, so we can use the
fact that whether population mean falls within the confidence interval of sample mean
or not as a criterion to test for the likelihood or the similarity between sample and
population. If population mean falls within the confidence interval, we say that the
null hypothesis is rejected, ie, the sample is similar to the population. If population
mean falls out of the interval, we say that the rejection of null hypothesis is wrong, ie,
we commit a type II error, the sample is in fact not similar to its population (Yeomans,
1968b:71-72). According to the probability theory of t distribution, when sample size
is very large, generally larger than 120, then the t value at 0.05 level of significance
will be 1.960 (see Yamane, Table 3 in Appendix). So the confidence interval of 95%
should be between sample mean minus 1.960 standard error and sample mean plus
1.960 standard error. Finally, according to actual figures, we can get the confidence
intervals as follows: age, 62.55 < X < 63.41; insured wage, 10.03 < X < 10.53 (in
thousand); months of payments, 31.94 < X < 33.32; lump sum payment, 321.31 < X
< 343.26 (in thousand). Based on above confidence intervals, we find that the
population mean of age is lower than the interval, ie, the average age of sample is
higher than that of population. This means that any interpretation of data related to
age should take account of this bias. All other three variables fall within the
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confidence intervals. They are considered as the direct evidence to support the
similarity between sample and population.
Table 4 .2 Means of Population and Sample in GEI 9 1984
|population sample
variable mean mean standard error| 1
1
.960 s.e.
Age 60.73 62.98 0.218 |
1
0 .4273
Insured |(NT$1,000) (NT$1,000) 1




payment I 32.43 32.63 0.354 |
1
0 .6938
Lump sum |(NT$1,000) (NT$1,000) 1
payment | 332.34 332.29 5.598 | 10 .9721
Source: 1)CTC, 1985:154-179
2)author's survey
As mentioned before, there are some vital limitations in mailing questionnaires, in
order to overcome or at least to relieve these limitations, a small scale of interview
survey would be very constructive in the interpretation of the questionnaire data,
because additional intensive data and unexpected data could be discovered in the
process of interview. After the questionnaire data had been processed and analyzed, in
August 1986, I returned to Taiwan to stay another one month to conduct an interview
research on the retirees who retired five years earlier than the previous questionnaire
respondents in 1979 and lived in Taipei City. The main purpose of the interview is to
get a general idea about the difference of the living situations of the retirees who
retired five years earlier. It was not only a chance to observe the living situations of
the retirees personally, but also a chance to collect more related data beyond the
structured questionnaire. My plan was to interview 50 persons in GEI and LI
respectively. The one sample drawn from each file box was the first one in each file
box who lived in Taipei. I expected the moving rate of LI would be much higher than
GEI, so I drew samples of 62 from GEI and 98 from LI. I hoped these extra samples
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would be helpful in achieving my goal of 100 interviews in GEI and LI. But after the
interview was conducted, I only successfully interviewed 16 cases in GEI and 25 cases
in LI. The reasons I was unable to access the interviewees were as the following
table (see Table 4.3).





1.death 1 1 5
2.old house being demolished 1
to build a new big building 5 1 12
to be extended as highway 2 4
to be a park 1 0
to be a car park 1 0
3.nobody at home when visiting* 14 17
4.door bell out of order (apartment) 2 0
5.went to the USA 4 i 5
6.moved to other place 11 1 18
7.address being renamed and recorded | 3 i 11




Total | 46 1 73
Note: * = to call only once in day time, no recall.
Based on this new sample, if a mailing questionnaire had been applied, its
non-delivery rates would have been as high as 45% in GEI and 56% in LI after
deleting the number of 'not at home', 'door bell broken' and 'refusal'. Compared to the
actual non-delivery rates of 1985 questionnaire survey which were only 4.2% in GEI
and 5.3% in LI (see Table 4.1), it was 10 time's difference in both GEI and LI though
the samples were only 5 years earlier. So it was a correct decision to draw the
sample from the latest year in the previous survey. However, delivery rate is certainly
not equal to response rate. The latter will be much lower than the former. As for the
response rate, there would not be much difference between these two samples
though they were drawn from a different year.
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4.4. The Design of the Questionnaire
Basically the purpose of the questionnaire was to ask the questions raised in the
previous section. But in practical design, more issues had to be taken into account.
Firstly, the questionnaire should look short and simple in order not to frighten the
respondents, then they might be happy to answer the questions. So for all questions
with great variety of answers, I used open-ended questions; only very few questions
with limited range of answers such as sex and marital situations, closed-ended
questions were used. However, several questions were mixed (see Questionnaire).
This measure greatly shortened the length of the questionnaire. If the questionnaire
was completely in closed-ended form, it would have been at least five times longer
by comparing with the coding list.
However, this modification also had its own disadvantages. The most significant
one was that the respondents had to write more words. It would have frustrated
many low educated respondents. Secondly, in order to encourage respondents to
start to answer questions, the easiest questions were put at the beginning and those
about sensitive questions such as source of income and amount of retirement
payment were mixed with other less sensitive questions in order to reduce the
resistance of respondents. And some open-ended and more difficult questions were
put at the end in order not to frustrate the motivation of answering the questions.
Thirdly, at the time of the survey, the compulsory occupational schemes had just
come into force. Most retirees of LI were retired without such payments. Moreover,
there was no option of health insurance for LI retirees, either. So these two questions
were deleted from the LI questionnaires. That is, the 16th and 20th questions in the
GEI questionnaire were deleted from LI questionnaire (see the GEI Questionnaire in the
end of this chapter). This was the main difference of the questionnaires between GEI
and LI.
In summary, the contents of the questionnaires could be classified into the
following aspects:
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1. personal basic data: resident area(1), sex(2), age(3), original
province(4), religion(16);
2. family situations: marital status(ll), number of children(12), forms
of residence(13), housing(14);
3. insurance data: last employer(5), actual monthly wage(6), insured
years(7), the number of months of old age payments(8), insured
wage(9), the amount of old age payments(IO);
4. occupational payments: the amounts and the reasons of choosing
certain types of payments(16);
5. the management of retirement payments(17);
6. other sources of income(18);
7. the sufficiency of gross income(19);
8. the reasons of joining or not joining RGEI(20);
9. the main biggest items of expenditure(21);
10. social participation and activities(22);
11. health situations(23);
12. other difficulties(24)
The results from my survey is treated as one of several sources for my analysis of
social security for the elderly in Taiwan. It might be useful to report where in the
following chapters the results of my survey are discussed. This is done in Table 4.4.






1.The insured wage ratio
2.The reasons for choosing types of payment
3.The management of retirement payments
4.The sufficiency of income after retirement
5.The reasons for joining or not joining RGEI



















End of Chapter 4
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The Questionnaire for GEI Retirees
1.Resident Area:







8.Number of Months of Old Age Insurance Payment:
9.Insured Wage:
(or Monthly Insurance Contributions: )







|_| yes; boys: person(s), girls: person(s)
Is the youngest child an adult? |_| yes, |_| no
Is the youngest child employed? |_| yes, |_| no
| no(no children)
13.Forms of Residence:
j_| living in family with children
|_| living in family but not with children or no children




Is the house paid off? |_| yes, |_| no
|_| children's house
i_| government-owned house
|_| rented house, monthly rent:
|_| other:
15.Religion:
|_| yes, the name of religion:
Li no
16.Types of Occupational Payments: (GEI only)
|_| lump sum payment, total amount:
|_| monthly payment, monthly amount:
| combination of payment:
/ (ratio)lump sum payment, amount:
/ (ratio)monthly payment, amount:
Why do you choose this type of payment?
17.How do you manage your retirement payments?
(for example, favourite rate saving, buying housing, helping
children to run a business, etc. )1)2)3)
18.Apart from retirement payments, do you have any other sources
income?
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J given by children, (|_| regularly, |_| non-regularly )
|_| past savings
|_| property investment
j | undertaking a new job
|_| other:
19.Depending on these income, is it enough for your living expenditure
|_| enough
|_| not enough, it should be at least per month
20.Have you joined RGEI? (GEI only)
! | yes, reasons: , contributions: per month
|_| no, reasons:
21.After retirement, what are the biggest items of your expenditure?1)2)3)
22.What kind of social activities do you participate?1)2)
23.In the last year, have you ever seen a doctor?
|_| no;
| yes, name of disease:
episodes:
total expenditure:
24.Apart from economic problems, do you have any other problems that
you expect our government to help you?
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GENERAL BACKGROUND TO SOCIAL SECURITY IN TAIWAN
5.1. Introduction
The establishment and development of a social security provision greatly depends
upon the general conditions and background of its society. Its relationship is just like
seeds to soil. The quality of soil will restrict the growth of seeds. So are the
conditions of a society to its social security system. In this chapter I will give a brief
description of the general background of Taiwan according to the following aspects.
Firstly, the most fundamental background is its natural environment. Different
geographical conditions such as climate, temperature, topography and natural
resources will influence the needs and life of its people in different degrees. Secondly,
the demographic conditions such as the number, age composition and dependency
ratio also have a very close relation with the social security provisions of its society.
When the proportion of old people become higher, the old age benefits expenditure
will be more expensive and need more resources to finance. So an estimation of the
proportion of old people in the future decades is made.
Thirdly, as social security is mainly a kind of income redistribution, either
horizontal (ie, intra-generation) or vertical (ie, inter-generation), not only the level of
economic development but also the structure and pattern of economy will greatly
influence the pattern and the function of social security. Apart from the discussion of
development and structural change of economy in Taiwan, the author also discusses
the possible future economic reform which will provide new form of resources to
finance an all-universal scheme.
Fourthly, all social legislations must be made through the political process. Apart
from the introduction of structure and operation of the existing political system, the
future possible reform in political system which will greatly improve the efficiency in
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social legislation is also discussed in some length. This discussion is necessary
because the management of the new branch of economic system in the future is the
responsibility of government. Some legal background of social security in the
constitution is also given. Lastly, the social situations will focus on family structure,
housing, education and health services because they all have a close relationship with
social security provision.
5.2. Geographic Situation
As a geographic unit, Taiwan is the biggest island of China. Including the nearby
small islands, its area is about 36 thousand sq km. The island is located
approximately 200 km to the southeast of mainland China. The position of the whole
area on a map is between 119°18'03" and 124°34'30" of east longitude and between
21°45'24" and 25°56'30" of north latitude. The Tropic of Cancer crosses the southern
part of the island. As it belongs to a semi-tropical zone, its average temperature is
about 19.1°C in the mountain area and about 21.8-24.5°C in the plains. Except for
mountain peaks, there is no snow in the whole area. As heating is not necessary in
the winter, its living conditions are not so difficult as countries in temperate zones.
The topography of Taiwan island is mountainous. The mountain area where the
altitude is over 500 metres is about 45% of the island's area. The arable land is only
about one fourth. The majority of the population are living in the plains in the western
part of the island.
Because the area is very small, natural resources are very scarce. The principal
mineral reserves are only some coal, copper, natural gas, marble, limestone and
dolomite. Apart from marble, production is quite limited. As for agricultural products,
due to the limitation of the area of arable land, only rice, tea, sugar, vegetables, fruit,
pork and seafood achieve surplus for export. Other agricultural products such as
wheat, soy bean, cotton, corn, cattle and timber are far behind actual need. Most of
them must be imported. The main resource of Taiwan is human capital.
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5.3. Demographic Situation
In 1946, the year after Taiwan was returned to China, its population was about 6.1
million. Four years later, after a tide of immigrants from mainland China following the
retreat of the nationalist government to Taiwan, the population rose to 7.6 million in
1950. Afterwards, the population was 10.8 million in 1960, 14.7 million in 1970, 17.8
million in 1980, and 19.3 million in 1985 (see Table A1 in Appendix). Compared to
other larger countries, this population is not very large. But the area of Taiwan is so
small, only 36 thousand sq km, that its density has become very high, increasing from
169 persons per sq km in 1946 to 535 persons per sq km in 1985. Among the
countries with populations over 10 million, this density is the second highest in the
world. This population pressure is particularly serious on account of the scarcity of
natural resources in Taiwan.
Besides the growth of population, the structure of population is also undergoing
change. Due to the rise of the standard of living and the improvement of health
services, the crude death rate decreased from 1.82% in 1947 to 0.5% in 1985 (see
Table A2 in Appendix) and life expectancy at birth has also increased about 20 years
from 1950 to 1985. In 1985 it was 75.8 years for female and 70.8 years for male (see
Table A4 in Appendix). As for the life expectancy at 65 years, it was 13.2 years for
male and 15.6 years for female in 1983. On the other hand, due to the
industrialisation and urbanisation of society, child-bearing turned to be a great
financial burden; people realised the pressure of population and accepted the policy of
family planning, the crude birth rate dropped from over 4% in 1940s and 1950s to 3%
in 1960s and finally to 1.96% in 1984 though that is still quite high (see Table A2 in
Appendix).
As the population of Taiwan is still very young, the number of births does not
decrease very much though its rate has decreased a lot. The number of births per
year fluctuated at about 0.4 million in the whole period of time. As migration is very
small and the number of births is also very stable, the radical growth of population in
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Taiwan is explicitly caused by the increase of life expectancy and the decrease of
crude death rate. That is, more people live longer than before. However, before the
1970s the figure of old people aged 65 and over was still about 2% to 4% of the
population. Even in 1985 this figure was only about 5%.
Although the total dependency ratio, the total of old dependency ratio and young
dependency ratio, of Taiwan is quite similar to most western welfare countries, 53.0 in
1985, its old dependency ratio, the ratio of the number of the people aged 65 and
over to that aged between 15 and 64, was only 7.7% and its young dependency ratio,
the ratio of the number of the people aged under 15 to that aged between 15 and 64,
was as high as 45.2% in 1985. The difference of these two ratios was much larger
than those of many western welfare countries. The ageing index, the ratio of the
number of the people aged 65 and over to that aged under 15, can also demonstrate
the same phenomenon. Some welfare countries such as West Germany and Sweden
may be high up to 80 to 90 or even more(see Table A6 in Appendix), but it was only
17.1 in Taiwan in 1985(see Table A3 in Appendix).
However, the percentage of old people will keep growing as more young and adult
people can reach old age until the population reaches a stable pattern, ie, Zero
Population Growth (ZPG) or quasi-ZPG. According to the definitions established by
the United Nations, they define the population of the countries with more than 7% of
their citizens aged 65 and over as 'aged', 4-7% as 'mature' and those less than 4% as
'young'(TU, 1982:9). As the proportion of old people aged 65 and over can be as high
as 17% in Sweden, 16% in West Germany and 15% in Britain, this range for 'aged'
population seems a little too broad. It would be better to consider the range from 0 to
5% as 'young', the range from 6 to 10% as 'mature' and the range of 11% and over as
'aged' population. If so, the population of Taiwan is still 'young', it is far from 'aged'.
As the population pressure is not only a big problem today but also in the future,
a policy must be made to tackle it. A reasonable response to this problem is to aim at
124
Zero Population Growth (ZPG), that is, no more growth of population. As the growth of
population is mainly determined by fertility, mortality and migration, the possible
means of retarding the growth of population are to decrease fertility and immigration
and to increase mortality and emigration. Theoretically, the increasing of mortality
and emigration can have a very dramatic impact on both the growth and the age/sex
structure of a population. However, the increasing of mortality is obviously undesirable
and unacceptable by all people and the increasing of emigration will be opposed by
other countries. Therefore, the only feasible way is to reduce fertility. However, fertility
cannot be reduced too dramatically as the resulting unbalanced age structure of
population will cause new problems for a society.
For most young population countries, ZPG is only a long-term goal. Of course they
can pursue a ZPG-Now policy without regard to all side effects. For instance, the
one-child policy of the mainland China today will face the problem that there will be
too little working population to support their old people in the future. Or, to be more
precise, a young couple will have to support four old parents. Therefore, this is
explicitly not a desirable policy. The better way might be a ZPG-Later policy (Weeks,
172-178). But how can a ZPG-Later policy be implemented. That is an issue of
implementation. In order to simplify this issue I would like to delete migration and
restrict the discussion to Zero Natural Growth (ZNG) because in the case of Taiwan
migration has been very small in the past twenty years. Thus ZPG-Later is on this
assumption equivalent to ZNG-Later. ZNG means that the birth rate of society is equal
to its death rate.
For a young population society its birth rate is certainly much higher than its
death rate. A ZNG-Now policy will cause a great distortion of the future age structure.
Therefore, a ZNG-Later policy is the better one. Theoretically the mildest way to
approach a ZNG-Later policy is to adopt a Fixed Births (FB) policy, that is, keeping the
births of each year under a fixed amount without regarding the number of women
aged 15 to 49 and the number of deaths. Because the life expectancy of a society is
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quite stable and cannot be increased unlimitedly, so it will reach a ceiling at a certain
level at some length of time and then the death rate of a society will be equal to its
birth rate gradually. For example, if the life expectancy of a society is 70 years at
birth and its women start to have babies at the age of 20, then this society will reach
ZNG within 50 years, with a FB policy.
Although FB policy is theoretically possible, there is a problem of implementation.
Even after a given number of births has been fixed, how can this figure be allocated
to thousands of couples or fertile women? Therefore, FB policy is a general theoretical
idea, not a feasible practical measure. The more practical measure to approach the
aim of FB policy is a 2-Children Per Couple (2C/C) policy or 1—Child Per Person (1C/P)
policy. In Taiwan there has been a clear 2C/C policy for government employees since
1983. The government employees' child allowance is only paid for the children who
are born in the first two pregnancies after 1983. A similar measure is also
implemented in the tax system. Only the children in the first two pregnancies are
entitled to tax deduction if they are born after that year. Explicitly its purpose is to
discourage people from having more than two children per family. Explicitly, the
effect of this policy depends very much on the amount of the tax deduction each
child can be entitled to. Though the research evidence is not available, compared to
about US$5,000 per capita GNP in 1987, the amount of tax deduction, only NT$32,000
(US$1,143; US$=NT$28) per child in 1988, NT$2,000 more than the previous year, is not
very attractive, so I do not expect its effect is very significant.
Normally a 2C/C policy is sufficient because its aim can be achieved within a
certain period of time if couples really have an average of only two children. But if
there are too many cases of divorce, re-marriage and illegitimate births an 1C/P
policy is more precise. 1C/P means that any adult person, either male or female, is
entitled to have only one child, no matter whether he/she is married or not. However,
2C/C or 1C/P policy is only necessary for a society in which people have a strong
preference to have more children, otherwise a different policy might be considered
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and adopted. For example, a high standard family allowances may be applied to
encourage more births.
Whenever a society reaches its ZPG state, its birth rate will be the same as its
death rate though both of them may fluctuate slightly. Viewing the demographic
statistics of some western welfare states, two countries, Sweden and Britain, are of
near-ZPG. Both of them have birth rates of about 1.1% to 1.2% and death rates of
about 1.1% (see Table A7 and A8 in Appendix). Especially in Sweden these rates have
been quite stable for quite long periods. In the case of ZPG these rates may be
considered as constants in demographic theory. Since ZPG is the long-run aim of
Taiwan, the endeavour is to decrease the birth rate which at present is about 2% and
to increase the death rate, 0.5%, until they are identical to the above constants.
As for the future population of Taiwan, it can be estimated by the population
projections which were made by the Council for Economic Planning and Development
(CEPD) in 1986. They were based on the mid-year population in 1985 and the sex ratio
at birth of 107.5. As its assumption of mortality was derived from the average life
expectancy at birth which, co-projected by the Department of Health (DOH) and the
Ministry of Interior (MOI), will increase from 70.8 years in 1985 to 73.0 years in 2010
for male and from 75.8 years to 79.5 years in the same period for female for all
projections, the projections are mainly the functions of the different assumptions of
fertility (see Table A5 in appendix).
In the high fertility projection the state of ZPG will be achieved in 2035 at the
population of 26.6 million. In medium one it will be achieved in 2027 at the population
of 25.1 million. And, lastly, the low one will be achieved in 2022 at the population of
24.0 million. As the high projection assumes that the total fertility rate (T.F.R.), the
total of age-specific birth rate of all years between 15 and 49 of females, will remain
the same as that in 1985, 1,900, for the whole period, viewing the declining trend of
the past twenty years, this assumption is probably untrue. So this assumption could
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be safely rejected.
The medium projection assumes that the total fertility rate will decline 75 points
every 5 years from 1,900 in the first ten years and then keep unchanging at 1,750
afterwards. Compared to the figures of the past 20 years, it could still be a little too
high but quite reasonable. As for the low projection, its decline is the double of the
medium one, even if it would be too low but still possible. Therefore, the practical
choice could fall between the medium and the low. That is, the population could reach
its ZPG state between 24 and 25 million in the time between 2022 and 2027. This is a
very important element to be taken into consideration when we make any
policy-decision on universal pension schemes in the future.
5.4. Economic Situation
5.4.1. Some Indicators
The economic achievement of Taiwan is generally considered as an economic
miracle in developing countries. The most significant indicator is that the per capita
gross national product (GNP) has increased from less than US$100 before 1950 to
about US$3,000 in 1985 and to US$5,000 in 1987 at current prices. According to a
report in the Economist(21-27 February 1988), this figure will be expected to be up to
about US$17,000 by the end of this century. Of course, the recent rapid appreciation
of the Taiwan dollar against the devaluated US dollar has greatly influenced this
figure. The Taiwan dollar has increased from 39 dollars exchanging for one US dollar
to 28 Taiwan dollars exchanging one US dollar in the last two years.
However, per capita GNP is not the only indicator to express the economic welfare
of a country. Other indicators such as the ownership rates of certain family facilities
might be helpful and even more precise because they can avoid the biases derived
from the inaccurate exchange rate and the differences of purchasing power of the US
dollar in different countries. For example, let us compare the per capita GNP of
Taiwan with other developed countries in 1986 (see Table A5.8 in Appendix). The per
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capita GNP of Switzerland is 5.2 times that of Taiwan, USA is 4.5 times, even Italy
which is generally listed as one of the less successful of developed countries is also
twice that of Taiwan. Does this mean that the economic welfare of these countries is
really better than Taiwan to the same degree? Explicitly that is not certainly the case.
Because not only is the price level in different countries different, but also the official
exchange rate does not necessarily reflect real purchasing power in different
countries, so their gaps could not be the same as the calculation. They could be
larger or smaller. But what difference it should be is a question which requires
further study.
Obviously, compared to income, economic welfare also has a very close
relationship with consumption. It is clear that not all of our income will be used up for
consumption, so the concepts of national income (either GNP or GDP) or personal
income cannot precisely express the economic welfare of a country, a family or even
a person. As national consumption is the main part of national income they are
about 70% in Taiwan, 84% in USA and 84.6% in UK the indicators of concrete
consumption items might be more effective because the amount of income could be
very large but the amount of consumption might be quite limited. For instance, if we
choose the number of telephones per 1,000 inhabitants as the indicator of economic
welfare, the difference between Taiwan and other developed countries is unanimously
less than that of per capita GNP. Furthermore, if we compare the figures of television
sets between developed countries and Taiwan, the difference is even less than those
of telephones(see Table A5.8 in Appendix). I would expect that the figures for food
will be even smaller than those of television sets because food is more necessary in
daily life. Unfortunately that kind of data is not available.
However, not all items of consumption are valid for this purpose. For example, the
number of motor vehicles is a very exceptional one. The relative difference is much
worse than for per capita GNP. Motor vehicles are so common in developed countries
that, apart from Denmark, Japan and UK, the ownership rates of motor vehicles of
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developed countries are even higher than that of television sets. That is, it is more
common than television sets. In developed countries the price of an old second hand
car could be as low as twice that of a new colour television set. So it is quite easy
for most people to get one. But the situation is quite different in Taiwan. An old
second hand car will cost at least five times more than a new colour television set. A
new imported car will cost 1 to 2 times more than in the exporting country. This high
price is caused by the government using a high-rate tariff to protect the infant
domestic motor industry. Due to the bottleneck of technology and economic scale, the
price of local cars is so high that they would not be able to survive if there was no
tariff protection. It is true that the price of a car is generally much higher than a
television. But if there is no distortion from tariff, the situation will not be so
significant. This is the reason why motor vehicles are not a valid indicator to
substitute for per capita GNP in Taiwan.
5.4.2. The Development
The economic achievement in Taiwan was achieved by a deliberate economic
policy and economic strategy. Taiwan has implemented eight four-year economic
plans since 1953. Roughly these eight plans can be further divided into three phases
(CEPD, 1986c:27-29). In the first phase which included the first and second plans from
1953 to 1960, the object of policy was to establish labour-intensive light industries to
produce consumption goods that had to be imported at that time. The government
used every means such as foreign exchange, import control, and tariff exemption to
encourage people to import capital goods, ie, machine and equipment, in order to
establish domestic light industries. Because the object of establishing domestic light
industries was to substitute for consumption goods, this stage was also named as
'import substitute'. In 1960 the percentage of the import of consumption goods
decreased from 19.0% in 1952 to 8.1%. The average economic growth rate was 7.6%
annually.
In the second phase which included the third and the fourth plans, the strategy
130
was to continue to expand the industries established in the previous phase. The object
was to produce consumption goods not only for the domestic market but also for the
international market. So this phase was also named as 'export-expansion' or
'export-substitute'. The percentage of industrial products exported increased from
40.9% in 1961 to 84.6% in 1968. The average economic growth rate was 10.4%
annually. However, the rapid export-expanding growth finally caused the problems of
labour-shortage and wage-increases. Therefore, the economic strategy in the third
phase had to be changed from labour-intensive to capital- and technology-intensive
industries. In this phase the policy was to call for a backward integration and a
gradual move toward heavy industries in order to produce essential intermediate
goods, capital goods and durable consumption goods which were originally dependent
on import. In 1985 the percentage of the export of industrial goods continuously
increased from 84.5% in 1974 to 93.8%, but the percentage of the import of capital
goods decreased from 30.7% in 1974 to 23.8%. The average economic growth rate in
this phase was 7.3% annually.
Before the implementing of the first four-year economic plan, there was also an
internationally famous rural land reform in Taiwan. This reform was nominally based
on the principle of the Equalisation of Land-Right in the third ism of Tripeopiism that
was initiated by Dr. Sun Yat-sen and was formally prescribed in the constitution of
the state. In theory there is a set of self-sufficient measures (which I will describe in
detail in a separate subsection) to carry out a comprehensive land reform within
Equalisation of Land-Right but unfortunately the government in that time only
adopted a revised measure to carry out the reform in order to distinguish from the
land reform in mainland China. This reform was started in 1949 and finished in 1953. It
could also be divided into three stages.
Publicly, this revised land policy was based on the existing private ownership
system and enforced on only rural land. In the first stage, farm rent was limited to a
maximum of 37.5% of the total main crop yielded in order to guarantee the tiller a
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reasonable reward for his endeavour. All rent over that rate was illegal. In the second
stage, public land formerly owned by japanese nationals was distributed on easy
terms, with preference given to the tenant claimants. In the third stage, landlords were
obliged to divest themselves of their holdings above a minimal size and to sell out to
their tenants under the Land-to-the-Tiller Act (Evans, et al, 1986). In the last two
stages, the land was sold to the tillers at an official price that was equal to 2.5 times
of the value of one year's main crop. The former landlords would get their price of
land through the prescribed bank in the form of a land bond or the stock of public
enterprises. Most landlords profited from stock ownership and became successful
industrialists. On the other hand, the tillers also had to pay-off the cost by installment
payment plan over 15 years. No tiller can get the land free, nor the landlord lose his
wealth by the compulsory divestment of holding of land. In principle, there is no 'free
lunch' nor un-compensated loss in this reform.
In addition the equal distribution of holdings of land not only greatly contributed
to the equality of income distribution in Taiwan but also gave a strong stimulation to
the growth of agricultural output. Whereas net real product of agriculture had
increased at a rate of 3.8% annually between 1911 and 1940, it rose on average by
10% annually between 1951 and 1960. The prosperity of the agriculture economy
demonstrated not only that the tillers worked hard but also that they applied more
advanced agriculture technology. The latter in particular allowed the agriculture sector
to release more labour-outflow to the industrial sector. According to the employment
records, the rate of economically active population in primary industry was 56.1% in
1952 and reduced to 17.5% in 1985. The rate in secondary industry was 16.9% in 1952
and increased to 42.4% in 1980 and then started to decrease mildly to 41.4% in 1985.
As for tertiary industry, the same rate was 27.0% in 1952 and 41.1% in 1985 (see
Table 5.1). When examining the product of industry, it demonstrates a similar tendency
(see Table 5.2).
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Table 5.1 Employment by Industry in Taiwan
I Number | Primary Secondary Tertiary






1952 | 2 999 56.1 16.9 27.0
1960 | 3 473 I 50.2 20.5 29.3
1970 | 4 576 36.7 28.0 35.3
1980 | 6 547 19.5 42.4 38.1
1985 | 7 428 ! 17.5 41.4 41.1
1986 | 7 733 | 17.0 41.5 41.5
Note:
Primary industry = agriculture, forestry, hunting and fishing.
Secondary industry = mining and quarrying; manufacturing; construction;
utilities: electricity, water and gas services.
Tertiary industry = commerce: commercial shop, hotel and restaurant;
banking and financial, insurance, real estate;
community and personal services.
Source: CEPD, 1987a:15-16
Table 5.2 Product by Industry in Taiwan
NDP Primary Secondary Tertiary
Year m Industry Industry Industry
( =100%) % % %
1952 14 572 35.9 18.0 46.1
1960 50 437 32.8 24.9 42 .3
1970 177 077 17.9 34.7 47.4
1980 1 149 924 9.2 45.0 45.8
1985 1 887 687 6.9 45.2 47 .9
1986 2 180 209 6.6 47.3 46.1
Note: NDP = National Domestic Product
Source: CEPD, 1987a:40-41
Examining the economically active population pattern in advanced western
industrialised countries, their rates tend to be from 5% to 10% in primary industry,
from 25% to 40% in secondary industry, and from 55% to 70% in tertiary industry (see
Table 5.3). Therefore, in Taiwan the rate of primary industry is likely to keep going
down. The rate of secondary industry is likely to remain stable or go down. But the
rate of tertiary industry is likely to keep going up. That is, there are more people
transferred from primary industry to secondary and tertiary industries. This change of
economic structure not only means that there are more people than before in wage
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employment basing on 'labour7 rather than on 'land' or 'capital', but also means that
the income of more people will become unreliable. Therefore, a more effective income
maintenance scheme or social security provision is necessary.
















Australia 1985 6 646 .1 6 .23 | 27 .36 | 66. 40
Austria 1985 2 832 .8 1 .29 j 40 .27 | 58. 44
Belgium 1984 3 634 .7 2 .92 | 29 .80 | 67. 28
Canada 1985 11 311 5 .22 | 25 .49 | 69. 30
Denmark 1985 2 553 .4 6 .61 | 27 .77 | 65. 41
France 1984 20 941 7 .92 | 33 oo 59. 08
Germany, W.[ 1985 25 000 5 .56 | 41 .01 | 53. 43
Italy 1985 20 507 11 .20 | 33 .63 | 55. 18
Japan 1985 58 070 8 .77 | 34 00 55. 97
Sweden 1985 4 299 4 .84 j 29 .84 | 65. 27
Switzerland| 1980 3 012 .2 7 .25 j 39 .48 | 53. 27
UK | 1985 24 071 2 .58 j 32 .35 | 65. 07
USA j 1985 107 150 3 .12 j 28 .27 | 68. 62
Source: ILO, 1986:46-107
5.4.3. Other main Characteristics
Social security provision must have a sound economic background as its basis, so
the main characteristics of a society's economy such as economic structure and
income distribution will have great influence on this issue. For many societies, as
economic equality or equal income distribution is a desirable and even a cherished
ideal, so a social security scheme is often used as an instrument to achieve this goal.
However, in Taiwan the economic equality in the sector of primary industry or
agriculture was achieved by the land reform as mentioned above. But in the sector of
secondary and tertiary industries, this goal was achieved by the principle of Regulation
of Capital. Under this principle, most large scale and monopolistic enterprises such as
steel, petrol, electricity power, water, minerals, railway, airline, wine and tobacco are
owned and managed by government, either local or central. As for the industry of the
private sector, only about 2% are of large scale, the rest 98% are of medium and
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small scale. Of course, the coverage or definition of medium and small enterprises is
quite broad. All manufacturing, processing, handicraft and mining enterprises having a
paid-up capital of less than NT$40 million or all importor/exportor, commercial firms,
transportation companies or other service enterprises having an annual sales less than
NT$40 million are classified as medium and small enterprises. Explicitly most medium
and small enterprises belong to secondary and tertiary industries. As the product of
the secondary and tertiary industries was up to 93% of national domestic product in
1985 (see Table 5.2), it means that more than 90% of these products are produced by
medium and small enterprises. Because the possession of these medium and small
enterprises belong to thousands of owners or families, this factor has greatly
contributed to the equality of income distribution in Taiwan. However, from a
negative point of view, the dominance of medium and small scale enterprises will
have the following two disadvantages in economic activities. Firstly, the research and
development of the economy will be greatly restricted due to the lack of resources;
this restriction will make the further development of these enterprises difficult and
impossible. Secondly, the life span of (many) small enterprises will be more
vulnerable and uncertain due to strong competition, this will in turn lead to the
income insecurity of the employed of these enterprises, so a provision of social
security is necessary.
The reasons why large scale enterprises are not so popular in the private sector in
Taiwan can be attributed to many factors. Apart from the above institutional reasons,
the other important one is that Chinese culture always encourages people, especially
males, to create their own businesses. Most enterprises are owned by one person or
one family or at most a few people. As the competition is so strong they cannot offer
a good pay to their employees, let alone long-term security benefit. Therefore, most
competent cadres will leave their employers and create their own businesses when
they become experienced and have accumulated sufficient capital. This cultural factor
greatly restricts the growth and the scale of private enterprises. The natural result is
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that numerous small enterprises or businesses lead to the equality of income
distribution. Besides, more small enterprises also means more self-employed or
employers employing less than five persons, and more self-employed means more
unpaid domestic workers because most of them are working for small family
businesses. This is a very important reason why there are so many people excluded
from the existing social insurance system. When we plan to extend the coverage of
social security in Taiwan, we have to take account of this factor.
Another important economic characteristic that is closely related to social security
is savings. As the economy grows, the rate of savings also grows rapidly. In 1952 the
ratio of net savings to national income was 5.2% and the gross savings in gross
national product was 9.2%, but in 1985 their rates increased up to 30.7% and 33.5%
respectively(see Table 5.4). But in western industrialised countries these rates are
quite low because there are good social security provisions to protect their people
from all kinds of contingencies, especially old age. The high rate of savings in Taiwan
demonstrates that the social security measures are far from satisfactory.







to Save in PDI
1952 5.2 9.2 2.5
1960 7.6 12.7 6.3
1970 23.8 25.5 16.5
1980 32.7 33.0 18.5
1985 30.7 33.5 22.8
1986 36.1 37.8 27.4
Note: PDI = Personal Disposable Income
Source: CEPD, 1987a:56, 59
5.4.4. The Blueprint
Dr. Sun's third ism of TripeopHsm provides a criterion for the economic
construction of a society which has inspired much of the policy of Taiwan. Its main
idea is to provide an affluent and equal economic welfare to all people of the society.
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Because the most distinctive principles in the third ism of TripeopHsm are the
Equalisation of Land_Right and the Regulation of Capita! and because the Equalisation
of Land-Right only deal with one of the productive factor, land, and the Regulation of
Capital only deal with another one factor, capital, so in this subsection we will discuss
only these two productive factors, land and capital, though there are four factors in
economic activities, here we discuss land first.
According to Dr. Sun, land should collectively belong to or be owned by the whole
people of a country. No private ownership of land or taking rent from land is
allowable. But, on the other hand, in order to survive all people have to live on land
and to produce on land, so the right to use land should be equally open to all people
of the country. No one should be deprived of it and no one should have priority or
privilege to use any piece of land unless he/she is proved as the person who can use
that land most efficiently. Only when the use of land is distributed to the person(s)
who is(are) the most efficient can the contribution of land to economic production
reach its optimum or maximum level. But the question here is how can land be
distributed to the most efficient person(s) or how can the state know who is(are) the
most efficient person(s). The way to achieve this objective is the principle of the
Equalisation of Land-Right or more precisely, the Equalisation of Land-Use (Chin,
91-5).
In the administration of land-distribution, the only tasks that government have to
do are: 1)to make a plan of land use. For example, where is rural land? Where is urban
land? In the field of urban land, where is the business area? Where is the residential
area? Where is the green area? Where is the industrial area? 2)to promulgate a fixed
and differential tax rate table for the use of different land. For example, a lower rate
for residential area and a higher rate for business area. After these two tasks have
been prepared by the government, then the use or the distribution of land is open to
the public for free competition like an auction. For any piece of land, as long as a
person can offer the highest price (This price is like a deposit) and pay it to the
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government, then he can win the right to use that land. Because the tax rate of
different land varies, so when the rate is high, the land-user will have to lower the
price of land in order to reduce the tax burden; on the contrary, when the rate is low,
the land-user will have to raise the price of the land in order to win the right to use
it. Therefore, if the rate of residential land is low, though families or households have
to pay a higher price or a longer period on instalments to win the right to its use, it
is in fact a way to save or to accumulate wealth. A higher price will in particular have
the function of encouraging stability. For land in a business area, if its tax rate is
high, then its tax of land-use will be heavy, and then the land-user will have to lower
the price of the land in order to reduce the tax burden. In turn, a lower price of land
will enable them to have more capital to invest and have the function of encouraging
the takeover and the use of land.
But one question nowadays is that all land has been occupied by certain
'land-owners', how can these lands be redistributed again? There is also no problem
for this. This problem will be easily solved by exempting the deposit in the first
auction. That is, all 'land-owners' are allowed to report the price of their land to the
government at any level and need not pay the price. Afterwards, if the land-users
find that they offered a price too high and want to reduce the price in order to relieve
their tax burden, then there will be no refund from the government because their first
deposits are exempted. But for urban land-users, if they want to increase the price to
keep on using their land, they have to pay the difference to the government
immediately; for rural land-users, if the added value of land is due to their own
efforts, then they need not pay the difference, but they need to pay tax according to
the new higher price, otherwise the government will not protect their new price.
In summary, because the government can only fix a standard rate of tax, so the
actual total cost of land is in fact determined by land-users by reporting different
price of land, not by the government. We need not worry if the tax on land is too
high or not. We also need not worry if this will discourage or suppress
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land-consuming industries or not, because those industries can be moved to a cheap
land area. We even need not worry if there is any unused land because when a land is
unused, its price will go down, and down to a level that can attract new land-users.
Furthermore, we also need not worry that land-users or 'land-owners' will report their
price too low in order to avoid the tax burden, or report their price too high in order
to get non-earned capital, because there will be another force to balance this
tendency. For example, if they report their price too low, then other people will
compete for the use of their land; and if they report their price too high, they will
have to pay unnecessary tax. Finally, all people will voluntarily or involuntarily adjust
their price equal to the actual value of the land.
After all land has been distributed, the government will register their price publicly,
and then the government will have the obligation to protect all land-users, both their
right to use and the price of the land. Correspondingly, the land-users also have the
obligation to pay tax according to the price (or deposit) they report. The theory is that
the person who can offer the highest price is considered as the one who can use the
land most efficiently, so the government authorise(s) him the right to use it. After a
prescribed period of time, whenever there is any person or enterprise unit that can
offer a higher price to use that piece of land, then the government will expropriate or
buy back that land with the same price that the current land-users have deposited
unless they also offer the same or higher price to compete for the use of that land.
In theory the price of land must be decided by its actual contribution or
productivity. Otherwise, if a land-user over-estimates the price, he will finally be
unable to pay the tax of land-use; but if he under-estimates, the other person will
compete with him. Therefore, only the most efficient land-user can keep on using a
land without any competitor. Only through this policy, will the most efficient person
use the most expensive land, and the less efficient person use the less expensive
land. Under this situation, all land is used in full efficiency. And this will enable the
government to receive the maximum revenue from land.
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But, unfortunately, the revised land policy nowadays in Taiwan deviates quite far
from the original blueprint of Dr. Sun. Firstly, the land system totally remained as
private ownership mainly due to the political reason against the Communist mainland
where land is totally nationalised. The landlords generally have the absolute
sovereignty over their land. So the transfer of the management of land is very
difficult and expensive. It is impossible to expect that all land is used efficiently.
Secondly, the government withdrew the right of all existing landlords to decide their
land value by their own self-judgement, because at the beginning all landlords would
tend to under-report their land value in order to pay less tax. On the opposite side, in
order to levy more tax revenue from land, the government required all landlords to
report their land value according to the differential official price within a difference of
20%, otherwise their land will be bought away by the government if the reported price
is less than 20% of official price. Under this circumstance, because the price of land
is in fact decided by the government, so, by logic, the government have to sacrifice
the right to tax away the increments of land value, or the government will be
criticised as exploiting the landlords. Finally all increments of land value go to the
landlords. Moreover, this revised policy has caused a great difference between
registered price and market price owing to tax avoidance. Thus the government failed
to levy real tax revenue from land.
In summary, under the existing system, many problems such as 1)land is
inefficiently used and 2)most of rent is in injustice arrogated by the landlords are
inevitable. According to Dr. Sun, land is publicly owned by the whole people of a
society, so land will be one of the sources of public income to finance our social
security scheme. Of course, this might be still not sufficient to finance a vast
universal scheme from land, according to Dr. Sun, we also have another income
source from public capital, ie, public owned enterprises. So we pass on to discuss this
factor.
As for capital, its characteristic is quite different from land. Land is naturally
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existing. No one can create land. Because land is not the result of human effort, so in
theory no one should have the right to possess any piece of land. But for capital, no
matter what its form, it is definitely a result of human effort or creation. So its
ownership should belong to the people who create it. Any other person has no right
to share or to arrogate it. It is simple justice that the creator should have the absolute
sovereignty over all his creatures, not only capital. So it is explicitly that the
Regulation of Capital has nothing to do with the ownership or the possession of
capital, it is only to regulate or to restrict the use of capital.
Under the Regulation of Capital, the main task that government has to undertake is
to make a division between public enterprises and private enterprises according to the
following two criteria: 1) the degree of monopolisation and 2) the degree of
publicness. In turn the degree of monopolisation is determined by another two
conditions: a) the nature of the enterprise and b) the minimum scale of economy.
Because the operational definition of monopolisation can be defined as the number of
enterprises in an industry, so when there is only one unit of enterprise in an industry,
it is the highest degree of monopolisation or 'monopoly'. When there are only a few
units of enterprises in an industry, that is 'oligopoly'. And, lastly, when there are many
units, it is 'competition'. As for the degree of publicness, it is decided by another two
factors: a) the number or percentage of consumers in the population, and b) the
degree of collectivity or undivisibility of consumption of the goods. The higher the
percentage and the collectivity, the higher the degree of publicness.
In theory the strategy to promote the economy is to increase the number of
enterprises in an industry in order to increase its competition and efficiency. But in
practice, for many enterprises or industries such as electricity, running water, railway
and communication utility, their number of enterprise units should be one or as few
as possible in order to avoid waste and to meet the minimum economic scale. So it is
certainly uneconomic for these kind of enterprises to have two or many units. If the
products of these enterprises are also of a high degree of publicness, especially if
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they are highly demanded by the majority of the people, then these enterprises had
better to be nationalised in order to avoid unjust exploitation from monopoly.
Although, in both socialist and capitalist countries, the experience of most
nationalised enterprises are inefficient, money-losing or even bankrupt if there is no
government subsidy, however, it is not the fault of nationalisation or monopoly. The
real reason for the inefficiency and bankruptcy of nationalised enterprises in those
countries is that their governments manage those enterprises based on political
principles and methods rather than economic ones. For example, for most
government-owned enterprises in Taiwan and China, they have no right to adjust the
price of their products; they have to employ too many unnecessary staff and workers;
they even have no right to fire the inefficient workers. Under such conditions, no
nationalised enterprise will be able to gain. Under the Regulation of Capital, all
government-owned enterprises must be managed by the economic principle. All
enterprises are free from political pressure except the supreme command: to make
profits. For all government-owned enterprises, they are definitely able to make profit
due to the following reasons. Firstly, they are all of high degree of monopolisation, so
they can be managed by the economic principles of monopoly either to make
maximum profit or to produce maximum production under the preconditions of
self-sufficiency, available economic resources and other basic requirements raised by
democratic political authorities. Secondly, because they are all of high degree of
publicness, so their consumers and the market demand of their production are
guaranteed. Thirdly, although the external competition is reduced by higher degree of
monopolisation, it can be substituted by internal competition. As long as the
promotion and rewards of their managers and staff are judged only by their merits,
then the internal competition can be created and their efficiency will be finally
guaranteed.
Moreover, the running of large-scale nationalised enterprises is a highly
professional task, so not only the highest chairman or president and general manager
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but all staff and workers must be qualified specialists and technicians. Because the
status of nationalised enterprises is like special governmental agencies, so their
operations are subject to the second 'ism' of TripeopHsm That is, the success of
nationalised enterprises is dependant on not only the democratic political supervision,
but also the efficiency of government. This will be discussed in next section.
5.5. Political Situation
5.5.1. The Legitimacy in Competition
Taiwan is a very special political entity in the world. Since it was established in
1912 with the name of 'Republic of China' representing the whole of China, its
government has experienced several stages of development. In the last stage its
government retreated from the mainland to the island of Taiwan in 1949. As this
nationalist government had governed the whole of China for several decades, it
proclaims that it is the only legitimate government which can represent the whole of
China and that the communist government on the mainland today is only a temporary
rebellious regime. The highest mission of its government is to develop and construct
Taiwan as a powerful base and then to re-unify China by Tripeop/ism (The Three
Principles of the People) and to implement this 'ism' throughout the whole country.
Taking the opposite line, the communist government on mainland China also
proclaims that it is the only legitimate government representing the whole of China. It
also has tried to conquer Taiwan by every means. In the past it tried to conquer
Taiwan by force but it failed. Now it tries to persuade Taiwan to accept the proposal
of 'one state, two systems', ie, it is the central government but Taiwan is only a
special local government, to re-unify China as an united country. Due to the fact that
not only is the democratic degree of political life but also the economic achievement
in mainland China are far behind those of Taiwan, there is no point for Taiwan to
sacrifice its successful policy to adopt the inefficient one of mainland China.
However, at the present stage, because Taiwan does not have formal diplomatic
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relations with most countries in the world, it has a very disadvantageous status in
international society.
5.5.2. The Blueprint
As all social security legislation has to pass through political procedures, an
understanding of the present political system and its operation will be helpful and
necessary. Many foreigners and even local people find it quite difficult to understand
why Taiwan has such a special style of government. For example, "What is five-power
government (or quinquepartite government)?" and "Why do you have such a type of
government?". In order to explain this problem more clearly, we have to trace back to
the thought of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, the founding father of the Republic of China.
According to the thought of Dr. Sun, there are two fundamental objectives in the
political life of the people, ie, to construct a full-democratic political representative
body and to build up an all-efficient government. Dr. Sun strongly proposed that if
we wanted to fulfil these two objectives simultaneously, we had to separate clearly
the administrative power of government from the political power of the people. That is
his famous Theory of Separation of Political Power and Administrative Ability. Under
this theory, no staff-member of government should come from election. They should
come from appointment after an examination. And no elected representative should
play a role in government. After the separation of power and ability, there follows a
separation of political laws and administrative laws. Only political laws which
including problem-finding, policy-formation and policy-making to define the objectives
of the government will be made by the congress/parliament/national assembly which
is organised by the representatives elected by the people/citizens. As for
administrative laws which mainly deal with the selection, adoption and application of
technology to achieve the prescribed goals of the government, they are in logic made
by an independent part of the government based on the corresponding political laws.
By these administrative laws, the government carry out the political policies which
they present in the form of political laws made by congress. In brief, the laws of
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'what' are made by a political representative body and the laws of 'how' are make by
government. 'What' is about value-judgement and 'how' is about expertise. As this
new political representative body will not let the representatives interfere with the
administrative affairs and interest, it will help them play their roles for the people
more impartially (Chin, 57-60, 69-74).
In theory the five-power government is hierarchical, ie, both central and local
governments are functionally divided into five independent parts. In central
government, it includes five yuans, ie, Executive Yuan, Legislative Yuan, Judiciary
Yuan, Examination Yuan and Supervisory Yuan. Actually it is an Executive
Yuan-centred government because it is the Executive Yuan which carries out the
political policies of congress. If things are like this, what are the other four yuans
used for? As the purpose of Dr. Sun was to establish an all-efficient government.
Executive Yuan needs the Legislative Yuan to make all professional administrative laws
or statutes according to existing political laws and needs Examination Yuan to select
able or competent experts as its staff. All staff must have their qualifications
confirmed by the Examination Yuan or they cannot be appointed. Up to this step, it
maybe still cannot guarantee the efficiency of Executive Yuan because the appointed
officials may not be active or responsible though they are professionally qualified. So
there should be a Supervisory Yuan to supervise these staff if they obey the laws or
not, or if they neglect their duties or not. Whenever the Supervisory Yuan finds that
executive staff offend or deviate from the laws, or only do not work as well as
expected, the Supervisory Yuan will appeal to the Judiciary Yuan for trial and
judgement. If the Supervisory Yuan also finds the judgement of the Judiciary Yuan is
not impartial, this Yuan can further appeal to the President, the Head of Government,
for the final decision. Under such a chain of 'check' design (Note: not as the mutual
check and balance in western democratic countries), the government will certainly be
efficient (Chin, 75-80).
Under five-power government, because the political laws of 'what to do' are made
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by the congress or parliament of the people and the administrative laws of 'how to
do' are made by the legislative yuan of the government, and because there is already
a chapter of social security in the constitution, there are not many problems of
value-judgement left for the political body to make, so the task of social policy
legislation is mainly the obligation of Legislative Yuan. These laws will be prepared in
a very good form because the technical part is prepared by the most excellent
experts. Under this special design, many unnecessary or arbitrary changes of social
security schemes can be avoided.
5.5.3. The Problems
Although the political design may be theoretically consistent, the representatives
of the National Assembly 42 years ago did not really understand the design of Dr. Sun.
They changed the character of the Legislative Yuan and Supervisory Yuan from a
governmental body to a representative body. They prescribed that the members of
these two yuans be elected by the people, not appointed after examination.
Therefore, the five-power government in the present constitution of the Republic of
China is not in accordance with Dr. Sun's thought any more though they have the
same title.
According to the constitution, the National Assembly still preserves its power of
amendment of the constitution. It also preserves its power to elect and recall the
president and vice president of the state and to initiate or veto the laws made by the
Legislative Yuan. But the latter has never been used. As the Legislative Yuan and
Supervisory Yuan are also prescribed as representative organisations, the power of
political law-making of the National Assembly is shifted to the Legislative Yuan and its
power of impeachment is shifted to the Supervisory Yuan. The other special point is
that the power of examination is still independent of the Executive Yuan as an
independent power. Only this point had been in accordance with Dr. Sun's design.
Furthermore, according to the present constitution, the president, the head of state
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and government, is elected by the National Assembly every six years, and the National
Assembly is elected by the people also every six years. In Dr. Sun's thought, this
president can appoint all five presidents of the five yuans. But now, the appointment
of the president or premier of the Executive Yuan must be based on the confirmation
of the Legislative Yuan and the appointments of the presidents of Judiciary Yuan and
Examination Yuan must be based on the confirmation of Supervisory Yuan in order to
balance the powers. But the presidents of Legislation Yuan and Supervisory Yuan are
mutually elected by their elected representatives. Even so, in theory, there will be no
serious problem in the operation of this special political system. There will not be
much difference from western democratic countries because the sum of National
Assembly, Legislative Yuan and Supervisory Yuan is equal to the congress or
parliament of western countries. The problem is that all representatives of these three
parts of congress elected from mainland China 41 years ago have not been able to be
subject to fresh elections since that time. The problems of ageing and the legitimacy
of their representation has caused widespread concern and debate, but no easy
solution can be reached.
Firstly, as for the problem of representation, because the government needs the
representation of mainland China, so the representation of these representatives
would not expire after their 3-year or 6-year tenure. The tenure is 3 years for the
representatives of Legislative Yuan and 6 years for those of National Assembly and
Supervisory Yuan. It may be an expedient way to let them undertake their tenure until
the next election. But after several decades' extension of their tenure, their
representation is really in question. It is explicitly contrary to the general principle of
democracy. Their tenure should not be continued, but the political interest on
mainland China is not easy to give up.
Secondly, on the problem of ageing, most representatives of these three parts of
congress are now very old and unable to perform their duties. This matter greatly
influences the development and the quality of political life in Taiwan. This problem still
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remains there unsolved. Although there is a compulsory retirement age of 65 years for
all government employees, it is not applicable to a special rank of officials, not to
mention the political representatives. If we could have a law to prescribe all special
rank of government officials and elected representatives to retire at age 70 or even 75
years, this problem would be resolved at once. But this approach is never possible
because the power of law-making is in their own hands. However, time will solve this
problem because there are no replacements after their death. After 5 to 10 years,
when all these old representatives elected from mainland China have passed away,
there could be a chance for the constitution being amended according to Dr. Sun's
theory, then, a great political development can be expected. Its progress could be
even greater than the economy.
As western democratic countries do, the government of Taiwan is operated by a
party system. Nowadays there are three registered parties. National Party
(Kuomintang), Youth Party and Democratic Socialist Party and many other
un-registered parties such as Democratic Progressive Party and Labour Party. As the
National Party which was founded by Dr Sun Yat-sen is the founder party of the
Republic of China, though the government retreated to Taiwan, this party is still the
dominant ruling party in Taiwan. In a general election the ruling party can win about
70% of votes. But actually the ruling party can hold about 90% of seats in all three
parts of congress, both National Assembly, Legislative Yuan and Supervisory Yuan,
because all representative members who were elected 40 years ago from mainland
China are still holding their seats. Under such circumstances, the policies of the
ruling party are very easy to be implemented. But the quality and the efficiency of
law-making are in question.
5.5.4. The 'Social Security' in the Constitution
As the constitution was promulgated by the National Assembly of the Republic of
China when the nationalist government still governed the whole of China. So this
constitution is a very important token of Chinese democracy. This constitution
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prescribes not only the rights and obligations of people, the structure of political
system, but also the basic national policies on defence, diplomacy, economy, culture,
education and social security. Therefore, the provisions of 'social security' in this
constitution are the legal basis of social security policy today. There are six articles
in this independent section of social security in the constitution. They are as follows:
- Article 152. The State shall provide suitable opportunities for work to
those persons who have the ability to work.
- Article 153. The State shall enact laws and carry out policies for the
protection of labourers and farmers so as to better their livelihood
and improve their productive skills.
- Special protection shall be provided for women and children doing
manual labour, according to their age and physical conditions.
- Article 154. Capitalist and labour shall act in accordance with the
principles of harmony and cooperation for the development of
productive enterprises. Conciliation and arbitration of disputes
between capital and labour shall be prescribed by law.
- Article 155. The State shall establish a system of social insurance to
promote social welfare. To the aged and the physically disabled who
are unable to make a living, and to victims of extraordinary
calamities, the State shall provide appropriate assistance and relief.
- Article 156. The State, in order to consolidate the foundation of
national existence and development, shall protect motherhood and
carry out a policy for the promotion of the welfare of women and
children.
- Article 157. The State, in order to improve national health, shall
establish extensive services for sanitation and health protection and
a system of public medical care.
Explicitly article 152 is about employment services; there already is a comprehensive
employment service in Taiwan. Article 153 is about labour weifare; the Labour
Standard Law was promulgated and enforced in 1984. Article 154 is about industrial
relations; besides the trade unions of different levels, there is an official Labour
Commission in central government and a formal private association of industrial
relation to deal with this matter. Article 155 is about social insurance and social
assistance; there are several schemes to provide such protection. This is the highest
legal base of social security in Taiwan. A thorough discuss will be made in chapters 7
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and 8. Article 156 is about child and women (motherhood) protection and welfare and
article 157 is about public health service. Public health service provides only for
military servants (including their dependants) and veterans.
Explicitly, because the boundary of 'social security' prescribed in this constitution
had included employment, health and social security, so its coverage was actually the
same as the Beveridge Plan but without a sense of planning. According to the
meaning from the context, as employment, family (motherhood and childhood) and
health were the responsibility of the state, so they could be rationally interpreted as
Beveridge's 'front tier' (or preconditions): full employment, public health services and
family allowance. Therefore, the design of social security in Taiwan could widely refer
to the Beveridge Plan. However, as the designing of a social security system includes
both value-judgement and expertise, in the view of the special political doctrine in
Taiwan the law-making of social security can also be divided into two parts: the
decision-making of value-judgement belongs to the political representative body and
that of expertise belongs to government. Under this arrangement, then many technical
errors such as the provision of social insurance benefits without adequate
contribution-records in the post War British Labour Government and the provision of
funded social insurance with a deficit in Taiwan can be avoided.
For example, as the author suggested in chapter 3, a simple way to make the
labour division between political laws and administrative laws in social security
legislation can be based on the equation: the total benefits expenditure (B) must be
equal to the total taxation revenue (T). That is,
B = f(T).
If the political representative body have the priority to decide only one side of the
equation, either B or T, and the other side is decided by government experts
according to actuarial calculation, then the balance of this equation will be easily able
to achieve.
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If a 'back to Dr. Sun Yat-sen' political reform can be carried out in the near future
in Taiwan, then all social security laws will be rationally made by this two-step




The family is a very important part of Chinese society. Unfortunately there is no
official or academic census of families, here I try to use the number of households in
place of family because all households in Taiwan are officially required to register
their households according to their residence. That is, a family here socially and
culturally means an adult, married or un-married, with his/her own children, parents or
even grand-parents. But for a household, it officially means the actual members who
are living together, occasionally it might include brothers or sisters or other relatives
living together; but it would exclude even children or parents if they are not living
together. So the concepts of 'family' and 'household' do not certainly coincide with
each other in all cases. However, even though many children do not live with their
parents, they are actually responsible for supporting their parents. So, in fact 'family' is
still a valid tool in the analysis of social security provision in Taiwan. Moreover, in
theory, a co-resident family seems to be more efficient than that of a
separate-resident one if married children have a good relationship with their parents,
because the total living expenditure of the latter is more costly than the former.
In 1953 there were about 1.55 million households. By 1982 this figure had
increased to 4.03 million. The growth rate was 3.35% annually. Before 1971 the
average growth rate of households was 3.17% annually, and the growth rate of
population was 3.28% annually. During the same period of time, the average number
per household was about 5.5 to 5.6 persons. But after 1971, because of the rapid
growth of the economy, the level of urbanisation became higher than before, and
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especially the promotion of family planning, though the growth rate of household was
still 3.7% per year in the 1970s, the growth rate of population was only 1.91%.
Therefore, the average number per household decreased from 5.5 persons in 1972 to
4.5 persons in 1984. This demonstrates that there was a significant change in
household size. Generally there will be some young children and some old people in
a household. Its dependency ratio mainly depends upon the age structure of a
household. But the larger the size of a household, the larger the probability to have
more adult members to undertake the household economic responsibility. That is, the
function of social security of a large household will be better than a small one.
Therefore, the decline of household size could mean the decline of its function of
social security.
However, a family can play a better function of social security only if the family
can be as large as possible and include old parents, adult couple and young children.
So the factor of whether married children like to live with their parents or whether
parents like to live with their married children is a crucial one. Nowadays the actual
co-residence rate ('co-residence' here means that 'family' and 'household' are
identical, ie, parents and children are actually living together, eating together was still
as high as 66.7% in 1986 (Cheng, 1986), though this is lower than the rate in 1980, let
alone 1973. What is its trend in the future? In a comparative study in 1973 and 1980,
a clear trend of the proportion of co-residence has been shown (see Table 5.5).
Firstly, in both 1973 and 1980, the more recent the marriage cohort, the smaller the
proportion who were still in co-residence with their parents (Freedman, et al, 403).
Secondly, the proportions of co-residence were higher in 1973 than in 1980 for all
cohorts.
153
Table 5.5 The Length of Co-residence %(N)
Length of Co-residence | 1973
1
1980
Married less than 5 years 1
Still live with parents | 78(1101) 74(966)
No longer live with parents 1 (860) (711)
Separate after 1 year's co-residence 1 14 26
Separate after 3 years' co-residence | 30 72
Married from 5 to 9 years 1
Still live with parents |86(1109) 77(844)
No longer live with parents 1 (956) (653 )
Separate after 1 year's co-residence 1 9 13
Separate after 3 years' co-residence I 24 26
Separate after 5 years' co-residence | 33 38
Separate after 7 years' co-residence 1 41 66
Separate after 9 years' co-residence 1 47 91
Married from 10 to 14 years 1
Still live with parents 189 (889) 82(581)
No longer live parents 1 (790) (479)
Separate after 1 year's co-residence 1 4 13
Separate after 3 years' co-residence 1 14 26
Separate after 5 years' co-residence | 22 33
Separate after 7 years' co-residence j 29 38
Separate after 9 years; co-residence 1 36 42
Married over 15 years 1
Still live with parents 192 (685) 90(332)
No longer live with parents 1 (632) (299)
Separate after 1 year's co-residence 1 3 8
Separate after 3 years' co-residence 9 16
Separate after 5 years' co-residence 1 15 22
Separate after 7 years' co-residence 1 19 27
Separate after 9 years' co-residence 1 24 32
Note:
1)The population was restricted to the Taiwanese couples those
whose husbands were under 45 years and their parents were
alive and lived together at least one month after marriage.
2)The percentages were calculated based on a life-table of different
marriage durations.
3)The allocation of separate-residence could not traced back to
the original marriage durations.
Source: Freedman, et al, 1982:403
According to another general sample survey of the breadwinner of households,
conducted by the DGBAS in 1982, the attitude to co-residence of parents with married
children was not very positive. Only 24.8% people were in favour of co-residence,
40.7% against and the remaining 34.5% had no special preference (see Table 5.6).
Compared to the actual co-residence figure, it is really very striking that a very high
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proportion of people are against co-residence in their attitude. And more curiously
among this group of people, the older the people were, the stronger their objection to
co-residence. This is really a little out of our expectation. This phenomenon might be
linked with the level of education and income, because the same empirical survey data
showed that: the higher the level of education, the more people tend to be in favour
of separate-residence and against co-residence, and vice versa; the lower the income
level, the more people tend to be in favour of co-residence, while at higher income,
there are more people against it. Therefore, we can conclude that the factors of
education and income have played a very important role in the attitude on
co-residence.








24.8 1 34.5 |
1 1
40.7 100.0
under 40 23.7 1 36.7 ! 39.6 100.0
Age 40-60 26.0 ! 32.7 ! 41.3 100.0
over 60 i
1
24.0 | 32.9 |
1 1
43.1 100.0
single 21.3 43.4 | 35.3 100.0
Marital married/coh.| 24.5 33.9 | 41.6 100.0
Status divorced/se.| 26.4 I 36.0 t 37.6 100.0
widowed
1
38.2 | 30.6 [
1 1
31.2 100.0
college & + | 14.6 I 35.4 | 50.0 100.0
Education senior high | 19.8 37.6 i 42.6 100.0
Attainment junior hi &-|
1
28.6 1 33.5 1
1 1
37.9 100.0
lowest 5th| 28.4 1 32.1 | 39.5 100.0
Income 2nd low 5th| 26.9 1 34.1 39. 0 100.0
middle 5th1 25.1 ! 36.4 | 38.5 100.0
Level 2nd high 5th| 23.9 ! 35.8 | 40.3 100.0
highest 5th| 19.6 1 34.6 j 45.8 100.0
Source: DGBAS, 1982:34-36
However, the level of education and income are not the only exclusive factors to
explain this phenomenon. Marital status can also explain part of the secret. The
empirical data showed that most married and divorced people tend to be against
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co-residence, but most widowed persons tend to be in favour of it. Those who do not
have special preference are the single (see Table 5.6). According to previous study
(see Table 5.5), as there are still about 70% married children living with husbands'
parents, the un-harmonious relation between mother and daughter-in-law may be the
main cause that leads to the objection to co-residence, because many married
children did live with their parents after they were married and had lived a period of
time so. Not all of them separated from their parents as soon as they were married.
But if the problem of un-harmonious relationships could not be solved, they would
still tend to separate. Fortunately, however, man is also a social animal. He needs
some close relationships with other people. This makes the widowed persons tend to
be in favour of co-residence. As for single people, unless they have an unhappy
relationship with their parents, because most of them are young and do not have the
experience of personally difficult or unhappy relationships with other people, so they
tend to have no special preference. But as the data indicates, they would tend to be
against co-residence after they are married, and would have the opposite view after
they are widowed.
Following the change of family size, the structure of family also changes. It can be
shown by a comparative study conducted by Taiwan Provincial Institute of Family
Planning in 1982 (see Table 5.7).
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Nuclear | 49.1 | 52.6 | 42.5 | 49.6 | 80.9 I 78.0













Total lioo.o lioo.o lioo.o lioo.o lioo.o 1100.0
Notes:
Nuclear=A couple with non-adult and unmarried children
Stem=A nuclear family with couple's parents
Joint=A stem family with two or more nuclear families
♦'Taiwanese' and 'mainlander' are decided according to
the registration of their original province in household
office.
Source: Freedman, et al> 1982:400
In view of the above table, we can see that the figure of the nuclear family has
increased from 49.1% in 1973 to 52.6% in 1980, so we then might have a
misconception that the people in Taiwan prefer nuclear family to stem family. Actually
the tendency would not be so significant. One important fact that can help us to
understand this phenomenon is that most married children nowadays have several
brothers and sisters. Because their parents can live with only one of their married
children, so there can only be one stem family and the rest of the married children
can not but have their own nuclear families. This might be the main reason why the
number of nuclear families have increased so significantly and the rate of
co-residence is still as high as 70%. The other important factor is the housing
condition in Taiwan tends to have fewer rooms per household/flat (only 2.5 in 1986)
due to urbanisation (see Table 5.8). This objective condition greatly restricts the
possibility of co-residence of parents and their married children.
As for the reason why the number of nuclear families of mainlanders has
decreased, it is because most of them immigrated from mainland China after 1949.
They are now quite old and their parents are either dead or remained in mainland
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China, so their percentage of nuclear families was quite high in the earlier stage. But
in the later stage when their next generation started to marry and continued to live
with them, so the figure of nuclear families tended to decrease and that of the stem
families tended to increase.
Other studies (Wen, 1986; Chang, 1986) also showed that the co-residence rate of
old parents and married children would tend to decline with the increase of the
degree of economic development and urbanisation. This demonstrates that there are
some real objective and subjective difficulties in the issue of co-residence. First, the
occupation mobility in Taiwan is very high with changes in residence area. It is more
difficult for a big family to move than a smaller one. Second, because the education
of second generations is generally higher and better than the parents' generation, the
ideas and life style are quite different from each other. This may make the
relationship between mother-in-law and daughter-in-law more difficult to adjust to.
Third, the parents with higher education attainment and socio-economic status are
always the parents with higher earning ability. This will mean they will not be
dependent on their children necessarily and economically. Fourth, Taiwan is not a
very big country. So even if they do not live together, they still maintain contact by
phone or visit each other easily. It does not make much difference.
5.6.2. Housing
Every family or household must live in a housing unit. So there is a close
relationship between family (or household) and housing. If the number of family is
equal to the number of households registered in the household office, then the ratio
of households to housing units can be considered as the ratio of family to housing.
And then, the trend of family can be demonstrated. According to census evidence, the
ratio of household to housing units was 0.999 in 1966. In 1970 and 1975 these ratios
were 1.000 and 1.003 respectively. But in 1980 this ratio was up to 1.166 (IQL,
1985:127). This means that there were about 17% of families which had to share a
housing unit with another family. But according to other statistical figures from
158
DGBAS, the rate of one family occupying one housing unit had risen from 84.6% in
1979 to 92.0% in 1986. Only 8.0% of families still need to share a housing unit with
another family. These figures demonstrated that the supply of housing was greatly
improved, but it is still not satisfactory.
The housing unit was not necessarily owned by the family because the rates of
owner-occupied housing were only 67.4% in 1976, 78.8% in 1986 and 79.2% in 1987.
That is, there were at least 21% of families which did not have their own houses.
They had to live in rented accommodation or assigned houses. Of course, the lack of
the ownership of housing does not necessarily influence the quality of housing
significantly unless the economic circumstances are too disadvantageous to achieve a
good housing. Several other conditions must be taken into account.
Firstly, the usage of housing will influence the quality of housing very much. The
quality of accommodation of houses which are used only for dwelling is certainly
better than those which are used also for other purposes such as workshop or
commercial shop. From 1979 to 1986, the rate of usage for dwelling purposes only
fluctuated between 83-84% ( DGBAS, 1986b:4 & IQL, 1985:128).
Other influential conditions are housing size, housing facilities and housing
possessions. The average housing size in Taiwan was 23.4 ping (1 ping = 36 sq ft) in
1976 and increased to 27.7 ping in 1986 (28.6 ping in 1987). Accompanied by the
decrease of the number of persons per household from 4.95 persons to 4.69 persons
in the same period of time, the average living size per person increased from 4.7 ping
to 5.3 ping (6.26 ping in 1987). The situation has improved significantly. But if we
view the average number of persons per room, we find that the figure increased from
1.08 persons in 1979 to 1.15 persons in 1986. This means that the increase of housing
area was mainly used for extending the size of living room, dining room and even
bedroom, but not for increasing the number of those rooms. On the contrary, the
number of rooms per flat tends to decline. Compared to developed countries, the
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number of rooms per housing unit is significantly low. The high price of housing
might be one of the main causes of this disadvantage. In turn this factor restricts the
rate of co-residence.
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Table 5.8 Housing Situation in Taiwan
Items 1980 1982 1984 1985 1986
Floor area (ping per household) 24.75 25.40 26.21 26.43 27.74
Rooms per household 2.8 2.7 2.5 2.5
Persons per household 4.82 4.76 4.75 4.71 4.69
Living area(ping) per household 5.13 5.33 5.52 5.61 5.91
Rooms per person 0.95 0.82 0.82 0.85 0.87
Persons per room 1.05 1.22 1.22 1.18 1.15
(Per 100 Households) below:
Housing Ownership:
owner-occupied(self-owned) 77.3 74.5 76.7 78.1 78.8
rented housing unit 13.8 14.4 13.3 12.6 11.4
assigned housing unit 5.9 7.3 5.9 5.3 5.5
other(such as borrowed) 3.1 3.9 4.1 4.1 4.4
Housing Usage:
residence only 82.3 84.0 83.8 84.6 83.8
residence with commercial use 12.8 11.1 11.5 11.6 11.9
residence with manufacturing u 2.7 2.9 2.7 2.4 2.5
residence with other use 3.0 2.1 2.0 1.4 1.8
Housing Facilities:
Kitchen
private 94.7 96.8 97.0 98.2 98.0
shared 4.2 2.0 1.3 0.7 1.0
none 1.1 1.3 1.7 1.1 1.1
Bathroom
private 90.7 92.4 93.8 96.0 95.7
shared 5.6 2.8 2.0 1.3 1.5
none 3.7. 4.9 4.2 2.7 2.8
Toilet
private 86.4 90.1 92.0 94.1 94.6
shared 11.1 7.2 5.1 4.1 3.6
none 2.5 2.8 2.9 1.8 1.8
Water Supply:
piped water 75.0 77.1 79.0 80.2 79.5
water from wells 21.6 19.6 18.3 17.3 17. 9
water from springs 2.6 2.1 1.9 1.9 2.1
others 0.9 0.4 0.8 0.7 0.5
Family Possessions:
television sets 102.0 102 .9 104.2 105.5 106.7
colour television sets 69.3 83.1 90.4 92 .3 94.4
refrigerator 92.3 94.3 96.1 96 .7 97.1
washing machine 64.7 70.5 75.5 77.8 79.5
gas stove 96.8 96.9 96.8 97.4 -
air conditioner 14.4 17.2 22.9 24.0 25.5
camera 26.2 29.6 34.6 36.6 -
stereo set 25.6 30.0 32.5 34.5 -
piano 4.6 5.8 7.5 7.4 7.9
video recorder 1.5 5.8 14.2 20.7 27.1
Sources: DGBAS, 1986b, 1987:296-7
CEPD, 1986d
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Housing facilities also have a close relation with the standard of living. The
ownership rate per 100 households of private kitchen, bathroom and toilet was 98.0%,
95.7% and 94.6% respectively. The population served with electric lighting and piped
water was also up to 99.7% and 77.9% respectively in 1985. Apart from the service of
piped water, which is somewhat lower, they are up to the level of developed
countries. As for family possessions such as TV sets and refrigerators, these figures
also seem quite good.
Table 5.9 International Housing Situation
|Germany| Italy Sweden Scotland France| Japan
Item j 1978 |
1 1
1981 1980 1981 1975 |
1
1978
Persons/household 1 2.4 | 3.0 2.3 2.8 2.9 | 3.2
Rooms/housing Unit 4.4 j - 4.1 3.8 3.4 j 4.3
Persons/room 0.6 j - 0.6 0.7 0.8 | 0.8
Housing Ownership 1 1 1
owner occupants | 36.0 | - 54.9 34.7 46.7 | 59.8
renters 64.0 | - 40.8 64.9 42 .8 j 40.0
Vacancy Rate (%) 3.0 | 19.9 4.7 9.8 16.0 | 9.2
Toilet: all | 100.0 | - 98.5 99.0 73.8 | 99.7
flush 1 97.1 | - 96.2 - 71.9 | 45.9
Piped Water i I — 97.2 j 92.7
Source: UN, 1986:498-507
5.6.3. Education
Education is another important indicator of the quality of life of a society. The
level of education influences not only personal occupation, income and social status
but also the life style, technology level, economic development and modernisation of a
society. There are several scales to indicate the achievement of education in Taiwan.
First, the literacy rate: it was only 57.9% in 1952, but it was 92.0% in 1986. Though it
was not as good as developed countries, it was in the forefront of developing
countries.
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Source: CEPD, 1986d:24; 1987a:6
The six-year primary education in Taiwan is compulsory. From 1967 on,
compulsory education was extended to nine years, including three-year junior high
school. The entrance rate to primary school was 99.8% and that of junior high school
98.6% in 1982. After nine-year's compulsory education, apart from 27.5% of the
graduates who will be in employment, those who continue their further education can
be divided into two groups: occupational (or professional) group and academic group.
The students in the occupational group would go to occupational high school or
five-year's junior professional colleges; those in the academic group would go to a
general high school and prepare for entrance to university or college. The proportion
of the students in these two groups, ie, occupational to academic, were 49:51 in 1966,
and 71:29 in 1981. Even so, the competition for entrance to university or college is
still very strong today. According to official statistics in 1985, the distribution of
education attainment of population aged six and over in Taiwan was as follows:
illiterate 8.4% and literate 91.6%; among the literate, there were self-learned 2.3%,
primary 48.4%, junior high 18.4%, senior high 14.9%, and higher education 6.0%. A
well-developed education is not only good for economic development but also good
for the implementation of social security provision.
5.6.4. Health
Another important aspect of social life is health. According to research conducted
by Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics (DGBAS) in July 1982, the
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elements of happiness of social life could be divided into six by their priority order, ie,
good health, harmonious family life, wealth, satisfactory job, high education and
religious belief. Good health came to be the first priority. Roughly there were 66.3% of
respondents who felt that their health situations were very satisfactory and
satisfactory. Most who felt not satisfactory were the elderly and the low
income-earners. So it is the elderly and the low income-earner who need health
services most.
In the last ten years, the growth rates of both physicians and hospital beds were
over 50% and 100%. In 1985 the population per physician (including Chinese herb
doctors) was 1,130 persons and the population per hospital bed was 270 persons
(CEPD, 1986e:60-61). Compared to western industrialised countries whose population
per physician were less than 600 persons and the standard population per hospital
bed which is recommended by the World Health Organisation (WHO) as 125 persons,
the standards of Taiwan still need to be improved. Another related indicator is the
distribution of medical resources. We shall compare the number of physicians (also
including Chinese herb doctors) per 10,000 population among different administrative
units in 1985. The range was from 3.0 persons in Chiayi County to 17.1 persons in
Taichung City. The average was 8.04 persons (CEPD, 1986e:60-61). It seems that the
distribution in urban areas is better than rural areas. But the distribution of hospital
beds was quite abnormal. By the same measurement the highest figures were Chiayi
City's 103.5 beds and Hualien Hsien's 92.6 beds, the lowest one was Changhua Hsien's
11.0 beds (CEPD, 1986e:60-61). A more equal redistribution is required.
For the people who are not included in social insurance and sub-universal health
service, the main characteristic of health services in Taiwan is of near-perfect
competition in both supply side and demand side. The physicians can establish their
own clinics or hospitals freely and have clinical freedom to decide on the diagnosis
and therapy they consider appropriate for their patients. On the other hand, the
patients also have a perfect freedom in the choice of the clinics or hospitals that they
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wish to attend. Another special characteristic is that there is no separation of medical
and pharmaceutical services. All private clinics or hospitals of physicians can sell
medicine, and all patients can buy all kinds of medicine without doctors' prescriptions.
However, the consumption of medical services is quite different from the consumption
of general goods. It is very difficult for patients to estimate the cost of the service
and there is no opportunity for the patient to bargain with the doctor. The patients are
certainly at a disadvantage.
In Taiwan as both GE1 and LI are employment-related, so are their health services.
Although the retirees of GEI may opt to join health insurance voluntarily, all retirees of
LI will lose their entitlements to joining health insurance in LI as soon as they are
retired. In general the retirees are old, so they will need more medical care. So the
provision of health services is a major issue for the retired people.
5.7. Conclusion
Generally, as Taiwan is located in a semi-tropical zone, its temperature is mild and
its climate is pleasant. Particularly in the winter its living conditions are not as difficult
as countries in a temperate zone. Unfortunately its natural resources are very scarce.
Its main resource for economic development is human capital. So the large and dense
population in Taiwan is both an advantage and a burden. To cope with the large
population, compared to the radical policy of mainland China, we adopt a mild policy
to encourage all families to have only two children in order to achieve a demographic
steady state of ZPG in the coming decades.
We have used several indicators to measure the economic achievement of Taiwan.
Its achievement is splendid. It is a great advantage to have a good economic basis to
develop a sound social security system. Apart from the equal distribution of farm land
due to the rural land reform, the great majority of medium and small scale of
enterprises which are due to the special Chinese cultural value also makes a great
contribution to the equality of income distribution in Taiwan, so the policy of social
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security of Taiwan does not need to put so much emphasis on this object as other
countries so. According to Dr. Sun Yat-sen's thought, nationalised land and public
owned capital could be the available sources to finance the social security scheme in
Taiwan in the future.
As for social security legislation, there is a sound legal basis in the constitution.
But the actual law-making is not very satisfactory due to the aging of the Legislative
Yuan. In the near future if we can amend the constitution as Dr. Sun's original design:
political laws made by political representative body and administrative laws made by
government experts, then the making of social security laws will also be divided into
two parts: the part of value-judgement decided by political representative body and
the part of expertise decided by government experts. Under this arrangement, many
unnecessary technical errors could be easily avoided.
Both in theory and in practice, the family is generally considered as the main
provision of social security in Chinese society, and certainly is in Taiwan. The family
structure in Taiwan has changed gradually under the forces of modernisation and
industrialisation. In modern industrialised society, the members of a family can be
more economically independent than before, so the size of family will tend to be
smaller. And the declining of family size indicates that its function of social security is
also weakened. This is the reason why other types of social security measures must
be strengthened.
In Taiwan the services of housing and health must be considered as the contents
of social security because these expenditures are paid for by family income, except for
the minority of insured and military servants who are entitled to free medical service.
Generally the housing and the medical conditions of Taiwan are not as good as
developed countries, improvements are necessary. The planning of a social security
scheme must take them into account properly.
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CHAPTER 6
OLD PEOPLE IN TAIWAN AND THEIR NEEDS
6.1. Introduction
As the main interest of this thesis is to discuss the social security provisions for
old people, the discussion of this chapter will focus on some of the main
characteristics which are closely related to the elderly in Taiwan. The number of old
people involved is inevitably a most important point. Though the numbers of old
people, either in the past or at present, are well-recorded in official publications, a
discussion of the change of the number of old people is also of some importance
because the population structure of Taiwan has been in a state of transition since the
mid 1960s and the age composition has been changing gradually. This change will
greatly influence the need of social security provisions. The discussion will be based
on the population projections made by the Council for Economic Planning and
Development(CEPD).
Secondly, a new social provision must be relevant to its society and consistent
with its basic values. In Chinese society there is a high ideal that old people should
live in a family and especially with their children. Only under such arrangements it is
believed that old people can be free from suffering physical need and the deprivation
of mental loneliness. However, this usually only happens to old people who have
children. For those who are not married or married but do not have children, this
provision will not be valid. Therefore, a discussion of the number of single persons
and the number of married persons without children is necessary. Even the number of
married persons having children but not living together is also meaningful.
As income security is the main aim of social security, the economic situation of
old people is one of the most important concerns in this chapter. Sources of income
and their levels will be discussed. In Taiwan there is at present neither a public health
service nor a universal health insurance scheme. Medical expenditure is often one of
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the largest items of basic living expenditure. Under such circumstances medical
expenditure has to be included in the coverage of social security. Moreover, medical
expenditure is always inversely related to one's health. A discussion of the health
situation of old people is therefore necessary. Furthermore, as man is a social animal,
social activities are not only enjoyable but also a cause of health. For this reason
these issues have to be discussed at some length.
6.2. The Number of Old People
According to official statistics, the number of people over 65 years of age in
Taiwan in 1986 was 1.03 million, about 5.3% of the total population. After the War,
there was a long period of at least 20 years, when the proportion of old people in
Taiwan remained at about 2.5% despite the rapid rise in total population (see Table A1
and Table A2 in Appendix). Compared to Sweden's 17.1%, Britain's 14.9%, or even
Japan's 10.2% (see Tables A6, A7 and A8 in Appendix), the population of Taiwan is still
quite young.
However, there is no problem concerning the number of old people at present and
in the past. It is more important to estimate this figure in the future in the discussion
of social policy. As discussed in the previous chapter, under the birth policy of
'2-children per couple' (2C/C) or '1 —child per person' (1C/P) and the related tax policy,
the possible population of Taiwan in the future will fall between medium and the low
projections of population. Under these two projections, the population of Taiwan will
reach ZPG state in between 2022 and 2027 at a population level of between 24 and 25
million. At that time its birth rate and death rate will be equal at the level between
0.98% and 1.07%. And the number of old people will be between 3.5 and 4.3 million
at the rate between 14.8% and 16.9% of total population. Otherwise, if the ZPG state
is not achieved, then a growing population will bring down the proportion of old
people and a decreasing population will push up this proportion even if the number of
old people remains the same.
168






year | 2022 j 2027
population (N) 24.0 25.1
65+ population (N) 3.5 | 4.3
65+ population (%) 14.8 [ 16.9
birth rate (0/00) 9.8 10.7
death rate (0/00) 9.6 | 10.5
Source: CEPD, 1986b (Table A5 in Appendix)
Compared to the ZPG state, we expect that the number of population, both the
total and the elderly, will continue to grow. Especially, the proportion of old people
will be three times more than today in 3 to 4 decades. The composition of population
will differ greatly from today. If we do not have a good provision in old age for the
working people today, we will face a serious social security problem concerning old
age in the future.
6.3. The Family Situation of Old People
Family is the most important institution of human life. Almost all people are born
into a family, and maybe spend their whole life in one or several families. However,
the meaning and the function of family between east and west are quite different. In
western societies, especially in modern western societies, the development of family
tends to be a life-cycle pattern(Turner, 41). A family, known as 'family of marriage',
will be created whenever a man and a woman from two different nuclear families,
known as 'family of origin', are married after a certain period of time of courtship.
After experiencing an intimate initial marriage stage, there comes a long period of
child-bearing phase. Children are the seeds of the new families of the next generation.
And after all children get married and have their own new families, these two persons,
a man and a woman, will resume their late marriage again until the coming of the
phase of disintegration, that is, the death of one of the old couple. Whenever the last
member also dies, then this family comes to an end.
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On the other hand, the development of Chinese family life traditionally tends to be
an evergreen-style. The size of family may have declined somewhat and the
members of family may also have been totally replaced, but the family can still remain
the same by having the same ancestors or the same genealogy. Even some minor
children have their own families in separate places, but these families are only
considered as sub-family. The main family must be the family that their parents live
in. By custom all children have to have a reunion in that main family in the
Mid-Autumn Festival and the Chinese New Year Eve. Therefore, in theory, all persons
belong to a permanent family whether they are living in that family or not. Of course,
this style of Chinese family is mainly feasible in a rural society where all members of
a family generally live together, work together and have common property. But in an
industrialised and urbanised modern society, most members of a family have to
engage in different jobs in different areas and generally have to live separately in
different houses. Especially, as mentioned in the previous chapter, the average size of
a housing unit in modern society is so small, only 27 ping or 2.5 rooms per housing
unit, it is impossible for the great majority of families to have a reunion over a night
any more. This fact will greatly weaken the function of taking care of old members of
the family as previously. What is the difference between fact and ideal of Chinese
family life in Taiwan today? We need to check this by empirical evidence.
Generally, we assume that family plays a vital role in the social security in Chinese
society because, according to the civil law in Taiwan, there is a legal supporting
obligation between husband and wife and between parents and children, but no such
obligation between brothers and/or sisters. So family in Chinese society has an
important role in income maintenance in the same way as statutory social security
programs. The difference is that family is only an informal one because there is no
further regulation or penalty to require the related members how to carry out this
obligation. All these things are dependent on the willingness of the members or the
moral sanction of the society. However, only the persons who have/had ever married.
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including either the widowed or the divorced, may have children to support their old
age. As for unmarried single persons, they definitely must depend on themselves. So
we would like to examine this element, marriage, first.
What is the marital situation of old people in Taiwan today and in the future?
Unfortunately the data of old people aged 65 and over is not available in formal
official statistics. The only data available is for those aged 50 and over (see Table 6.2).
There must be some differences between the proportion of marital status of people
aged 50 years and over and that of 65 years and over because there is a 15 year gap.
Especially, the higher the age the higher the mortality rate, so, after deleting the
youngest group of older people aged 50 to 64, the figures in the column of the people
aged 50 and over (see Table 6.2 and Table 6.3) will certainly have a sharp rise in the
widowed rate and a sharp decline in the married rate. As for the rates of divorce and
single, we would expect they change mildly.










15-19 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49 50+
37.6 444.5 1 206.4 1 390.1 930.3 845.3 762.1 2 233 .5
0.1 1.2 4.6 10.1 12 .5 20.4 32 .3 515.5
0.4 7.2 24.5 36.3 25.9 20.4 17 .0 58.0
1 881.6 1 549.4 639.0 200 .0 65.5 37.8 30.1 235.7





Single=not married/not widowed/not divorced
Source: MOI, 1985a:357
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Table 6.3 Marital Status in Different Age Groups in
Taiwan Area, 1984 (%)
Age Group
Marital
Status 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-34|35-39
1
40-44 45-49 50 +
Married 2.0 22.2 64.4 85.0 | 90.0 91.5 90.6 73.4
Widowed 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.6 | 1.2 2.2 3.8 16 .9
Divorced 0.0 0.3 1.3 2 .2 [ 2.5 2.2 2.0 1.9
Single 98.0 77.4 34.1 12 .2 | 6.3
1
4.1 3.6 7.8
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 |100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Calculated from Table 6.2
From Table 6.3, we can see a special pattern of marital status. The rates of married
and divorced persons tend to be an upside down U pattern. The climax of married
persons is at the age group of 40 to 44 years and that of divorced persons is at the
age group of 35 to 39 years. The pattern of widowed persons increases mildly before
the age group of 45 to 49 years and increases drastically afterwards. On the contrary,
the pattern of single persons decreases drastically before the age groups of 45 to 49
or 40 to 44 years and decreases mildly afterwards. Of course, these rates are
mutually related. Among them, the rate of the married is reversely related to the
widowed and the divorced because one death in the married means 2 less in the
married and 1 plus in the widowed; one divorce means 2 less in the married and 2
plus in the divorced; one marriage means 2 plus in the married and 2 less in single or
divorced or widowed. For single persons, in normal cases the rate would continue
going down mildly. But in fact there is a bulge in numbers of single people over 50.
This rise of the single rate of people at age group of 50 years and over is very odd
and abnormal. It needs some explanation.
Fortunately, this anomaly can be explained fully by related facts. Firstly, from the
figure of sex ratio (see Figure 6.1) and the population pyramid (see Figure 6.3) of the
Taiwan area in 1984, we can clearly recognise that there is a great excess of males
(compared to the normal case, not to female) within the age groups from 50 to 72
Figure6.1SexRatioinT iwan,1984
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years old. From the official statistics we know that 84.7% of the single persons aged
50 years and over are males (MOI, 1985a: 357). And, secondly, referring to the
evidence of the author's own research, we also find that the rate of original domicile
of single persons from mainland China is more than 90%. The fact indicates that most
single persons were immigrants from mainland China about 35 years ago when the
present government retreated from mainland China. As most of them were soldiers,
the high rate of single male is a natural result. After the age of 72 years, because that
is beyond the years of average life expectancy at birth for male, so the sex ratio
becomes normal again.
Since excess males are significant only at the age of 50 years and over, this
phenomenon will disappear naturally after 20 years. After the excess males disappear,
the normal sex ratio of total population will not be so high as 108.1 in 1984 any
longer. At present the lives of most single veterans from mainland China are taken
care of by the Commission of Veterans, Executive Yuan, or directly by the old
veterans' homes. So there is not much of a social security problem in this group of
people. Especially this issue will disappear after 20 years. For this reason we may
ignore the influence of single veterans and pay more attention to the ordinary,
non-veteran single or 'normal single' excluding immigrant single.
In order to estimate the normal number of single persons aged 65 years and over,
firstly, we must estimate and delete the number of the excess males by drawing a
straight line between the two sides of the huge bulge on the sex ratio curve in Figure
6.1. The question here is that which two points beside this bulge should we choose
in order to get a more adequate normal ratio. Referring to the sex ratio of UK (OPCS,
34-37), South Korea (NBS, 42-43) (see Figure 6.2), Sweden (SS, 1988:33), Japan
(SBMCA, 1987:36-37) and the ethnic Chinese in Singapore (MCI, 266), we find that the
values of sex ratio are commonly less than 100 after 50 years of age in all these
countries. Among them, Japan and Korea are even less than 100 in 40s of age. So, for
any two points, if the values of sex ratio on the straight line are less than 100 in 50s
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of age shall be reasonable. When we view Figure 6.1 or read the figures of sex ratio
themselves, we find that there is a lowest value at 45 years before the bulge. After
that point, the values begin increasing, and are back to normal at about 73 years of
age. Under these circumstances, it should be adequate to draw a straight sex ratio
line between these two points: 45 and 73. Based on the difference and the number of
years between these two points, we can get that the difference between each year is
0.24, so all values on the straight line can be established. Finally, because the values
of sex ratio will be less than 100 after 53 years, so this line is proved to be
concordant with the normal cases of other countries. According to these adjusted sex
ratios in different age groups (see Table 6.4), we can get the normal figures of male in
different ages and age groups, so do their total of both sexes (see Table 6.5 and Table
6.6).
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Table 6.4 Population by Age over 50 with Adjustment to Delete
Soldiers from mainland, 1984 (in thousand)
sex adjusted adjusted excess total
age | male |female| ratio sex ratio male male excess
45 | 90.5 | 88.8 | 101.90 101.90 90.5 0.0
46 | 86.1 | 84.0 j 102.48 101.66 85.4 0.7
47 | 85.5 I 83.5 | 102.37 101.42 84.7 0.8 5.0
48 | 82.0 1 79.6 j 103.08 101.18 80.5 1.5
49 | 82.1 1 79.3 | 103.47 100.94 80.1 2.0
50 | 81.7 1 76.7 | 106.52 100.70 77.2 4.5
51 1 82.2 | 72.8 | 112.92 100.46 73.1 9.1
52 | 85.4 1 71.0 j 120.29 100.22 71.1 14.2
53 | 91.5 1 71.2 j 128.41 99.98 71.2 2 0,2
54 j 95.8 1 69.4 | 138.18 99.74 69.2 26.7
55 | 94.1 | 65.8 | 142.96 99.50 65.5 28.6
56 | 93.5 | 63.9 j 146.51 99.26 63.4 30.2
57 | 90.2 j 60.5 | 149.09 99.02 59.9 30.3 318.9
58 | 88.0 | 59.4 j 148.09 98.78 58.7 29.3
59 j 84.0 1 55.1 | 152.35 98.54 54.3 29.7
60 | 74.0 1 51.7 | 143.05 98.30 50.8 23.1
61 | 67.8 | 48.6 | 139.52 98.06 47.7 20.2
62 j 67.2 | 48.9 | 137.24 97 .82 47.9 19.3
63 65.1 | 48.0 | 135.67 97.58 46.8 18.3
64 j 56.1 1 41.8 | 134.23 97.34 40.7 15.4
65 | 49 .9 | 37.9 | 131.73 97.10 36.8 13.1
66 | 45.9 | 36.0 | 127.40 96 .86 34.9 11.0
67 | 43.1 1 35.2 j 122.24 96.62 34.1 9.0
68 | 38.5 1 31.3 | 123.03 96.38 30.8 7.7
69 j 36.2 j 30.6 j 118.31 96.14 29.4 6.8 68.0
70 | 35.8 1 30.3 j 118.04 95.90 29.1 6.7
71 I 33.0 I 28.7 | 114.83 95.66 27.5 5.6
72 | 34.4 I 27.7 | 124.44 95.42 26.4 8.0




Table 6.5 Marital Status Rate in Different Age Groups After
Deleting the Excess of Males in Taiwan, 1984 (%)




Divorced | Single i
1
Total
15-19 ! 2.0 1 0.0 | 0.0 | 98.0 I 100.0
20-24 ! 22.2 0.1 I 0.3 | 77.4 100.0
25-29 ! 64.4 0.2 | 1.3 | 34.1 100.0
30-34 ! 85.0 | 0.6 j 2.2 j 12.2 | 100.0
35-39 ! 90.0 I 1.2 j 2.5 | 6.3 | 100.0
40-44 1 91.5 | 2.2 j 2.2 | 4.1 | 100.0
45-49 ! 90.6 I 3.8 | 2.0 j 3.6 ! 100.0
50-54 1 1 1 (2.0) | (3.4) | 100.0
55-59 1 1 1 (2.0) | (3.2) | 100.0
60-64 1 1 1 (1.9) | (3.0) | 100.0
65 + 1 1 1 (1.9) | (2.5-2.6)| 100 .0
Sources: Table 6.3 and self-evaluation
Table 6.6 Marital Status in Different Age Groups After Deleting
the Excess of Males in Taiwan, 1984 (in thousand)








15-19 ! 37.6 | 0.1 | 0.4 | 1 881.6 | 1 919.7
20-24 i 444.5 j 1.2 | 7.2 | 1 549.4 2 002.3
25-29 | 1 206.4 | 4.6 | 24.5 | 639 .0 | 1 847.5
30-34 j 1 390.1 | 10.1 | 36.3 j 200 .0 | 1 636.5
35-39 930.3 | 12.5 | 25.9 | 65.5 | 1 034.2
40-44 ! 845.3 | 20.4 | 20.4 j 37.8 ! 923.9
45-49 ! 762.1 j 32.3 | 17.0 j 30.1 ! 841.5
50-54 1 1 1 1 (24.6) 722 .9
55-59 1 1 1 1 (19.4) 606.5
60-64 1 1 1 1 (14.2) 1 472.9
65 + 1 1 1 1 (21.3-22.2) | 853.5
Sources: from Table 6.2 , Table 6.4 and Table 6.5
After deleting the excess of males, because it would be quite reasonable to
assume that the rate of single persons decreased mildly from 3.6% in age group of
45-49 to 3.4% in age group of 50-54, to 3.2% in 55-59, to 3.0% in 60-64, and finally
to 2.6% or 2.5% in age group over 65 years (see Table 6.5), so according to
corresponding total in Table 6.6, we would get the number of the single in age group
over 65 years as 21 or 22 thousand persons. Among them, about 7.8 thousand lived in
old people's homes.
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Furthermore, according to the calculation in Table 6.4, the total excess of males in
age group over 65 in 1984 was 68 thousand. This was exactly the same as that of
residents in 14 veterans' homes in the same year. Although the residents in veterans'
homes included many veterans who were as young as 62 years and many disabled,
there were also many single veterans did not move into veterans' homes. Therefore,
this figure may justify the previous statement that all single veterans have been taken
care by the Commission of Veterans, Executive Yuan.
With regard to the non-single old people, whether they are married, widowed or
divorced, their marital status is not so important any longer. The main issue here is
whether they have children or not, because only those who have children can get
support from their children. As a survey in Taipei City showed, only 86.3% of old
people who have/had ever married have children, the remaining 13.7% are without
children. Furthermore, not all old people having children would live with their children.
There were only 65.6% living with children and the remaining 34.4% not(Tang, et al,
27). But in another survey on old people aged 70 years and over in Taipei City in
1987, the co-residence rate of old people with their children was as high as 71% (Bai,
et al, 35). As older people will need more services or even more assistance from their
children, this might be the main reason why this rate was higher. But according to a
survey of old people on the Taiwan area in 1986, the co-residence rate was 66.7%
(Cheng, 2). Viewing these two different co-residence rates of old people aged 65 and
over, which one is the more believable one for Taiwan area? As not only the labour
mobility in Taipei City is higher than that of the Taiwan area, but the housing price of
Taipei City is higher on average than that of the whole Taiwan area, so the higher
co-residence rate in whole Taiwan area could be explained by these two factors.
As shown in Table 5.6 in the previous chapter, apart from the widowed, in all
situations of different variables, more people preferred separate-residence to
co-residence. Those data showed an explicit relation between the attitude of
co-residence and the degree of education and income. That is, the higher the level of
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education and income, the stronger the attitude on separate-residence. Several other
similar researches also find that the higher the level of education, occupation and
socio-economic status, the weaker the attitude of both parents and children to live
together; on the contrary, the lower the level, the stronger their attitude (Wen, et al,
246; Chang, 20). Generally the level of education, occupation and urbanisation of
Taipei City is higher than the whole Taiwan area. Therefore, this difference is once
again supported. Furthermore, according to this hypothesis, we should expect that
the co-residence rate of old parents with their married children would tend to be
lower in the future because the levels of education, economy and urbanisation would
be higher than today.
If the description above is true, then less people will favour co-residence in the
future. Under such circumstances the expectation of co-residence as old age
provision for Chinese society will be in vain. However, there are some
counter-evidence. Things seem not so pessimistic. Firstly, in the author's survey on
retirees in 1985, the co-residence rates of parents with their children of GEI and LI
were quite different. The former was 71.7% and the latter was only 67.4%. The
average amounts of monthly wage, insured wage and old age payment of GEI were all
better than LI, so were the education. This better economic and educational conditions
made them both able to accommodate their relationship between parents and children
and able to afford to have a larger house to live together. So the co-residence rate of
GEI was higher than LI.
Secondly, in a regular research conducted by DGBAS, we find a fact that: when we
question the people whose attitude are presently in favour of separate-residence
whether they will still be in favour of the same style of residence in the future when
they are retired, their answers, though not negative, are not so positive and so strong
as expected(see Table 6.7). Many people who are in favour of separate-residence at
present would tend to favour co-residence in the future. But very few people who are
in favour of co-residence at present will change their mind in the future. This fact
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means that people still prefer co-residence to separate-residence mentally and
culturally. If there is a type of accommodation which can, on one hand, preserve the
advantage of co-residence and, on the other hand, avoid its disadvantage, then this
type of accommodation will be a great invention and most welcome.
Table 6.7 Attitude for Residence in Taiwan
in favour of














Attitude at present: 1 1 1
co-residence | 22.6 1.8 | 0.4 | 24.8
no preference 18.3 12.5 I 2.7 | 33.5
separate-residence 17.2 21.6 I 1.9 j 40.7
other residence 0.5 0.3 0.2 1.0
Total | 58.6 36.2 | 5.2 | 100.0
Source: DGBAS, 1982: 43
As discussed above, we find that economic condition could play either a positive
or a negative role in this issue of co-residence. Basically, better economic means are
needed for a family to co-reside, ie, it is impossible to expect those originally
separate-living families to live together if they are too poor to get a larger house; but,
however, the higher economic ability of both parents and children could also operate
to reduce co-residence. That is, for those co-resident families, when their economic
circumstances become better, they might like to have their own houses and to live
separately, not definitely to have a larger house to better their living standard.
Therefore, the economic circumstance is not sufficient reason in itself to decide the
style of residence, it was only a necessity. If the economic condition is not strong,
the residence situation could not be changed, whether it is originally co-residence or
separate-residence. In that case, the other conditions will play a more crucial role.
Although the co-residence of the old parent with their adult children is a good
income maintenance provision in Chinese society, the rising rate of
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separate-residence demonstrates that this provision is now being challenged. In fact
in a highly industrialised modern society, not only do subjective attitudes tend to
favour separate-residence but also the objective conditions reinforce it. Apart from
the reasons given in the previous chapter, more data was obtained from my empirical
interviewing survey on old people in Taipei City in 1986. In that interviewing survey on
the retirees retired in 1979, I received a very strong impression that the earning ability
and life style of adult children play a very important role in this matter. Due to the
lack of proper and sufficient education and training, many children of lower
socio-economic level cannot find a permanent job and even cannot get married. They
not only are unable to provide reliable support, but are also a heavy burden on their
parents economically and psychologically. Some children find work with so low a
wage that they are unable to buy a larger house to accommodate their parents
together, nor have extra money to support their parents. For these family problems, in
my interview research in Taipei City in 1986, there were three vivid cases worth
introducing here to illustrate the difficulties in different family situations.
Case A. Mr. Li-lin Teng was born in 1919. He is a veteran retired from the army in
1956 with a very small amount of retirement payment. He held an informal
(non-statutory) post of porter in the Taiwan Sugar Corporation in 1962. He worked for
16 years in that post until he retired. When he retired, his wage was about NT$9,000,
but his insured wage was only NT$3,675, 40.8% of his normal wage. Though he was a
full-time employee, he was not a formal employee. So he was not entitled to
occupational retirement payment and his lump sum insurance retirement payment was
only NT$62,475. Nine years ago, in 1977, one year before his retirement, his 8 year old
son contracted a serious disease and became totally disabled: unable to move, sit,
speak or eat by himself. Mr. Teng spent all his money and property on this son, but
every effort was in vain. Now his son is 17 years old. It is more difficult for the old
father to take care of him. At present Mr. Teng makes some money by selling sweets
to the children in the neighbourhood at home. His wife does some occasional work
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while his 19 year old daughter is still at college. He has another income of NT$3,000
per month from the veteran home. Normally, children should be expected to be a
source of income for their parents, but in this case, we find that a severely disabled
child is in fact economically a great burden.
Case B. Mr. Ah-hai Chen was also born in 1919. He joined the army when he was
20 years old and retired in 1954 due to sickness without any retirement payment.
After retirement he did many temporary jobs. In 1961 he got a permanent job as a
bus-driver in the public Taipei City Bus Enterprise. He served in this post until he was
compulsorily retired in 1979 when he was 60 years old. Taipei City Bus is a
government-owned enterprise, but only white collar administrators or officers are
entitled to the options of lump sum payment or monthly payment in the occupational
scheme. All blue collar workers such as drivers and technicians must accept lump
sum payments. His monthly wage at that time was about NT$10,000, but his insured
wage was only NT$4,807, 48.1% of his wage. So the total of his lump sum retirement
payments of both occupational scheme and Labour Insurance was about NT$300,000.
He could not find a job after his retirement. His daughter was still at school at that
time. So he had to support her. One more point is that his wife is the only child of
his parents-in-law and they have to depend on him and live with him. They are still
alive and very old. Under these circumstances he spent all of his retirement payment
within 3 and a half years. Now his daughter has been married and has a baby. He and
his wife take care of this grandchild. His daughter and son-in-law pay them NT$6,000
per month. They live on this small amount of income. Mr. Chen also has a 31 year old
son. Due to a lack of proper education and training, he cannot find a permanent job
and is unable to get married. He seldom comes home. Under this circumstance, it is
impossible for these four old parents to depend on this inadequate adult son. This
indicates that an inadequately educated and under-employed child is not a reliable
source of income for old parents or a family.
Case C. Mr. Yen-chun Ma was a cook in a factory. He had made quite a lot of
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money and invested it by purchasing two flats. He had three sons and one daughter.
He retired in 1979 and supported his eldest son to study in the United States by using
his retirement payment. Now this son is married and stays in the USA. His second son
and daughter are also married and live separately. After retirement Mr. Ma had even
worked for another employer for 4 years. He is still very healthy and able to work. But
he decided not to work any more because all his earnings were taken away by his
second son. He felt very unhappy about this. Now he lives on NT$10,000 per month
from rent. He feels very happy. If Mr. Ma had had only his second son and had not
invested in the extra flat, he would have been in great economic difficulty now. This
case demonstrates that a son with low income or who is very selfish or of
extravagant tastes will not be a reliable source of income for a family with old people.
Some children fortunately do not have the problem of earning ability, but their life
style is not consistent with their parents. Old people do not eat very much, but they
need refined food; they do not sleep very much, but they need more rest; when they
want to sleep or to take a rest, they need a very quiet environment. Especially, the
life of old people is always very regular or even stereotyped. They cannot
accommodate a life with too much interference and change. This kind of life style is
quite different from their young children. Not a few old people expressed the view
that they did not like to live with their children. Some of them even preferred to live
in an old people's home, but unfortunately they were un-qualified for publicly financed
ones because they have children. As for the self-financed ones, they were neither able
to afford them nor satisfied with their conditions.
Nowadays there are several very high standard self-financed old age homes. The
living costs are quite high and most old people cannot afford to live there. But on the
other hand, I also found some old people who definitely did not want to live in any
kind of old people's homes even if they or their children could afford to do so. Their
common reason is that if they live in an old people's home, all their new friends and
new neighbours will be old people. If he/she becomes the person who lives the
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longest, he/she has to experience many funeral events. What a terrible experience it
will be. Briefly, old people's homes are a very controversial way to tackle the ageing
life of old people having children.
For this dilemma, a new proposal has been raised to tackle this problem, that is,
"separating but neighboured" residence policy. The life styles of two generations are
so different it is better to live separately. But the old parents also need the company
and caring of their children, so they need to live neighbourly. The best is that they
can live next door. For this purpose, a new special housing design for the stem family
has been widely discussed. But there is no creative conclusion yet. Due to economic
limitations, this new idea will not be easy to carry out in the near future.
6.4. The Economic Situations of Old People
Generally when old people retire, they have to rely on non-earned income. In
older welfare states this non-earned income is social security and occupational
pensions. But in Taiwan only very few people can live on this kind of payment
because the number of persons entitled to these payments is very few and the
amount of their payments is generally very low. Then, what are the sources of income
that are available for the old people in Taiwan? According to two independent
researches in Taipei City, we can get a rough idea about sources of income of old
people in Taipei City. Unfortunately the population and the design of the questionnaire
of these two surveys are not the same. A fully comparative study is impossible. It
needs some judgement when we compare their figures. The first research is a sample
survey on the old people aged 65 years and over in 1984.The second one was a
census survey on all old people age 70 years and over in 1987.
Although a comprehensive comparative study between these two surveys cannot
be applied owing to the difference in their design of questionnaire, however, we can
discuss the items that are similar in these two surveys. As we expect that children are
the main source of income for old people in Chinese society, so, firstly, we are
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interested to know how many old people are really dependent on this kind of source
of income. Survey A said it was 21.2%, but survey B said it was 66.8% from the
members of the family (see Table 6.8). It is true that the main meaning of the
"members" here is "children". But, however, not all of them are children because, at
least for the married people without children, their 'members' are not children.
Moreover, another important thing that we must keep in mind is that survey B is a
census survey on all old people aged 70 years and over. Although there were still
some excess males in this population, the life expectancy of the female is longer than
the male. Among the respondents, about 47% of them were females and their main
sources of income might be their husband's earnings, retirement payments, savings or
property gains even though their number and amount might be quite small and low.
So it was impossible that all 'members' were children. According to Tang's survey in
Taipei City, there were about 13.7% of old people having no child. So it would be safe
to say that at least 13.7% of the 66.8% were not children. If so, as a source of
income, children would be about 57.6% [66.8% - (13.7%)(66.8%)] in Survey B. It is still
much higher than that of Survey A. So we can generalise this fact and get this
hypothesis: the higher the age of old people, the more of them have to depend on
their children as the main source of income.
Secondly, we can compare the retirement payments in these two surveys. In
survey A there were only 16.8% living only on retirement payment, another 26.5%
were partly supported by retirement payments. In survey B the questionnaire was
once again different. In this survey retirement payments and savings were classified
as one item. So we have the problem of how to isolate retirement payments from this
gross item. Fortunately this gross item was only 14.8%. Therefore, even if the savings
were zero, the rate of retirement payments was still less than that of survey
A. Furthermore, in Taiwan there is another very important point about retirement
payments. It is that all retirement payments, either insurance payments or
occupational payments, are based on retirees' monthly wages or insured wages. As
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wages are always adjusted with the price index, so the later the retirees retire, the
higher their payments. And as younger old people certainly on average retire later
than the older ones, so their payments will be higher. So logically more old people in
the younger group in survey A than the older group in survey B can live only on
retirement payments.
As for savings, it would be gradually reduced when people started to spend after
their retirement. The longer the time, the less savings will be left. Unfortunately, the
sum of retirement payments and savings in Survey B was grouped together as 14.8%,
or we could get direct evidence. In order to separate retirement payments from
savings, it would be reasonable to suppose that the proportion of retirement
payments to savings was the same as Survey A, 58.3% : 41.7%. Under this condition,
the retirement payments in Survey B would be 8.6% and its savings would be 6.2%.
Since both figures in Survey B were less than those in Survey A, so we can formulate
this hypothesis: the older the old people, the fewer of them can depend on their
retirement payments and savings.
In the case of employment income, because the figure of survey A was not only
grouped with other sources, but also divided into at least two items, so it was very
difficult to make any reasonable estimation. However, as the 'other sources' in items
6 and 7 were possibly 'employment', so no matter what deduction was made, the
figure in Survey A would be still larger than that in Survey B. Therefore, the same
hypothesis is still true: the older the old people, the less of them can depend on the
income from employment, because the more of them will be too old or too weak to
engage in any paid job. On the other hand, as fewer self or private sources of income
can be available when old people grow older, so the figures of people who have to
depend on public assistance would be larger. The fact that the figure of survey B was
much larger than that of survey A proved this hypothesis.
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Table 6.8 Sources of Income of Old People in Taipei City
Sources I %
1
Survey A: (Number of Samples=585) 1
1.retirement payment only | 16.8
2.savings only | 12.0
3.children only | 21.2
4.partly employment and partly private 1 helps' i 5.6
5.public assistance only ! 0.9
6.partly retirement payment and partly others 1
' sources' | 26.5





2.retirement payments and savings | 14.8
3.members of family ! 66.8
4.public assistance ! 6.9
5.others j 3.6
Note: The questionnaire is in closed-ended questions.
Sources: l)Tang, et al, 24
2)Bai, et al, 37
As described above, the sources of income have a close relationship with the age
of old people, ie, the older the old people, the more of them have to depend on
children and assistance, and the fewer of them can depend on retirement payments,
savings and employment. Are these hypotheses valid and reliable? Could they just be
sampling errors? It would be more convincing if there were more evidence to
re-confirm or to justify these hypotheses. The author's research is available for this
purpose. The interviewees of the author's sample survey were the retirees who
retired in 1984 from two social insurance systems, LI and GEI. The average age of LI
was 61.5 years old and that of GEI was 63.0 years. The average age of both systems
was 62.2 years. Compared to the previous two surveys, the average age of the
author's survey was the youngest one. It is a very good condition to use this data as
evidence to re-justify the above hypotheses.
Firstly, as the population of the author's survey were retirees, so all of them more
or less had their retirement payments. In theory we should ignore the figure of this
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source because it would be meaningless to compare the figure of this survey, 100%,
with the corresponding figures in another two surveys. But in practice if we want to
treat retirement payments as a source of income as the previous two surveys, then
only the persons whose payments are big enough for their basic needs can be
considered as a source of income. Otherwise, if their retirement payments were too
small, then their payments should be ignored. In the author's survey, there were only
37.6% (60% in GEI and 30% in LI) having sufficient gross income for their daily living
expenditure. It was explicitly that the 'retirement payment', the gross income after
deleting all other sources of income, would be somewhat less than 37.6%. However,
because retirement payments were certainly the main part of the gross income in the
author's survey, so it could be reasonable to expect that at least 60% to 70% of them
were of this case. Even so, the figure was still much higher than the other two
surveys. So it is concordant with the former hypothesis: the older the old people, the
fewer of them can depend on retirement payments.
Secondly, the figure of 'children' should be 12.1% because only the regular or
periodical payments from children can be considered as a reliable source of income.
This figure is less than that of survey A. So it can support the claim that: the
younger the old people, the fewer of them depend on their children because many of
them can still rely on their retirements or other sources of income (see Table 6.9).
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Table 6.9 Source of Income of Retirees besides Retirement












Children:a)periodically 64 | 56 | 15.5 | 10.9 | 12.1
b)non-periodically | 70 | 71 j 16.9 | 13.9 | 14.7
c)not mention a or b| 12 j 28 | 2.9 1 5.5 | 4.8
Savings 89 | 48 j 21.5 I 9.4 | 12.5
Previous retirement payments | 12 | 87 j 2.9 I 17.0 | 13.4
Re-employment: a)full-time 53 j 64 j 12.8 j 12.5 j 12.6
b)part-time 15 | 22 | 3.6 1 4.3 j 4.1
Investment I 27 | 16 ' 6.5 i 3.1 | 4.0
Spouse's employment 29 | 11 I 7.0 | 2.1 | 3.3
Spouse's retirement payments | 2 1 1 j 0.4 : 0.2 I 0.3
Assistance and relief I 0 1 2 j 0.0 ! 0.4 I 0.3
Total or Maximum | 413 | 512 j100.0 1100.0 jioo.o
Note: l)The 'SUM' has been weighted by the two populations:
GEI = 6631 (25.25%), LI = 19,630 (74.75%).
2)All items are independent.
Source: author's survey
Lastly, as for the figures of employment, savings and assistance in the author's
survey, they are very clear and definite. The figures of both employment (16.7%) and
savings (12.4%) were higher than those of survey A. But the figure of assistance
(0.3%) was less than that of survey A. All these three figures can justify their
corresponding hypotheses.
In summary, as discussed above, the author's research evidence can re-confirm or
re-justify all the mentioned hypotheses: the older the old people, the fewer of them
can live on retirement payments, savings and employment; on the contrary, the more
of them have to depend on children and assistance (see Table 6.10).
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Children 12.1 < 21.2 < 57.6
Retirement Payments | (37.6) > 16.8 > 8.6
Employment 16.7 > 15.0 > 7.9
Savings 12.4 > 12.0 > 6.2
Assistance 0.3 < 0.9 < 6.9
Source: Table 6.8 and Table 6.9
However, when we make a scrutiny into Survey A and Survey B, because their
questionnaires are both closed-ended and the respondents can choose only one item,
so their answers certainly cannot reflect the multiplicity of the income source of the
respondents. According to the author's survey which was illustrated as in Figure 6.4,
apart from retirement payments, among 413 GEI respondents, there were 58 persons
having 2 sources of income, 9 persons having 3 sources of income and one person
having 4 sources of income; among 512 LI respondents, there were 60 persons having
2 sources of income and 7 persons having 3 sources of income. That is, they were
16.7% in GEI and 13.1% in LI having more than one source of income. But if we view
the mode of the sources of income separately, apart from their retirement payments,
then, for example, in GEI there were 48% (43 out of 89) of persons depending on
savings also having other sources of income; in LI there were 31% (27 out of 87)
persons depending on previous retirement payments also having other sources of
income. These figures demonstrated that the multiplicity of the sources of income
was a significant phenomenon for retired people.
After making clear the sources of income of old people, we try to make clear or at
least to get some general idea about the level of income from different sources.
Firstly, children. If the old people live with their children, they live together and eat
together, the old parents not only need not pay anything, but also can receive some
pocket money regularly from their children. Every day when their children go out to
work or want to join any party at night, they may stay at home to look after their
Figure 6.4a The Income
192
Sources of GEI Retirees
12
The meaning of each symbol is as Table 6.7f matched by N.
Figure 6.4b The Income Sources of LI Retirees
2-S
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grandchildren and the house. Under these circumstances they need not worry about
the problem of economic insecurity and mental loneliness. I would say co-residence is
one of the best ways to provide social security for old people. The high rate of
co-residence in Taiwan demonstrates that the actual figure of old parents who can
get financial support from their children should be much higher than the above
reported figures. If the old parents do not live with their adult children, in theory or by
law, their children are obliged to give them financial support according to their needs,
but in practice this obligation is not certainly guaranteed due to different objective
and subjective difficulties.
Secondly, savings. Actually it is a kind of personal provision, not a social provision.
But it is a good substitute if there is no adequate public provision. According to Table
5.4 in the previous chapter, all three measurements indicated that the savings rate in
Taiwan is very high and much higher than most developed countries. So it is not
surprising that there was more than 10% of old people depending on only this source
of income. Its level might differ greatly, but we could not tell.
Thirdly, retirement payment. In the author's survey although 100% of them could
get a retirement payment, only 60% of retirees in GEI and 30% in LI, or 37.6% in total,
mentioned that their gross income after retiring was sufficient for their daily needs.
Both in GEI and in LI retirement payments are based on monthly wages or insured
wages. The maximum of lump sum retirement payments are about 97 months in GEI
and 90 months in LI. But both wages and insured wages of GEI are better than LI, so
the retirement payments of GEI are also better than LI. For GEI retirees, if they opt for
monthly payments in the occupational scheme, their highest pension rate not only
may be as high as 90% of the monthly basic wage, but also can keep up with the
wage index. So their retirement payments are generally sufficient for their daily needs
though the basic wage is on average about a half of gross wage. Fortunately, as we
have mentioned before, this basic wage will be adjusted according to the wage index,
so does its pension. For the retirees who can receive large amount of lump sum
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payments, they may use their payments as capital to invest or to deposit in the
preferential account in the Bank of Taiwan (for only GEI retirees), then they can
depend on this payments as old age provision. But for the retirees who receive only
small amount of lump sum payments, they are certainly much more disadvantaged
than the previous two groups of retirees. They are the group of retirees who need to
depend on other sources of income.
Fourthly, assistance and relief. There exists public assistance and charity relief.
Because only the figures of the former are available, so we discuss only the former.
There are three administrative areas in the Taiwan area, ie, Taipei City, Kaohsiung City
and Taiwan Province. Nowadays the theoretical 'subsistence levels' are defined by the
three local authorities as the 'minimum living expenditure' which are 40% of per capita
regular family expenditure of the previous year in Taipei City or one third per capita
personal disposable income of the previous year in Kaohsiung City and Taiwan
Province. At present the 'official' subsistence levels or minimum living expenditure are
NT$2,100 per month in Taipei City, NT$2,000 in Kaohsiung City and NT$1,950 in Taiwan
Province. But they have no relation to the level of assistance. They are only used as
a standard to decide the qualification or the entitlement of applicants into different
groups of beneficiaries. However, only those who have no income at all are qualified
to receive regular cash assistance. The assistance levels are NT$1,800 per person per
month and NT$1,000 per person for the additional qualified beneficiaries in Taipei City
and NT$1,200 per person per month for all qualified persons in Kaohsiung City and
Taiwan Province. As the assistance levels are less than the official or theoretical
subsistence level, they are by definition not sufficient for the beneficiaries, especially
old people. It is theoretically impossible for the elderly to live on only this source of
income.
Fifthly, employment. Due to health conditions and other reasons, the rate of
employment for old people is gradually reduced as they grow older (see Table 6.10). In
addition, due to the restriction of their educational attainments (more than 54% of
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them were illiterate) the main industry that they could engage in is agriculture. The
employment rate of old people in agriculture was as high as 40.5%. Referring to the
tables of industry and occupation (see Table A10 in Appendix) and the fact that
employees might have to retire at the age of 60 years according to the Labour
Standard Law, we might be quite sure that the 27% old people who engaged in the
industry of 'commerce' were certainly in the self-employed category. And most old
people who served in the industry of 'government, community and individual services'
were certainly the workers of the lowest level such as porters and cleaners. Therefore,
for many old people, if they lived only on their own earnings from their job, their
economic situations could not be very good. At least, they were low-income earners.
However, as many old people did depend on several sources of income, so we
cannot judge their economic situations by only one source of income. As the gross
income of old people is not available, their self-assessment might be used as a
reference. From the closed-ended questionnaire in survey A in Taipei City, there were
5.1% old people mentioning that they were well-off; 69.8% still alright, not good, not
bad; and the remaining 25.1% thought that they were poor (Tang, et al, 25). However,
this self-assessment implies a serious limitation. This limitation can be clearly
demonstrated by the evidence in the author's survey. According to the author's
survey, there were only 60% in GEI and 30% in LI having 'sufficient' (including
'stringent') gross income for their daily living expenditure. Due to the multiplicity and
the irregularity of sources of income, the valid gross income in both GEI and LI are
not available. As the retirement payments in both insurance schemes and occupational
schemes are earnings-related in Taiwan, there should be also a close relationship
between their previous ways and their savings and investment. So their previous
monthly wages may be used as the indicator or substitute for their 'gross income' to
justify the validity of their subjective self-assessment. Furthermore, because only GEI
retirees received both insurance and occupational payments, so the test will
concentrate on GEI retirees.
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According to the author's survey (see Table 6.11), there seemed to be no clearly
correlation between the self-assessed 'sufficiency' of gross income and the level of
monthly wage. Many people felt that their gross income were not sufficient though
their monthly wages were actually in higher wage groups. On the contrary, many
people felt their gross income were sufficient though their wages were actually in
lower wage groups. Although this significant phenomenon can be partly explained by
the factors of family size and children (as a source of income), it was quite clear that
subjective self-assessments of the people were quite arbitrary.
Table 6.11 Pre-Retirement Monthly Wages and The Sufficiency of
After-Retirement Gross Income in GEI, 1984
Monthly wage Sufficient | Sufficient Not Total




- 10 1 1 2 | 3 1 6
11 - 15 47 ! 7 ! 47 101
16 - 20 81 16 | 56 ! 153
21 - 25 33 7 i 23 63
26 - 30 10 1 1 1 7 j 18
31 - 35 6 I o 1 4 10
36 - 40 3 i 3 i 5 | 11





Total N 185 ; 36 | 146 367
% 50.4 Vi3 OO 39.8 | 100.0
Note: number of missing observations = 46
Source: the author's survey
Other more useful information provided in Tang's survey was showed in Table
6.12. Apart from the item of 'others', its items can be measured by a scale of
necessity. From the top, 'basic living expenditure' is the most necessary item; to the
bottom, 'donations' is the most voluntary one; in the middle, 'social life expenditure'
(ie, money spent on both red and white invitations) is the semi-necessary or
semi-voluntary one. In normal case, even for the general people or families, their
largest expenditure item is the first one, 'basic living expenditure', let alone the
low-income or poor families or persons. In theory, as there were only 90.4% of
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respondents having their largest item in 'basic living expenditure', the remaining 9.6%
of them should be better-off. Moreover, for those who voluntarily spent the largest
amount of money on 'tourist travelling' (ie, away from home for holiday), either abroad
or domestic, they were also certainly better-off without any doubt. Furthermore,
because some better-off old people might be too old or too ill to travel any more, or
they were not keen to travel, so the figure, 11.5%, could even be considered as the
minimum number of the people who were relatively well-off in Taiwan because there
might be many rich people spending their largest amount of money on 'basic living'.
These practical evidence shows that there is a significant difference between
subjective self-assessment and objective other-judgement of the economic situation
of the people in Taiwan. As for the figure of the poor, because the official assistance
level is lower than either theoretical or official subsistence levels, so if the official
assistance can be raised to the same level as official subsistence, ie, the official
poverty line, then the number of old beneficiaries will be greatly increased. It would
be definitely larger than the existing figure, 0.9%. Moreover, on economic affairs, as
most Chinese would tend to hide their wealth and to pretend they were poor under
the motivation of self-protection, tax avoidance and applying for assistance, so the
figure of the poor in Tang's survey as 25% would be an over-assessed one. The
number of the poor can be estimated as falling between 0.9% and 25% by available
evidence. The understanding of real economic situation, especially poverty, still needs
more works to clarify.
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Table 6.12 The Largest Two Expenditure Items of Old People







Basic living expenditure! 529 | 90.4 | highly-compulsory
Medical expenditure 256 j 43.8 ! 1
Social life expenditure | 190 I 32.5 |semi-compulsory













Total samples j 585 | 100.0 1
Note: The questionnaire was allowed to choose two items
from the closed-ended questions.
Sources: Tang, 30
6.5. The Health of Old People
Generally the health of old people has a close relation with their ages. The older
they are, the worse their health, and the more health services they need. Many
empirical surveys in Taiwan show that health services are overwhelmingly considered
as the first priority in the basic needs of old people (Bai, et al, 51; Tang, et al, 38).
Even in a general survey, health is also considered as the most important necessity in
daily life for all people (DGBAS, 1982:33). So the health situation of old people is the
main focus of this section.
According to Tang's survey in Taipei City, there were 45.0% old people healthy,
52.4% unhealthy and 2.6% disabled (34). These figures are very precise, but their
questions are many. First, we know that the populations of Taipei City and the whole
Taiwan area are different, so it is quite difficult for us to justify its validity when we
use the figures of Taipei City in substitute for those of the Taiwan area. Second,
health is a very complicated phenomenon. There is no clear-cut line between health
and illness. Instead, there is a zone of transition between them. And this zone may be
quite wide or quite narrow. It just depends on different persons. Third, that survey did
not give an objective criterion to decide if a person was healthy or not. The decision
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was quite subjectively or even arbitrarily made by the interviewees or interviewers. In
order to avoid asking people abstract questions and committing the same error, in my
survey in 1985, I only asked people empirical things that happened in the last year.
For example, "Have you seen a doctor in the past year?". The results are summarised
as Table 6.13.
Table 6.13 Visiting a Doctor by Retirees in Taiwan, 1984

















GEI | 16.7 | 27.8 | 44.5
LI j 30.9 j 23.0 | 53.9










Note: The total of GEI and LI has been weighted.
Source: author's survey
If we define a person who never visited a doctor in the past year as 'healthy', then by
this table, we could conclude that there were 42.8% old people healthy, the remaining
57.2% unhealthy; or there were 42.8% healthy, 27.3% in transition and 29.9% (=24.2 +
5.7) diseased if we considered the occasional patients as in transition. However,
because in my survey most retirees retired before 65 years old and their average age
was only 62.2 years, so not all of them could be considered as old people by
definition. The validity of the author's figures as the indicators of health of old people
could be over-estimated. For the old people, as their health was generally worse than
younger ordinary people, so when we apply these figures, we should keep in mind
that the health situations of older people will be definitely worse than this. As for
their actual situations, a separate investigation is necessary.
Besides, there would be another risk to under-estimate the frequencies of visiting
a doctor because the low income people might not visit a doctor even when they
needed to. Some other people might just go to a pharmacist to buy medicine by
themselves (because in Taiwan a prescription is not necessary to buy drugs). On the
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contrary, some other people might also visit a doctor even though they are healthy.
This is in particular true as there are free health services under health insurance and
sub-universal health service in Taiwan. The former might cause an over-evaluation of
the health situation of the people and the latter would cause an under-evaluation.
According to Cheng's survey on old people in Taiwan area, there were 357
diseased persons in his 986 respondents. That is, the figure of 'unhealthy' was 36.2%
(see Table 6.14). It seemed quite reasonable because it was lower than Tang' figure
and higher than the author's one. However, apart from the same criticisms as for
mine, Cheng's survey might face another criticism that his methodology to record for
every diseased person only one disease could be unreal, because many old people
might be suffering from several diseases simultaneously. In that case, his calculation
of medical expenditure would be a little over-estimated for each disease. Of course, it
was in fact difficult to separate them administratively. Moreover, the length of time of
being diseased of different people might differ greatly even if they were suffering the
same disease. So we could not get a general idea of the aggregate medical
expenditure of old people by the weekly cost in Table 6.14. However, we might
roughly conclude that the health situation of old people was like the following: 42.8%
healthy, 36.2% unhealthy, and the remaining 21.0% in transition.
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Table 6.14 Morbidity and Medical Expenditure of Old people
in Taiwan Area, 1985





1.Hypertensive disease I 72 | 20.2 | 204
2.Disease of respiratory system 1 71 19.9 | 356
3.Disease of digestive system j 32 ! 9.0 j 693
4.Disease of musculoskelital system and 1 1 1
connective tissue | 32 1 9.0 | 435
5.Diabetes mellitus | 27 ! 7.6 | 594
6.Vertigo j 26 ! 7.3 | 400
7.Headache 1 18 i 5.0 j 628
7.Cerebral apoplexy 1 17 4.8 j 1,376
9.Disease of heart and vessel 1 11 i 3.1 | 1.705
11.Disease of nervous system 1 io j 2.8 j 600
12.Disease of kidney and urinary system 1 io ! 2.8 585
10.Other heart disease i 8 ! 2.2 | 813
13.Disorder of eye I 6 1 1-7 | 2,453
14.Tooth disease | 5 ! 1.4 ! 780
15.Neoplasm/cancer I 3 ! 0.8 1 3,400
16.Mental disorder/psychoses I 2 ! 0.6 | 625
17.Disease of ear nose and throat 1 2 1 0.6 j 150
18.Senility 1 2 I 0.6 j 550






Total | 357 | 100.0 |
Note: 1)** = diseased persons
2)The total sample is 986.
Source: Cheng, 6
Referring to Cheng's survey, the diseases that are of highest morbidity are
diseases of the respiratory system and hypertensive disease. The research figures
showed that the diseases of high morbidity are not simultaneously those requiring
expensive medical treatment. This could imply that many old people might go without
medical care or delay visiting a doctor due to high medical expenditure. The disease
of highest expenditure is neoplasm or cancer. It costs a patient about NT$3,400 per
week. The next costly ones are disorder of the eye, heart and blood vessel disease,
cerebral apoplexy and disease of skin.
As old people certainly suffer from diseases, the incidence of their medical
expenditure is also a very vital problem. According to the author's survey, about 60%
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of diseased retirees had to self-finance their medical expenditure (see Table 6.15).
Only the retirees who were veterans or the dependants of military servants could get
free medical service from veteran or military hospitals. After 1985, several
subordinate health insurance schemes for GEI retirees and their spouses were
introduced. More old people were included. However, as the number of GEI retirees is
only a quarter of total of GEI and LI retirees, and as long as there is no health
insurance for the LI retirees, it is impossible to reduce this high rate of self-financing
medical expenditure significantly. The rate of self-financing of medical expenditure
among all old people would be much higher than this 60% figure from a survey of
recent retirees. Therefore, the 60% of self-financed medical expenditure would be
only a minimum. So medical expenditure is definitely a great burden for all families
with old people.
Table 6.15 The Incidence of Medical Expenditure
of Retirees in Taiwan, 1984 (%)























Total | 34.6 7.8 ! 14.8 ! 57.2
| 60.5 | 13.6 | 25.9 | 100.0
Note: (related to Table 6.13)
Source : author's survey
Although old people are vulnerable to suffer from so many diseases, not ail these
diseases will be the cause of their deaths. If we compare the morbidity in Table 6.14
with the ten or even five leading causes of death (see Table 6.16), we will find that
they are not the same. Apart from accident, those ten leading causes of deaths of
total population were also the main causes of deaths of old people aged 65 years and
over, because the percentage of old people was only about 5% of total population, but
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the proportion of the ten leading causes of deaths of old people was as high as 49%.
If only in the age group of 65 to 69, this rate was even up to 83%, but it would be
less than 50% if the age group was over 90 years old (see Table A11 in Appendix).
Therefore, the lower the age groups of old people, the more deaths were caused by
these ten leading diseases. Certainly, the ten leading diseases of different age groups
or sexes were not totally the same, but their differences were minor.
Table 6.16 The Ten Leading Causes of Death in Taiwan,1984
Causes
I
Total 6 5+ |
1
%
1.Malignant neoplasms 15 467 6 227 | 40.3
2.Cerebrovascular disease 14 801 9 569 | 64.7
3.Accident 11 559 1 506 | 13.0
4.Heart disease 8 676 5 750 | 66.3
5.Hypertensive disease 3 302 2 415 | 73.1
6.Chronic liver disease and cirrhosis 3 143 1 020 | 32.5
7.Diabetes mellitus 2 687 1 681 j 62.6
8.Bronchitis, emphysema and asthma 2 479 1 914 j 77.2
9.Nephritis, nephrotic syndrome and nephrosis| 2 130 1 094 | 51.4
10.Tuberculosis I 2 113 1 186 | 56.1
Subtotal S 66 357 32 362 | 48.8
All other causes I
1
22 415 11 803 j
1
52.7
Total I 88 772 44 165 | 49.8
Source: DOH, 1985: 74, 83-87
Although sickness is the main cause of the health problem, however, the people
who are not diseased are not definitely healthy. They might be too old or too weak to
be healthy. In that case there is no medical treatment that can help them. Therefore,
the morbidity rate may still not be a good indicator of health. In the field of social
policy we might be more interested to know how many old people need special care
or attendance for their daily lives. According to a health survey conducted by the
College of Medicine, National Taiwan University, in 1986 (Cheng, 1986), there were
86.4% of old people in Taiwan area who could take care of their own lives, whether
they were healthy or not. Among those who had to depend on other persons' care,
the 2.3% paralysed elderly definitely needed full-time care from members of their
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families, 6.5% needed help only for special activities and the rest just needed
company in order to avoid any accident. Nowadays the number of old people in
Taiwan amount to only 5%, so the burden of old people should not be very heavy.
But when a greater proportion of the population falls into the senior citizen category,
the situation will be very difficult if we have no proper provisions in that time.
6.6. The Social Participation of Old People
Man is a social animal. People cannot be isolated from society though they are
retired or they are old. All people more or less join some kind of social activities
unless they are too ill to do so. From this point of view, the frequency of social
participation might be considered as an indicator of the health of old people. Social
participation or social activities here are conventionally defined as non-economic or
non-profit activities. Of course, these activities can further be divided into two groups:
egoistic and altruistic; or recreational activities and voluntary services. The discussion
will be based on this classification.
Firstly, we begin with recreational activities. According to the author's survey,
about 30.4% of retirees joined seven different kinds of social activities. In detail, there
were about 45.8% retirees in GEI and 25.2% retirees in LI participating in these social
activities (see Table 6.17). And of these most of them joined friendly and sporting
activities.
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Table 6.17 Recreational Activities of Retirees in
Taiwan, 1985











Friendly associational 1 104 I 511 25.2 | O • O 13.2
Educational/training 1 io 1 6 j 2.4 j 1.2 | 1.4
Political ! 91 20 | 2.2 j 3.9 | 3.5
Academic ! 91 2 1 2.2 | 0.4 j 0.8
Community ! 161 111 3.9 | 2.11 2.5
Music and artist 3 | o| 0.7 | o.oj 0.1










Total 1 189 | 12 9 | 4 5. 8 | 25.2 | 30.4
Note: Activities are independent. The SUM has been weighted.
Source: author's survey
As these figures were collected from an open questionnaire, they tend to be too
low because there were no hints to remind the interviewees. However, these figures
would be quite meaningful because only the activities which were most popular and
were participated in by the interviewee with the greatest enthusiasm would be written
down. For example, many retirees of GEI were members of the Kuomintang (National
Party) and they were supposed to take part in political activities normally, but this kind
of activity was meaningful for only 2.2% of them. Therefore, only activities of personal
interest of the retirees could be indicated by these figures.
As friendly associational activities and sporting activities are the most popular
ones, it is worth analysing them in detail. Under the item of friendly associational
activities, there are associations of old age, schoolmates, colleagues, home county or
home province, majiang playing, LION International, women's club, community group,
etc.. Among them the peer group, ie, old age group, have the biggest amount of
participants. The next one is community activities. Among Sporting activities there are
tai-chi boxing, morning jogging, folk dancing, Chinese kung-fu, swimming, mountain
climbing, morning exercise, fishing, ball playing, etc.. The most popular ones are
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mountain climbing, morning jogging and morning exercise. I learnt from my
interviewing in Taipei that the activities of old age associations and sport are
generally the same. The main activities of old age associations always are of a
sporting nature. And the old people who always have the same sports together also
often organise their own old age groups. Old people always get up and go outdoors
before dawn to take part of their morning sporting activities. After their physical
exercise, they start chatting and having their snacks together until sunrise. And then
they go home separately. If there is no economic and health problem, their lives are
really very enjoyable.
As for voluntary service, because participation depends not only on the welfare of
other people, but also the capacity of the volunteers, so these figures can be expected
to be much lower than for recreational activities. According to the latest census on
old people aged 70 years and over in Taipei City, only 8.1% of old people said that
they would like to join such activities (Bai, 1987:100). This seems quite reasonable and
believable. In that census the voluntary service was divided into five groups:
child-caring, helping the poor and the sick, social visit, arts teaching and academic
teaching. Most people preferred to join a social visit. Others preferred the teaching of
arts or knowledge. The least ones were involved in helping the poor and the sick and
to look after children. It is important to remember that this survey was for people
over 70.
The results were much better for the same question in another survey on the
younger population of old people in Taipei City (see Table 6.18). Its highest item
could even be as high as 33.2%. The difference was really very large. When we made
a scrutiny into the questionnaire of this survey, we found that the interviewees were
directly asked, "What kind of voluntary services listed below do you like to join?' I do
not think the old interviewees could understand the meaning of "voluntary services".
They just thought that the government wanted to find some paid jobs for them and
asked them what kind of job they liked to do. So they expressed enthusiastically so
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and so they liked to do. This was the reason why their figures were so high. The
reason is very clear. Many jobs listed in the table are available at any time for them.
There is no need for the government to arrange these for them. Therefore, the
figures may be precise, but their meanings are invalid.




1.Security patrol of community | 194 33.2
2.Child-caring in community | 119 20.3
3.Casher of car park j 117 20.0
4.Scavenger of community | 101 17.3
5.Family repairing work 1 74 12.6
6.Helping the sick and the disabled 1 69 11.8
7.Taking care of the in-patient old 1 69 11.8
8.Pupils' homework tutor 1 61 10.4
9.Missionary work in church 57 9.7
10.Extra-curricular activities assistant 1 57 9.7
11.Services in make-up school 1 53 9.1
12.Painting and caligraphy teaching ! 39 6.7
13.Traffic warden j 37 6.3
14.Chinese Kung-fu teaching 1 16 2.7
15.Music teaching 1 io 1.7




Total | 585 100.0
Note: Multiple choice.
Source: Tang, et al, 39
6.7. Summary
Though the number of old people in Taiwan is only about 5% of the total
population, this number will be changing in the coming decades. The issue of
population transition must be taken into account in the formation of social security
policy. According to the discussion on the population projections, when the
population of Taiwan reaches its ZPG state, the number of old people will be about 3.5
to 4.3 million, ie, 14.8% to 16.9% of total population. Certainly the rates of
dependency and retirement will be very different from today.
Both in theory and in practice, the family plays a vital role in the social security
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provision for old people in Chinese society. Now there are about 67% old people living
with their children. However, the family has its limits in dealing with the problems of
21-22 thousand of single persons and quite a large number of couples without
children. Apart from the excess of males, the number of these groups of people is
about 16% (calculated based on the rate of married people without children, 13.7%) of
old people. Nowadays old people's homes are the main ways available to tackle this
problem though their standard and capacity are far from satisfactory.
As for the economic situations of old people, generally, they are also not very
satisfactory. We have discussed their sources and the levels of income. We find that
there is a negative relation with their ages: the older they are, the more of them are
disadvantaged in their economic situations. The number of the poor might be ranged
from 0.9% to 25% in the population of old people, they are the targeted group of
people of our social security policy.
In addition at least 36% of old people were not in good health, and very few of
them can get free medical care, so medical expenditure is certainly one of the biggest
items in the daily expenditure of most old people or families with old people. This
economic burden must be taken into account in the formation of social security
policy. Lastly, since only healthy people can join social activities, the frequency of
social participation, 30.4%, could be also a reliable indicator, at least a supplementary
indicator, of the health of old people.
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CHAPTER 7
THE STRUCTURE OF EXISTING PROVISION IN TAIWAN
7.1. Introduction
According to the classification in chapter 2, there are all types of social security
provisions in Taiwan, but not all of them develop to the same level of maturity, and
not all of them have an adequate provision for the old. In this chapter I plan to give a
detailed discussion about the basic structure of existing provision in Taiwan. Only
after such an overall discussion, will we have a basis for further discussion about their
function and weakness.
In the field of social insurance, there are three main systems, that is, Labour
Insurance (LI) (1950), Government Employees' Insurance (GEI) (1958) and Military
Insurance (Ml) (1950). Under the GEI system there are the Retired Government
Employees' Insurance (RGEI) (1965), the Insurance for Teaching and Administrative
Staff of Private Schools (ITASPS) (1980), the Health Insurance for Government
Employees' Dependants (HIGED) (1982) and the Insurance for Retired Teaching and
Administrative staff of Private Schools (IRTASPS) (1984). These schemes provide either
cash benefit or health services to the old.
Social assistance provides benefits both in cash and in kind. Although the cash
benefit level is quite limited and the test is very severe, it is a reliable source of
assistance. Its level of benefit and number of beneficiaries will be given in the related
section. The main types of benefit in kind are medical services and old people's
homes. As for the latter, there are two different systems of public old people's home.
One of them is restricted to old veterans.
There are three different occupational schemes for three different groups of
employees in Taiwan, i.e., ordinary, government and military ones. Regretfully, only
the data of the government occupational scheme is available because the ordinary
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one has only just came into force recently and the military one is confidential.
Therefore, the discussion is mainly focused on the government occupational scheme.
In Taiwan there are two kinds of free benefit in sub-universal schemes, that is,
free employment service and free health service. But for old people the only kind of
benefit is health service and only for very limited numbers of elderly. Due to shortage
of data, only an estimate of its possible number of beneficiaries is given.
7.2. Social Insurance
7.2.1. Primary Social Insurance
There are three main systems of primary social insurance which are closely related
to the old in Taiwan, that is, LI, GEI and Ml. The other minor insurance provisions are
subordinate to one of these main systems. The common characteristics of these
systems are that they are contingency-comprehensive and employment-related. As
they are comprehensive, each system includes several similar contingencies such as
maternity, sickness, injury, old age and death. Of course, their contributions are also
comprehensive. And as they are employment-related, all insured persons must be in
the labour force. The persons who are employed by an employer are in principle
included in the schemes, but the employers themselves are excluded. Whenever an
employee is retired from his employment with or without a retirement payment, he
will lose the entitlement to all other benefits. So, to be more precise, all these three
insurance schemes are in fact comprehensive employees' schemes. Generally the
difference is that LI includes employees employed by the private sector; and GEI and
Ml include only the employees employed by government. In an industrialised society
most breadwinners of families are employees, this might be one of the effective ways
to protect them and their families' lives from the insecurity of economy by protecting
them from certain expected but uncertain contingencies. Compared to employers or
even self-employed, it is also true that employees are more economically vulnerable.
It might be the main reason why only employees are included and all employers and
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the self-employed are excluded in Taiwan.
7.2.1.1. Labour Insurance
Before the retreat of current National Government from mainland China, there were
several attempts to formulate and to implement social insurance for the general
labour force. Firstly, in October 1943 there was an experimental insurance scheme for
the salt workers in Sichuan Province where the provisional capital was in during the
anti-Japanese War. Later, after the promulgation of the Constitution on the first
January 1947, a preliminary Central Bureau of Social Insurance was immediately
established in order to prepare a draft of social insurance law to carry out the
requirement of the Constitution. Unfortunately, due to the outbreak of civil war with
the Communist Party and the retreat to Taiwan in 1949, this attempt failed. However,
just a few months after the National Government moved to Taiwan, the Labour
Insurance (LI) was promulgated in February 1950 by Taiwan Provincial Government by
an administrative regulation. This regulation was one year earlier than the Communist
counterpart in mainland China, so it was not a reflection or copy of mainland China.
Just as there was a policy to stablize the farmers by implementing rural land reform,
there was a political policy to stablize the non-farming workers by enforcing this
labour Insurance.
Due to lack of experience in setting up a new administrative system, at the first
step this insurance covered only the workers in public and private enterprises
employing over 200 persons. The coverage was extended from the enterprises
employing over 200 persons to 100 persons and then to 20 persons within the first
year. Later, it was extended to include those employing over 10 persons in 1955. And
lastly, all industrial and business units employing over 5 persons were included in
1979. There has been no further extension to include the insured units employing less
than five persons due to the difficulty in the collection of contributions and the cost
of administration. However, after these several stages of extension, the covered
insured persons of this scheme nowadays has reached 52.0% of labour force and
212
21.8% of total population in 1985.
Before July 1958 the insurance was carried out not only by local government's
regulations but also by different regulations for different industrial workers. For
example, union workers, fishermen and sugar cane farmers were covered under
different regulations though they were administered under the same insurer,
Department of Labour Insurance, Provincial Taiwan Life Insurance Company, at that
time. Moreover, there were also five different supervisory authorities to supervise the
operation of the insurance affairs. In order to improve the efficiency of administration,
these regulations and supervisory organisations were integrated into a single national
insurance law, ie, Labour Insurance Act, and a single supervision authority respectively
in 1958. Most of these changes were referred to the example of GEI law which was
pronounced in the beginning of the same year. This law was also enforced by a
unique and independent insurer, the Bureau of Labour Insurance for Taiwan and Fukien
Area (BLITF), although it is still an agency under Taiwan Province Government.
The making of this new central law was based on a principle to improve benefits
without increasing the financing burden of government, employers and employees.
Retaining the contributions rates unchanged, compared with the largest scheme
before the unification, the following benefits were more or less increased:
1. old age benefits increased from 15 months to 45 months,
2. funeral allowances for dependants increased from one month to
one and a half or to two months depending on status and age,
3. ordinary death benefits increased from 20 months to 27 months,
4. occupational death benefits increased from 36 months to 37
months,
5. ordinary disability benefits increased form 36 months to 40
months,
6. occupational disability benefits increased from 54 months to 60
months,
7. the number of occupational diseases increased from 10 to 21,
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8. the length of ordinary hospitalisation increased from 50 days to 4
months,
9. the length of occupational hospitalisation increased from 6 months
to 7 months,
10. the food of hospitalisation increased from only 50% to 100%,
11. missing allowance increased from two thirds to 70%.
No financing basis was given why such levels of benefits should be made. So the
increase of benefits level was quite arbitrary.
At the inception of this insurance, the contingencies included only injury, disability,
maternity, old age and death. Among them maternity covered only the insured, the
maternity of spouse was not included until 1953's amendment. From the beginning,
the contribution rate was only 3% of the monthly wage of the insured persons, but
the insured persons paid only 20% of it, the rest was shared by employer (60%) and
government (20%).
All benefits were paid in cash in the beginning. The injury benefit was paid
regularly for 6 months for ordinary injury and 12 months for industrial injury. Other
benefits were paid as a lump sum. Among them old age benefit was an amount of
one monthly insured wage for each year's insurance. That is, if a retiree has insured
for 5 years, then he can get 5 months' insured wage as his old age benefit. For the
sake of financial soundness, the ceiling of benefit was restricted to only 15 months.
So it was not a very generous payment.
In the amendment of 1956 the scheme began to provide in-kind benefit for the
contingency of sickness, but it was restricted to only inpatient service in order to
relieve the high medical expenditure of the insured. At the same time, the contribution
rate was increased from 3% to 4%, ie, only 1% was added for the newly provided
inpatient service. The maximal length of inpatient medical care was only 50 days for
ordinary injury and disease and 6 months for industrial ones. The only generous offer
was the phasing out of the ceiling of old age benefit because there was no point to
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set such a ceiling as the longest insured persons was not up to six years at that time.
Unfortunately this generosity did not last many years, the formal national Labour
Insurance Law of 1958 reset a higher ceiling of 45 months. In this amendment, the
retirees still gets only one month's insured wage as payments for the first 15 years'
insurance, but afterwards he will get two months' insured wage for each additional
year's insurance. If there were no ceiling, the amount of payments could be too high
to pay by the insurer. That would be a threat to the soundness of financing of the
system in the future.
In an amendment in 1968 outpatient medical care was introduced due to the
massive abuse of inpatient services from both the delay of check-out of the inpatients
and the hospitalisation of the minor diseased persons. At the same time the limit to
the length of inpatient benefit was also phased out because this would cause
difficulties for those who were really in need. Following the providing of outpatient
service, the contribution rate rose from 4% to 8% and subject to a ceiling which
would adjust according to wage index. This ceiling was NT$14,400 in 1984. The
contribution was shared by only employee (20%) and employer (80%), no government
sharing any more.
The Taiwan Provincial Government continued to budget to pay 8% of total
contribution revenue as a subsidy to cover administrative expenditure in this new
central law though the legislators also knew the same kind of rates were only 4.38%
in Canada, 5-11% in France and 3.45% Norway in 1953. But the actual administrative
was not generally as high as 8% of contribution revenue, so the subsidy was reduced
to 5.5% in 1979.
Though unemployment was added as a contingency by the legislators, it never
really come into force in the later three amendments by the objections of the
Executive Yuan. Their main reasons for this objection were several. Firstly, they
emphasised that the unemployment rate was still very low. It was as low as about 2%
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at that time. Even in 1985 it was only 2.9%. So it was not a serious social problem.
A more important issue was how to improve the technology and productivity of
economic activities. They preferred employment services to unemployment insurance.
In employment services the government provides not only placement services but also
vocational training. Under such circumstances, unemployment insurance was really not
so urgent. Secondly, government was worried about the disincentive of people to
work if this scheme provided long-term unemployment benefits. On the other hand, if
our aim was to provide only short-term benefit, eg, one year or even half a year's
benefit, most families would still be able to provide such security. Especially, if the
long-term unemployment benefits were financed by general revenue, as the insured
persons were the minority of the total population, this financing would be no less
than taxing the majority of non-insured persons to subsidise the minority of insured
persons. It would be unfair to the non-insured majority. Thirdly, as we have
mentioned in chapter 5, Chinese people generally prefer to create their own business,
either to be an employer or a self-employed, rather than being employed if there is an
opportunity. If he is a petty self-employed, it would be very difficult to judge whether
a person is in employment or not. For this reason the administration of this scheme
would be much more difficult in Chinese society than western countries.
At present the benefits of LI can be divided into two categories, ordinary and
industrial. The former includes maternity, injury and sickness, medical care, disability,
(unemployment), old age and death; the latter includes injury and sickness, medical
care, disability and death. Apart from medical care, all benefits of these two categories
are paid in cash. The contribution for ordinary contingencies is shared by employee
and employer. But the premium for industrial contingencies is borne only by the
employer according to the Schedule of Premium Rates for Occupational Injury which is
prescribed by the competent central authority subject to the approval of the Executive
Yuan and readjusted once every three years. Its rate is from 0.2% to 3.0% at present;
and its average is about 0.8%. In order to avoid arguments from different industries.
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the rates for different industries are confidential. No figure has ever been declared.
No public discussion has been made, even only for academic purposes.
At present the coverage of the insured includes all workers aged from 14 to 60
who are employed by an employer employing at least 5 persons or more in the
following industrial units:
1. public or private factory, mine, saltern, ranch, pasturage, forest, tea
plantation, communication and transportation enterprise and public
utility;
2. commercial shop or firm;
3. journalistic, cultural, non-profit organisation or cooperative
enterprise;
4. technicians, drivers and office boys in government agencies, public
or private schools;
5. staff employed by a government agency, public school under a
contract;
6. technicians receiving training at a government authorised
vocational training organisation;
7. full time fishermen and
8. union members without permanent employers.
All workers within the above industries are compulsorily included in the scheme; and
the workers in other industries not listing above can participate in this scheme
voluntarily if their employers want to do so.
The above industrial workers can also be classified by the standard international
industry classification by the insurer of LI in its statistical yearbook. So there should
not be any industry being excluded by the law. Even if there were, their workers still
could join the scheme voluntarily. Therefore, if there are any workers who are
excluded by the scheme, its reason is definitely not the industries they belong to
being excluded by the scheme, it should be that either their employers employ less
than 5 persons or they themselves are employers or self-employed or unpaid
domestic workers.
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The only benefit that is closely related to the elderly is the lump sum old age
benefit. The amount of this payment is proportional to one's length of contribution.
When a man retires at 60 or a woman at 55, or a man aged 55 having worked in the
pit up to 5 years, they still can receive an amount of benefit that is equal to a given
sum of monthly insured wage in full rate. By law, the insured wage should be equal to
one's actual wage if one's wage was not over the ceiling. But as many employers
want to reduce their burden of contributions, they always contributed only part of the
actual wage as insured wage. As the actual wage of an insured person will change
during the insured period, so will his insured wage. So the insured wage which is
used as the base to calculate one's benefit is the average of the latest six months'
insured wage if his insured years are over three years. But if his insured years are
less than three years, that should be the average of the whole period. In counting
one's old age payment, it is one month's insured wage for each of one year's
contribution; but they will be two month's insured wage for each one year's
contribution from 16th year on until up to the ceiling of 45 months' wage. In the case
of men of 55 years and women of 50 years, if they have contributed for 10 years, then
they can receive a reduced benefit which is 4% less for each year short of qualified
retirement age. In 1984 there were 19,630 retirees in this scheme. 79.5% of them
retired with full rate benefit and the remaining 20.5% retired with reduced benefit. But
there will be no benefit for those who contribute less than one year.
7.2.1.2. Government Employees' Insurance
In 1947 the first draft of 'Government Employees' Insurance' (GEI) was prepared by
the Ministry of Personnel, Examination Yuan. This Bill had also been sent to the
Legislative Yuan by the Executive Yuan and the Examination Yuan together for
approval. Later, due to the retreat of the Nationalist Government from mainland China
to Taiwan, this Bill was postponed until the request of the Examination Yuan was
made in 1955. After three years' procedure in the Legislative Yuan, the GEI law was
finally passed and promulgated in January 1958 as a formal central government law.
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This insurance gives protection to all persons who are employed by government
administrative organisations, public educational institutions, judiciary organisations,
public health institutions, government owned enterprises and public representative
organisations. That is, all persons who get regular pay from government are included
in this scheme.
Formally the coverage also includes dependants such as parents, spouse and
children for health service (in Article 11), but its enforcement has to be prescribed in a
separate law. The reason for this is that the increase of each group of dependants will
be not only a great increase of insured persons, but also a great complexity of the
administration of benefit in kind. Before this health insurance for dependants was
provided, the government provided 70% of reimbursement for inpatient expenditure for
the dependants of government employees subject to a maximum each year in order to
relieve the hardship of the employees to some degree. However, a dependent
insurance scheme would be a better policy, so, finally, the subordinate law for
dependants was promulgated in 1982 and came into force in the same year. The range
of contribution for each dependant is between 3% and 5% of insured wage of GEI
insured person, but it is 3% in the inception. But the maximum of contributions is 5
dependants. That is, if a GEI insured person has more than 5 dependants, he needs to
pay only five dependants' contributions.
However, in its first stage the coverage of the above subordinate law included only
the spouse. Because the benefit of this subordinate law included only medical service
for sickness and injury, so it was named as Health Insurance for Government
Employees' Dependants (HIGED). At this stage the contribution was prescribed as 3%
and it was equally shared by the insured and the government. Besides, the
beneficiaries of this subordinate law also have to pay 10% of out-patient medicine
cost. The remaining costs are borne by the insurer.
The benefits of GEI scheme are provided for contingencies such as maternity,
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sickness and injury, disability, old age and death. For the death of dependants, there is
a funeral allowance. Originally this scheme also had a provision to refund premium to
the ex-insured if they had never claimed any benefit. But this provision was abolished
in the only amendment in 1974. The scheme provides free medical care for maternity,
sickness and injury and cash benefits for all other contingencies.
The contribution rate was 7% of insured person's monthly insured salary. Originally
the insured salary was equal to actual salary. But because the months of occupational
old age payments were adjusted too high to finance, so, from 1978 on, with
corresponding change in occupational payments, the government re-defined the
insured salary as only 'basic salary' in order to relieve the fiscal burden. The
contribution rate was raised from 7% to 9% in 1974. The insured person pays only
35% of this contribution, the remaining 65% is borne by his employer, ie, government.
This contribution will be exempted if an insured person has contributed for 30 years.
By a separate government regulation of 1964, the coverage of this scheme was
extended to include retired government employees by a scheme named as Retired
Government Employees' Insurance (RGEI). The insured retirees in this new scheme are
entitled to all benefits as those of present government employees. But they cannot
receive their old age benefit though they are retired. In fact this scheme is like a
measure of 'deferred retirement', because the insured persons in RGEI can 'retire'
again within two years. When they 'retire' again, they can receive their retirement
payments and will lose the entitlements to all other benefits. The main difference is
that if they decide to join RGEI, then they have to pay the full rate of contribution by
themselves according to the last monthly salary when they retired. But if their total
insured years of GEI and RGEI are over 30 years, their contributions will be exempted.
This scheme is voluntary, not compulsory. From the point of insured persons, the only
one requirement for the participants is that they have to deposit their retirement
payments in the scheme unless they want to 'retire' from RGEI again within two years.
There will be no such claim of retirement payments after two years any more.
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Due to the characteristic of voluntariness and the loss of the lump sum payments,
not only is the rate of participation very low, but also the effect of reverse selection
(ie, only the ill or diseased persons join the scheme) is very serious. In order to tackle
the huge deficit in the RGEI scheme, from July 1985 on, this scheme will be replaced
gradually by the introduction of two new schemes: the Health Insurance for Retired
Government Employees (HIRGE) and the Health Insurance for Spouses of Retired
Government Employees (HISRGE). All government employees who retire after that date
can join only one of these two new schemes voluntarily without any special
requirement and cannot join RGEI any longer. As for the insured in RGEI, they also
have the option to transfer from RGEI to HIRGE or HISRGE and to claim back their
deposited old age benefits. But this refund was valid only until the end of 1985. After
that date, the transfer will still be available, but no refund of old age payments will be
made any longer.
In theory as the death payment is still as high as 30 months as in GEI, it is only 6
months less than the maximum old age payment, there should be no strong incentive
for the insured persons to transfer from RGEI to HIRGE or HISRGE. It would be
particularly true if their total insured years has been or will be up to 30 years soon.
But in practice the transfer was very significant. The number of the RGEI was reduced
a half from 10 thousand to 5 thousand in the first year of the enforcement of the
HIRGE and the HISRGE in 1985. The main reason might be that the retirees could only
consume their old age benefits but not death benefits. The contribution rates of these
two new schemes are the same, from 6% to 12% of insured wage. At its inception,
they are 9%. The contributions are shared equally by insured persons and government.
Besides half of a food bill for the first 30 days' inpatient and a full food bill afterwards,
the insured have to pay 10% of out-patient medicine cost for their health services.
The remaining costs are borne by the insurer on the same conditions as GEI insured
persons.
The benefits that are available for old people in this scheme are old age payment
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and medical care. The medical care for maternity, sickness and injury is free at the
®
point of consumption. However, the insured person has to pay the registration fee. It
is NT$20 for each visit to a doctor. If the registration fee of some contracted hospitals
is higher than NT$20, the difference will be paid by the insurer.
The minimum qualification of old age payment is 5-yeaTs contributions. For ail
government employees who have contributed more than 5 years, they are qualified to
retire voluntarily at 60 years old or forced to retire compulsorily at 65 and to receive
a lump sum retirement payment which is amounted to certain months' insured
salaries. As the insured salary of the last month was always the highest one in one's
working age, so it was prescribed as the base to calculate one's old age payment. The
number of months' insured salaries is calculated according to the following formulas:
1. For the first two five years, each year's contributions will be
entitled to one month's salary as payment, ie, 10 months for 10
years;
2. for the third five years, each year's contributions will be entitled to
two months' salaries as payment, ie, 20 months for 15 years;
3. for the fourth five years, each year's contributions will be entitled
to three months' salaries as payment, ie, 32 months for 19 years;
4. finally,for those have contributed for 20 years and over, their
payment will be up to the maximum, 36 months' salaries, ie, 36
months for 20 years and over.
Under the same insurer and with the same standard of benefits as GEI, RGEI,
HIGED, HIRGE and HISRGE, the Insurance for Teaching and Administrative Staff of
Private Schools (ITASPS) was introduced in 1980; the Insurance for Retired Teaching
and Administrative Staff of Private Schools (IRTASPS) was introduced in 1984; the
Health Insurance for Retired Teaching and Administrative Staff of Private Schools
(HIRTASPS) and the Health Insurance for Spouses of Retired Teaching and
Administrative Staff of Private Schools (HISRTASPS) were introduced in 1986. The only
one difference is that a half of the 65% of employers' contributions will be subsidised
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by government.
In 1986 there are only 4 thousand insured persons in RGEI, 181 thousand in HIGED,
26 thousand in ITASPS and 0.4 thousand in HIRTASPS and HISRTASPS, so they are
minor insurance schemes subordinate to GEI.
7.2.1.3. Military Insurance
Military Insurance (Ml) was started from 1953. The coverage includes all military
servants and non-military personnel employed by a military agency under a contract.
The insured contingencies are disability, death and retirement. As there is a free
medical service for all military servants, all benefits for these contingencies are paid in
cash. According to different ranks, the contribution rates are prescribed from 3%-8%
of monthly salary. At present the enforcing rates are 3% for soldiers, 4% for officers
up to captain, 5% for officers up to colonel, and 6% for all senior officers. For all
officers the insured pay only 35% of contributions, the remaining 65% is paid by
government. But for the soldiers and the officers who have contributed for 30 years,
the government will pay the full rate for them.
The calculation of retirement payment is quite similar to that of GEI. For those
who do not serve up to 5 years, they receive only the refund of contributions that are
paid by themselves without interest. For those who have served for 5 years and over,
for the first two five-year and after the fifth five-year afterwards, the payment will be
one month's salary for each year's service; in the third five-year, it will be 2 months'
salaries for each year; in the fourth five-year, it will be 3 months' for each year. The
maximum of payment is 45 months. All payments are in a lump sum.
7.2.1.4. Health Insurance for Fanners
The Health Insurance for Farmers (HIF) was initiated in October 1985. Recently it
was still officially in an experimental stage, but practically no one expects it will be
dropped in the future. At the end of 1985 there were 113 thousand farmers joining
this provisional scheme through the Farmers' Associations they belonged to. As most
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farmers are self-employed, the minimum wage of NT$6,300 is adopted as the common
insured wage for all farmers. The insured farmers pay only 40% of the contribution
rate, 5.8%, ie, NTS 146.2 per month. Their Farmers' Associations pay for them 10% and
government subsidise the remaining 50%. The contingencies include maternity,
sickness, injury and death. The benefits for the first three contingencies are medical
services, but for death the benefit is in cash. No further statistics are available.
7.2.2. Occupational Schemes: A Secondary Social Insurance
Occupational schemes in Taiwan are quite similar to employers' liability because all
of them are contributed to by employers only. However, the occupational schemes in
Taiwan may be either public or private. But in Britain all occupational schemes are
conventionally described as private schemes even though some of them such as civil
service pensions are actually non-contributory and financed by general revenue. As
the employer of public schemes, both for civil servants and military servants, is the
government, so the schemes for public and military servants are a mixture of social
insurance and universal allowances because, on one hand, their benefits are
earnings-related and, on the other hand, their contributions are financed by general
revenue without means-testing. So they might be considered as public schemes. As
for the schemes for the private employees, they are a mixture of employer liability and
a provident fund because, firstly, both contributions and benefits are earnings-related
and the contributions are paid by employers only (Before the enforcement of the
Labour Standard Law, non-statutory occupational provisions were normally contributed
by both employers and employees.) and, secondly, the contributions must be
fully-funded and are paid in lump sum for only one contingency: retirement. As the
private schemes are financed by only the employers, so its amount of benefits will be
subject to the ability and willingness of employers.
Just as the latest reform in British occupational schemes requires the schemes to
contribute at least 4% of earnings, the Labour Standard Law in Taiwan requires
employers to appropriate 2% to 15% of their payroll as the reserve for retirement
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payment unless their previous provisions are the same or even better than the offer
of this new law. Explicitly, this measure will face the same weakness as Britain, ie,
uncertainty and vulnerability of the value of retirement payments in the future
(Philipson and Walker, 203,214; Silburn, 38,39,55). Moreover, as private schemes are
not centrally administered, many employers may have their own independent schemes,
so there could be a problem of both labour mobility and the portability of
occupational entitlement. In British experience, according to a study on the job
changers in occupational schemes in 1979, there were 6.8% of contributors losing
their pension entitlements, 10% withdrawing their membership, 7% having their
pension transferred, 13% having their pension right preserved and about 60%
accepting their refunds (Philipson and Walker, 203). In Taiwan because 98% of
enterprises are of medium and small scale, the frequency of labour mobility should be
much higher than in Britain because the life-span of medium and small enterprises is
more uncertain. This condition will make the occupational schemes in Taiwan much
more disadvantageous than those in Britain.
Furthermore, this new law stipulates that the employees can retire voluntarily at 55
years old if they have worked for 15 years or at any age if they have worked for 25
years. But if they are 60 years old or they are disabled, either in mental aspect or in
physical aspect, they may be forced to retire by their employers. It is very clear that
these retirement conditions are a mixture of LI and GEI.
The payment of private schemes is only in a lump sum. For the first 15 years, the
amount of payment is two months' average wage for each year's work time; and from
16th year on, that will be one month's wage for every additional year. The maximum
of payment is 45 months. On the other hand, if the disability is caused by industrial
contingencies, the payment will increase by 20%. The coverage of this new scheme is
the largest one in Taiwan. Unfortunately as this law just came into force 2 years ago,
no statistical data are available.
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There are two schemes, military/veteran scheme and government employees'
scheme, in the field of public occupational schemes. Their scale are both smaller than
the private one, but there are no financing problem for them because they are
financed by general revenue. Moreover, both of them have the options of lump sum
payment or monthly pension. Although the general conditions are quite similar in
these two sub-schemes, for example, the best offer for pension can be up to 90% of
salary, the military scheme is much better than the civil scheme because the
payments of the military scheme are based on actual salary but the civil scheme are
based on only basic salary. The difference between basic salary and actual salary
could be as high as 50%. The difference is very significant. Unfortunately the data of
the military scheme is confidential and cannot be made available. So the discussion
of the public occupational schemes will put more emphasis on the civil scheme.
In the military servants retirement scheme, its retirement requirements are more
complicated than those of the civil servants. At first, the compulsory retirement ages
are different for different servants in different ranks. By law, they are 45 years for
soldiers, 50 years for officers up to captain, 58 years for officers up to colonel, 60
years for major general, 65 years for lieutenant general, 70 years for three-star
general. Even before these compulsory retirement ages, if an officer cannot get a
promotion within a certain length of service in a rank, for example, from 10 years for
second lieutenant to 28 years for colonel, he is still forced to retire compulsorily.
Apart from above requirements of age and length of service, an officer or a soldier is
also allowed to retire if he is disabled or invalid. Therefore, the average retirement age
of military servants is generally lower than that of civil servants.
The military retirement payments are closely related to the length of service. If the
length of service is less than 3 years, there will be no payments at all. For those who
serve up to 3 and less than 3 and a half years, they will be entitled to 6 months' full
rate gross salary as their retirement payments. Afterwards and in the first ten years,
each one month's salary will be added for every half a year's service. Or, this formula
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can be expressed as 2N-1 (N = years of service). After the first ten and a half years,
the previous formula is still applied, but additional 2 months will be added. In that
case the formula is expressed as 2N+1. The maximum of payment will be reached at
61 months when a servant has served for 30 years.
Moreover, if a servant has served for 15 years, then he is entitled to the option of
a monthly payment, ie, pension. The level of pension amounted to 75% of one's gross
salary at the beginning. Afterwards, each 1% will be added for every one year's
service up to the maximum rate of 90%.
As for the government employees' occupational (retirement) scheme, all
government employees in GEI are included except a small number of representative
members. After 5 years' service, an employee may retire voluntarily at 60 years old or
at any age if he has served for 25 years; or he must retire compulsorily at 65 or at
any age if he is disabled, either in mental aspect or in physical aspect. The minimum
qualification of this payment is 5 years' service.
After fulfilling the minimum qualification, except the employees of some
government owned enterprises and utilities which opted to choose a provident fund
as the occupational provision for their employees, all employees who do not serve
over 15 years are entitled to only lump sum payments; but those who have served for
15 years and over will be entitled to the options of lump sum payment or monthly
payment or the combination of them since 1979. The options of combination may be
one of the following:
1. 1/2 lump sum payment and 1/2 monthly payment;
2. 1/3 lump sum payment and 2/3 monthly payment;
3. 1/4 lump sum payment and 3/4 monthly payment.
The amount of lump sum payment is calculated from the following formulas. After
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satisfying the minimum qualification of five years' service, the payment will start from
9 months' basic salaries (note: not gross salaries). Afterwards it will add 1 month's
basic salary for each half year's service until reaching its ceiling, 61 months' basic
salaries. Additionally there are 2 months' basic salaries to be added when the service
is up to 15 years. That is, the formula of payment can be expressed as 2N-1 for those
who have served from 5 to 14 years, or as 2N+1 for those who have served for 15
years and over.
As for the monthly payment, it will start from 75% of one's last monthly basic
salary. Afterwards there will be an increase of 1% for each additional year's service
until it is up to the ceiling, 90% of one's basic salary. In summary, the formulas of
both lump sum and monthly payments are the same as those of military retirement
payments. However, for a civil servant, if his retirement is due to an injury during his
duty, then his lump sum payment will increase by 20% and his monthly payment will
be 90% automatically. Even those who do not serve up to 5 years will be considered
as having served for 5 years.
As there is an option for lump sum or monthly payments since 1979 in the
government occupational scheme, so these figures could be a good indicator of the
preference for the types of payment among retirees. According to the statistics in
1984, the retirees who received lump sum payments were 57.6%, monthly payments
24.7% and combination payments 17.7% (see Table 7.1).
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Table 7.1 Statistics of Occupational Retirement Payment, 1984
lump 1 1 combi-| Total






Administrative Organisations 60.5 1 36.7 | 2.8 | 3 530










Government Owned Enterprises: 1 1 1
Productive enterprises 93.8 1 5.0 | 1.1 | 958
Communication enterprises 9.3 4.2 | 86.5 j 1 503





Total 57.6 1 24.7 | 17.7 | 8 276
Source: MOP, 1985
From the figures of above table, it seemed that the retirees strongly preferred
lump sum payments to monthly payments because the total of the monthly payment
was less than half of the lump sum payment. However, these figures cannot be
considered as the real preference of retirees because the high rates of lump sum
payments in productive and fiscal enterprises and the high rate of combination
payment in communication enterprises are mainly the results of special government
stipulation. In the author's survey, the retirees were asked the reasons why they
chose that type of payment. Most retirees of these enterprises replied that that was
prescribed by their enterprises or the government. There was no chance for them to
make any choice. The reason was clearly that many productive enterprises were not
always able to make profits, even their length of existence could not be guaranteed,
so the best arrangement for their retirees was a lump sum payment. But for some
communication enterprises such as railway and bus corporations, although they will
last forever, their low profitability make them unable to pay large amounts of lump
sum payments, so they cannot but arrange a combination payment compulsorily for
their retirees.
As for retirees of fiscal enterprises such as banks, because their payments were
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generally higher than the average and especially since most of them had the
knowledge and experience to manage big amounts of money, so they were arranged
to be paid in a lump sum. Only this arrangement would be able to meet their needs.
Actually there were very few retirees in these enterprises complaining that they could
not have the choice of monthly payments, but many of them did complain that they
could not join the preferential rate saving account in the Bank of Taiwan.
Therefore, the figures which indicate the real preference of retirees should be
those in the subtotal of administrative organisations and educational institutions
because only these two groups of retirees could have the full freedom on the option
of payments. So the real preference should be 62.5% in lump sum payments, 34.7% in
monthly payments and 2.8% in combination payments.
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However, this figure of lump sum payment might still somewhat over-estimate the
real preference of the retirees,because, according to the author's survey, there were
8% of retirees in administrative organisations and 3% in educational institutions not
serving up to 15 years so that they were not entitled to the options of monthly or
combination payments. Otherwise, their figures would be a little bit different, either
higher or lower. Although the figure of lump sum payments is still much higher than
the other two, when referring to their data of time series, we found that, from 1980 to
1983, the figures of lump sum payments were slightly down and the figures of
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monthly payments were slightly up. Unfortunately they changed in the opposite
manner in 1984, otherwise we might expect that the monthly payments would be
more popular in the future (see Table 7.2). However, this trend meant that the retirees
in Chinese society generally still preferred a lump sum payment to a monthly one.
According to the author's survey, the reasons can be explained as follows:
Firstly, it should be the case that most retirees would have a good relationship
with their children. They were confident that their children would support their old
age, so they were pleased to choose a lump sum payment in order to help their
children to study for a higher degree, to establish or to expand their business or to
marry, etc. This preference would particularly be true if their children needed help
when they retired.
Secondly, the other important reason, and maybe a major reason, that the retired
were not so keen on monthly payments was that there was no survivors' pension
payments or any other kinds of compensation in succession of the monthly retirement
payment of a retiree in order to protect the risk of his early death. The author was
told of a special case by a senior officer of the Ministry of Personnel, Examination
Yuan. There was a retiree who decided to choose a monthly payment. But he
unfortunately died after two months' retirement. So his dependants suffered a great
loss and asked for compensation. At last the government let them pay a refund of
that two months' pension and re-paid them the lump sum.
Thirdly, because the retirement of government employees is not totally depending
on the retirement age, many of them can also retire depending on the length of
service, so many of them may retire when they are still quite young. In that case, it
will be more flexible personally for them to have a big amount of money to carry out
many objectives, for example, to run his own business, to buy a house or to pay off
instalments or to help their children to get married, to study abroad, or to establish
business.
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Fourthly, apart from employees in government owned enterprises, there is a
special preferential interest rate, 18% p.a. or 1.5% p.m., for all old age benefits, both
insurance payments and occupational payments, if they opt to deposit their old age
benefits in the Bank of Taiwan. This informal, political and selective measure was
introduced before the establishment of monthly payments in order to provide retirees
a quasi-pension. It remains in effect until now. For those who can get a big amount of
retirement payments, in the short-term their income from interest may be larger or at
least not less than monthly payments. Only in the long-term their income value from
interest will be significantly or even greatly eroded if the inflation rate is very high.
But most people will not think so long, so this measure attracts many retirees to
choose lump sum payments. What many retirees of public enterprises and utilities
complained about was that they were excluded from this measure.
Fifthly, though the regular payment is named as 'monthly payment' by law, actually
it is paid once every 6 months or half a year. The retirees have to collect their
payments at their original place of employment. Many retirees feel that this is very
inconvenient for them and so they prefer a lump sum payment to the monthly
payment.
Sixthly, for those who do not have good health, and do not expect to live very
long, they tend to receive a lump sum payment.
Seventhly, for those who are veterans, if they want to renew their more favourable
military monthly payments, they have to receive a lump sum payment as a
requirement.
As for those who decide to receive a monthly payment, their reasons can also be
listed as follows:
Firstly, a monthly payment is a very safe and reliable source of income though it is
somewhat low and inconvenient.
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Secondly, monthly payment will be scaled and adjusted according to the price
index and the salaries of present civil servants. The risk of inflation can be avoided.
Thirdly, for those who have children in school, the status of monthly payment
receiver will entitle them to receive educational subsidies. Especially if their children
are still very young, this subsidy is quite substantial.
Fourthly, many old people want to have an independent life depending on this
independent income in order not to depend on their children. This is particularly true
if they do not have a good relationship with their children or their children are unable
to earn very much.
In summary, there is no unanimous trend on the option for the form of retirement
payments. People in different situations will have different needs, so do their
preference. So it is important to provide an old age scheme with wide options.
7.3. Social Assistance
Social assistance is another provision of social security in Taiwan. Generally
social assistance is a provision for all residents, not only for the old. The Social
Assistance Law was promulgated in 1980, instead of the previous Social Relief Law, in
order to provide more comprehensive benefits. This law provides living assistance,
medical subsidy, personal accident assistance and calamity assistance to the people
who can pass given tests, ie, it aims to protect people from all kinds of contingencies.
Among these four types of assistance, living assistance and medical subsidy are
always mutually linked. The low income people who qualify for living assistance
generally qualify for medical subsidy.
The low income families are divided by government regulation into three groups.
The first group includes the families without any source of income at all. The second
group includes the families whose labour force or employable persons are less than
one third of the total family members and their gross income is less than two thirds
234
of the official subsistence level. The third group includes the families whose
employable persons are not more than one third of the total family members and their
gross income is not more than the official subsistence level. Only the low income
families in the first group can receive regular full rate cash assistance.
We have several concepts in above assistance regulations requiring clarification.
First, 'family' here cannot always be substituted by 'household' although the meaning
of the latter is more precise. Because, in the civil law in Taiwan, Republic of China,
there is an obligation of mutual support between parents and children, especially sons.
But there is no such obligation between brothers or sisters. There is no regulation,
and it is in fact impossible to have any regulation, to require a minimum level of
mutual support, so it is only a quasi-statutory provision for the old people. The
'family' here means the category of parents with all their children and these children
are not necessary to live in the same 'household'. So 'family' and 'household' are not
mutually interchangeable in all cases. Second, 'labour force' certainly must be within
working age which ranges from 15 years old to 64 years old in Taiwan. Not only are
(disabled) children and housewives not considered as part of the labour force, but also
full-time students. This is quite similar to the international standard.
Third, 'subsistence level' is defined as 'minimum living expenditure'. As Taiwan is
divided into three different administrative areas: Taipei City, Kaohsiung City and
Taiwan Province, the 'minimum living expenditure' of these three areas are different
not only in their levels but also in their formations. In theory the 'minimum living
expenditure' in Taipei City is officially prescribed as 40% of average regular per head
family consumption expenditure which was derived from the family budget survey of
Taipei City. In Kaohsiung City and Taiwan Province, minimum living expenditure is
officially prescribed as one third of average per head family disposable income(see
Table 7.3). Therefore, according to statutory norms and statistical figures, the
'subsistence levels' should be NT$2,439 per month in Taipei City, NT$2,108 in
Kaohsiung City and NT$1,718 in Taiwan Province. But in practice the actual
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'subsistence levels' are officially prescribed as only NT$2,100 in Taipei, NT$2,000 in
Kaohsiung City and NT$1,950 in Taiwan province. To narrow the difference might be
the main reason why the government do not use the empirical figures as subsistence
levels. According to the author's opinion, the official subsistence levels are still
reasonable, but the actual assistance levels are really quite mean. They are only
sufficient to prevent people from starvation.
Table 7.3 Minimum Living Expenditure in Taiwan,1984 (NT$)
Taiwan Taipei Taiwan Kaohsiung
Measurement Area City Province City
Size of household (P/HO) 4. 68 4.41 4.77 4.31
Disposable income/HO 314.25 405.94 295.06 327.09 *
Disposable income/HE/m 5, 596 7,671 5,155 6,324
Consumption expenditure/HO 243.78 322.66 229.05 236.05 *
Consumption expenditure/HE/m 4, 341 6,097 4,002 4,564
Minimum Living Expenditure
(1)1/3 of income 1,865 2 ,557 1,718 2,108
(2)40% of expenditure 1,716 2,439 1,601 1,826






However, these official subsistence levels are still not the actual levels of
assistance. These subsistence levels are only used as the reference standard of
means-test in order to decide the qualification of applicants. The actual assistance
levels are even somewhat lower than these official subsistence levels. Nowadays the
actual levels of assistance in Taipei City are NT$1,800 for the head of household and
only NT$1,000 for each subsequent member. But they are NT$1,200 for all persons in
qualified households in Taiwan Province and Kaohsiung City. On average, the amount
of this full rate assistance is only about 49%, 57% and 70% of subsistence level for
every assisted family with two persons and more in Taipei City, Kaohsiung City and
Taiwan Province respectively. So if we define subsistence level as 'poverty line', then
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the actual assistance level is less than both actual poverty line and official poverty
line. Even worse, among the three groups of low income families, only the persons in
the first group who have no income at all are qualified to receive this cash assistance.
The other two groups of low income families are entitled to only medical subsidy and
some irregular assistance in cash or in kind.
Table 7.4 Assistance Recipients in Taiwan, 1984
Year |measurement
1
1st group 2nd group 3rd group Total
|households N 12 084 13 316 12 045 37 445
1 % 32.3 35.6 32.2 100.0
1984 |persons N 16 486 51 746 54 359 122 591
1 % 13.4 42.2 44.3 100.0
|persons/HO
1
1.36 3.89 4.51 3.27
|households N 11 836 13 484 12 224 37 544
1 % 31.5 35.9 32.6 100.0
1985 |persons N 16 171 52 224 54 726 123 121
1 % 13.1 42. 4 44.4 100.0
|persons/HO 1.37 3.87 4.48 3.28
Note: HO=household
Source: MOI, 1985d
In 1984 there were 12,084 households in the first group, 13,316 households in the
second group, and 12,045 households in the third group; or 16,486 persons in the first
group, 51,746 persons in the second group, and 54,359 persons in the third group. The
real figures could be higher if the poor households or persons not applying were also
included. Their average persons per household were 1.4 persons in the first group, 3.9
persons in the second group, and 4.5 persons in the third group. In 1985 these figures
were quite similar(see Table 7.4). It is clear that most low income families in the first
group are individuals. As the working age from 15 to 64 is officially prescribed as the
basic condition of labour force, those low income single people are certainly over 64
or disabled or they cannot pass the tests.
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1979 | 28 579 | 116 465 i 4.08 0.67
1980 | 30 685 | 115 666 1 3.77 | 0.65
1981 | 30 247 | 109 629 I 3.62 | 0.60
1982 | 33 625 | 120 014 | 3.57 0.65
1983 | 36 605 | 122 951 3.41 j 0.66
1984 1 37 445 | 122 591 I 3.27 ! 0.64
1985 I 37 544 | 123 121 | 3.28 | 0.64
Sources: 1)CEPD, 1986c:25
2)MOI, 1985d
Although the number of households with people of low income keeps growing
gradually their rate in total population is quite stable, at about 0.6% (see Table 7.5). As
mentioned above, the low rate of poor people was mainly derived from a strict
means-testing.
Under the provision of social assistance, another way to give assistance to the
elderly is to accommodate them in old people's homes. At present there are twelve
public old people's homes and twenty private ones. The number of residents at full
capacity are 7.7 thousand persons in public old people's homes and 2.6 thousand
persons in private ones. But actually there are only 6.3 thousand residents in public
homes and 1.5 thousand residents in private ones. Their utilisation rates are 82.0%
and 57.7% respectively in 1984 (see Table 7.6). The low utilisation rate in public homes
is mainly caused by the severe entrance tests. The entrance regulation requires that
the applicants must not be of working age and have no children to support them.
Under this strict test only single old people can easily enter these old people's homes.
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Public expected| 6 694 | 1 983 8 677






Self expected| 1 034 i 601 1 635






Total expected| 7 728 | 2 584 10 312
actual 6 338 1 492 7 830
% 1 82.0 | 57.7 75.9
Source: MOI, 1985c
In addition, the applicants also have to pass a strict means-test. If the old are
well-off or have property, even if they have no children, they still must self-finance
their expenditure in old people's homes if they decide to move in. There were 1,635
places for self-financed old people in 1984, but the actual number of residents was
only 748 persons. The utilisation rate was very low. According to the previous chapter,
apart from the huge number of single veterans moved in from mainland China about
35 years ago, the number of ordinary single people aged 65 years and over was only
about 21 to 22 thousand persons. Explicitly, the present capacity of old people's
homes, 10.3 thousand places, was far behind the need if all normal single old people
wanted to enter old people's homes. Fortunately that is not the case. Apart from
veterans, the total civil residents in old people's homes was only 7.8 thousand. The
utilisation rate was only 75.9%. Although this rate was not bad, it was also not good.
Certainly the low rate of utilisation of old people's home was not only caused by
the strict means-test, but also caused by many other social reasons. They might be
as follows. 1)The size of old people's homes are generally very large. According to the
number of registered places, it is generally several hundred. Among them, only three
of them are less than 50 places, but the highest one is as high as 1,869. For such
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large scale of homes, they certainly have to be located in a new developing area and
located far from the old person's familiar community. If they move to old people's
homes, it will not be easy for them to keep contact with their old friends or old
neighbours. 2)The living conditions of old people's homes are not good. For example,
a bedroom has to be shared by six persons in a public old people's home in Taipei
City. It is not only a problem of congestion, but also a loss of privacy. 3)Since all
publicly-financed residents must qualify by passing a strict means-test, all residents
are definitely very poor. This makes being in an old people's home a stigma of
humiliation. 4)Life in old people's homes is of a collective style, all residents must
obey a given living schedule and certain living regulations. Freedom of living is
relatively deprived. This is not easy for old people to adjust to.
Apart from the ordinary civil system of old people's homes, there is another
special old people's home system, veteran homes for old veterans, in Taiwan. In
theory this type of old people's home is in fact a sub-universal service in kind. It is
introduced here in order to compare with the old people's home for ordinary old
people. The main reasons for establishing this kind of old people's home separately
are that, firstly, the number of single old veterans was particularly large (it was
estimated as 68 thousand in 1984 in the previous chapter) that the existing old
people's homes could not admit all of them and, secondly, they had devoted their
whole lives in defence of this free land of China that the state was obliged to offer
them a favoured treatment. Under the charge of the Commission of Veterans,
Executive Yuan, in 1985 there were about 68 thousand veterans living in fourteen
veteran homes, which are scattered around the country. Normally the figure of
residents will increase by three thousand persons every year by government budget.
Adding two thousand new places vacated by the deaths of old veterans, there will be
five thousand new residents moving into those veteran homes every year. But in fact
the real figures are much higher than that. For example, there was a huge increase to
92 thousand persons in 1986 due to a strong demand from veterans and the less
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severity of their entrance conditions. Those who can get the first priority to move into
veteran homes are the disabled and the invalid. People who have second priority are
the senior of the veterans, ie, those who are over 65. At present the minimum age for
applicants is 62 years. If there are too many veterans applying in the same year, the
younger ones will be put on the waiting list. In 1985 the average age of residents in
veteran homes was 68 years. The youngest residents were 62 years old. Six of them
were over 100 years old.
The residents in veteran homes not only have free living expenditure but also can
get pocket money of NT$1,100 each month. Although there is no affect on the military
occupational pensions if the the veterans live in a veteran home, there are still some
single veterans preferring to stay in their old community rather than go to veteran
homes. That could mean that the private freedom and the harmonious neighbour
relations are more important than economic benefits for them. Besides, the married
veterans are not entitled to live in veteran homes, but if they are in special hardship,
they can get a special monthly aid of NT$2,000-3,000 from veteran homes. In the
author's survey, there were about 2.5% of retirees in LI receiving this aid. Of course,
not all of them were up to 65 years old.
7.4. Sub-Universal Schemes
As defined in chapter 2, apart from residence/citizenship test, if benefits, either in
cash or in kind, are due to all residents without any special test in the country, they
are all-universal benefits; but if they are entitled to only a given part of residents by
passing some non-pecuniary tests such as age, industry or membership, then they are
benefits of sub-universal schemes. In Taiwan only military servants and their
dependants and veterans (ie, retired military servants) can get free public health
service from military hospitals and veteran hospitals. This is the only provision of
sub-universal schemes for the aged in Taiwan. The number of beneficiaries can be
approximately estimated. Firstly, the number of veterans is about 2.0 million. As for
the number of military servants and their dependants, their actual total number is not
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available. We need to make an estimation. Because 1)the dependants of military
servants include only parents and non-adult children, 2)some parents might not live
together, so they were registered in different households, and 3) some children might
have been adult, so they were not entitled to service any more, so the number of
dependants of military servants would amount to the average number of per
household subject to an addition of the average number of the separately-residing
parents and a deduction of the average number of the adult co-residing children. If
the number of the separately-residing parents is equal to the number of the adult
co-residing children, then the number of dependants will be equal to the average
number per household. If this assumption is acceptable, then the number of
dependants of military servants would be about 2.6 million persons in 1984 because in
that year the number per household was 4.48 persons and the number of military
servants was said as 0.585 million persons. So the maximal total number of
beneficiaries of these two schemes was about 4.6 millions. Only part of them are the
elderly.
Though there is no free medical care for the dependants of veterans, they can get
a 20% discount in outpatient cost or 40% discount in inpatient cost. Even the
dependants of government employees can get a 70% reimbursement for their
inpatient expenditure subject to a given ceiling per year.
7.5. Summary
In Taiwan, as the titles of sections showed, all three main types of social security
have provision for the aged. But the benefits they provide differ greatly.
In the field of primary social insurance, because its three main schemes, LI, GEI
and Ml, not only include the largest number of insured persons, but also provide the
longest well-established statistics and related documents, so it is both in theory and
in fact considered as the main provision of social security in Taiwan. So this provision
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will be discussed in detail in the next chapter. In 1985 the number of total insured
persons of its three schemes was about 5,483 thousand. It was 28.5% of the total
population, 40.4% of population age 15 and over, or 66.3% in labour force and 68.2%
in employed persons. Apart from the health insurance for retired persons and their
spouses in GEI, the basic characteristics of all social insurance schemes are
employment-related and comprehensive. Whenever an employee is retired or
dismissed from his employment with or without a retirement payment, he will lose the
entitlement to all other benefits. All insurance retirement payments are paid in a lump
sum.
As for secondary social insurance in Taiwan, its main provision is occupational
payments, including both public schemes and private schemes. The private
occupational schemes have just been mandatory for two years. Their payments can
be up to 45 months of monthly wage, the same amount as insurance payment, if an
employee has worked for thirty years. But for the same length of service, the public
occupational schemes for government employees and military servants will be up to
61 months' wage. Compared to their 36 (GEI) or 45 (Ml) months' insurance payments,
the occupational payments of government employees and military servants are both
higher than insurance payments. As for their total (combined) retirement payments,
their possible maxima are 90 (45+45) months for the LI retirees and 97 (61+36) months
for the GEI retirees and 106 (61+45) months for the veterans. The veterans receive
the best treatment.
As for social assistance, its test is so severe that only the extreme poor people
are qualified to benefit. From every aspects, it is not a satisfactory social security
provision in Taiwan. It is in particular not a good provision for the elderly in Chinese
society due its special cultural tradition. As for sub-universal schemes, they are
restricted to only medical services for the elderly who are veterans, military servants
and the dependants of military servants.
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CHAPTER 8
THE PRIMARY SOCIAL INSURANCE PROVISIONS IN TAIWAN
8.1. Introduction
Both in policy and in practice, the development of social security in Taiwan tends
to be social insurance oriented. In the field of social insurance nowadays there are
three main systems of provision, i.e., LI, GEI and Ml, and five main subordinate
schemes, ie, RGEI (or HIRGE and HISRGE after 1985), HIGED, ITASPS, HIF, IRTASPS (or
HIRTASPS and HISRTASPS after 1986). The number of insured persons grew steadily
in all schemes (although in the case of valid military insurance figures are not
available). The total number was about 4,969 thousand persons in 1984 and 5,466
thousand persons in 1985 including estimated numbers in Military Insurance (Ml) (see
Table 8.1).
Table 8.1 Insured Persons in Taiwan Area (1,000)








1960 204 | - - — 1
1965 240 | 2 - | — 1 — 1 1
1970 938 294 | 5 - | — 1 — 1 11 237
1975 | 1 566 359 | 8 - | — 1 — 1 11 933
1980 1 2 549 415 | 9 - ii ! — 1 — 1 1 2 984
1981 1 2 791 432 | 9 - 22 | — 1 — 1 1 3 254
1982 1 2 958 444 | 9 176 23 | — 1 — 1 1 3 610
1983 1 3 330 453 | 10 177 25 | — 1 — 1 1 3 995
1984 1 3 699 469 | 10 180 26 | — l — l o 1 4 384
1985 1 4 154 476 | 5 180 26 | 41 26 | 0 1 4 908
1986 1 4 825 483 | 4 181 27 | 50 | 32 | 0 | 5 602
Notes
1)MI: Valid figures are not available . It was said to be about
500 thousand. But according to statistical evidence, it
seemed to be 585 thousand in 1984 and 558 thousand in 1985.
2)IRTASPS: The figures were less than 0.2 thousand in 1984
and 1985. No figures after 1986.
3)The figures of LI included 113 thousand insured persons
of HIF in 1985.
4)The total of HIRTASPS and HISRTASPS was less
than 0.5 (0.3 + 0.1) thousand persons in 1986.
Sources: 1)BLITF, 1985: 14




In order to get a more precise idea about the importance of the role of social
insurance in Taiwan, the proportion of the insured persons in the total population, in
the population aged 15 years and over, in the labour force, or in the total of employed
persons may be used as indicators. As all figures of the insured persons are of the
end of year, these proportions have to be calculated based on the end-year figures.
Unfortunately, not all end-year figures of the different populations mentioned above
are available. Some of them are derived from assumption and some from calculations
(see Table 8.2 and Table 8.3). According to these two tables, including military
servants, the rates of insured persons were 26.1% (28.4%) in total population, 37.4%
(40.3%) in population aged 15 and over, 61.0% (66.2%) in (military and civil) labour
force and 62.5% (68.0%) in (military and civil) employed persons in 1984 (1985). The
remaining 73.9%, 62.6%, 39.0% and 37.5% (71.6%, 59.7%, 33.8% and 32.0%) were the
excluded un-insured persons respectively in the different populations. They were the
targeted groups that we wanted to reach.
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Table 8.2.1 Labour Force Statistics in Taiwan, 1984 (1,000)































































19 013 13 276 j 585 49
1 1
|12 6421 5 092
1
7 550 | 7 366
1
| 184





1)mid-year and end-year total populations,
2)end-year population aged 15 and over,
3)mid-year civil population aged 15 and over, non-labour force,
employed persons and unemployed persons,
4)end-year prisoners.
B)calculating:
1)13 178 = 18 873 (13 276 / 19 013)
2)assume: mid-year prisoners = end-year prisoners
3)585 = 13 178 - 12 544 - 49
assume: mid-year military servants = end-year military servants
4)12 642 = 13 276 - 582 - 52
5)calculate %s according to mid-year figures
6)5 092 = 40.28% (12 642)
7 550 = 59.72% (12 642)
7)7 366 = 97.56% (7 550)
184 = 2.44% (7 550)
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Table 8.2.2 Labour Force Statistics in Taiwan, 1985 (1,000)
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19 258 13 562
1
558 | 57 12 947 j 5 245
1
7 702 | 7 479
1
| 223




1)mid-year and end-year total populations,
2)end-year population aged 15 and over,
3)mid-year civil population aged 15 and over, non-labour force,
labour force, employed persons and unemployed persons,
4)end-year prisoners.
B)calculating:
1)13 475 = 19 135 (13 562 / 19 258)
2)assume: mid-year prisoners = end-year prisoners
3)558 = 13 475 - 12 860 - 57
assume: end-year military servants = mid-year military servants
4)12 947 = 13 562 - 562 - 53
5)5 245 = 40.51% (12 947)
7 702 = 59.49% (12 947)
6)7 479 = 97.10% (7 702)
223 = 2.90% (7 702)
Though there are three main systems of social insurance in Taiwan, there are only
two of them, LI and GEI, whose statistics are accessible and research is possible. For
this reason, this research on social insurance was confined to only LI and GEL And,
finally, because the author's survey was restricted to only the retirees in 1984, so the




There were 3,699 thousand insured persons (if including 6 thousand sugar cane
farmers) in LI and 469 thousand in GEI in 1984. Disregarding the subordinate insurance
systems, the sum of insured persons of these two systems was about 21.9% of total
population or 55.2% of civil labour forces or 56.6% of civil employed persons. In the
same year there were 19.6 thousand retirees in LI and 7.2 thousand retirees in GEI if
its dismissed employees were also included because since 1979 dismissed
employees were entitled to retirement payments as long as they had contributed for
five years (see Table 8.13). Retirement rates per year were about 0.5% in LI and 1.5%
in GEL But their enrollment rates were significantly greater, so the increase rates of
insured persons were as high as 11.1% and 3.5% respectively. As mentioned in the
previous chapter, though both schemes are employment-related, due to the
restrictions of the laws, there is a large number of persons such as employees
employed by employers employing less than five persons, the self-employed, unpaid
domestic workers and employers being excluded from these two social insurance
systems even though they are in employment.
As all qualified government employees are recorded in the Ministry of Personnel
(MOP), Examination Yuan, so all of them should be included in GEI. Particularly as GEI
also includes representatives who are not qualified public servants, so the figure of
GEI should be larger than that of MOP. But actually this is not the case. Apart from
educational and cultural institutions, all figures in MOP were larger than those in GEI
in 1984. The reason for the difference in educational institutions might be that there
were many teaching staff in universities or colleges who were not qualified by the
Examination Yuan in their official requirements or the conditions of nationality, though
they had been engaged in those jobs for years. So its figure in GEI was larger than
that in MOP. As for other items, their main reason might be that there were many
qualified employees just temporarily quitting their salaries but still preserving their
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posts for such reasons as studying abroad or transferring to a political party system
(see Table 8.3).
However, Table 8.3 is presented not only for this purpose, but also for the
estimation of the number of government employees joining LI. According to the
author's research, in LI 26% of retirees were employed by government agencies or
organisations. Was this figure still valid for the existing LI insured persons? According
to one of the government regulations of personnel: there should be 4 white collar
workers to 1 blue collar worker, as the subtotal of white collar workers of the first five
categories in Table 8.3 was about 331 thousand persons, so there could have been 83
thousand blue collar workers. As for the sixth category in Table 8.3,
government-owned enterprises, its ratio was generally the opposite or a little more.
If its average ratio was 1:5, then they would be 686 thousand blue collar workers. So
in 1984 the total blue collar workers employed by government but having to join LI
would be 769 thousand, ie, 20.8% of LI insured persons. Frankly, these figures are
derived from estimation, they need to be proved by empirical data.




Administrative Organisations | 168 488 133 143
Representative Organisations 1 2 594
Judiciary Institutions 1 9 339
Health Institutions 1 19 594
Educational & Cultural Institutions | 163 405 166 702
Government-owned Enterprises | 144
1
340 137 205
Total i 476 233 468 577
Note: The figures of judiciary and health institutions in MOP
might be included in administrative organisations.
Sources: l)MOP, 1985: 192
2)CTC, 1985: 28
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Table 8.4 Civil Employed Persons by Class of Workers in Taiwan(lOOO)
1984 1985
Class survey's |estimated survey1s | est imated
mid -year % | end-
1
year mid- year % | end
1
-year
Employers 298 4.08 1 301 319 4.29 1 321
Self-employed 1 513 20.70 | 1 52 5 1 544 20.79 | 1 555
Unpaid workers 787 10.77 1 793 804 10.82 1 809
Paid employees 4 709 64.44 1 4 747 4 761 64.10 1 4 794
a)private 3 851 52.70 1 3 882 3 896 52 .45 1 3 923
b)government 858 11.74 1
I
865 865 11.65 1
1
871
Total 7 308 100.00 1 7 366 7 428 100.00 1 7 479
Notes:1)Estimated totals are referred to Table 8.2.
2)End-year figures are calculated in order to compare with
insurance statistics.
Source: CEPD, 1986f: 8
As mentioned before, in LI the excluded employees were those who were
employed by employers employing less than 5 persons, self-employed, employers and
un-paid domestic workers. According to the labour statistics (see Table 8.4), we could
get a rough idea how many persons in these classes were excluded. For example, by
definition the employees employed by employers employing less than 5 persons were
included in 'paid employees', so in theory the number of 'paid employees' who were
excluded from social insurance schemes were 553 (=4747-4194) thousand in 1984 and
only 249 (=4794-4656-113) thousand in 1985. Apart from the number of
self-employed which would be 1,442 (=1555-113), as for employers and unpaid
domestic workers, their numbers in 1985 were 321 thousand and 809 thousand
respectively (see Table 8.4).
By other empirical statistics we even can find out in what degree the labour force
in different industries have been excluded from LI. After the transformation of
mid-year employed persons into the end-year ones, we can obtain the ratio of
insured persons to employed persons in different industries (see Table 8.5). It was
quite clear that the ratio of primary industry was the lowest one. Even including the
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113 thousand newly insured farmers in the Health Insurance for Farmers (HIF), the
ratio was still only 24.6% and still was the lowest one. The second lowest one was
commerce. At only 25.4%, it explicitly showed that most employed persons in this
industry were self-employed and un-paid domestic workers. The third lowest one was
construction. Its ratio was 36.6%. As for GEI and ITASPS insured persons, they should
be included in industry T, ie, community, social and personal services. So the ratio of
this industry should be 83%. It might be an effective strategy to extend the coverage
of LI from the one with the lowest ratio and largest population to the one with a
higher ratio and less population until all employed persons are included. However, as
the non-insured persons of paid employees had greatly reduced from 553 thousand to
249 thousand between 1984 and 1985, the priority to tackle non-insured persons we
could apply was: 1)self-employed (1442 thousand), 2)domestic workers (809 thousand)
and 3)employers (321 thousand).
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Table 8.5 The Ratio of Insured Persons by Industry in Taiwan, 1984
(in thousand)
| Persons in Employment | Insured Persons








A | 1 286 17.6 1 296 | 206 i 15.9
1 1 319(206+113)| 24.6
B j 41 0.6 41 | 27 | 65.9
C | 2 494 34.1 2 514 | 2 029 80.7
D ! 34 0.5 34 | 36 i 105.9
E 521 7.1 525 | 192 | 36.6
F 1 280 17.5 1 290 | 328 25.4
G i 378 5.2 381 | 339 1 89.0
H (177) 2.4 179 | 119 66 .5








Total | 7 308 100 .0 7 366 | 3 699 | 50.2
1 1 4194 (=3699+469+26) | 56.9
Notes:
A=Agriculture, forestry, hunting and fishing
B=Mining and Quarrying
C=Manufacturing
D=Water, electricity and gas
E=Constructions
F=Commerce, ie, trade, restaurants and hotels
G=Transports, storage and communication
H=Finance, insurance, real estate and business services
I=Community, social and personal services
1)GEI and ITASPS insured persons should be included in 'I'.





The coverage of insured persons of these two systems are quite ambiguous.
Theoretically the coverage of GEI should include all government employees. That is, all
employees who receive a regular pay from a government agency should be included
in GEI. Even the representatives of different levels of representative organisations are
included in GEI because they receive some kinds of special pay from government. But
it is very astonishing that the blue collar workers such as technicians, drivers, porters
and cleaners employed in government agencies or government owned enterprises or
public schools are ail excluded. It is because they do not need to pass any
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qualification examination set by the Examination Yuan that they are not classified as
qualified public servants. So they have to join LI. From this point of view, it seems
that all white collar people among government employees are included in GEI, while
the blue collar ones are included in LI. But this is still not a general rule because if
the white collar employees are employed under a contract, then they have to join LI.
On the other hand, all employees in the private sector, except those in private schools
who can join either the independent ITASPS scheme or LI voluntarily, no matter that
they are the highest general managers or the lowest porters and cleaners, ie, both
white collar and blue collar, are compulsorily included in LI if their employers employ
more than five persons. Therefore, the insured persons in these two schemes,
especially LI, cannot be classified as white collar or blue collar any longer.
8.3. Contingencies
As the laws show, the contingencies covered by LI and GEI are comprehensive and
they are almost the same. They are maternity, sickness, injury, disability,
unemployment (not included in GEI and not come into force yet in LI though it has
been written in the law), old age and death (including dependants' Funeral allowance).
But their types of benefit are partly different. For example, in GEI the benefit of
maternity is in kind, i.e., medical care, but it is in cash in LI. In addition there are
benefits both in cash and in kind for sickness and injury in LI, but only in kind in GEI.
The remaining contingencies are all paid in cash in both schemes.
When we review the rates of claiming (by cases) (see Table 8.6) of different
contingencies independently, we find that they are quite stable over time. But when
we have a close comparison of the level between different contingencies, their
differences were quite significant. More interestingly, we even find that the order of
magnitude in LI and GEI are exactly the same. From the one with the highest rate of
claiming to the one with the lowest rate, their order are as follows: (1)sickness and
injury, (2)maternity, (3)deaths of dependants, (4)old age, (5)death and (6)disability. The
highest rates of sickness and injury were as high as 973% in LI and 834% in GEI in
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1984. That is, the number of visit a doctor per head per year was 9.7 times in LI and
8.3 times in GEI in 1984. Yet the lowest disability was only 0.2% in LI and 0.1% in GEI
in the same year. The difference between the highest contingency and the lowest one
was really very large.
Table 8.6.1 Rates of Claiming in LI (100% = 512 cases)
1
1
in cash in kind
year | 1 1 1 SI









1976 | 0.23 | 0.42 | 0.26 | 1.16 6.07 0.79 6. 85 | 773.11
1980 j 0.22 | 0.55 | 0.26 j 1.10 5.09 1.59 7.23 | 937.71
1982 | 0.21 | 0.65 | 0.26 | 1.12 5.26 1.94 8.59 11002 .72










Source: BLITF, 1985: 150-151, 276-277
Table 8 .6.2 Rates of Claiming in GEI (100% = 413 cases)
1
1
in cash in kind
1 1 1 1 MT 1 SI














1970 | 0.12 | 0.89 | 0.27 | 1.66 8.64 | 22.43| 11.23| 874.82
1975 i 0.10 i 1.03 | 0.25 | 1.67 7.11 | 20.31| 1U . 0/| 788.84
1980 | 0.09 1 1-45 | 0.26 | 1.86 6.89 | 21.63| 9 .9 8 | 770.72
1984 | 0.11 1 1-54 | 0.22 | 1.91 5.48 | 30.18| 8.87 | 833.77
Source: CTC, 1985: 133, 236-237
But when we compare the total cost of each contingency, we find that their order
is different from their utilisation. In 1984 the amount of expenditure on sickness and
injury still had priority in LI, but in GEI it was old age. As for the second highest one,
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it was old age in LI and sickness and injury in GEI. The order of remaining
contingencies were consistent in these two schemes again. Their sequence were:
(3)death, (4)maternity, (5)deaths of dependants and (6)disability. The highest
expenditure contingency was as high as 45% in GEI and 60% in LI. But the lowest one
was only 3% in LI and 1% in GEI (see Table 8.7). Their difference was also quite
significant.






1 1 1 1 1 1 SI












1976 | 4.78 | 12.24 | 11.73| 4.37 | 9.33 1.45 | 21.51| 34.51
1980 | 3.00 | 16.79| 10.17| 4.58 | 7.19 1.32 | 21.74 j 35.20
1982 | 2.52 | 15.35 | 8.53 | 4.05 | 7.08 1.28 | 25 .711 35.47
1984 | 2.70 | 13.84 | 8 .9 5 | 3.89 | 7.20 1.51 | 27 .40 j 34.50
Note: 1)Abbreviation : see Table 8.6.
2)100% = total expenditure each year
Source: BLITF, 1985: 150-151, 276-277
Table 8.7.2 The Costs of Contingencies in GEI
1
1
in cash in kind
1 t MT 1 SI









OP 1 IP 1
1 1
OP
1970 | 1.96 16.67| 11.89| 6.79 5.13 | 0.39 | 21. 55| 35. 42
1975 | 1.54 29. 97 | 10 .44 j 5.77 5.11 j 0.41 j 18.62| 28.15
1980 | 1.03 49.55 | 8 .30 j 4.90 4.31 | 0.34 | 13.34 j 18.24
1984 | 1.04 45.26 | 6 .311 4.48 4.77 | 0.67 | 16 .04 j 21. 43
Source: CTC, 1985: 133, 136-137, 136-237
Although the amount of expenditure in old age was the first or the second highest
in these two schemes, their maturity rate (the percentage of insured persons who are
qualified to receive old age benefits) was not very satisfactory. According to official
statistics, the sex composition of insured persons is male 68.6% and female 31.4% in
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GEI and male 55.7% and female 44.3% in LI. Even in national labour statistics, its
composition is male 58.1% and female 41.9%. Their differences are not very large. But
according to the author's research, the corresponding figures of retirees are male
92.3% and female 7.7% in GEI and male 91.2% and female 8.8% in LI. This sharp drop
in the number of female retirees may be caused by the following two reasons: 1)there
is a large number of female insured persons who left the labour market before they
can satisfy the retirement requirements such as age; 2)there is a higher female labour
participation from the younger generation than the older one. However, for those who
are in the first case, it not only means that they lose their entitlements to old age
payments no matter how long they had contributed to the schemes, but also means
that the breadwinner of a family in Chinese society is still the male or husband.
Furthermore, the Labour Standard Law stipulates that the employees are qualified
to retire after 25 years' service. This will enable an employee to retire before 50 years
of age if he starts work before 25 years old. But the stipulated retirement age in LI is
60 years or at least 55 years old. Therefore, the contradiction between the Labour
Standard Law and LI Law may make the contingency of old age invalid in some special
cases.
8.4. Contributions
Personal contributions is the revenue of social insurance. It is closely related to
its benefit. Generally, its grand total rate is a certain percentage of the wage of
insured persons. For example, including employer's contribution, they are about 19.5%
in UK, 50.7% in France, 31.3% in West Germany, 18.9%% in USA, 30.4% in Sweden and
20.5% in Japan (DHHS, 86, 94, 136, 242, 268, 270). Of course, these figures do not
really reflect the actual cost of social security in different countries because they do
not include the cost of universal allowances and the government subsidies. In Taiwan
the comprehensive contribution rates are 7% (or 8.2% to 11.0% if industrial
contribution is included) in LI and 9% in GEI. Comparatively they are rather low.
Theoretically or even legally in Taiwan the insured wage (which is actually taken into
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account as the base to calculate one's contribution and benefit) should be the same
as one's actual (gross) wage. But actually this is not always the case. On the contrary,
the insured wage is generally less than the actual wage. So it is necessary to make
clear the difference of different wages in different groups of population. From official
statistics we can obtain the insured wage of LI and GEI and actual wage of total
employed persons. In addition, the insured wage and actual wage of the retiring group
were available from the author' survey (see Table 8.8).










































The 'average' of GEI and LI has been weighted.
Sources:




In this table the figures of insured wage and actual wage in the retiring group
were reliable. In addition, the figures of insured wage in the insured group were also
reliable. According to these figures, we can conclude that, both for insured wage and
actual wage, GEI is higher than LI. In the insured group the insured wage of GEI was
also higher than LI in the retiring group. So the contribution of GEI was definitely
higher than LI. Under this circumstance, it will not be a surprise that the benefit of GEI
is better than LI.
According to the insured wage and actual wage of the retiring group, we can
257
calculate that their ratio was 0.53 in GEI and 0.70 in LI and their average was 0.64 in
1984. As for the same ratio in the insured group, the main problem is that the actual
wages are not available. We have to estimate them. Firstly, as the wage system in
government and government owned enterprises is operated by a normal procedure
and has its regular budget, and it should be quite stable in the whole system, so we
might assume that the insured wage ratio of the insured group in GEI would be still
the same as that in the retiring group. That is, 0.53. If this is the case, then the actual
wage of insured wage of insured group in GEI would be calculated as NT$15,758.
As for the insured wage ratio of the insured group in LI, I would not expected that
t
it would be still as high as 0.70 as in the retiring group because in the retiring group
there were more than 30% of them having a full ratio of 1.0 (see Table 8.10). It could
be a way the employers could do some favours to their employees by contributing
higher ratio (the maximum is 1.0) before they retired in order to enable them to
receive higher retirement payments. Besides, even if the ratio of the insured group
was as high as 0.70 as in LI, then its actual wage would be only NT$10,581. Its
amount was less than that of the retiring group. This would be contradictory to the
following facts: a)ln GEI most employees are selective elites who have passed the
examination set by the Examination Yuan, so their salary will increase proportionally
to their length of service or insurance. Empirical statistics clearly justified this trend
(CTC, 1985: 64-67). b)There was no such trend in LI. As we have mentioned in
chapter 6, the illiteracy rate of old people aged 65 years and over was 54% (MOI,1985:
114-115). If we delete the old people of GEI, this rate would be even higher. The
limitation of their educational attainment could be their main disadvantage. For most
LI retirees, it is a general pattern for blue-collar wages not to increase proportionally
to their ages. So it was quite reasonable that the actual wage of the retiring group
was higher than that of the insured group in GEI, but it was not necessarily the same
case in LI.
Then, what amount of the actual wage of the insured group in LI should it be?
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According to the DGBAS survey, we already know that the average salary of the total
number of employed persons was NT$13,698 in 1984 (see Table 8.9). Was the actual
wage of LI higher than that or lower than that? On one hand, as many employers and
self-employed were of high income, so the exclusion of employers and self-employed
might cause an under-estimate of average wage of insured persons, ie, the actual
wage of LI insured group could be less than NT$13,698. But, on the other hand, many
self-employed were of low income and un-paid domestic workers had no formal
income, so the exclusion of self-employed and unpaid domestic workers could cause
an over-estimate of average wage of insured persons, ie, it should be higher than
NT$13,698. Only an empirical survey can solve this uncertainty. At the present stage,
the actual wage of LI insured group could be higher or lower than NT$13,698, but it
should not be very far from this figure. If we assumed that it was equal to NT$13,698,
then we can obtain the ratio of LI insured group as 0.54 from the average of the ratio
in different industries in LI (see Table 8.9). And then the average actual wage of GEI
and LI would be IMT$13,930. And its average ratio was still 0.54 (see Table 8.8).







A - 4 075 | -
B 15 847 9 362 | 0.59
C 12 841 7 313 ! 0 .57
D 22 744 11 908 i 0.52
E 14 173 7 265 1 0.51
F 13 523 7 618 i 0.56
G 14 714 7 761 0.53
H 21 142 8 910 0.42
I 12 654 8 134
1
0.64
Average 13 698 7 407 ] 0 .54
Note: (see Table 8.5 )
Sources: 1)DGBAS, 1985: 384-385
2)BLITF, 1985: 92-93
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Table 8.10 The Distribution of Insured Wage ratio of









0 M 1 0 ! o | 1 ! 0.3
0.2- 2 ! 0.8 i 3 I 0.8
0.3- 9 6.5 ; 13 1 3.6
0.4- 24 i 17.7 24 ! 6.6
0.5- 66 i 40.3 1 41 ! 11.4
0.6- 42 1 27.5 ! 54 15.0
0.7- 4 ! 5.4 38 ! 10.5
0 00 1 2 1.6 55 15.2
0.9- 0 0 22 ! 6.1






Total 367 | 100.0 | 361 | 100.0
Source: author's survey
In summary, for an insured person, the components of social insurance in Taiwan
consists of three parts: (l)insured wage ratio: the amount of insured wage to actual
wage, (2)contribution rate: the proportion of contribution to insured wage and (3)the
sharing of contribution. Nowadays the average insured wage ratio is 0.53 in GEI and
0.54 in LI. The total contribution rate is 9% in GEI and 8% in LI. The total contribution
is shared by employer and employee. Its sharing rate is 65:35 in GEI and 80:20 in LI.
8.5. Benefits in cash
In both GEI and LI cash benefits are contribution-related, so the level of
contributions has a close relation to the amount of benefit. In both schemes cash
benefits are paid for the contingencies of disability, old age, and death (including
deaths of dependants) in lump sum. But in LI the same benefit is also paid for
maternity, sickness and injury. The rates of claim of these last two contingencies were
also the highest ones in LI. If excluding these two contingencies (because there was
no cash benefit for them in GEI), the order of the magnitude of claims would be the
same in GEI and LI in 1984, ie, (1)deaths of dependants, (2)oId age, (3)death and
(4)disability. This order was also the same in previous years (see Table 8.11). The
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actual numbers of claims in these two schemes were greatly different because their
population of insured persons were different, but their rates of claim were quite
similar (see Table 8.5).
Table 8.11.1 The Number of Claims and The












Claims (1, 000) i 1 1 1
1976 | 103.8| 13.5 | 3.9 1 7.2 | 4.4 | 19.9
1980 | 129.2 | 40.5 | 5.7 1 13.9 | 6.6 | 27.9












Amount per Claim (NT$1, 000) 1
1976 | 2.3 | 2.7 | 31.0 1 42.71 66. 9| 5.5
1980 | 4.6 | 2.7 | 43.7 1 99.5| 126.3 | 13.5
1982 | 6.9 | 3.3 | 61.1 | 120.5 | 169.2) 18.5
1984 | 9.5 | 3.8 | 71.3 1 157.1| 226. 0 | 23.2
Notes : (see Table 8 • 6)
Source: BLITF, 1985: 150-151, 176-277
Table 8.11.2 The Number of Claims
and The Amount Per Claim in GEI





Claims (1, 000) 1 1
1970 | 0.4 1 2.6 1 0.8 | 4.9
1975 | 0.3 1 3.7 | 0.9 j 6.0
1980 | 0.4 1 6.0 | 1.1 | 7.7
1984 |
1





Amount per Claim (NT$1,000)
1.970 | 20.4 | 24.0) 56. 9| 5.3
1975 j 37 .5 | 68.5 j 98. 3 | 8.1
1980 I 73.8 I 218.7| 207.0| 16.9
1984 j 99 .5 | 318-1| 310.5| 25.4
Source: CTC, 1985: 133, 136-137
As for the level of benefits, because the average insured wage of GEI was
generally higher than that of LI, the amount per claim of GEI was higher than that of
LI in every benefit and every year (see Table 8.11). Compared to the same benefit of
GEI, in 1984 the amount per claim of LI was about 91.5% of average GEI benefit for
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death of dependant, 72.8% for death, 72.7% for disability and only 49.4% for old age.
The difference was quite significant.
However, as only old age benefit has a close relation to old people in these two
schemes, we want to discuss this benefit in detail. Generally the two common
conditions for this benefit in these two schemes are retirement and contribution.
Firstly, in the aspect of retirement, since the enforcement of the Labour Standard Law,
the conditions of retirement for LI insured persons are almost the same as
government employees. The insured persons may retire voluntarily if they have
served for 25 years. The only difference is on the age of compulsory retirement. It is
65 years old for government employees and is only 60 years for LI workers.
Generally, because these compulsory retirement ages are legally enforced by
employers, so it is quite definite that all government employees will compulsorily
retire at that age. But for the employees in private sector, their retirement ages will
differ greatly.
Secondly, in the aspect of contribution, the minimum requirement of contribution
is also different in these two schemes. The minimum period of contribution in GEI is 5
years, but it is only 1 year in LI. For GEI insured persons, as long as they can fulfill
one of the two conditions, 1)having contributed for 5 years at 60 or 65, or 2)having
contributed for 25 years at any age, then they are entitled to GEI old age benefit. But
for LI insured persons, the required retirement ages between Labour Standard Law and
LI are inconsistent. In LI the minimum requirement of age for male is 60 years in
normal cases and 55 years in special cases. But it is 5 years less for female in the
same case. For LI insured persons, although they are allowed to retire as long as they
have served or contributed for 25 years, they are not certainly entitled to LI old age
benefits if their actual age is not above the minimum requirement.
On the contrary, as age is not a requirement for old age benefit in GEI, dismissed
employees are also allowed to claim their old age benefits as long as they have
262
contributed for 5 years since 1979. For many retirees in both GEI and LI, as their ages
have not reached 65 years old when they retire, especially since some retirees in GEI
are even younger than 50 years old, so the officially entitled 'old age' benefits are
actually 'retirement' benefits.
The amount of retirement payment is determined by the number of months and
the level of insured wage per month; and the number of months is determined by
insured years (see Table 8.12). One's number of months times one's insured wage,
that is the amount of retirement payment.
Table 8.12 The Number of months and the Amount of























































Source: summarised form LI and GEI laws
As the GEI scheme was established in 1958, the oid age benefit could be mature
only after 5 years' transition in 1963. Actually the average months of benefit in that
year is 5. Afterwards, the average months on benefit keep growing as the average
insured years increase. And the increase of average insured wage also plays a very
significant role in the increase of the amount of retirement payments (see Table 8.13).
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Table 8.13 old Age Benefits of GEI
|insured months of insured number of amount amount/cas
year 1 year
1
benefit wage claims (1,000) (1,000 )
1963 5.0 5.0 41 255 5.3
1965 6.3 5.9 847.3 1 032 7 353 7.1
1970 | 10.8 11.7 1 833.8 2 624 68 350 24.0
1975 15.2 21.5 2 726.4 3 703 251 763 68.5
1980 | 19.6 31.6 6 368.3 6 012 1 308 786 218.7
R : 5 888 1 295 958 220.1
D : 5 489.0 124 12 828 103.5
1984 | 21.7 31.3 8 667.1 7 206 2 291 421 318.1
R : 22.4 32.4 6 631 2 203 044 332 .3
D : 13.5 18.2 8 430 0 575 88 378 153.7
Note: From 1979 on, the number of claims includes dismissals(D).
Because the figures of claims of retirees(R) and dismissals
and the amount per case of dismissals are published,
so the amount of retirees and dismissals and the amount
per case of dismissals can be calculated as in the table.
Source:CTC, 1985:54-55, 87, 136, 154-155,
Table 8.13 is compiled from several pages of the official GEI statistical data book.
The figures do not thoroughly fit when we do a cross check of each other. The
possible reasons could be: firstly, errors or different bases of statistics; secondly, the
average insured wage of retirees are significantly higher than the insured wage of
total insured persons. According to the author's research, the average insured wage
of retirees in 1984 was NT$10,300, but the official figure for all insured persons was
only NT$8,700. We also find that the amount of payment per case increases steadily
and rapidly due to the increase of insured wage. The average amount of payment per
case of retirees in official statistics in 1984 was exactly the same as that of the
author's research, NTS332.3 thousand (see Table 8.13). As the average consumption
expenditure per head in the Taiwan Area in 1984 was NT$4,341 (see Table 7.1), this
amount of payment could last for about 76.5 months or 6 years and 4.5 months for a
single retiree. Of course, we realise that the average expenditure of retired persons
would not likely be as high as average consumption expenditure per head. However,
although the concept of 'average' can give us an idea about the total expenditure, it
cannot really give any help to solve the practical problem of those whose retired
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income is less than average.
As for LI, the published statistics are not so detailed as GEI. And the items of
statistics are also different. Originally the statistics included only the figures of claims,
amount of payment, and the average amount per case. From 1979 on, a benefit of
reduced rate was introduced for those who were not up to required retirement age.
The reduced benefit will be 4% less for each year short of required retirement age.
The maximum allowed is for 5 year earlier. The amounts of benefit per claim of
reduced rate are much higher than those of full rate because they had a longer period
of contribution (see Table 8.14). But even the amounts of reduced rate benefit are less
than those of GEI though their average months of benefit are quite similar to GEI. The
main reason was that the insured wage of LI was less than GEI. As for the amount per
claim in the the author's research, it was NT$175.6 thousand. Although it was a little
higher than the official figure, it was falling between that of full rate and that of
reduced rate of official figures. Linking to the average consumption expenditure of the
Taiwan area in 1984, the author's figure could last for 40.5 months or 3 years and 4.5
months, but the official figure could last for only 36.2 months or 3 years for a single
retiree.
Table 8.14.1 Old Age payments of LI
Total
Year number of NT$ per insured wage insured wage|months per
claims claim of total of retirees|claim
(1 000) (1 000) (1 000) |
1
1976 7 217 42.7 2.5 2.8 | 15.3
1977 7 854 54.0 2.9 3.3 | 16.4
1978 8 197 70.0 3.3 3.7 | 18.9
1979 11 652 92.0 3.7 4.2 | 21.9
1980 13 883 99.5 4.5 5.1 | 19.5
1981 15 158 106.6 5.3 6.0 | 17.8
1982 19 136 120. 5 5.6 6.4 | 18.8
1983 19 545 150.0 6.4 7.2 | 20.8
1984 19 630 157.1 7.4 8.4 | 18.7
Source: BLITF, 1985: 88, 218-219
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Table 8.14.2 Old Age Payments of LI
Full Rate Reduced Rate
Year number of NT? per months per number of NT? per months per
claims claim payment claims claim payment
1 000 1 000
1976 7 217 42.7 15.3 - - -
1977 7 854 54.0 16.4 - - -
1978 8 197 70.0 18.9 - - -
1979 9 978 84.2 20.0 1 674 138.5 33.0
1980 11 002 88.5 17.4 2 881 141.8 27.8
1981 12 137 96.7 16.0 3 021 146.3 24.4
1982 15 578 107. 3 16.8 3 558 178.3 27.9
1983 15 410 128.3 17.8 4 135 230.7 31.9
1984 15 605 132.1 15.7 4 025 253.9 30.2
Source: BLITF, 1985: 88, 218-219
Lastly, according to the author's survey in 1985, when we compare the distribution
of lump sum old age payments by five equal size groups of retirees, we find that both
the amount of the lowest fifth and the ratio of the highest fifth to the lowest fifth of
LI were much worse than that of GEL That is, in every aspect the old age benefit of
GEI is better than LI (see Table 8.15). Moreover, because the coverage and the
contribution revenue of LI has greatly extended in the latest decade, so in theory more
old age reserves must be made, but in practice its annual account has been in red
since 1986. According to an informal calculation of LI senior officials, although there
is some old age reserve, if its insured persons who are of retirement age retired at
the same time, LI would go bankrupt immediately. So the LI scheme is in a serious
financial crisis.
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Table 8.15 Distribution of Old Age Benefits by Five
Groups of Equal Size , 1984 (in thousand)










Lowest fifth 169.3 | 10.2 31.4 ! 3.6
Second fifth ! 280.0 | 16.9 j 67.3 I 7.7
Third fifth ! 333.3 | 20.0 | 122.3 I 13.9
Fourth fifth i 392.2 23.6 237.7 ! 27.1
Highest fifth | 486.7 | 29.3 419.1
I
I 47.7
Ratio of the highest 1
fifth's income to 2 .87 13 .35
the lowest fifth
Source: author's survey
8.6. Benefits in Kind
In GEI there are benefits in kind for maternity, sickness and injury. But in LI this
kind of benefit is only provided for sickness and injury. Except the retirees who are
also entitled to join the subordinate schemes such as RGEI (or HIRGE and HISRGE
after 1985) and HIGED, all other retirees lose their entitlement to this kind of benefit
whenever they retire from GEI or LI. However, the utilisation of this kind of benefit is
much higher than all other benefits in these two schemes.
As the rates of claims for benefits in kind were rather stable over the time (see
Table 8.7), so the change in the number of claims was mainly caused by change in the
number of insured persons (see Table 8.1). As for the number of inpatients of
maternity in GEI, as one claim of an inpatient always means a birth of new born baby,
so the decline in numbers in recent years could demonstrate the decline of the birth
rate of insured persons in GEI. In the same contingency the increase of outpatients in
GEi also demonstrated that the number of prenatal check-ups per pregnancy had
increased from 2.6 visits in 1970 to 5.5 visits in 1984 (see Table 8.16).
The cost per visit of outpatients and per spell of inpatients in both schemes
continuously increased over time (see Table 8.16). Generally the first reaction to
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explain this increase might be inflation of the economy. According to price indices
(see Table 8.17), it was true that the wholesale price index and the consumer price
index kept increasing before 1981. But after 1981 they were very stable. So inflation
could not explain all the facts. The other more important cause for this increase was
the escalation of the quality of health services. This objective may be achieved
through the increase of the number of services per patient visit and per inpatient day,
or through the use of more elaborate and advanced diagnosis and therapy, etc.
Generally, health services are not only very labour-intensive, but also very
technology-intensive. Especially under a free market of medical services, not only the
physicians have clinical freedom to decide on the diagnosis and therapy in order to do
the best for their patients but also the patients have a free choice of the hospital or
clinic they wish to attend or even the doctor they wish to visit. The introduction of
social health insurance which will pay the medical bills for patients will certainly
reinforce the rising of medical expenditure.
268
Table 8.16 The Number of Claims and The Amount



















Claims (1, 000) 1 1 1 1
1976 | 95. 0 1 30 .4 | 2 939.1 | 40 • 1 1 13 219.1 | 117.2
1979 j 83. 4 i 28 .8 j 3 098.2 | 40 .7 j 20 623.6 j 163.8
1980 | 89. 8 1 28 .6 | 3 200.0 1 41 .4 | 23 800.1 | 183.4
1981 j 100. 4 1 29 •5 | 3 411.6 | 44 •4 | 26 544.6 | 214.8
1982 j 139. 6 I 29 • 7 | 3 474.5 | 46 •4 | 29 581.5 | 253.4
1983 | 136. 8 i 26 .2 j 3 737.7 | 40 • 5 | 31 780.0 | 273.6
1984 |
1
141. 4 1 25 • 5 |
1




35 923.3 | 320.0
1
Amount per Claim (NT$) 1 1 1
1976 | 53 1 82 5 | 87 1 4 578 | 66 | 4 615
1979 | 76 2 789 | 125 1 6 648 | 93 | 7 518
1980 | 102 3 992 | 151 1 8 541 j 122 | 9 760
1981 | 144 5 506 | 189 1 11 059 | 152 113 809
1982 | 174 6 396 | 216 1 12 075 | 180 |15 245
1983 | 205 8 444 j 240 1 15 969 | 192 |16 983
1984 j 240 9 448 | 278 1 19 530 | 214 j19 079
Note: MA = maternity




1)CTC, 1985: 240, 236-237
2)BLITF, 1985: 276-277











1978 | 67.2 65.8 56.8
1979 j 76.5 72.3 68.7
1980 | 92.9 86.0 84.3
1981 | 100.0 100.0 100.0
1982 | 99.8 103.0 109.7
1983 | 98.6 104.4 116.6
1984 | 99.1 104.3 134.6
1985 | 96.6 104.2 | 132.2
Source: CEPD, 1986a: 175
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Except in 1984 the average cost per claim of inpatient service of LI was higher
than that of GEI every year. On the other hand, the cost per visit of outpatient service
of GEI was higher than that of LI every year. For inpatient service the patients of
these two schemes attended almost the same hospitals and were charged by the
same standard. Its difference might be caused by these two factors: first, the
heterogeneity of these two population groups and, second, the method of calculating
GEI figures. Research had been done on this issue by Prof. Kaim-Caudle and the
author in 1982 (1984: 29-31). As most insured persons in GEI are white collar and
non-manual workers (its blue collar are included in LI) whilst the great majority of
insured persons in LI are blue collar and manual workers, their differences in industrial
risk, industrial accidents and disease patterns are certain to lead to differences in
average length of stay and cost per inpatient case. In addition, the GEI inpatient cost
for the year is the aggregate of the 12 monthly payments divided by the aggregate of
the patients hospitalised each month. This method implies that a patient whose spell
(episode) in hospital extends over two months, for example from June 29th to July
5th, would be counted twice. The over-counted number of inpatients would reduce
the cost per case. But why was the cost of GEI in 1984 higher than LI? It is a new
question we can answer only by an additional study.
As for the reasons why the cost of GEI was higher than LI for outpatient
treatment, its reasons could be suggested as three (Kaim-Caudle and Chin, 11,31).
Firstly, in LI almost three quarters of outpatient visits were made to small private
hospitals and clinics where the average cost was only NTS107. Yet in GEi 42% of
outpatients were made to its own Central Clinics and 14% of cases were made to
Provincial and City Hospitals at both of which the cost per visit was in excess of
NT$200. Secondly, in LI as the payments from insurer to these hospitals and clinics
were so low, the outpatients were always charged two certificates for one visit or
asked to visit twice. This rate was found to be about 14%. So the number of visits
which was counted by the number of certificates was certainly over-counted. This
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would lower the cost of the outpatient visit in LI. On the other hand, GEI patients pay
a uniform registration fee at the rate of NT$20 to the contracted hospitals while LI
patients have to pay whatever fee is demanded by their contractors. And then GEI has
to pay its contractors the remaining registration fee. This payment would add about
5% of the cost of an outpatient visit in GEI.
Table 8.18 Participation Rate and Enrollment Rate
in RGEI
Number of New Insured| RGEI | Participation Enrollment
GEI Persons in | Insured (Rate of Rate in





1977 4 467 1 086 8 662 | 24.31 12.53
1978 5 243 1 016 i 8 959 j 19.38 11.34
1979 5 709 858 i 9 076 i 15.02 9.45
1980 6 012 854 9 212 i 14.20 9.27
1981 7 633 827 9 222 | 10.83 8.97
1982 8 008 877 | 9 327 ! 10.95 9.49
1983 7 465 1 068 9 637 j 14.31 11.09
1984 7 206 1 115 | 9 922 | 15.47 11.24
Source: CTC, 1985:
Both GEI and LI are strictly employee-related, all non-employees are excluded.
However, some of the subordinate schemes, RGEI, H1GED, HIRGE and HISRGE are
available for GEI retirees and their spouses provided they are able and willing to make
contributions while retired. Among them, the HIGED which is available only for the
spouses at present will extend to include non-adult children and parents of the
government employees in the future. Apart from HIGED, the participation in these
subordinate schemes is voluntary, so their rates (the proportion of newly insured
persons to the GEI retirees) are quite low. In 1984 the participation rate was about
15.5%. Even after deleting the number of dismissals, the rate was only 16.8%. That is,
there were 84.5% or 83.2% of GEI retirees not joining RGEI in 1984. The newly insured
persons in RGEI was only 11.2% (ie, enrollment rate) in the same year (see Table 8.18).
Then, how about the health care of the 84.5% or 83.2% of retirees who did not
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join RGEI? According to the author's survey in 1985, the participation rate in a health
scheme was as high as 58.4%. Compared to actual figure in Table 8.18, explicitly, this
rate is too high. Reasons for this need to be pursued in a further study. However, the
reasons found in the survey for those who did not join RGEI gave very useful
information. For those who did not join RGEI but had proper health care through other
sources of service, their sources could be listed as follows: 1)34.9% of them were
veterans; 2)4.7% of them joined LI by getting a new formal full-time job; 3)11.0% of
them joined HIGED through their government employed spouse; 4)6.4% of them could
get free military medical care through the status of military servants' dependants.
Therefore, there were only 17.9% of GEI retirees who did not join RGEI and failed to
get suitable medical services. The main reason that they did not join RGEI was that
contributions were too high. There were 20.9% attributed to this reason (see Table
8.19). Generally, health insurance is not a good way to provide health services for
retired old people even if it is pooled in the same scheme with younger people,
because their contributions will be much higher than those before their retirement.
But, on the other hand, their incomes have greatly declined after their retirement.
Whenever they are unable to contribute, the services will be discontinued. This is
unlike pension schemes, where one does not need to pay contributions any more after
retirement.
In LI, there were 27% of retirees who were veterans. They could get free medical
services from veteran hospitals; 0.2% of them were the dependants of military
servants and could get free medical services from military hospitals; and 1.0% of them
were GEI retirees and also joined RGEI. The rest of retirees in LI had to self-finance
their medical services.
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Table 8.19 Reasons for Not Joining RGEI
Reason N I %
ljveterans, getting free medical care from j
veteran hospitals; 60 | 34.9
2)reworking, joining LI; 8 1 4.7
3)joining HIGED; 19 | 11.0
4)dependants of military servants, getting
free medical care from military hospitals;| 11 6.4
Subtotal (1-4) 98 | 57.0
5)contributions too high; 36 j 20.9
6)no confidence in medical care of GEI; 3 | 1.7
7)long queue to see a doctor; 3 1.7
8)having good health; 11 j 6.4
9)unknown; 21 j 12.2
Subtotal (5-9) 74 | 43.0
Total 172 1100.0
Note: The total GEI samples was 413.
Source: athor's survey
8.7. Merits and Limitations
As we have described in previous sections, there are several essential
characteristics in social insurance in Taiwan. (1)They are roughly divided into three
main systems and five or nine minor subordinate systems. Each system covers only
definite prescribed categories of population. (2)AII three main systems are
comprehensive. Each of them covers similar contingencies, ie, maternity, sickness,
injury, old age, disability and death. (3)AII three systems are strictly
employment-related or, more precisely, employee-related. That is, all insured persons
must be in employment. Whenever an insured person is unemployed, dismissed or
retired, he will lose his status of insured person and his entitlement to benefits. (4)AII
three main systems adopt a low contribution rate policy. The contribution rates are
not only very low but also largely borne by employers. (5)Almost all cash payments
are paid in lump sum. (6)AII cash payments are contribution-related, ie, all cash
benefits are calculated on the basis of insured wage.
These six characteristics of social insurance certainly have their merits. That is.
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(1)separate systems make the start or the establishment of a new scheme easier
because a small scheme is always easier than a large one; (2)a comprehensive system
makes the collection of contributions simple and easy; (3)an employment-related
system can guarantee the ability to pay contributions; (4)low contribution policy is
welcomed by both employees and employers so avoiding strong objections; (5)lump
sum payments make the administration of the system simple and easy; (6)strict
contribution-relatedness makes the system actuarially sound and simple.
However, their limitations and weaknesses are also derived from these
characteristics. (l)Firstly, it is an administrative waste to have three administrations to
administer similar groups of contingencies. Separate systems mean a smaller number
of insured persons in each system. And a small number is contradictory to the
principles of large numbers and risk-pooling of social insurance. So it is difficult for
the administration to reach its optimum of economy and efficiency. Furthermore,
separate systems certainly will cause difficulties of labour mobility. If an insured
person wants to change his job from this system to another system, he will either
lose his retirement payment in the previous system or he has to retire twice or more.
Furthermore, divided systems also cause the double claims for one contingency. For
example, if a couple participate in different systems, then both of them can claim
maternity benefits and funeral allowances from their own insurance. But if they join
the same scheme or only one of them is an insured person, then they can claim only
one benefit.
(2)As a comprehensive system will cover all prescribed contingencies, firstly, the
quality of covered contingencies differs so greatly that it certainly leads to the
complexity of management, both in accounting and administration; secondly, this
measure is explicitly unfair to part of the insured persons by requiring them to be
insured for some contingencies that will never occur to them. For example, single
workers and old workers, especially old female workers, may not or even never claim
maternity benefit and a majority of young female workers will not work until they
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retire so they will not claim old age benefits, but they have to pay the contributions
for these contingencies. This case is unreasonable just like requiring the persons who
do not have motorcars to buy motor vehicle insurance. As one of the basic principles
of social insurance is risk-pooling, in principle, the contribution had better be
contingency-related in order to meet the principle of individual equity. In addition, if
a couple join the same system, they have to pay double contributions for some
contributions such as maternity because they can claim only one benefit for that
contingency.
(3)The characteristic of employment-relatedness will deprive the entitlement of
many insured persons and exclude the people who are in need. For example, if an
insured person quits his job, either by being dismissed or retired, he will lose his
membership of the scheme and therefore lose all other benefits that he has ever
contributed to. He even loses his retirement benefit if he does not meet its
requirements. Old people certainly need more medical care, but they are excluded
whenever they retire and lose their status of employment.
(4)Though a low contribution policy is welcome by both employees and employers,
its logical result is that the benefit will be very low. In turn, low levels of lump sum
retirement payments will make a pension scheme either impossible or meaningless.
Furthermore, low ratios of insured wage to actual wage makes this situation worse.
According to the data of 1984, the lump sum retirement payments of GEI could last
about 6 years and that of LI could last only 3 years if the retired persons wanted to
maintain the average living standard. As the average retirement age was 60.7 years in
GEI (CTC, 1985: 158) and 61 years in LI (author's survey) and the life expectancy at 60
years was 18 years (DOH, 1985: 61) in 1984, so the life expectancy at retirement age
was about 17 years for both LI and GEI retirees in that year. Therefore, the proportion
of an average retirement covered by average retirement payments is only 18% for LI
retirees and 35% for GEI retirees.
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(5)From the individual point of view, a lump sum payment is not a good provision
for old age in many cases because, firstly, it cannot avoid suffering from inflation,
secondly, nobody can make a consumption plan for his retirement payment because
nobody can know his life span.
(6)The close relationship of cash benefit with contribution will restrict the adoption
of a pension scheme and survivors' scheme due to the actuarial difficulty.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
9 The Options for Change 276
9.1 Introduction 276
9.2 The Summary of Facts 276
9.3 The Criteria for Options and Planning 279
9.4 Family 284
9.5 Primary Social Insurance 288
9.6 Social Assistance 304
9.7 Occupational Schemes 310
9.8 Universal Schemes 314
9.8.1 Existing Sub-Universal Services 315
9.8.2 Towards An All-Universal Scheme 319
9.9 Feasibility and Implementation 323
9.10 Conclusion 327
CHAPTER 9
THE OPTIONS FOR CHANGE
9.1. Introduction
As the purpose of this chapter is to raise some options for change for Taiwan
according to the facts presented in previous chapters, so a very brief summary of
these facts will be made as a first step. The discussion of options will be divided into
two parts: a)a macro-discussion on the whole system of social security and b)a
micro-discussion on the individual provision of social security. Both of them will be
based on the same criteria. But in macro-discussion much attention will be paid to
the mutual relationship among different criteria in order to achieve a harmonious and
efficient social security system. As for micro-discussion, which must be based on the
macro-arrangement as its precondition, because the discussion will be concentrated
on only one provision of social security in each section, so the discussion will be
closely linked with the current facts in Taiwan. The aim of this chapter is to find
some ways to strengthen the existing provisions, or even to create some new ones,
without causing any contradiction or undesirable side effects for the macro-system.
9.2. The Summary of Facts
Taiwan is a very small country. Her density of population is the second highest in
the world among the countries with a population over 10 million. The country's
population structure is still quite young, old people (aged 65 and over) are only about
5% of the total population nowadays. We can expect that the population will keep
growing, and the population pressure will be more severe in the future. According to
population projections, the population would reach a ZPG state between 2022 and
2027 with a population of about 24 to 25 million. At that time, the proportion of old
people would be about 15% to 17% of the total population. From the point of social
security, the expenditure to support old people will be three times heavier than today
provided the support level is the same as today. The ability of the next generation to
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support this will become a very crucial element in the field of social security. Any
policy consideration of social security must not ignore or under-estimate this element.
Furthermore, the economic situation of Taiwan has also changed greatly. The
labour force employed in primary industry has reduced from 56% in 1952 to 17% in
1986. That is, 83% of the labour force is employed in secondary and tertiary
industries. This change of economic structure demonstrates that a great majority of
the labour force are forced to live on earned income. Their source of income is at
greater risk and becomes more uncertain. More formal and reliable income security is
therefore necessary. Fortunately, the per capita GNP of Taiwan has increased from less
than US$100 before 1950 to about US$3,000 in 1985 and to US$5,000 in 1987 (and
US$6,000 in 1988) at the market price. Although quite a high percentage of the
increase in the past two years was owing to the inflation of the US dollar and the
appreciation of the Taiwan dollar, the increase was still very significant. This
successful economic achievement provides a good basis to develop existing
provisions or even to establish some new ones.
Both in theory and in practice, we expect the family to play a vital role in social
security in Taiwan, but what is its real function? The most reliable indicator that can
show this function is the rate of co-residence of old parents with their children.
Nowadays this rate is still as high as 67%. It is still a very important old age
provision in Taiwan. But according to several research studies, both in attitude and in
fact, the rate of co-residence will tend to decline in the future for several reasons.
And this trend has further led to a decline of family (or household) size, so the social
security function of family will be weakened in some degree. This development, the
decline of the co-residence rate, does not necessarily mean a great harm to the
supporting obligation of children because the children may still financially support
their parents even if they do not live together. However, this will make the family's
function of social security less reliable and more expensive than before. Apart from
single persons and married persons without children, the health, economic ability, life
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style and attitude of children will greatly influence the function of social security of
family. Much evidence demonstrates that disabled, low income and selfish children
are not only not a reliable source of income of a family but a great burden.
As family has its limits as a provision of income maintenance for the elderly in
Taiwan, the other available sources are employment and private savings. But when the
elderly grow older and older, these two sources will be more impossible or finally
exhausted. As for social security, as only a minority of people are covered in social
insurance, the number of old people who can totally depend on retirement payments
are even less because not only is the amount of retirement payments quite small, but
most of them are paid in a lump sum. Especially, as indicated in Table 8.8, the average
ratio of contributions of retiring group is only 0.64, its replacement ratio will be the
same. So the full rate of benefits is only average 64% of working income of the
retirees. Including occupational retirement payments, even if their total old age lump
sum payments are the maximum of insurance and occupational payments: 90 months
for LI retirees, 97 months for GE1 retirees and 106 months for Ml retirees, they can
last only 7.5, 8.1 and 8.8 years respectively. Compared to the 17 year average life
expectancy at actual retirement age, 61 years, these maximum retirement payments
can meet 44%, 48% and 52% in LI, GEI and Ml respectively. For those whose payments
are less than the maximum, their situations are even worse.
Finally, social assistance, either in cash or in kind, will be only the last resort in
Taiwan due to its inadequacy in amount. Furthermore, this resource will be
accompanied by an unpleasant side effect, stigmatising.
In summary, in Taiwan all existing provisions of social security have their own
limits and weaknesses, so how to solve these problems and to make the option of
provisions comes to the focus of this chapter.
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9.3. The Criteria for Options and Planning
As mentioned in Chapter 2, all provisions of income maintenance have their
inherent merits and limitations. However, in this thesis on the discussion of policy
options, we will concentrate on only family and social security rather than other
provisions such as employment or savings, because in Taiwan these two provisions
are not only the main source but also the last resort of income maintenance
provisions for the elderly. In the field of social security, historically, the first reaction
to deal with the problem of income insecurity is social relief or social assistance. In
theory this provision is not only applicable to all people of a society but should also
be able to meet the needs of the people. Unfortunately its weakness is its side
effects of stigma, disgrace, disincentive to voluntary actions and high administrative
costs by its formality of means-test. Later, the provision which can avoid the
weaknesses of social assistance was introduced. It is social insurance. But social
insurance also has its own weakness: exclusion, both in contingencies and in
coverage. Finally, universal allowance which aims to avoid all weaknesses of the
previous two provisions was recommended. Its own weakness is its benefits level will
not be guaranteed to meet the needs if the pre-condition of an affluent economy is
not existent.
As these three provisions of social security by nature have their own merits and
weaknesses, the option and planning of social security are dependent on what
objectives we want to achieve. As mentioned in chapter2, four criteria equity,
adequacy, economic efficiency, and administrative efficiency are applied in this
thesis. Among them the criterion of equity can be further classified into three
sub-criteria: vertical equity, means horizontal equity and outcome horizontal equity. In
the field of social security, in theory and in ideal, it will the best if all these criteria
can be achieved simultaneously, at least not to sacrifice any one of them as the price
to achieve another one. But, in practice, as different benefit provisions and financing
methods has different merits and limitations to achieve these criteria, it is in fact
280
impossible to achieve those criteria simultaneously without a delicate design. For
example, according to Table 2.4, if we want to pursue the objectives of 'vertical equity'
and 'outcome horizontal equity', more emphasis should be put on social assistance
rather than on universal allowance and more emphasis on progressive taxes rather
than on flat rate ones. But, on the other hand, if we want to pursue the objectives of
'economic efficiency' and 'administrative efficiency', then more emphasis should be put
on universal allowance rather than on social assistance and more emphasis on flat
rate taxes rather than on progressive ones.
Even within a given provision of social security, we are also able to put more
emphasis on certain criteria by applying different practical measures. For example,
according to Table 2.4, if the provision of social insurance is flat-rate, it will be helpful
to achieve the criteria of 'means horizontal equity' and 'administrative efficiency'; but if
the provision is earnings-related, it will be helpful to achieve the remaining criteria of
'vertical equity', 'outcome horizontal equity' and 'economic efficiency'. In universal
allowance, sub-universal provision will be advantageous to achieve the criteria of
'vertical equity', 'outcome horizontal equity' and 'economic efficiency'; but the
all-universal provision will be advantageous to achieve the criteria of 'means
horizontal equity' and 'administrative efficiency'. Each provision has its own
irreplaceable merits. Facing these exclusive or even contradictory options, explicitly,
the final policy-making must be left to political procedure.
As mentioned in chapter 2, apart from the provision of benefits, the method of
financing is also a very important element in the pursuit of given criteria. Up to the
present because the main financial source of social security is from only one
productive factor, labour, so its main financing methods are taxes and contributions.
Among them the main financial source of social assistance and universal allowance is
taxation and that of social insurance is contribution. As the rates of tax can be
flat-rate, proportional and progressive and that of contribution can be flat-rate or
earnings-related, as demonstrated in Table 2.4, progressive (and proportional) taxes
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and earnings-related contributions have a better function to achieve the criteria of
'vertical equity', 'outcome horizontal equity' and 'adequacy'; and flat-rate taxes and
contributions have a better function to achieve the criteria of 'means horizontal
equity', 'economic efficiency' and 'administrative efficiency'.
Compared to social insurance and universal allowance (see Table 2.4), in theory
social assistance will be able to achieve first rank in 'vertical equity' and 'outcome
horizontal equity' in benefit aspect due to its high selectivity and 'unequal treatments
for unequals'; in financing aspect it will be able to win the additional first rank in
'means horizontal equity', 'economic efficiency' and 'administrative efficiency' if it is
financed by a flat rate tax, or it will be able to win the additional first rank in 'vertical
equity', 'outcome horizontal equity' and 'adequacy' if it is financed by progressive or
even proportional tax. But, in practice, in Taiwan at least according to its regulations,
in benefit side the zero income test will make the achievement of 'outcome horizontal
equity' impossible because, for those who have some income but not as high as
actual assistance, their living standard will be lower than assistance receivers. And
worse, the actual assistance level in Taiwan is lower than its official subsistence level.
The criterion of 'adequacy' is ignored.
As for universal allowance, because its benefits are generally flat-rate, so it will be
able to achieve first rank in the criteria of 'means horizontal equity', 'economic
efficiency' and 'administrative efficiency' in benefit aspect; But in financing aspect, in
theory a universal allowance can be financed by either flat-rate tax or progressive tax
(inclucding proportional tax), but in practice it is financially infeasible to finance a
unuversal allowance by flat-rate tax. So, in financing aspect, it will be able to win first
rank in 'vertical equity', 'outcome horizontal equity' and 'adequacy' only because the
scheme is financed by progressive tax.
As for social insurance, compared to social assistance and universal allowance, its
ability to achieve each criterion is in the middle. But within the field of social
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insurance, because both its benefits and contributions can be either flat-rate or
earnings-related, so its combinations will be four as follows (see Table 2.4): 1)if
flat-rate benefits are financed by flat-rate contributions, then the scheme will be able
to achieve the criteria of 'means horizontal equity' and 'administrative efficiency' in
benefit aspect, and 'means horizontal equity', 'economic efficiency' and 'administrative
efficiency' in financing aspect; 2)if flat-rate benefits are financed by earnings-related
contributions, then the scheme will be able to achieve the criteria of 'means horizontal
equity' and 'administrative efficiency' in benefit aspect and 'vertical equity', 'outcome
horizontal equity' and 'adequacy' in financing aspect; 3)if earnings-related benefits are
financed by earnings-related contributions, then the scheme will be able to win the
criteria of 'vertical equity', 'outcome horizontal equity' and 'adequacy' in financing
aspect, and 'vertical equity' and 'economic efficiency' in benefit aspect; 4)if
earnings-related benefits are financed by flat-rate contributions, then the scheme will
be able to win the criteria of 'vertical equity', 'outcome horizontal equity' and
'economic efficiency' in benefit aspect and 'means horizontal equity', 'economic
efficiency' and 'administrative efficiency' in financing aspect.
Facing these four possible options, in Taiwan, due to the popularity of medium and
small scale of enterprises and self-employment (as high as 98% of all enterprises), a
flat-rate financing method will be more feasible and equitable than an
earnings-related one. If so, because it is only reasonable and equitable for flat-rate
contributions to finance flat-rate benefits rather than earnings-related benefits, so the
logical result is that only the first combination in social insurance will be the major
provision in the future.
In summary, the discussion above is mainly based on one productive factor,
labour, and its corresponding financing methods, taxation and contribution. As
mentioned in chapter 2, the current tax-financing method is not an efficient way to
finance an all-universal allowance, but it is still feasible to finance a sub-universal
allowance. So, if we confine universal allowance to only sub-universal allowance.
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then, based on tax-financing method, we can still make a rational multiple provisions
planning according to the strategy of contingency-division which was initiated by
Beveridge.
For example, based on the principle of 'the division of labour', all regular
contingencies can be tackled by social insurance or universal allowance. Among them,
the short-term contingencies can be tackled by social insurance and long-term
contingencies can be economically tackled by universal allowance. As for irregular
contingencies and extra particular needs, they can be tackled by social assistance.
Moreover, within the field of social insurance, it is even possible to arrange primary
social insurance schemes to provide only flat-rate benefits at primary adequacy level,
and the earnings-related benefits which aim to achieve the objective of secondary
adequacy may be left to secondary social insurance schemes such as occupational
schemes and private insurance.
Under a design described as above, because different contingencies are technically
tackled by different schemes and different benefits are provided by different
provisions according to their merits, so all four criteria would be able to achieve
rationally to their maximal level and all side effects and shortcomings might be
reduced to their minimum even though these criteria are by nature conflicting to
some extent.. Therefore, we may conclude that the better policy of social security for
old people is to multiply their sources of income: not only the number of the sources
but also the heterogeneity of their sources.
Under this general policy, we will discuss different sources separately in the
following sections. The discussion will focus on, firstly, how to strengthen the existing
provisions and, secondly, how to establish new provisions if it is necessary.
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9.4. Family
According to Figure 3.1, the income source of 'family' is the main item in
'voluntary actions'. Although 'family' is not formally considered as a social security
provision, according to the description in chapter 2, it has the greatest advantage to
achieve the special objectives of 'vertical equity', 'secondary adequacy' and 'economic
efficiency'.
Both as an ideal and in fact, the family plays a vital role in social security not only
in Chinese society in Taiwan but also in other oriental countries such as South Korea
and Singapore (Chow, 1985). In normal cases all people are born in a family and grow
up in a family. Family is seen as the most natural place for people to live and to
spend their old age. For this reason the policy for old people to stay in their own
family should be encouraged. However, only the plural family, a family with many
members, can perform the function of social security. But the plural family can further
be divided into conjugal (or nuclear) family, stem family and extended family. By
definition, conjugal family is a family consisting of a couple with or without children;
stem family is a family in which old parents live with their married children; and
extended family is a family consisting of two stem families or two conjugal families or
one stem family with one conjugal family. As there is a legal supporting obligation
between parents and children, husband and wife in Taiwan, so the social security
function of conjugal family and stem family is stronger than that of extended family.
But for elderly people, the function of stem family is better than conjugal family.
In normal cases, as long as the couple is healthy and employed or self-employed,
even though they do not have any children, (13.7% of married persons do not have
children,) they will be able to make their savings or other provisions to protect their
old age. However, these preconditions are not always present, let alone abnormal
cases such as disability, illness, injury, unemployment, occasional employment and low
pay. Even if this couple are normal, healthy and employed, and also have made a
substantial amount of savings and property for their old age, if one of them
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unfortunately gets a chronic and costly disease, they will spend all their money in a
very short time. Especially since medical expenditure in modern society is so
expensive that no one can be sure that they will be able to make sufficient funds or
savings for this purpose. Therefore, conjugal family is just like a single person and
quite easily comes to its limits. They have to depend on other statutory provisions, for
example, social assistance. We will discuss its options in related sections.
What are the limits of 'stem family' which we want to emphasize particularly in
this section as a social security provision? Simply, the social security function of this
kind of family mainly depends on the earning ability of its children. And the earning
ability depends on the children fulfilling the following preconditions:
1. the children must be normal, not mentally or physically
handicapped or disabled;
2. the children must be healthy;
3. the children must be suitably educated and trained;
4. the children must be employed;
5. the children must be able to earn sufficiently;
6. the children are willing to live together with or to support their
parents.
Even if the first 5 conditions are satisfactory, that does not mean that the last one will
be satisfied automatically. So the discussion of the limits of stem family will cover all
conditions.
Firstly, for disabled children, especially for totally disabled children, after several
years', e.g., five years, being taken care of by their parents, the government might
establish some special nursing homes to admit them in order to relieve the old
parents' hardship. In that case the parents may voluntarily pay some contributions to
the nursing home as a token to fulfil their obligation as parents. Of course, if the
parents prefer to continue to take care their children, they should be able to get some
special aid from the government. In Taiwan there is the well-known case of Miss
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Hsiao-min Wang, a beautiful conductor of a tatto band of a senior girls' high school.
She was hit by a motorcycle when she was walking along the street about thirty years
ago. She has been totally paralysed and disabled since that time. Her parents have
taken care of her for thirty years. Now her parents are too old to take care of her.
Several years ago, her mother appealed to society to let her daughter die by
euthanasia. But the law did not allow it. What a long term affliction it is for this family.
According to a report in a magazine, there were more than 100 such cases in Taiwan.
For all parents with only disabled children, they should be treated as single persons or
married persons without children; or at least as dependent children, not sources to
depend on.
In the case of preconditions 3 to 5, as long as children are normal and healthy, the
problem is easier than for disabled children because there is a good system of free
occupational training and free employment service in Taiwan. About 50 thousand
skilled workers have been trained by 12 public occupational training centres within 5
years from 1980 to 1984. Besides, the government also financed many private training
agencies to provide half a year to one year's short-term occupational training for
graduates from senior high schools and colleges and the people who are disabled.
The total number was about 13 thousand persons in the same period of time. The
employment service centres which are scattered over the whole country provide free
placement service for all persons of working age. It is true that job-creating is mainly
dependent on economic investment, economic development and other external
economic conditions, placement service itself cannot create any job, but because
people become less discriminating on the quality of the job and the level of wage, so
people will accept jobs or create new jobs for themselves when they are unemployed.
In Taiwan it is reported that many college graduates are employed as shopkeepers or
waiters/waitresses, and many retired high ranking officers from military and
government organise their own cleaners' companies. It is this work ethic that makes
the unemployment rate so low in Taiwan. It was as low as 1.2% in 1980 and
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somewhat higher, 2.4%, in 1984. Compared to industrialised countries, this is rather
low.
In the case of the last limitation mentioned above, even if the children have a
well-paid job, but do not have a good relationship with their parents and are not
willing to live with their parents or to support them in later life, the problems are still
there. As there is only legal obligation but no legal sanction for the children to
support their parents if children do default their obligation, the parents will have no
way to get help. For this problem, it might not be a good idea to push them into
living together or to force children to finance their parents by formal legal action
because old parents might be badly treated by their children. This will make things
worse. Especially, this will contradict with our aim to encourage the co-residence of
old parents with their adult children.
In order to achieve this aim, even sub-universal allowances are not an effective
way because they are neutral, no incentive to encourage nor discourage. The more
adequate way might be a special high 'tax deduction' or 'tax credit' for their children if
they live together. For high income children, tax deduction may benefit them more;
but for low income children, tax credit may benefit them more. In theory the amount
of tax deduction or tax credit should be designed to be at least equal to or had better
be higher than the level of universal benefits. Because both 'tax deduction' and 'tax
credit' are provided only as an incentive or reward for the children who are optional
to live with their parents, so whether to take those benefits are subject to the choice
of the children. As there is no compulsion for co-residence, many side effects can be
avoided. Moreover, the level of tax deduction or tax credit can even be prescribed
according to age and other special conditions in order to meet needs. So this new
measure can benefit the family substantially without stigmatising. It is a good
incentive to encourage parents and their children to live together. It is not necessary
to force all old people to live with their children if they prefer to live separately and
they are able to do so. They are free to make their own choice.
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However, this new measure must be based on a sound tax system, especially
income tax system, then the level of tax deduction or tax credit can be worked out.
In Taiwan as 98% of economic enterprises are of medium and small scale, and
particularly many of them are run by the self-employed, so the accuracy of their
income tax information is seriously in question. The feasibility of this new measure is
therefore greatly reduced by this weakness. Furthermore, as most old parents
nowadays have several children, and because the tax incentive is given by year, so
this will reduce the residence freedom of parents at least within one year.
As there is an obligation for children to support their parents, it should be an
appropriate policy not to allow some minority of well-off but selfish children to
neglect their obligation to support their old parents or not to treat their parents well
when they live together, these children should be required to pay a special "parents
tax" if their parents cannot live independently or do not like to live with them
(children) and have to apply for public assistance or to move into public old people's
homes unless their gross income is less than the tax threshold or other given figure,
because nowadays it is impossible for old parents to get any cash assistance if their
children are well-off or to move into old people's homes if they have children. This
provision of 'unless' will help some children who really have financial difficulties in
co-residence with their parents or to support their parents. Because this kind of tax
is applied to only the well-off children whose parents are so poor that they have to
rely on public assistance, so its number will be very small. Even here there is some
stigmatising effect on this group of children, but there will be no significant
consequence on the whole of society.
9.5. Primary Social Insurance
In general, as mentioned in section 3, due to the popularity of medium and small
scale of enterprises and self-employment, there is a great difficulty in the assessment
of earnings of the people. So, a universal social insurance scheme can be established
for all employed people and non-labour force only if a flat-rate financing method is
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applied in Taiwan, because it is only reasonable for flat-rare contributions to finance
flat-rate benefits, so this combination will be able to achieve the criteria of 'means
horizontal equity' and 'administrative efficiency' in benefit aspect, and 'means
horizontal equity', 'economic efficiency' and 'administrative efficiency' in financing
aspect.
As for the reform within the existing system, it must start from the existing
conditions. As we have discussed in the previous chapter, there are six limitations or
weaknesses in the basic characteristics of social insurance in Taiwan. Firstly, the
separate systems cause waste in administration by having several groups of personnel
to manage the same quality of insurance. Secondly, the comprehensive system
providing benefits both in cash and in kind lead to a complexity of management in
both accounting and administration and reduce their due efficiency. Thirdly, the
characteristic of employment-relatedness or even employee-relatedness limits the
growth of coverage. Fourthly, the logical result of a low contribution policy is a low
level of benefit. Fifthly, as a provision for old age, the lump sum payments are
vulnerable to the erosion of its value by inflation. Sixthly, the characteristic of
insurance or contribution-relatedness will limit the schemes to concern only their
insured persons, not their dependants. In summary, the last three characteristics
mainly concern the level and quality of benefits. The third one concerns coverage.
The first two concern the issue of efficiency. Based on the discussion in the previous
chapter, we know that, not to mention their advantage, the main shortcomings of
social insurance in Taiwan are: 1)low benefit level due to low contributions, 2)no
option of pension, 3)there are still more than 30% of employed persons excluded from
existing schemes, 4)administrative waste due to separate schemes for different
industries. Therefore, the main objects of change or reform can also be listed, from
the one which is easiest to start to the one which is the most difficult, as the
following aspects:
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1. to increase the level of benefit, ie, to achieve the objective of
'adequacy';
2. to improve the types of payments;
3. to enlarge the coverage of insured persons; and
4. to improve the efficiency of administration, ie, to achieve the
objective of 'administrative efficiency'.
1)According to Table 2.4, because the existing social insurance schemes in Taiwan
are earnings-related in both contributions and benefits, so in theory the objectives of
'vertucal equity' and 'outcome horizontal equity' can be achieved at the first rank in
both aspects simultaneously. But the 'adequacy' of benefit is mainly determined by the
'adequacy' of its coresponding contribution, so the increase of benefit must be
followed by an increase in its contribution. In existing GEI and LI schemes, the
increase of contributions can be divided into two steps. The first step is to increase
the ratios of insured wage to gross wage of insured persons. At the present stage,
the ratio of GEI is about 0.53 and that of LI is about 0.54 (see Table 8.8). Therefore, if
these ratios can be raised up to 1.00 or 100%, then the benefits of GEI will increase
89% and those of LI will increase 85%. We can increase these ratios by one step or
several steps. In LI the ratios of many insured persons in the retiring group are
already as high as 1.0 or 100% in the author's research. So it is not impossible to
raise this ratio of all other groups to this level. At present the ceiling of LI
contributions is NT$14,400, all wages over this ceiling do not need to pay
contributions any more. As benefits are closely contribution-related, to increase or to
phase out this ceiling is another way to increase the contributions of LI.
Moreover, the gross contribution rate of LI (including the rate of industrial injury) is
8.2%-11.0% and that of GEI is 9% of insured wage, comparing to those of
industrialised countries, e.g., 19.5% in UK, 50.7% in France, 31.3% in West Germany,
18.9% in USA, 30.4% in Sweden and 20.5% in Japan, these rates are quite low. It is
possible to increase these rates to a somewhat higher level. As the sharing of
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contributions is mainly borne by employers, 80% in LI and 65% in GEI, the remaining
20% and 35% are borne by employees, and the government only subsidize the
administration cost. So it is not surprising that any form of increase of contribution
will cause the opposition of employers. For this reason, the increase of contributions
should be accompanied by a revision of the sharing rate of contribution between
employers and employees.
It is true that in the long run the increased burden on employers might be shifted
to employees by delaying the increase or increasing less for their wages or shifted
from producers (including both employers and employees) to consumers by raising
the price. The employers (or employees) might in fact not bear the burden. However,
the employers cannot raise the price arbitrarily only if the demand elasticity of their
product allows it. Whether employers can raise the price or not, there is not much
influence on employees because in most cases the employees will not consume their
own product very much. Even if the employers want to shift the burden to their
employees, it is only possible for them to shift it to higher income employees whose
incomes are over minimum wage. The low income employees whose incomes are
near minimum wage will be benefited by higher retirement payments in the future. Of
course, a more fundamental and better way is simultaneously to accompany an
increase in the productivity of workers and enterprises to increase their wages and
gains, and then the higher wage will in turn increase the amount of contributions and
tax revenue, but it will need a longer time to achieve.
As mentioned above, the existing earnings-related systems have the advantage to
achieve the criteria of 'vertical equity' and 'outcome horizontal equity' in both
contributions and benefits aspects, so the increase of benefit had better also improve
the criteria of 'outcome horizontal equity' and 'adequacy'. As 'risk-pooling' is the main
principle of social insurance, it is possible only if the coverage is also compulsory or
there will be a reverse effect or negative selection. Besides, if we want to achieve the
objective of income redistribution simultaneously, the contributions of social insurance
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had better be earnings-related, ie, the high income earners pay more contributions.
When the contributions of insured persons are closely earnings-related, then the
benefits should also be earnings-related in order to fulfil the criterion of 'vertical
equity', but this earnings-relatedness should also be only loosely related in order to
give some room for 'redistribution' or radically to set a 'minimum income guarantee'
for all, then the criterion of 'adequacy' can be also achieved.
2) Due to ubiquitous inflation in modern money economy and the uncertainty of
life span from the individual point of view, a pension scheme is a better provision
than a lump sum scheme to protect old age in an industrialised society. However, it
will be a big policy-decision to change the existing lump sum old age provision into a
pension one in Taiwan. Normally the existing lump sum old age provisions, both in
GEI and in LI, are funded systems. But due to the characteristic of comprehensiveness
and the lack of independent accounts for different contingencies, the reserves for old
age are transferred to other contingencies such as sickness and injury. So the old age
contributions are generally not fully funded. As the contribution rates of both GEI and
LI are not fully actuarial, the insurance of GEI has been in deficit since 1966, 8 years
after the establishment of the scheme. In 1984, in GEI the rate needed for the actual
benefit expenditure should be 11.57% of insured wage, but the actual contribution rate
was only 9.0%. As for LI, its annual insurance account has also been in the red since
1986. Even including employers' contributions for industrial contingencies, in 1984 the
actual gross average contribution rate was only 8.8% of insured wage, its needed rate
was as high as 8.2%. There was only 0.6% for old age reserve (see Table 9.1). But
after 1986, because the balance became red, so the needed rate was certainly over
8.8%. Under this circumstance, it is explicitly impossible to establish a new pension
scheme based on the past old reserve any more. As the balance has been red in both
GEI and LI, so the financing methods of both GEI and LI are in fact an assessment or
pay-as-you-go though they are still nominally funded.
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Table 9.1 Contribution rates of Social Insurance in Taiwan, 1984
Contribution Rate 1 GEI |
1 1
LI
Actual ordinary contribution rate 1 9-0 | 8.0
Actual industrial contribution rate(0.2-3.0)
1 1
0.8
Needed contribution rate (gross) 1 11.57 |
1 1
8.20
|Sickness and Injury 1 4.23 | 5.08






|Disability | 0.12 | 0.22
|01d Age j 5.03 | 1.14
Benefits j Death | 0.70 | 0.73
in |Deaths of Dependants | 0.50 | 0.32







Administration | 0.30 | *
Others | 0.06 |
Note: * = subsidised by government at 5.5% of total contributions.
Sources: 1)CTC, 1985:102
2)Self-calculation
As there is no, or nearly no, reserve fund left in both GEI and LI, so newly
introduced pension schemes would in fact not be different from any other newly
established schemes even for insured persons who have insured for several decades.
In theory there should be a possibility to reform or to create a new pension scheme
based on either the funding principle or the pay-as-you-go principle. But in practice it
is impossible and also unfair to require most insured persons, especially the older
insured persons, to re-establish a new funded pension scheme. Therefore, unless the
exhausted old age reserve can be re-established, it is impossible to establish a
full-funded retirement payment, either a lump sum payment or a pension, any more.
As I cannot see any possibility of re-establishing this huge reserve, I would expect
that the transformation or the new establishment of the pension schemes for both GEI
and LI would have to be based on only the pay-as-you-go principle.
Although social insurance pensions are financed by pay-as-you-go method, there
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will be no significant change in their rank to achieve their original criteria. However as
we have mentioned in chapter 2, the financial burden of contribution rates (or social
security tax if the scheme is compulsory and universal) for the contributors to finance
a pay-as-you-go scheme is determined by the following two factors: first, the ratio of
earners (ie, employed persons) to pensioners and, second, the ratio of pension to net
earnings (ie, current gross earnings of earners after deducting social insurance
pension contribution). Generally, for the latter factor, in a democratic society because
the level of benefit always faces a pressure to push up, so it is to be expected that
the benefit level will keep growing or at least to keep steady. But for the former
factor, we expect that the proportion of elderly persons in Taiwan will increase from
5% at present to 15% and more in three to four decades' time. That is, the ratio of
earners to pensioners will change greatly during this three to four decades. According
to a tabular form presented by Prof. Kaim-Caudle (see Table 2.2), we can see that the
contribution rate will greatly increase in the future.
Excluding the insured persons of health insurance schemes, in 1984 the number of
insured persons for old age benefit was about 4,694 thousand. As for the number of
retirees, in the same year that of GEI was 6,631 or 7,206 if including dismissals; and
that of LI was 19,630. So the retirement rate of these two main schemes was about
0.65% of the total insured persons. Suppose this retirement rate was also applicable
to Ml and other minor schemes, then the total retirees from the total insured persons
of all schemes would be 30.5 thousand. Therefore, we would get the ratio of
contributors to pensioners as 154:1 (4,694:30.5) if the pension scheme had been in
force in 1984. This ratio was very large because only the retirees in 1984 were
included. But if the pension scheme could compulsorily cover all employed persons
and provide pensions to all old people aged 65 years and over (the number of retirees
aged 65 and over is not available), then the ratio of earners to pensioners would still
be 8.8:1 in 1984 and 8.5:1 in 1985 (see Table 9.2). When the replacement ratio, the
ratio of pensions to net earnings, was also known or decided, then the contribution
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rate could also be decided. According to Table 2.2, if the ratio of earners to
pensioners is 8:1, and the replacement ratio is 1/3, then the contribution rate will be
4.0%.
The rate of employed persons (including military servants) in the population aged
between 15 and 64 years was about 59.9% in 1984 and 59.3% in 1985. Let us
suppose the same labour participation rate (including self-employed) will be about
60% in the coming decades, then we can calculate employed persons as Table 9.2
according to the low and the medium population projections made by CEPD. Assuming
'pensioners' will cover all old people, the ratios of earners to pensioners can also be
calculated as Table 9.2. They will be 5.1 in 2000 and about 3.1 in 2020 and about 2.0
in 2030, or more precisely, 3.0 in 2022 and 2.3 in 2027 in which period the population
will reach ZPG.
Table 9.2 The Ratio of Earners to Pensioners in Taiwan
year 15 -64 |employed persons| 65+ ratio
of 1 1








L & M low
1
medium
1984 13 276 1 8 132 1 922 8.8 : 1
1985 13 562 1 8 264 1 973 8.5 : 1
1990 13 520 1 13 520 1 6 112 | 8 112 | 1 233 6.6 : 1
1995 14 628 1 14 628 1 8 777 | 8 777 | 1 572 5.6 : 1
2000 15 602 1 15 602 1 9 361 | 9 361 | 1 844 5.1 : 1
2005 16 310 1 16 347 1 9 786 j 9 808 | 2 085 4.7 : l| 4.7 : 1
2010 16 821 1 16 961 1 io 093 | 10 177 | 2 289 4.4 : l| 4.4 : 1
2015 17 064 1 17 336 1 io 237 | 10 402 | 2 576 4.0 : 1| 4.0 : 1
2020 16 802 1 17 213 1 io 081 | 10 328 | 3 258 3.1 : l| 3.2 : 1
2025 16 326 1 16 875 1 9 796 j 10 125 | 3 986 2.5 : l| 2.5 : 1
2030 15 674 1 16 365 1 9 404 | 9 819 | 4 642 2.0 : l| 2.1 : 1
Note: Employed persons including military servants.
Source: Self-calculation (number in thousand)
From this very rough estimation, we can see that the ratio of earners to
pensioners in Taiwan will change very greatly in the coming decades. In order to
relieve the contribution burden of the next generation, one of the feasible ways to
achieve this object is to adopt a semi-funded and semi-pay-as-you-go policy. That is,
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the contribution should be high enough to have half of the contributions remaining to
finance the existing benefit expenditure, and another half to provide reserve for future
benefits. Or we may have another option, just as the British system has done,
formally to set up two separate old age benefits: the flat rate pension financed by
pay-as-you-go methods and earnings-related pension financed by funded
earnings-related contributions. If a pure pay-as-you-go pension is to be established
now, then, because the number of pensioners that employed persons in this
generation have to support is quite small, the contributors are thus more able to and
should contribute more, in order to aid the funding of future pension. This would also
equalise the financial burden between generations. Finally, as the labour participation
rate has a close relation with the number of employed persons, so it also has a close
relation with the ratio of earners to pensioners. We can improve this rate in several
ways such as raising the retirement age to reduce the number of pensioners or to
provide more social services to help or to release more labour into the labour market
to increase the number of employed persons.
In order to get a rough idea about the cost or the possible contribution rate in
Taiwan if a pay-as-you-go pension is going to be in force in the near future, we need
to suppose that 1)average wage as net earnings, 2)subsistence level as minimum
pension level and 3)average consumption expenditure as maximum pension level.
According to the actual statistics of Taiwan, in 1984 the average wage was NT$13,698
(see Table 8.8) and average consumption expenditure per head was NT$4,341 (see
Table 7.1), so the maximum pension level would be 1/3. Because the official
subsistence level is prescribed as 40% of average consumption expenditure per head,
so the minimum pension level could be only 1/8. If we decide to take the level of
average consumption expenditure as the level of pension, then the replacement ratio
will be 1/(3.16). ie, roughly 1/3. As the current ratio of earners to pensioners was
about 9-1, according to Table 2.2, so the contribution rate would be 3.6%. But if we
decide to take the subsistence level as pension level, by the same ratio of earners to
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pensioners, then the contribution rate would be only 1.4%. But when the population
approaches to the ZPG state in the future, because its ratio of earners to pensioners
is about 3-1, so its contribution rate will be 4% at subsistence level (ie, when
replacement ratio is 1/8) and 10% at average consumption level (ie, when replacement
ratio is 1/3).
As the description above indicates, because the structure of population in Taiwan
is still quite young, so it will be very cheap to establish a pay-as-you-go pension at
its inception. But it will be very heavy to finance it within several decades. In addition
with the financing of other benefits such as the health service, maternity, disability,
unemployment and death, the total social security tax will be very high. Referring to
the experience of Britain, this total cost could be at least a double of the pensions.
Moreover, earners also have to pay general tax, so the total tax burden of income tax
and contribution will be extremely high. We expect that a high rate of tax will
influence the behaviour of tax-payers. For example, tax-payers may react to an
increase in the tax rate in many ways just depending on what objectives they want to
maintain or to achieve. If they want to maintain the same level of consumption, they
may save less. If they want to maintain the same level of other savings, they may
consume less. Or they may work harder and longer in order to maintain the same
level of consumption and savings. In the most inactive case they may just consume
and save less. However, we are quite sure that people will save less if the old age
pension is very generous. Furthermore, we can even pursue the relationship between
taxation and incentives (see Figure 2.4). Because higher tax means less reward for
one's efforts, so, for higher income earners, there could be a 'substitution effect', ie,
they will work less in order to avoid paying more tax and opt for more leisure; but for
low income earners, they could have an 'income effect', ie, they will work harder or
longer in order to earn more to maintain their necessary living standard.
Lastly, the introduction of a pension scheme must also be accompanied by a
survivors' scheme, or it will not be able to protect the risk of the early death of a
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pensioner because many pensioners might still have their dependants (generally
spouses). Normally the survivor's pension is not necessarily as high as a full-rate
pension. 60% of a full-rate pension might be adequate.
3) Another approach to improve the existing systems is to extend the coverage of
insured persons. Though the improvement in this aspect does not directly indicate in
Table 2.4, there is a great contribution to improve the criterion of 'administrative
efficiency', because the extension of coverage will be helpful to achieve the principle
of 'the minimum scale of economy'. Furthermore, a wider coverage would be also
good for the improvement of the principle of 'income redistribution' or 'risk pooling'.
This would be good for both adequacy and equity in some degree. As the coverage of
GEI is restricted to only government employees and that of Ml is restricted to only
military servants, this discussion will focus only on LI. By the title, the coverage of LI
should include all people in the labour force. At least it should include all employed
persons who are in the labour force. In fact it is not the case. Firstly, all employed
persons who are employed by a firm employing less than 5 persons are not
compulsorily included in this system. Its reason is that the administrative cost will be
too high if the system includes those small business units. Especially, the cost of the
contribution collection will be very high.
Secondly, both scholars, officials and legislators think that employers, even the
self-employed, are well-off enough to provide their own provision for their old age.
Government does not need to interfere with them. They also think that there will be
a reverse distribution from the poor to the rich if the system includes comparatively
well-off employers. So not only all employers but most self-employed are excluded
from the scheme. Actually the distribution of income is quite different between the
labour market and the social insurance system. In the labour market, the distribution
of income is closely related to one's effort and quality of employment; but in the
social insurance system, the distribution of benefits, both in cash and in kind, is
mainly related to the occurance of contingencies or one's misfortune. Normally, as
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effort should be encouraged positively and misfortune should be relieved mutually, so
unless we can prove that the contingency risk of employers is higher than employees,
we cannot conclude that there is a reverse distribution in the social insurance system.
Therefore, the exclusion of employers and the self-employed is un-justified.
On the other hand, nowadays both scholars and government officers also advocate
that the long-term policy of our country should be to establish a universal social
insurance scheme. But if there is any exclusion of specified groups of people, it will
never be possible to be universal. So the reason to exclude employers and
self-employed and the reason to advocate a universal insurance scheme are explicitly
contradictory. Since there is no evidence to prove that the contingency risk of
employers is certainly higher than employees, there is no reason to exclude employers
and the self-employed from LI. From 1985 on, since the self-employed such as
farmers were allowed to join LI, there is no reason to reject the self-employed in
other industries. Finally, if we have no reason to exclude the self-employed, we also
have no reason to exclude small employers because there is not much difference
between them. As we have mentioned before, 98% of enterprises in Taiwan are of
medium and small scale, the number of both enterprises and employers is very large,
so if the coverage of LI can be extended from employees to the self-employed, and
then from the self-employed to small employers, then the coverage will be greatly
enlarged.
Thirdly, because there is a legislation of minimum wage in Taiwan, so there is no
problem of exclusion due to low pay. Nevertheless, there is a great difficulty in
including unpaid domestic (family) workers. Not only is the cost of the contribution
collection very high, but also the ability to pay the contribution cannot be guaranteed.
The possibility of them joining an insurance scheme is hardly mentioned or discussed.
However, in theory it could be already beyond the capacity of social insurance to deal
with this group of people. For them, an all-universal allowance could be the better
provision.
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4)ln this case the meaning of 'administrative efficiency' is the same as
'administrative simplicity' and 'administrative economy'. As mentioned in chapter 2,
there are two principles which can be applied to achieve this objective, ie, 'the
minimum scale of economy' and 'the division of labour'. We will discuss this objective
or criterion based on these two principles. By 1986 there were about 12 acts of
social insurance in Taiwan. They are:
1. Government Employees' Insurance (GEI, 1958)
2. Retired Government Employees' Insurance (RGEI, 1964)
3. Insurance for Teaching and Administrative Staff of Private Schools
(ITASPS, 1980)
4. Insurance for Retired Teaching and Administrative Staff of Private
Schools (IRTASPS, 1984)
5. Health Insurance for Government Employees' Dependants (HIGED,
1982)
6. Health Insurance for Retired Government Employees (HIRGE, 1985)
7. Health Insurance for Spouses of Retired Government Employees
(HISRGE, 1985)
8. Health Insurance for Retired Teaching and Administrative Staff of
Private Schools (HIRTASPS, 1986)
9. Health Insurance for Spouses of Retired Teaching and
Administrative Staff of Private Schools (HISRTASPS, 1986)
10. Labour Insurance (LI, 1950)
11. Health Insurance for Farmers (HIF, 1985)
12. Military Insurance (Ml, 1953)
The schemes NOs 2-9 are eight subordinate schemes administered by GEI and NO
11 is administered by LI. So there are only three insurers in Taiwan. However, the
contingencies covered by these three insurers are quite similar. As Taiwan is not a
very large political unit, even if all existing insured persons are included into one
insured group, the total number would only be about 5.8 million persons in 1986. It is
not larger than the population of Hong Kong. Compared to the total population of
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Taiwan, this figure is not very large. In social insurance if the risk of contingencies is
to be pooled, then not only must its coverage be compulsory but also its number of
insured persons must be reasonably large. But the operation of social insurance in
Taiwan contradicts both these two requirements. Firstly, the limited number of insured
persons are divided into three separate systems so the numbers of each insurance are
much less than the total number. Secondly, except NOs 3 and 5, all minor schemes in
GEI are optional, not compulsory. They are no more than a mix of social welfare and
commercial insurance, not a typical social insurance. All these facts demonstrate that
the conditions of existing social insurance schemes are contradictory with the first
principle, 'the minimum scale of economy'.
As for the second principle, 'the division of labour7 or 'the division of
administration', there are also many problems. At first, the existing social insurance
systems in Taiwan, both GEI and LI, provide benefits both in cash and in kind. The
character of these two types of benefits are so different, each insurance has to divide
its staff into at least two groups to manage the different types of benefits. From the
point of the whole society, it is a waste to employ so many groups of staff to
undertake a certain small amount of work. If they had been integrated as a unified
single system, less workers would be required. So administration costs also could be
less. Moreover, 'the division of labour' will not reduce the number of insured persons
in existing systems because the insured persons of these two types of benefits are
the same in LI and GEI, nor increase the number of staff because there are already
two groups of staff in each system to manage these two different types of benefits.
So this second principle does not contradict with the first one, 'the minimum scale of
economy'.
Moreover, only after the division of benefits in cash and benefits in kind is carried
out, then health services can be provided for the retired under a newly established
universal health insurance which will include ail groups of people, because, under the
existing comprehensive insurance system, there is really no legal status for the retired
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to join LI only for health service at all. However, it is also financially impractical to
establish a new independent health insurance for only the retired due to its extremely
high costs. Only a universal health insurance scheme can solve this problem and
avoid many abuses from non-insured persons. Of course, we still have to face the
problem of exclusion caused by the inability to contribute.
In social insurance another way to reduce waste is to prevent the abuse of the
systems. As the benefits of social insurance are certainly contingencies-related, an
insured person can abuse the system only through pretending to commit a
contingency. Generally the incidence of any contingency should be involuntary. Only
contingencies which can be made to occur on purpose can be abused. Checking the
contingencies of social insurance, maternity, disability, old age and death are very
definite. It is not easy nor is it desirable for people to commit such contingencies. So
there will seldom be abuse with these contingencies. Only the contingencies of
unemployment and sickness can be made to happen voluntarily or happen
involuntarily. So mainly these two contingencies are likely to be abused.
However, for these two contingencies, in many western welfare states such as as
Britain, because their retirement ages are generally identical to their conventional
definition of old age, so the old age pensioners are not entitled to unemployment
benefit and sickness benefit any more even if they are in employment. But in Taiwan
because its employees (both in GEI and LI in occupational schemes) are allowed to
retire voluntarily after 25 year's service, so many retirees may undertake a new job
and take part in a new social security secheme without losing their former retirement
benefits. So these two contingencies need to be discussed in some length in Taiwan.
Firstly, we discuss the contingency of unemployment. Nowadays employment is
still an important source of income for many elderly people. Due to the progress of
technology and the rising of productivity, unemployment has been an inevitable event
in modern industrialised societies for all working people, not only for the elderly. So
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involuntary unemployment is really a misfortune, but voluntary unemployment could
be through personal shortcomings or moral failings. For this reason it has been a
general principle that only involuntarily unemployed persons are entitled to
unemployment benefits. But in the case of a high rate of and long term of
unemployment, for example, like in Britain nowadays, the distinction between voluntary
unemployment and involuntary unemployment has become meaningless because all
unemployed persons may declare that they are involuntary so. However, the
government cannot create so many jobs to place them.
When unemployment is a prolonged situation, the existing assistance which aims
at the consumption side will be unable to tackle this problem successfully. It could
be an effective way if the assistance can be transferred from the consumption side to
the investment side, ie, to require all long-term unemployed persons to receive
occupational training as Beveridge recommended and pay them benefits equal to a
very high percentage of the average wage of the industries that they intend to
participate in. The training centres or schools shall give them strict and intensive
training in high technology as long as they need it. But if the achievement of their
training is not satisfactory, they will be dismissed from the centres or schools. By this
way, the state might spend several times' more than normal unemployment
expenditure in the short term, but both the state and unemployed persons will benefit
in the long term. Because whenever the trained unemployed persons are re-employed
again, they will be high income earners, so they will be able to pay more tax and
contributions to the state. It is also true that technology in a modern industrialised
society is more advanced than before that not only is its training cost very high but
also more difficult for many old or low educated unemployed persons to learn. If the
training needs more than one year to complete, then there will be another risk that
the demand of the technology could have changed when the training is finished.
Secondly, as for sickness, it is more complicated than unemployment. Professor
Kaim-Caudle has given a good description about sickness:
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Sickness is not a state which can be easily defined or measured.
Neither its beginning nor its end can be precisely determined. There is a
continuum with perfect health at one end and excruciatingly painful and
completely disabling sickness at the other. The great majority of the
population are at any one time somewhat between these two extremes.
Moreover, the physical and mental state which individuals accept as
normal vary widely and to some extent influence the type of work they
are willing and able to undertake. Most people continue working even if
their state of health falls somewhat below what is their norm, and
everybody has to give up working at some level of ill-health, but there
is an indeterminate area between these two states (1973: 104).
Due to the nature of sickness, abuse could happen in case of slight illness or even
malingering. For the elderly, they are generally weaker and more unhealthy than the
younger people, so it is more difficult to judge if they are malingering or not. In
Taiwan the number of old employed persons is very small (most working old people
are self-employed), the chance for them to abuse the social insurance system to
claim sickness benefits is very rare. Furthermore, because there is no universal health
insurance for the majority of old people yet, so there is also no chance for them to
abuse the health insurance system either.
9.6. Social Assistance
As mentioned in section 3, compared to social insurance and universal allowance,
in benefit aspect social assistance can achieve the first rank in the criteria of 'vertical
equity' and 'outcome horizontal equity'. In theory it will be able to achieve the
additional criteria of 'means horizontal equity','economic efficiency' and 'administrative
efficiency' in financing aspect if the scheme is financed by flat rate tax and to achieve
the criteria of 'vertical equity', 'outcome horizontal equity' and 'adequacy' in financing
aspect if the scheme is financed by progressive or proportional tax. But in practive
only the latter can be achieved because in most cases social assistance is financed by
progressive tax.
In Taiwan social assistance includes living assistance, medical subsidy, personal
accident assistance and calamity assistance. They are the provisions for all people, not
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only for the elderly. As described in chapter 7, the provisions of social assistance are
not very satisfactory. Compared to other provisions of social security, the most
outstanding element of social assistance is its means-test. We also know that the
most undesirable side effects of the means-test are disincentive and stigma. In theory
there is no way to avoid means-test to attain access to the benefits of social
assistance, or it is not social assistance any more. However, the effects of
disincentive and stigma can be minimised by using a most generous means test or
setting a minimum wage, Australia and New Zealand are good examples of this. But
this policy can be feasible only in relatively affluent countries with very small
populations. For countries with large populations, it will be extremely expensive.
Due to the effect of stigmatising in social assistance, no matter how little it is, it
certainly will make this provision less popular in the field of social security. For this
reason, it will be quite easy to encourage people to utilise this provision as the last
resort. The available effective way to strengthen this policy is to keep the level of
assistance not more than the levels of all other benefits in the field of social security.
When the level of social assistance is the lowest one in the field of social security,
people will consider this provision as the last resort.
The main shortcoming of social assistance is that both its means test and benefit
are too severe. So the direction of its reform is to reduce its degree of severity. There
are at least two ways which can be applied to reduce its severity. Firstly, the severity
of the means-test can be reduced by phasing out the zero income test. As described
in chapter 7, the criteria of means-test is the official subsistence level which is
referring to the actual subsistence level but not certainly equal to it. Because in
theory the actual subsistence level should be 40% of average consumption
expenditure in Taipei City or 1/3 of average family income per head in Taiwan
Province and Kaohsiung City, so they should be NT$2,437 in Taipei City, NT$2,108 in
Kaohsiung City and NT$1,718 in Taiwan Province. But in practice the official
subsistence level was set at NT$2,100 in Taipei City, NT$2,000 in Kaohsiung City and
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NT$1,950 in Taiwan Province. Only those families with a gross income of not more
than this official subsistence level can qualify as families in poverty. They are at least
entitled to free medical care and some irregular cash assistance. However, only those
families without any income at all, ie, those families who can pass the zero income
test, are entitled to regular cash assistance. Furthermore, the actual assistance level is
prescribed in a level much lower even than the official subsistence level. They are
NT$1,800 for head of household and only NT$1,000 for each subsequent members in
Taipei City, NT$1,200 for all persons in a qualified household in Kaohsiung City and
Taiwan Province. So the actual assistance level is only about 60% of the official
subsistence level.
Explicitly, under this zero income test, there will be great frustration for those
qualified poor families which have just only a little bit of income. If their income is
less than 60% of the actual assistance level, then their income will be less than those
who originally have no income after they receive an assistance. So the most urgent
reform is to phase out this zero income test and give assistance to all people whose
income is less than official or actual subsistence level in order to guarantee them an
income floor at the level of official or actual subsistence income.
Secondly, the other way to reform social assistance is to improve the level of
actual assistance. Although it is not an adequate way to increase the assistance level
unconditionally, it would be very safe that, as long as the assistance level is not
higher than the level of other provisions of social security, any level of increase
should be allowable. The level of social assistance can be increased through several
steps. At first, it is to increase the actual assistance level to the official subsistence
level. After this objective has been achieved, the next step is to match the official
subsistence level to the actual subsistence level if it is higher. And, lastly, it is to
improve the actual subsistence level by increasing the percentage from 40% to 50%
or even 60% of average consumption expenditure.
307
Thirdly, however, no matter how favourable the assistance benefit is, it cannot
avoid being stigmatised by its test. This is quite in contradiction of the tradition of
Chinese culture. There is a high value of respect for or even honour for the elderly in
Chinese culture. In a culture of respecting old people, social assistance with a
stigmatising effect is particularly not an adequate provision for the elderly in Chinese
society. Before an universal old age benefit can be available, it will be acceptable to
offer the elderly who are over a given age, eg, 70, a better or preferential rate of
assistance. There will be no great financial difficulty for prosperous Taiwan, because
her population is still very young.
Besides benefits in cash, benefits in kind are also very important in the field of
social assistance. The first important type of benefit in kind is medical care (mainly
inpatient service), the other one is homes or houses for orphans and old people. All
qualified poor people are entitled to free medical care, but not certainly almshouses or
old people's homes. For orphans, they are definitely entitled to orphans' homes
without ambiguity. But for the elderly, only those who can pass both means test and
children test are allowed to enter an almshouse or old people's home. That is, only
old poor people without children can possibly pass those two tests and move into old
people's homes. So we will focus our discussion of benefit in kind on only old
people's homes.
Generally, even in old people's homes in big cities such as Taipei City, we find
conditions are not satisfactory. According to Table 7.4, except veterans' homes, the
total capacity of old people's homes is only about 10.3 thousand places. According to
the estimation in chapter 6, the number of old single people aged 65 and over was
about 38.1 to 43.7 thousand in 1984. If a half of them were ordinary single old people,
then their number would be about 19 to 22 thousand persons. If all ordinary single old
people were qualified to move into those homes, those places would be far behind
the needs. Actually only 75.9% of places were occupied in 1984. The low rate of
utilisation of old people's homes demonstrates not only that the tests are too strict
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but their conditions are not satisfactory.
As long as old people's homes are still a part of social assistance, its side effect is
certainly the same as that of cash benefit. But, the conditions of benefit in kind are
more severe. In cash benefit, only means test is applied; but in the in-kind benefit of
'old people's home', apart from means test, a children test is also applied in order to
narrow the coverage. So the reform of in-kind 'home' benefit could mainly emphasize
how to enlarge its coverage and to improve the standard of old people's homes. As
the entrance into old people's home is subject to two or three tests: means test,
children test and/or age test. So the extension of coverage can also be made through
these three paths.
Firstly, as the means test for the entitlement to old people's home is restricted to
only those who are entitled to regular cash assistance, ie, the first group of poor
persons or families without any income, so the direction to extend its coverage is
from the first group to the second group which with income less than 2/3 of official
subsistence level, and then from the second group to the third group with income
less than official subsistence level. Secondly, as for the children test, elderly people
with children are officially excluded from old people's homes. Only single persons and
the married persons who have no child are possibly entitled to old people's homes. So
the direction to extend its coverage is to include the old parents whose children are
unable to support them owing to disability, illness, unemployment and even low
income. Of course, those whose children are permanently and totally disabled should
have the first priority. Thirdly, the criteria of age test is normally 60 years old. But
because in one's calendar 'old age' is not certainly matched with one's biological or
psychological 'old age', many people might have been disabled or 'old' well before
they are 60 years, so there must be some special provisions allowing a lowering of
this age.
From much evidence, the social assistance provision of old people's homes in
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Taiwan has many problems and is far from satisfactory. Firstly, for the sake of
economy, the size of old people's homes are always very large. For example, the
number of residents of veteran homes are always several thousand, even the number
of the ordinary public old people's homes amounts to several hundred. In turn the
large scale of old people's homes certainly means that they have to be established in
a new developing area and are far from their residents' old community. This sudden
change of living environment also involves a change in their social life. It is not easy
for old people to adjust themselves to a new life. Many old single persons refused to
move into old people's home though they were qualified. Therefore, the policies to
tackle these problems, besides improving their facilities, was to reduce the scale of
homes and to locate them within the original community. Only in small scale old
people's homes can the administration or management easily meet the individual
needs of the old; and only if an old people's home is located in the original
community, is it easy for old people to adjust their lives.
Lastly, as we want to improve the assistance benefit both in cash and in kind
simultaneously, we must have another policy to keep the pace of these two benefits
parallel and harmonious. It will be best if we can achieve a state of indifference
between benefit in cash and benefit in kind. That is, we do not provide any incentive
to encourage old people to opt for benefit in cash or benefit in kind. The option
should be totally based on the real interest of the elderly.
The utilisation rate of old people's homes was only about 76% in 1984, ie, only
76% of the places of old people's homes were occupied. This low occupation rate
demonstrated that the means-test should be more generous by allowing its applicants
to have a certain amount of property or regular income. A more generous means-test
might let more applicants be qualified to move into old people's homes. Under this
circumstance the government would also have to invest more and spend more in the
short term. But in the long-term this generosity will benefit both old people's homes
and even government in many aspects: 1)the quality of life of old people's homes will
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be improved by having more well-off residents; 2)as well-off single persons do not
have legal heirs for their resources, the old people's home they live in should have
the first priority to be the heir, so their resources will be a big source of revenue for
old people's homes; this would not only improve the financial situation of old people's
homes but also relieve the financial burden on government; 3)as there is a close
relationship between education attachment and earning ability, better-off residents
certainly means better-educated residents. In theory the demands of better-educated
residents will initiate a new ideal for old people's homes.
9.7. Occupational Schemes
Theoretically, in this thesis the traditional occupational schemes are classified as
secondary social insurance, so the options of criteria (which are) applied to (primary)
social insurance can also be applied to occupational schemes. But, practically, in
Taiwan occupational schemes are some kind of mixture of social insurance,
sub-universal schemes and provident fund, they also have the same function and
limitation, generally, there are not many problems in the public occupational schemes
because they have not only a general revenue as their source of financing but an
option of lump sum and pension in types of payments. But for the private ones, they
will confront many problems because their financing is based on the contributions of
their thousands of employers and their paying ability is not always stable and
guaranteed. So the discussion of the reform of occupational schemes will focus on
only private ones.
There are several problems in private occupational schemes. Firstly, the schemes
are contributed to only by employers, so the paying ability of employers is the vital
factor of the schemes. As mentioned in chapter 5, 98% of enterprises in Taiwan are of
medium and small scale. Due to the huge number of enterprises, its greatest merit for
the economy is that its efficiency will be very high because of the strong competition.
On the other hand, its most serious weakness is that the life-span of each enterprise
will be very unstable. No enterprise is able to guarantee to provide a long-term
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provision for its employees. And it is not only unreasonable but impossible to request
individual enterprises to provide such provisions. That is beyond the ability of
employers unless the employer is government. This is the reason why there were
occupational pension schemes for only government employees and military servants
in the first stage. The Labour Standard Law which requires employers to provide
occupational payments formally came into force in 1985 though its promulgation was
in 1984. Because the contributions of occupational schemes are certainly the costs of
productions, so if the level of occupational benefits is very high, either in lump sum or
in pension, it finally will greatly reduce the profits of employers and will be a
disincentive for employers to invest in the country. They will invest abroad where the
costs are lower because the foreign exchange nowadays is normally free. That is just
like a Chinese proverb, "to kill the hen to take the eggs". In order to overcome these
difficulties, not only must the contribution rate be reasonably low, but a new
administration, ie, an independent central reserve fund, must be set up. All employers'
contributions are paid to this reserve, and future benefits are also guaranteed by this
reserve. If so, the schemes in fact are no more than a provident fund or a full-funded
social insurance. Then, the shortcomings of a provident fund or funded social
insurance such as the erosion of inflation and sometimes the inefficiency in the
investment of the huge fund cannot be avoided.
In theory those newly established private occupational schemes have the same
coverage as LI. But, in practice, at the inception only the enterprises of comparatively
large scale are required to establish their occupational provisions, so their coverage is
much smaller than that of LI. Although it is welcome to have a new scheme to
provide one more source of income for the LI retirees in the future, however, it is an
administrative waste to establish another new separate agency to administer this
similar scheme. It could be better just to require employers to pay their occupational
contributions to the existing social insurance scheme, LI. And then require LI to
fully-fund these contributions and to increase the same amount of old age payments
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for employees. It will be more simple, safer and even more efficient than to trust
another new agency.
As 'occupational scheme' is a new title of old age provision, it could be a radical
reform to adopt a new non-insurance principle to create a new measure to provide a
new form of old age benefits by this title. This new scheme could be and had better
be based on economic principles. Generally there are four economic productive
factors: land, capital, labour and management. All economic income should be earned
through these four sources. In industrialised countries, most employees earn their
income through 'labouT when they are of working age until they are old and retired.
At present, because all provisions of social security are based on only one productive
factor, 'labour', so their policy is to request employers to provide retirement payments
to their retirees based on the hypotheses of 'deferred wage' and 'human capital
depreciation'. This will cause a difficulty in estimating labour cost in economic
activities. So we suggest a new policy to establish a new old age provision based on
the other economic productive factors such as 'capital' for occupational schemes.
Under such a new policy, there are several ways in which one might achieve this
aim: 1)all employers with capital up to a given level are required to sell a certain
percentage of their company's share or stock annually to any employees with union
membership. In order to encourage competition, employees can be allowed to buy the
stock from other companies if they think those companies are gainful; or 2)those
employers may be required to offer a given amount of their own companies' stock to
their employees annually as part of their wages or bonus up to a given level, and no
option for employees; or 3)they (employers) may be required to provide a given higher
amount of stock when their employees retire. The choice of these three options
should be up to employers. According to a report in a newspaper (CDN), in Taiwan
more than 70% of capital of a very successful high technology computer enterprise
was distributed to its own employees. Unfortunately, the percentage of employees
who are the share-holders is not known. However, this evidence demonstrates that
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this proposal is feasible. Further research on this issue would be worthwhile.
Explicitly, the effects of these three measures are quite different. For the first
measure, it is highly competitive for both employers and employees. Because the
current value of stock is clearly related to the efficiency or profitability of its company,
so this measure will give a great advantage to the stock-holders with economic and
commercial knowledge, but will be a great risk for those without. The merit of the
second measure is that it can improve the solidarity or industrial relationship between
employers and employees, but its shortcomings is that the labour mobility will be
greatly reduced. The third measure is in fact similar to existing lump sum cash
payments, so does its shortcoming. We require employers to pay lump sum payments
in form of stock in order to avoid the risk of inflation. But it will be a great
disadvantage for those who always change their jobs. That is, there is also an effect
to deter labour mobility.
Although the management of stock is still based on the existing principle of stock
market, in order to guarantee stock as a source of old age provision, we may legally
require that all employees must join a trade union based on their stock-holding record
and their amount should be proportional to their length of employment, or a
certificate from their employers proving that they will have a legal amount of stock
when they retire is required. Straightforwardly, the aim of this policy is to help
people to transfer their source of income from 'labour' to 'capital' before they retire.
Generally, there are many merits in this new policy. Firstly, because this device does
not violate the principles of economy, so it will not cause any side effect such as
disincentive to work or to save. Secondly, as the value of stock will appreciate when
the business or economy is growing, so the problem of inflation of funded scheme
and the uncertainty of financial burden of pay-as-you-go scheme can be avoided in a
stock-distribution scheme. Thirdly, for employees there is a greater degree of freedom
(or more options of choice) in a stock-distribution scheme than in a trsditional
occupational scheme. Fourthly, as many employees may also hold the shares of their
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employer's company, so an employee will be actually at the same time an employer.
That is, a member of a company will be both an employee and an employer. This will
not only be a great incentive to strengthen the solidarity of a company, but many
unnecessary industrial disputes could be avoided, and also provide a powerful base to
break through the family-link of old enterprises and to extend the existing small scale
enterprises into medium and even large enterprises, so the principle of the minimum
scale of economy could easily be achieved. In this case, the most important thing that
government has to do is to prevent the stock market from being a speculative
business.
Lastly, people may still argue that stock-distribution scheme is not a safe way to
protect old age because stock might devalue in event of an economic recession or
the failure of individual enterprises. This could very well be the case. But there is no
need to fear this because, firstly, compared to the existing situation, this new
occupational scheme is only an extra or additional provision for our multiple old age
income sources; and secondly, we reasonably expect that the risk of speculation will
be reduced to the least level after the stock holdings are more equally distributed to
the public.
9.8. Universal Schemes
As we have defined them in chapter 2, a 'universal scheme' is the kind of provision
with no coverage restriction and includes all residents of a country. Its theoretical
form is 'basic income' or 'social dividend'. As for the 'sub-universal scheme', it is a
kind of provision from which benefits are equally paid to certain groups of residents
based on non-pecuniary tests such as age which will mature or phase out
automatically or certain status which will be fixed for long term or even forever.
Once the targeted group is fixed, then the prefix 'sub' can be omitted. And this benefit
can be entitled as 'universal child benefit' or 'universal old age benefit' because its
coverage has been indicated with 'child' or 'old age'.
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As mentioned in section 3, in the field of social security, flat-rate universal
allowance can achieve the objectives of 'means horizontal equity', 'economic
efficiency' and 'administrative efficiency' in benefits aspect. Furthermore, in financing
aspect the additional objectives of 'vertical equity', 'outcome horizontal equity' and
'adequacy' will be achieved if the scheme is financed by progressive or proportional
tax; or the additional objectives of 'means horizontal equity', 'economic efficiency' and
'administrative efficiency' will be achieved if the scheme is financed by flat rate tax.
When the scheme is financed by flat rate tax, the function to achieve the objectives of
'means horizontal equity', 'economic efficiency' and 'administrative efficiency' will be
distinctively significant because their first rank can be achieve in both benefit and
financing aspects. But within the field of universal allowance, all-universal benefits will
perform better than sub-universal ones in achieving the objectives of 'means
horizontal equity', 'economic efficiency' and 'administrative efficiency', but the latter
can perform better in achieving the objectives of 'vertical equity' and 'outcome
horizontal equity'.
In Taiwan there are only sub-universal schemes providing services in kind. They
are sub-universal employment services for all the labour force, sub-universal health
service for veterans, and sub-universal health service for military servants and their
dependants. Obviously, only health services have a special close relationship with old
people. Therefore, the discussion of existing sub-universal schemes in this section will
focus mainly on this service. However, some new sub-universal proposals for the
elderly raised in the section of social assistance will also be discussed at some
length.
9.8.1. Existing Sub-Universal Services
In the field of health service, although there is a co-existing system of western
medicine and traditional Chinese herb medicine in Taiwan, the services in these
sub-universal schemes consist mainly of the western one. The main characteristic of
the health service system in Taiwan is a near-perfect competition on both the supply
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side and demand side. Physicians can establish their own clinics or hospitals freely
and have clinical freedom to decide on the diagnosis and therapy they consider
appropriate for their patients. On the other side, the patients also have perfect
freedom in the choice of the clinics or hospitals that they wish to attend.
Theoretically, the merits of this system is that there will be strong competition among
suppliers and they will be forced to supply the best service at the lowest price or the
patients will not come to visit. However, this hypothesis is true only if all medical
expenditure must be paid by patients because the development of high-priced
sophisticated medical services will be checked by the payment ability of patients.
But after the introduction of health insurance and sub-universal schemes in the
health service, the price of the health service is free at least at the point of
consumption, this offer certainly will induce an over-demand on high standard health
services because there is no price to check the demand. Furthermore, this offer will
cause not only an unbalanced development of the health service but also many other
side effects. Firstly, any free health service in a free medical market without any
restrictions or ceiling will encourage the multiplication of services and the acquisition
of technologically advanced equipment. On one hand, patients like to receive the best
possible treatment and an associate quality of care with modern elaborate facilities
and the willingness of doctors to undertake many tests. From the macro point of view,
the free choice of patients will lead not only to a waste by taking the same medical
history and tests several times in different hospitals but also an abuse by visiting
expensive large-scale hospitals for a very minor disease. On the other hand,
physicians also have a professional interest, occasionally a financial interest, to do the
best for their patients and therefore favour elaborate and expensive over basic and
economical procedures and drugs if they realise that their patients need not pay for
them. Therefore, the cost of a free health service under social insurance or
sub-universal service will be extremely inflationary (Kaim-Caudle and Chin, 29-31).
The figures provided in chapter 8 (see Table 8.16) are good evidence of this.
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As the health service for veterans is provided only by 13 veteran hospitals and
those for military servants and their dependants are provided only by military
hospitals, due to the limitation of the number of hospitals, its main problem is that it
is very inconvenient for many beneficiaries to go to the hospitals. Much worse, many
patients like to rush to visit the two high standard general hospitals in Taipei City.
Their queues are terribly long. On the contrary, other local hospitals are under-utilised.
Furthermore, the number of beneficiaries of the sub-universal health service is not
only quite small but also scattered over the whole island, so it is not an economical
way to set up more clinics or hospitals to fulfil the object of convenience. The fact
that many veterans and the dependants of military servants prefer to visit general
hospitals in Taipei City rather than visit local hospitals indicates that the quality of
local clinics or hospitals are far behind the general hospitals. So if there is no strict
referral system within the medical service network, every effort will be in vain. In the
field of sub-universal schemes, the medical service network could be divided into
three levels according to their equipment, facilities and personnel, i.e., central general
hospitals, local hospitals and local clinics. Except in the case of an emergency, all
patients could visit only one chosen clinic where he had established a medical history,
and no one could visit local hospitals or general hospitals without reference from the
doctor of his registered clinic unless they paid the expenditure by themselves.
At present the number of old people in Taiwan is only about 5%. Compared to
ageing countries, this figure is rather small. It is not a great difficulty to extend the
existing coverage of beneficiaries to include all old people. That is, to reform the
existing sub-universal scheme to become more universal. Nowadays, as all residents
aged 65 years and over in Taipei City have been entitled to free medical services at
the local community clinics and half price hospitalisation in city hospitals, so the
sub-universal health service for old people is financially feasible in Taiwan. The
direction to extend the coverage of the sub-universal health service could be from the
point of area or age. Firstly, if the extension is based on age, then its direction is from
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70 to 68 or 65 and finally to 60 in order to include all normal retirees from LI.
Secondly, if the extension is based on area, then its direction is from Taipei City to
the whole Taiwan area. Of course, the second one is less feasible because it might
cause a great immigrant flow of sick people between areas. Through this process, a
sub-universal scheme for all old people can be achieved in the near future.
After this sub-universal health scheme for the elderly is achieved, social insurance
will be responsible for only the health service of the working population if
comprehensive insurance or health insurance is still applied. However, as insurance is
always a strong incentive to encourage a high cost/price medical service, so it is not
even an economical way to provide health services for only the working population,
so a universal health service scheme may be the most economical way or at least a
more economical way. According to Article 157 of the Constitution, it is our national
policy to establish a universal or public health service for the people.
Nevertheless, health service is not the only item of benefits in kind. Apart from
health service, the other important service in kind is housing (or home) service. For
old people in Taiwan, the most important one is the old people's home. As we have
mentioned in a previous section, it is very inadequate to provide this kind of service
through the method of social assistance in Taiwan and all other Chinese societies. So
we suggest that a better way to provide this service should be through a
sub-universal scheme. That is, the better reform for old people's homes is to transfer
them from the social assistance system to a sub-universal system. By definition,
sub-universal old people's homes should allow all old people aged 65 years and over
to move in. But the confiner "sub" will bring us great elasticity. At the very inception
of the scheme, we may define the coverage to include only single old people and old
people without children. It will not contradict the name of the scheme. As for married
old people who have children, in the principle of equality and equity, there is no
reason to exclude them forever. The matter we would be concerned about is that the
universal 'home' scheme would have the side effect or alienating the intimate
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relationship between parents and children owing to the reduction of interaction and
communication. In principle a universal old age scheme should cover all old people,
but in order to provide an incentive to encourage adult children to live with their old
parents, in particular when their old parents are retired, it might be a better policy to
offer the children a preferential 'tax deduction' or 'tax credit' if they are living with
their old parents. This will be a strong incentive to encourage old parents and their
children to live together.
Apart from a sub-universal service in kind for the elderly, we also want to aim for
a sub-universal old age cash benefit, or more precisely, a universal old age pension.
As a small Chinese society. Hong Kong, is able to provide such universal pensions to
her old people aged 70 years and over, there will be no financial difficulty for Taiwan
to provide the same pension under the same condition in the incipient stage.
Depending on the financing ability, our further aim is to provide a universal old age
pension to all old people over 65 years. Whenever a universal old age pension can be
provided for all old people aged 65 and over under the existing tax revenue system,
its total estimated pensions expenditure will be the same as the pay-as-you-go social
insurance system mentioned in section 5 in this chapter. However, the real pensions
expenditure will be dependent on the ratio of tax-payers to pensioners and the ratio
of pensions to net earnings (ie, replacement rate). Comparatively, taxing ability is the
the most crucial factor in deciding the pension level and the total pensions
expenditure of a universal scheme.
9.8.Z Towards An All-Universal Scheme
As for our long-term aim or final aim, it is to establish a real universal scheme, ie,
all-universal allowance, which is generally entitled as 'basic income' or 'social
dividend' for all citizens as Basic Income Research Group (BIRG) (1984) and Deacon
and Bradshaw (182-183) have described. In theory the merit of the universal scheme
is that it can overcome the shortcomings of both social assistance and social
insurance and its own vital weaknesses are that, firstly, it will be too expensive to be
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implemented if its benefit level is reasonably high to meet primary or even secondary
needs and, secondly, its flat rate benefit, no matter however high, may not be able to
meet the special needs. But in practice this is not certain to be the case. For many
high per capita income western industrialised countries, it is not that they are not rich
enough to implement such a universal scheme, in fact it is their financing method
which is depending on only one productive factor, labour, fails to raise sufficient
income to finance such a scheme.
This phenomenon can be fully illustrated in Figure 2.4. The crucial problem for
tax-financed social dividend is that its tax rate will be extremely high. Conservatively
estimated, it could be at least more than 50% for benefit level as high as official
social assistance benefit. The higher the basic income, the higher the income tax. As
mentioned in chapter 2, it is also an administrative waste to finance an all-universal
allowance by taxes, because, those who have to pay tax more than the amount of
benefit, the benefit is in fact no different from a kind of tax credit or tax exempt. For
them, the payment of benefit is actually a kind of administrative waste.
In order to avoid the strong disincentive effect from a high tax rate and
unnecessary administrative waste, in theory, the all-universal allowance should not be
financed by only tax revenue any more. But, unfortunately, the problem is that, apart
from this financial source, labour, and its corresponding fiscal method, all advanced
welfare states including the UK cannot find another workable method to raise
sufficient revenue to finance the scheme, this the reason why the all-universal
allowance schemes fail to be in force. For this reason, the author has looked for
other types of financing sources such as economic production rather than fiscal
taxation to finance the all-universal scheme in Taiwan. Of course, this type of
financing might not be feasible in other countries.
As we have mentioned in a previous section, the basic economic productive
factors are generally classified as four: land, capital, labour and management (or
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entrepreneurship). All economic income is earned through these four sources. In
western welfare states, financing of social security is mainly based on the factor of
labour and using only the fiscal method, tax, to raise their revenue. Explicitly it is very
difficult for this policy to raise sufficient revenue unless it disregards its side effect of
disincentive and substitution.
For this financing issue, in his economic policy in his third ism of Tripeop/ism, Dr.
Sun Yat-sen had envisaged a workable plan to tackle this issue seven to nine decades
ago although he did not use the same terms, basic income or social dividend. In
brief, because his main idea was to guarantee a basic living for all people of the
country based on the revenue from land and public enterprises, so his basic policy
was in fact no different than to establish a pension provision based on the factors of
'land' and 'capital' rather than 'labour', and also based on an economic method, cost,
rather than a fiscal method, tax (see Figure 9.1). Of course, his aim to receive an
affluent income from public productive factors, land and capital, can be achieved only
if these two factors are managed by the highly efficient professional experts of the
quinquepartite government (or five-power government) which are established under
the Theory of Separation of Political Power and Administrative Ability in the second
ism of Tripeop/ism Therefore, both the second ism and the third ism are the
inseparable parts of the precondition to implement an all-universal scheme in Taiwan.
As mentioned before, 98% of enterprises in Taiwan are medium and small scale, it
is very difficult to establish an efficient and accurate tax system to tax small business
and the self-employed or even for many employers to finance public expenditure, not
to mention a basic income scheme. Most tax incidence is on paid employees in
medium and large enterprises. Apart from this source of revenue, taxation from
employers and employees, there seems to be no other feasible or even theoretical
method to finance a basic income. If public income received from land and public
capital are sufficient for all public expenditure including basic income, personal income
tax could be phased out or merely apply a proportional tax only. This new financing





















































method will be an effective way to encourage the development of human capital (see
Figure 9.2).
As mentioned in chapter 5, since it is possible to raise substantial amounts of
money from the factors of land and public capital because both of them are managed
by the full-efficient quinquepartite government which are proposed under the second
ism of Tripeop/ism, so it is also possible to solve the financing problem of basic
income or social dividend. Therefore, a universal cash benefit is possible in Taiwan in
the future. Until that time the existing provisions of social assistance, social insurance
and all other minor schemes based on revenue from labour are not necessary to be
phased-out under our policy of the multiplicity of income sources. Of course, the
function of social assistance may be of much less importance; the provisions of social
insurance, including occupational schemes and provident fund, may be considered as
one of the sources of secondary income to meet personal special needs.
9.9. Feasibility and Implementation
As mentioned in chapter 5, any reform and change in social security can be put
into force only if they can be transformed into social legislation through the political
process. In theory under Tripeoplism and the special provisions of social security in
WmtBSm
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the Constitution, there is not only not an ideological obstacle to inhibit the betterment
of existing provisions of social security, but also an advantage to establish new ones.
But, in practice, there are some difficulties in the existing political system.
Firstly, LI is the largest provision of social security in Taiwan, but the LI Bureau
itself is only a special agency under the Taiwan Provincial Government. All
amendments or reforms raised by LI must be approved by both the Taiwan Provincial
Government and the Taiwan Provincial Congress at the first two steps. In the third
step, this approved draft of reform must be submitted to the Ministry of Interior of the
Executive Yuan. The ministry will make their revision and decision after consulting
with the reference groups consisted of the representative from capital, labour and
scholars and then submit this revised draft to the cabinet of Executive Yuan which is
organised by ail ministers of the Yuan. Finally, this draft will be sent to the
Legislative Yuan for formal political approval if it can be passed in the cabinet of
Executive Yuan. This six-step policy-making procedure for LI reform is really very
long. Even if it takes only half a year to finish the procedure in each step, then it will
take at least three years to work out a revision or amendment in LI scheme. In fact, it
really took such a long time to work through all amendments in the past. Therefore,
the direct reform to remove this difficulty is to upgrade the legal status of the LI
Bureau as high as a special agency which is equal to a ministry or commission.
Secondly, under the existing systems of LI and GEI, because the level of benefits
has no direct relationship with the rate of contributions though this level is calculated
based on insured wage and the length of contributions, so the increase of
contribution rates will cause the objections from both employers and employees in
the Legislative Yuan. This is the reason why the drafts of LI and GEI planning to
increase contribution rates were turned down by the Legislative Yuan recently though
the annual balance of both schemes are already in the red. This is a serious flaw in
both the existing social security system and the political system. There must be a
technical reform to establish a direct relationship between benefit level and
325
contribution rate. Fortunately, in Taiwan this relationship can be fully established
based on Dr. Sun's theory of the separation of 'political power7 and 'administrative
ability' on the affair of social security. As mentioned in chapter 3 and chapter 5, if the
political power (ie, the Legislative Yuan) can restricted itself to decide only one side of
the equation, B = f(T), (B= benefit, T= taxation), and the other side is left to the
government (ie, the Executive Yuan or the Ministry of Interior), then the balance of
this equation will be able to be achieved.
Thirdly, generally, the political party will play a very important role in the reform of
social security in a democratic society. In Taiwan this factor is even more important
due to the character of the ruling party, Kuomintang or National Party. Basically, since
the reform of 1923 the organisational structure of the National Party is of the 'Leninist
model' owing to adopting the advice of Soviet political adviser, Michael Borodin,
during Dr. Sun's cooperation with Soviet Russia (Tung, 93). By nature the
organisational structure of the party is based on the principle of 'democratic
centralism', so it will tend to be totalitarian or dictatorial. In the National Party
nowadays its leader is elected by the party congress which is a conference of the
representatives of party members and by regulation should be held every 4 years. But
in fact the interval is always much longer than this. Another function of the party
congress is to elect about 150 (recently 180) deputies of central committee and to
amend the party constitution. The plenum of centra/ committee will be convened
occasionally every 1 to 2 years. Only about 30 members of the standing central
committee will have regular conferences every 1 to 2 weeks. By party constitution
the highest party power shall belong to party congress, but in practice it is controlled
by the 'conference of standing central committee' (CSCC). The crucial problem here is
that the candidates of central committee and standing central committee are all
nominated by the party leader (only a half of candidates of central committee were
open to free competition in the latest party congress). So, finally, the party leader will
have absolute power to control the whole party. That is, the party leader will become
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the dictator of the party.
Moreover, in the political system all party candidates for the representatives of
both central and local congress are nominated by the party, so the party leader can
also control the representatives of congress effectively. Under this circumstance, if a
bill of social security reform is opposed by the CSCC, there will be no chance to
survive; if a bill is neither opposed nor agreed by the CSCC, it will be very difficult to
get through the Legislative Yuan; but if a bill is approved by the CSCC, there will be
no challenge to its implementation because all party representatives will be mobilised
by the party machine to support the bill. So, the support of the ruling party is the
crucial force in the political process of all public legislations, not only social
legislations.
In Taiwan as the ruling party and its leader have such a strong influence in the
policy-making of social legislations, this factor could be either an advantage or a
disadvantage in the making of social legislation. The crucial point here is how to
guarantee that the decision of the CSCC can really reflect the needs of the people.
This objective can be achieved only if members of the standing central committee can
play their prescribed role independently without any reservation. In the existing
circumstances, this condition is not existent. Therefore, a reform of the organisational
structure of ruling party is necessary and inevitable. Though this party reform is out
of the field of social security, it is a pre-condition of social security reform. In brief
the direction of party reform could be as follows: 1)the party leader had better be
elected and recalled by the CSCC, not by party congress because there must be
another power to balance the power of party leader regularly; 2)the members of the
standing central committee had better be elected and recalled by the plenum of
central committee, not nominated by the party leader; 3)the deputies of central
committee had better be elected and recalled by the congress of the party, no
nomination of the party leader is necessary; 4)the representatives of party congress
had better be competitively elected from party members, no non-elected
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representative should be allowable. Only through this party reform, the public opinion
of party members can be reflected in the policy-decision in the CSCC of the party.
9.10. Conclusion
Viewing the structure of population and economy in Taiwan, especially the
increasing ageing of the population and the high rate of the labour force employed in
secondary and tertiary industries, so it has been very urgent to reform the existing
social security provisions in order to provide more valid and more efficient benefits to
meet the rising needs.
Generally, in an industrialised society, because most people earn their income
through their 'labouT, so their old age provisions are also mostly and heavily based on
this source of income. In theory we can also expect that many undesirable side
effects such as disincentive and substitution have been caused due to the high rate of
tax, both income tax and contributions. However, under the existing social security
system, many improvements are possible. In this study, four criteria are applied to
assess or to judge the direction and strategy of reform and options. They are:
'equity', 'adequacy', 'economic efficiency' and 'administrative efficiency'. Because these
four criteria are either partly mutually exclusive or contradictory, or partly mutually
influenced and reinforced, or partly independent, so the options of different social
security provisions are really complicated. These four criteria cannot be achieved by
applying only one provision or applying all possible provisions without a rational
planning. The framework of social security derived from the Beveridge Report provide
us a sound basis to develop a policy to multiply the sources of income for all people
including the elderly. This should be a better policy to do so because different
provisions have their different merits to achieve certain criteria and their different
weaknesses to retard them to achieve other criteria. For this reason, our policy to
treat each different provision is to maximise their function and to minimise their
shortcomings in order to achieve these four criteria.
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In Taiwan the most important private provision of income maintenance is family.
Because this provision belongs to voluntary actions, so it tends to achieve the
objectives of 'economic efficiency', 'vertical equity' and 'secondary adequacy'. Further,
as the security function of family is dependent on children, so the first shortcoming of
family is that it cannot cover single persons or married persons without children. They
have to depend on other social security provisions such as social assistance and
sub-universal schemes, either in cash or in kind. For married persons, including
widowed and divorced persons, even if they have children, their children might be
disabled, ill, inadequately educated and trained, unemployed or with low income, then
they are still not a reliable source of family income. In that case, some public service
in kind such as health service and employment service to help them overcome these
problems are necessary. As co-residence is a traditional and economical way for
children to support their parents in the family and the existing evidence indicates that
this trend will decline in the future though it is still as high as 67% nowadays, so the
incentive of 'tax deduction' or 'tax credit' is suggested to offer the children who live
with their parents. As for those well-off children, if their parents are so poor that they
have to live on social assistance, then a 'parents tax' is recommended.
In the field of social insurance, because there are at least four combinations of
benefits and contributions, so its options of objectives could also be several. Apart
from the general shortcomings, the main shortcomings in Taiwan are that: 1)the
benefit level is too low (ie, the objective should be 'adequacy'), 2) no option of
pension, all payments are in lump sum, 3) the coverage is quite limited and separate
(ie, its objective should be 'administrative efficiency'). Because the low benefit is the
result of low contribution, so the practical way to increase benefit is to increase
contributions. Under the economic condition of US$5,000 per capita GNP in 1987,
people should be well-off enough to contribute at a higher rate than the present
ones. Moreover, the amount of contribution can also be increased by increasing the
ratio of insured wage to actual gross wage. When the calculation of contribution is
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based on actual gross wage, this ratio is 1.0 or 100%. Furthermore, even if the old age
benefit is greatly increased, apart from those who successfully invest their payments
by themselves or by their children, there are many risks for lump sum payments, for
example, the erosion from inflation, careless spending, loss in investment, etc.
However, some people might really need a lump sum payment to undertake some
business, a compulsory pension provision might not satisfy all people, so it should be
better to have a pension as an option. For the reason of economy and efficiency, the
existing separate social insurance systems could be more economical and more
efficient if they are integrated as a united single scheme because it will meet the
principle of large numbers and 'the scale of economy'. Lastly, the benefits in cash and
in kind should be managed by two separate organisations because these two types of
benefits are totally different. This division will improve the efficiency of administration
and the soundness of financing.
Because the most outstanding element of social assistance is its means-test, so
its natural result is its stigmatising. Though this stigmatising could be minimised by
using a most generous test. However, it is impossible for the stagma to be totally
phased out as long as there is a test. Even assessed by the four criteria, the
combination can achieve the least objectives. All evidence demonstrates that social
assistance is not a popular provision. Especially for the elderly, as there is a tradition
in Chinese culture to respect old people, so social assistance is not a good provision
for old age in Chinese society. A sub-universal scheme is a better substitute.
However, before such a universal scheme is available, the mean level of assistance
should be raised at least up to the official subsistence level for old people. It would
be even better if it could be up to actual subsistence level. Besides, all non-pecuniary
tests for benefits in kind, mainly old people's homes, also should be better phased
out.
It is welcome to have occupational schemes as an additional provision for old age
whether it is considered as a secondary social insurance or a scheme with new
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characteristics. However, in Taiwan as the characteristic or principle of occupational
schemes is similar to social insurance in every aspect, and their coverage also
overlaps with the existing social insurance schemes, so, for the objective of
'administrative efficiency', such occupational schemes could be integrated with the
existing social insurance schemes. We could then create a new type of occupational
scheme which is based on the other economic productive factor, 'capital', rather than
'labour' any longer. Many good side effects on the economic structure of Taiwan may
be expected.
As for universal allowance, its objectives could be achieved at maximal level if the
scheme is financed by progressive or proportional taxes though there are some
differences between a sub-universal scheme and an all-universal one. However, it is
financially possible and culturally desirable in Taiwan to establish a sub-universal
scheme for the elderly, both in cash and in kind. Further, our long-term goal is to
pursue an all-universal scheme in Taiwan. It is difficult for a country to carry out such
a scheme unless its financing base of social security can be shifted from the
economic element, labour, to another two elements, land and capital. Fortunately, Dr.
Sun Yat-sen's TripeopHsm presents us with a feasible plan and an efficient political
machine to achieve this reform. Therefore, a universal scheme is possible in Taiwan
in the future.
Finally, all options and reforms must be carried out through political procedure. In
Taiwan the low legal status of LI scheme has caused special difficulty in achieving our
objectives. These difficulties can be removed only after the status of LI bureau can be
upgraded in existing political system. As for the factor of party, it could be either an
advantage or a disadvantage in the reform of social security just depending on
whether the policy can meet the needs of the people or not. However, a
democratisation of the party system is suggested.
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CHAPTER 10
CONCLUSION
10.1. Questions and Problems
As mentioned in chapter 1, Introduction the main purpose of this thesis is to
answer the question: what kind of income maintenance provision for the elderly
should be applied to tackle the problem of economic insecurity in Taiwan?
Surrounding this question, the discussion has developed from chapter 2 to chapter 8.
Finally, some options for change are made in chapter 9.
Generally, Taiwan is a very small country scarce in natural resources and with a
high density of population. The large population of Taiwan is both an advantage and a
burden for her economic development. Several indicators such as per capita GNP, the
number of telephones, TV sets and motor vehicles per 1,000 inhabitants are used to
measure the economic achievement of Taiwan. Her achievement is substatial. This
provides a good base to improve the existing provisions or even to establish new
ones. However, due to the industrialisation of economic production, the rate of
economically active population in primary industry was reduced from 56.1% in 1952 to
17.5% in 1985. In the same period, the rate in secondary was increased from 16.9% to
41.4% and tertiary industry from 27.0% to 41.1%. This profound change in economic
structure demonstrates that the income of more employed people will become
vulnerable and unreliable because their earnings are based on 'labour' rather than on
'land' and 'capital'. Moreover, the current medium and small scale enterprises could
also be a disadvantage in not only the matter of research for further development of
the economy, but also the administration of social security provisions though they
have ever made a great contribution to the achievement of efficiency and equal
income distribution.
Due to the decline of the birth rate and the rise of life expectancy, the proportion
of old people will keep steadily growing until a ZPG state is reached. According to
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population projections, the population of Taiwan will reach this ZPG state in between
2022 and 2027 at a population of between 24 and 25 million. At that time, the number
of old people will be between 3.5 and 4.3 million, a ratio of between 14.8% and 16.9%
of total population. Compared to today's 5%, it will be a threefold increase. This
significant change of population structure can be demonstrated in many
measurements of old age. Of course, the expenditure to support the elderly in the
future will also increase in the same line even if the benefit level is only the same as
today.
In order to tackle the problem of income insecurity of the elderly, the author has
made a brief review of the possible provisions of income maintenance. They are
employment, saving, investment, family (mainly 'children') and social security.
Comparatively, 'family' and 'social security' are more popular than other provisions in
Taiwan.
Both in theory and in practice, family is the main provision for old people in
Taiwan. And the most efficient way for a family to play this role is the co-residence
of old parents with their children. But both in attitude and in fact, the rate of
co-residence tends to decline. This tendency will greatly reduce the function of family
as an old age provision. Apart from this negative tendency, as an old age provision,
family itself also has its own limitations. Apart from single persons and married
persons without children, even for married persons with children, if their children are
disabled, unemployed or low paid, family will be unable to play its function of social
security. Due to these limitations, further measures must be provided as a second
safety net.
Although the provisions of social security can be classified into three main
patterns: social assistance, social insurance and universal allowance, for the current
old people, only government retirees and veterans have the option of occupational
pensions in secondary social insurance. All LI retirees (who are the majority of total
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retirees) receive only lump sum payments in primary social insurance, so the existing
old age provisions are not adequate for the majority of insurance retirees, not to
mention those who were originally excluded from insurance schemes. Generally, the
older the old people, the more of them have to depend on their children and/or
assistance, and the fewer of them can depend on retirement payments, employment
wage and savings. There is evidence that at least 11% of old people are very poor.
From the point of the number of beneficiaries, because social insurance schemes,
either primary or secondary, have the largest coverage in social security in Taiwan, so
it can be said that social security in Taiwan is social insurance-oriented. Including
military insurance, the total insured persons were about 5,466 thousand in 1985. It was
about 28% of the total population, 40% of population aged 15 and over, and 66% of
labour force or 68% of employed persons.
The insured persons are allocated into 12 different schemes which are
administered by three different main insurers. All schemes are not only
comprehensive, employment-related, but also adopt a policy of low contribution rates.
Therefore, several disadvantages can easily be envisaged. Firstly, as Taiwan is a small
country with a small population though her density of population is very high, so it is
certainly an administrative waste to set up three different administrative agencies to
administer similar groups of contingencies for three different groups of insured
persons. The division of insured persons is contradictory to the principles of large
numbers and risk-pooling of social insurance. So it is difficult for the administration
to reach its optimum of economy and efficiency. Furthermore, it will also cause
problems for labour mobility and double claims of one contingency.
Secondly, the characteristic of comprehensiveness in theory should be an
advantage to simplify administration, for example the collection of contributions, not
certainly a weakness. But in Taiwan because the schemes include benefits both in
cash and in kind, so it leads to the comlexity of management in both accounting and
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administration. Moreover, because the systems are also employment-related,
whenever an insured person permanently quits his job, either through resignation or
retirement, he will lose his entitlement to all benefits, even retirement payment, if he
cannot satisfy the requirements.
Thirdly, the logical result of low contributions is a low level of benefit. In turn a
low level of lump sum payments will make a pension either impossible or
meaningless.
As for occupational schemes, generally, their provisions are quite good for the
government scheme and military scheme in both their level and types of payment. But
the private scheme for LI retirees is less satisfactory because not only is its maximum
payment only 45 months but also no option of monthly payment is available. As for
social assistance, its main problem is that its test is too severe and its benefit is too
low to meet needs. As for the main problem of sub-universal schemes, at the
present stage, it is that their coverage is very limited.
As for the health situation of old people, 43% of them are healthy, 36% of them
are unhealthy and need medical care, and the remaining 21% in transition. In general,
old people certainly need more health care than young people. But unfortunately,
because the existing insurance health service is provided by comprehensive,
employment-related systems, so old people are disqualified from joining health
insurance any more after they are retired. Only government retirees are allowed to
join health insurance voluntarily and veterans and the dependants of military servants
can get free medical service. According to the author's research, at least 60% of
retirees who retired in 1984 need to self-finance their medical expenditure. This figure
would be higher in the total population of old people.
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10.Z Reforms and Changes
In response to these shortcomings of existing social security provisions, some
necessary measures must be raised to tackle them. First of all, because all types of
provision have their merits and limits, so our general policy to tackle the income
insecurity problem of old people is to multiply their sources of income: not only the
number but also the heterogeneity of their sources in order to achieve all four criteria
of assessment. Under this general policy, we then try to improve the existing
provisions or to establish new ones if it is necessary.
10.2.1. Family
Family can be considered as an effective income maintenance provision only if old
parents and their children live together. Apart from parents with disabled children who
have to be treated by a different policy, generally, our objective is to encourage them
to live together. The positive policy to achieve this goal is to adopt a "parents' tax
deduction" for well-off children and a "parents' tax credit" for the unemployed or low
paid children if and only if they live together. As for the level of deduction or credit,
they could be any level as long as the financing ability is allowable. But for tax credit,
it should be at least equal to subsistence level or assistance level.
10.2.2. Primary Social Insurance
Firstly, because low benefits are the result of low contributions, so the way to
increase benefits is to increase contributions. The way to increase contributions can
be divided into two steps. The first step is to increase the ratio of insured wage to
gross wage. The maximum of this increase is from the current 0.5 to 1.0, ie, insured
wage equals gross wage. The second step is to increase the contribution rate from
the current 8% to more than 10%. In LI, to phase out the ceiling of contributions is
another way to increase contributions.
Secondly, because a lump sum payment is not a good provision to protect the old
age of all people, so there should be an option of pensions for the people who are in
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need. Of course, pension scheme must have an adequate contribution as its financial
base, or its level will be too low to meet needs. In theory a pension scheme can be
based on either funded method or pay-as-you-go method, but in practice it will be
mainly based on a pay-as-you-go method if inflation is ubiquitous and significant. In
the pay-as-you-go system, the contribution rate will be determined by the following
two factors: 1)the ratio of earners to pensioners and 2)the replacement rate of benefit,
ie, the ratio of pension to net earnings. In Taiwan when the population becomes
stable, neither growing nor declining, ie, approaches a ZPG state, then the ratio of
earners to pensioners will decline from the current 9-1 to only 3-1, and the financing
burden of future generations will be very heavy, so a revised semi-pay-as-you-go
method or semi-funded method is proposed.
Thirdly, as all social insurance schemes are employment-related, so in principle all
employed persons should be included. But in fact, apart from military servants and
government employees, many employed persons in the private sector such as
employees employed by employers employing less than 5 persons, the self-employed,
unpaid domestic workers and employers are not legally included by LI Act. Among
these excluded employed persons, apart from the employees employed by employers
employing less than 5 persons, 28.8% of them were self-employed, 10.8% of them
were unpaid domestic workers, 4.3% of them were employers in 1985. Their total was
as high as 36%. If the figure of excluded employees was also available, this figure
would be even higher. We also know that the industries of excluded employed
persons are agriculture, commerce, social and personal services, etc. This information
gives us a direction to enlarge the coverage of the LI scheme. After the
implementation of Health Insurance for Farmers (HIF) in 1985, the figure of excluded
persons was reduced to 34.5%.
Fourthly, two principles of economic management are raised to pursue for the goal
of efficiency. The principle of 'the minimum scale of economy' can be achieved if the
three main similar social insurance systems should be integrated as one united
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system in order to increase the number of insured persons up to its maximum. The
task of management can be simplified if benefits in cash and benefits in kind should
be divided into two separate systems. Especially for the LI scheme, the phenomenon
of old age reserves exhausted by medical expenditure should be avoided.
10.2.3. Social Assistance
Due to the effects of stigma and disgrace, both in theory and in practice, this
provision will be the less popular one. In principle, we like to encourage people to
utilise this provision as the last resort. For this reason, it should be our policy to keep
the level of assistance not higher than the levels of all other social security benefits.
But at present, as many other social security benefits are unable to meet the basic
needs of the people, so it is really a difficulty to increase the benefits of social
assistance only. However, after the other benefits have been improved, the level of
cash assistance can be increased by several steps. The first step is to increase the
level from current actual assistance level to official subsistence level. The second step
is to increase from official subsistence level to actual subsistence level. The last step
is to improve the actual subsistence level by increasing the percentage from 40% to
50% or even 60% of average consumption expenditure.
As for assistance in kind, medical services benefit the poor and the elderly
substantially. But the service of old people's homes is contradictory to the value and
ideal of Chinese culture, so its best reform is to transfer this service from the social
assistance system to a sub-universal system. Before this reform is achieved, the
improvement of old people's homes can be made through the following two paths:
1)the criterion of means test should be improved from the current zero income to an
official assistance level or even to an official subsistence level; 2)the elderly whose
children are unable to support them owing to disability, illness, unemployment or even
low pay should be allowed to move into old people's homes if they wish. As our
policy is to encourage the co-residence of old parents with their children, a tax credit




When we consider occupational schemes as the secondary social insurance, public
occupational schemes for government employees and military servants are not only
better than their primary social insurance benefits, but also have the option of
monthly payments, so they are more important than primary insurance provision for
these workers. But for private schemes, because 98% of enterprises are of medium
and small scale, so it is in fact impossible to require all employers to provide the
same standard of benefits as the public sector. In the field of the private sector, as
the coverage of occupational schemes is the same as that of the LI scheme, even
their maximum payments and the basic characteristics are also the same, so it would
be possible to integrate the two schemes. It could be better just to require employers
to pay their occupational contributions to the existing LI scheme, and require the LI
scheme to fully-fund these contributions and to increase the same amount of old age
payments for the retired. It would be more simple, safer, and more efficient.
In order to make the occupational scheme with its own new characteristics and
new function, we suggest a new policy to establish this scheme based on the other
economic productive elements such as 'capital' rather than 'labour', ie, we do not treat
occupational schemes as the provisions of secondary social insurance any longer.
Under this new policy, we may require the employers to provide another income
source for their retirees by selling or giving their company's share or stock to their
employees. This is concordant with our general policy: to multiply the sources of
income for old people.
10.2.5. Universal Schemes
For old people, in Taiwan there are only sub-universal schemes providing health
services for veterans and military servants and the dependants of military servants. In
theory the reform of this sub-universal service should be to extend its coverage to a
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larger degree, and finally to include all old people. But under the existing free
market-style health service system, a universal old age health service will be
extremely expensive. The possible way to extend or to establish such a universal
health service scheme is to base it on a reference system in order to avoid abuse.
According to the value and ideal of Chinese culture, social assistance is definitely
not a good way to provide both benefits in cash and benefits in kind for the elderly
due to its stigma and disgrace. Social insurance can avoid these side effects, but it
has its own shortcoming, exclusion. Especially this shortcoming tends to adversely
affect the people who are originally disadvantaged. Therefore, a sub-universal scheme
is the most adequate provision for old people. As we want to strengthen the function
of family, we suggest the provision of these sub-universal benefits be based on the
methods of tax deduction or tax credit for the elderly with children; but for those who
have no children, a neutral policy will need to be applied.
All universal schemes, either sub-universal provisions or all-universal provisions,
are relative expensive due to its large coverage. So how to solve the financing
problem of universal schemes is a vital issue. Traditionally, people in western welfare
states tried to tackle this problem with mainly the fiscal method to tax earnings from
one of the economic productive elements, labour. When the schemes are very
expensive, their high taxes will definitely cause serious side effects and disincentives.
This is the main reason why universal schemes are so difficult to be implemented.
For this financing problem. Dr. Sun Yat-sen's Tripeop/ism provides an alternative way
to transfer the financing sources of universal schemes from 'labour' to the other two
economic productive elements, 'land' and 'capital'. This should be expended further as
it might be a feasible way to overcome this financing problem. Once the financing
problem is tackled, a universal scheme will be able to be carried out for all people.
This is our dream.
APPENDIX
Table A1 Population in Taiwan Area:


















1946 | 6 091 1 2 639 3 297 1 155
1947 | 6 498 1 6 294 2 750 3 583 | 164
1948 | 6 808 1 6 653 2 856 3 777 | 175
1949 j 7 397 1 7 102 3 041 4 172 j 185
1950 j 7 554 1 7 476 3 129 4 237 | 189
19511 7 869 1 7 712 3 312 4 364 | 193
1952 | 8 128 1 7 999 3 443 4 482 | 203
1953 | 8 438 1 8 283 3 605 4 624 | 208
1954 | 8 749 I 8 594 3 768 4 766 | 215
1955 | 9 078 1 8 913 3 940 4 915 | 223
1956 j 9 390 1 9 234 4 123 5 039 | 229
1957 | 9 690 1 9 540 4 289 5 165 | 237
1958 | 10 039 i 9 949 4 472 5 320 j 248
1959 | 10 431 1 io 407 4 675 5 501 | 256
1960 | 10 792 1 io 792 4 904 5 620 | 268
1961 | 11 149 1 11 152 5 112 5 759 | 278
1962 j 11 512 1 11 528 5 293 5 932 | 286
1963 | 11 884 1 11 903 5 446 6 135 | 303
1964 | 12 257 1 12 281 5 573 6 367 j 317
1965 | 12 628 1 12 654 5 667 6 626 j 335
1966 | 12 993 1 13 021 5 712 6 929 | 353
1967 j 13 297 1 13 363 5 755 7 175 | 367
1968 | 13 650 1 13 683 5 794 7 474 j 383
1969 | 14 335 1 14 096 5 806 8 125 j 404
1970 | 14 676 1 14 505 5 821 8 426 j 428
1971 j 14 995 I 14 835 5 805 8 736 | 454
1972 | 15 289 1 15 142 5 797 9 012 | 480
1973 | 15 565 I 15 427 5 769 9 292 | 503
1974 | 15 852 1 15 709 5 733 9 586 | 534
1975 | 15 150 1 16 001 5 705 9 880 j 565
1976 | 16 508 1 16 329 5 723 10 186 | 600
1977 | 16 813 1 16 661 5 705 10 465 | 643
1978 | 17 136 1 16 974 5 699 10 755 | 682
1979 | 17 479 1 17 308 5 714 11 041 I 724
1980 | 17 805 1 17 642 5 714 11 329 | 762
1981 j 18 136 1 17 970 5 731 11 605 j 799
1982 | 18 458 1 18 297 5 763 11 857 | 838
1983 | 18 733 1 18 595 5 768 12 089 | 875
1984 | 19 013 1 18 873 5 737 12 354 | 922
1985 | 19 258 1 19 135 5 696 12 589 | 973
1986 | 19 455 1 19 356 5 640 12 788 11027
Note: Including servicemen since 1969
source: MOI, 1985a:1064; DOH, 1895:54; CEPD, 1987a:4-5,8
Table A2 Population in Taiwan Area:
Change and Comparision (1,000)
1 Net I Natural
1 Change Increase | Births Deaths














1947 | 404 | 6.6 1 127 | 2.0 | 241 | 38.3 114 | 18.2
1948 j 311 1 4.8 1 168 | 2.5 | 264 | 39.7 95 | 14.3
1949 j 591 | 8.7 I 207 j 2.9 | 301 | 42 .4 93 | 13.1
1950 | 157 | 2.1 | 238 j 3.2 | 324 j 43.3 86 j 11.5
1951 | 315 | 4.2 1 296 | 3.8 | 385 | 50.0 89 | 11.6
1952 j 259 | 3.3 1 294 j 3.7 | 373 | 46 .6 79 | 10.0
1953 | 310 | 3.8 1 296 | 3.6 | 375 j 45.2 78 | 9.4
1954 | 311 | 3.7 1 313 | 3.6 | 384 | 44.6 70 | 8.2
1955 j 328 | 3.8 1 327 | 3.7 | 404 j 45.3 77 | 8.6
1956 | 313 | 3.4 1 340 | 3.7 | 414 | 44 .8 74 j 8.0
1957 | 300 | 3.2 1 314 | 3.3 j 395 | 41.4 81 1 8.5
1958 | 349 | 3.6 1 336 | 3.4 j 411 j 41.7 75 | 7.6
1959 j 392 3.9 1 347 | 3.4 | 421 | 41.2 74 j 7.2
1960 j 361 | 3.5 1 346 | 3.3 j 419 | 39.5 74 | 7.0
1961 | 357 | 3.3 1 346 | 3.2 j 420 | 38 .3 74 | 6.7
1962 j 363 | 3.3 1 351 | 3.1 | 42 3 | 37.4 73 | 6.4
1963 | 372 3.2 1 353 | 3.0 j 42 4 j 36.3 72 | 6.1
1964 | 373 | 3.1 1 348 | 2.9 | 417 | 34.5 69 | 5.7
1965 | 372 | 3.0 | 339 | 2.7 | 407 | 32.7 68 j 5.5
1966 | 364 | 2.9 1 345 | 2.7 | 415 j 32 .4 70 | 5.5
1967 | 304 | 2.3 | 302 | 2.3 | 374 | 28.0 72 | 5.4
1968 | 354 | 2.7 1 321 | 2.3 | 394 | 28.8 74 | 5.4
1969 | 684 | 5.0 1 320 | 2.3 | 391 | 27.7 71 | 5.0
1970 | 341 | 2.4 1 323 | 2.2 | 394 j 27 .2 71 | 4.9
1971 | 319 | 2.2 | 309 | 2.1 j 380 | 25.6 71 j 4.8
1972 | 294 | 2.0 1 294 | 1.9 | 366 | 24 .2 71 | 4.7
1973 j 276 j 1.8 1 293 | 1.9 | 367 | 23.8 73 j 4.8
1974 | 287 | 1.8 j 293 | 1.9 | 368 | 23.4 75 j 4.8
1975 j 297 | 1.9 1 293 | 1.8 | 368 | 23.0 75 j 4.7
1976 | 358 j 2.2 1 347 j 2.1 | 423 | 25.9 77 | 4.7
1977 | 305 | 1.8 1 316 | 1.9 | 396 | 23.8 79 | 4.8
1978 | 323 | 1.9 j 330 | 1.9 j 409 | 24 .1 79 j 4.7
1979 | 344 j 2.0 1 341 j 2.0 | 423 | 24.4 82 | 4.7
1980 j 326 | 1.9 | 329 | 1.9 | 413 | 23.4 84 j 4.8
1981 | 330 | 1.9 1 326 | 1.8 j 413 | 23.0 87 | 4.8
1982 | 322 1.8 1 317 | 1.7 | 404 | 22 .1 87 | 4.8
1983 | 275 | 1.5 | 292 j 1.6 | 382 | 20.6 91 j 4.9
1984 | 280 j 1.5 | 280 | 1.5 | 370 | 19.6 90 j 4.8
1985 | 245 | 1.3 1 253 | 1.3 | 345 | 18.0 92 | 4.8
1986 | 197 | 1.0 1 213 | 1.1 | 308 | 15.9 95 | 4.9
Note: Including mi litary servicemen since 1969
Source : MO I , 198 5a:106 4; CEPD, 1987a : 4-5
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Table A3 Population in Taiwan Area
Change and Comparision
% in Population (1)| Ratios (2) (2)
Aging








1946 43.3 1 54.1 | 2.6 | 80.0 1 4.7 | 84.7 5.9
1947 42.3 | 55.1 | 2.5 | 76.8 4.6 j 81.4 6.0
1948 42 .0 i 55.5 | 2.6 j 75.0 | 4.6 | 79.6 6.1
1949 41.1 1 56.4 j 2.5 j 72.9 | 4.4 I 77.3 6.1
1950 41.4 | 56.1 | 2.5 | 73.9 | 4.5 | 78.4 6.0
1951 42 .1 1 55.5 | 2.5 j 75.9 4.4 | 80.3 5.8
1952 42 .4 i 55.1 | 2.5 j 76.8 | 4.5 | 81.3 5.9
1953 42 .7 1 54.8 | 2.5 | 78.0 1 4.5 ! 82.5 5.8
1954 43.1 j 54.5 | 2.5 | 79.1 1 4.5 ! 83.6 5.7
1955 43.4 1 54.1 | 2.5 | 80.2 | 4.5 | 84.7 5.6
1956 43.9 1 53.7 | 2.4 j 81.8 4.5 86.4 5.6
1957 44.3 1 53.3 j 2.4 j 83.0 | 4.6 | 87.6 5.5
1958 44.5 1 53.0 | 2.5 | 84.1 1 4.7 88.7 5.5
1959 44.8 1 52.7 j 2.5 | 85.0 ! 4.7 | 89.6 5.5
1960 45.4 1 52.1 j 2.5 | 87.3 j 4.8 | 92.0 5.5
1961 45.9 1 51.7 | 2.5 j 88.8 4.8 | 92.0 5.4
1962 46.0 1 51.5 j 2.5 | 89.2 | 4.8 I 94.1 5.4
1963 45.8 I 51.6 j 2.6 | 88.8 I 4.9 ! 93.7 5.6
1964 45.5 I 51.9 | 2.6 | 87.5 | 5.0 j 92.5 5.7
1965 44.9 1 52.5 | 2.7 | 85.5 1 5.1 j 90.6 5.8
1966 44.0 1 53.3 j 2.7 j 82 .4 1 5.1 | 87.5 6.2
1967 43.3 1 54.0 | 2.8 | 80.2 1 5.1 j 85.3 6.4
1968 42 .5 1 54.8 | 2.8 | 77.5 1 5.1 j 82.6 6.6
1969 40 .5 | 56.6 | 2.8 | 71.5 | 5.0 | 76.4 7.0
1970 39.7 1 57.4 | 2.9 | 69.1 1 5.1 I 74.2 7.2
1971 38.7 | 58.3 | 3.0 | 66.4 | 5.2 71.6 7.8
1972 37.9 1 59.0 | 3.1 | 64.3 | 5.2 | 69.6 8.3
1973 37.1 1 59.7 | 3.2 j 62 .1 1 5.4 | 67.5 8.7
1974 36.2 | 60.5 | 3.4 j 59.8 5.6 | 65.4 9.3
1975 35.3 | 61.2 | 3.5 | 57.7 | 5.6 I 63.4 9.9
1976 34.7 1 61.7 j 3.6 j 56.2 1 5.9 | 62.1 10.5
1977 33.9 | 62.3 | 3.8 j 54 .5 j 6.1 | 60.7 11.3
1978 33.3 j 62.8 | 4.0 | 53.0 | 6.3 | 59.3 12.0
1979 32.7 | 63.2 | 4.1 | 51.7 ! 6.6 j 58.3 12 .7
1980 32 .1 | 63.6 | 4.3 | 50 .4 6.7 57.2 13 .3
1981 31.6 j 64.0 j 4.4 j 49 .4 | 6.9 | 56.3 13.9
1982 31.2 j 64.2 | 4.5 | 48 .6 7.1 | 55.7 14.5
1983 30.8 1 64.5 | 4.7 j 47.7 j 7.2 j 54.9 15.2
1984 30.2 | 65.0 | 4.8 | 46.4 7.5 j 53.9 16.1
1985 29.6 1 65.3 | 5.0 | 45.2 7.7 53.0 17.1
1986 29 .0 1 65.7 | 5.3 | 44.1 | 8.0 | 52.1 18 .2
Source: CEPD, 1987a:8
Note: A/B = young dependency ratio
C/B = old dependency ratio
(A+C)/B = dependency ratio
C/A = aging index
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1950 | 52.90 I 56.32 | 10.20 12.91 |
19511 53.10 I 57.32 | 10.04 12.71 |
1952 j 56.50 | 60.68 j 10.91 13.91 j
1953 | 58.30 | 62.35 j 10.64 13.34 |
1954 j 59.86 I 64.16 | 11.10 14.06 j
1955 j 59.91 | 65.03 | 10.47 13.80 |
1956 j 59.79 | 65.41 | 10.25 13.47 |
1957 | 59.89 j 65.02 | 10.31 13.26 |
1958 | 61.26 | 67.22 | 11.32 14.53 j
1959 | 61.80 | 66.72 j 10.96 13.43 |
1960 j 61.80 | 67.07 | 10.77 13.35 |
1961 | 62.26 I 67.72 | 11.02 13.69 j
1962 | 62.62 I 67.89 | 11.07 13.53 |
1963 | 63.25 j 68.31 | 11.31 13.62 |
1964 | 63.75 j 69.23 | 11.55 14.03 |
1965 | 64 .52 | 69.98 | 11.95 14.30 |
1966 | 64.14 | 69.68 | 11.6 4 14.06 |
1967 | 64.22 | 69.65 j 11.54 13.70 |
1968 | 63.55 | 69.74 | 11.20 13.66 |
1969 | 65.12 | 70.77 | 12.00 14.42
1970 | 66 .08 I 71.21 | 11.89 14.40 |
1971 | 67.19 j 72.08 | 11.95 14.57 |
1972 | 67.56 | 72.30 j 12 .26 14.48 |
1973 | 67.57 | 72.48 | 12 .17 14.54 |
1974 | 67.80 | 72.76 | 12 .20 14.63 |
1975 j 68.27 | 73.42 | 12 .45 14.92 j
1976 | 68.70 | 73.59 j 12 .61 14.87 |
1977 | 68.69 I 73.85 | 12 .83 15.21 j
1978 | 69.15 j 74.32 | 13 .22 15.61 j
1979 | 69.36 | 74.48 | 13.32 15.56 j
1980 | 69.56 | 74.54 | 13.48 15.67 |
1981 j 69.74 j 74.64 | 13.62 15.48 |
1982 j 69.86 I 74.86 j 13.32 15.44 j
1983 | 69.90 | 75.08 j 13.23 15.57 |
1984 j 70.46 j 75.53 | 1
1985 | 70.8 1 75.8 | 1
Source: DOH, 1985:58-61
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70-70 | 1 | Hong Kong
67-67 | 3 I Denmark, Iceland, Norway





Canada, Cyprus, Finland, Kuwait, Luxembourg, Mexico,
Netherland, Spain, Sweden, USA, etc.





Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Chile, E. German;
Greece, Isreal, Poland, South Africa, UK, etc.
63-63 | 1 | W. Germany
62-62 1 | Saint Christopher and Nevis





Egypt, France, Kenya, Morocco, New Zealand, Paraguay,









Algeria, Argentina, Bulgaria, China, Colombia, Cuba,
Hungary, Iran, Iraq, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Lebanon,
Panama, Peru, Sudan, Taiwan(R.O.C.), USSR, Uruguay,
Venezuela, Yugoslavia, etc.
60-5 3~ 7| 1 | Czechoeslovakia
59-59 | 1 j Zaire







Chad, Congo, Ecuador, Fiji, Gambia, Guinea, Haiti,






Bolivia, Central African Republic, Ghana, Pakistan,
Sri Lanka, Tuekey
50-50 | 2 I Kivibati(Gilbert Island), Zanbia
45-45 | 2 1 Swaziland, Uganda
40-40 j 1 | Solomon Islands
open 1 j Nepal
Source: U.S. Department of Health and Human Service, Washington,D.C.
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Table A2.2 Townsend's Deprivation Index
Characteristic
1. Has not had a week's holiday away from home in last twelve
months.
2. Adults only. Has not had a relative or friend to the home
for a meal or snack in the last 4 weeks.
3. Adults only. Has not been out in the last 4 weeks to a
relative or friend for a meal or snack.
4. Children only (under 15). Has not had a friend to play or
to tea in the last 4 weeks.
5. Children only. Did not have party on last birthday.
6. Has not had an afternoon or evening out for entertainment
in the last two weeks.
7. Does not have fresh meat (including meals out) as many as
four days a week.
8. Has gone through one or more days in the past fortnight
without a cooked meal.
9. Has not had a cooked breakfast most days of the week.
10. Household does not have a refrigerator.
11. Household does not usually have a Sunday joint (3 in 4
times).
12. Household does not have sole use of four amenities indoor
(flush WC, sink or washbasin and cold-water tap, fixed bath
or shower, and gas or electric cooker).
Note: % of D = % of population going without
Source: Townsend, 1979:250
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Table A2.3 The Public's Perception of Necessities
Standard-of-living items in rank order |% of N
1. Heating to warm living areas of the home if it is cold | 97
2. Indoor toilet (not shared with another household) | 96
3. Damp-free home | 96
4. Bath (not shared with another household) | 94
5. Beds for everyone in the household | 94
6. Public transport for one's needs | 88
7. A warm water-proof coat | 87
8. Three meals a day for children * | 82
9. Self-contained accommodation | 79
10. Two pairs of all-weather shoes | 78
11. Enough bedrooms for every child over 10 of different sex to |
have his/her own * | 77
12. Refrigerator j 77
13. Toys for children * j 71
14. Carpets in living rooms and bedrooms | 70
15. Celebrations on special occasions such as Christmas | 69
16. A roast meat joint or its equivalent once a week | 67
17. A washing machine | 67
18. New, not second-hand, clothes | 64
19. A hobby or leisure activity | 64
20. Two hot meals a day (for adults) | 64
21. Meat or fish every other day | 63
22. Presents for friends or family once a year | 63
23. A holiday away from home for one week a year, not with
relatives | 63
24. Leisure equipment for children e.g. sports equipment or a !
bicycle * j 57
25. A garden j 55
26. A television | 51
27. A 'best outfit' for special occasions | 48
28. A telephone | 43
29. An outing for children once a week * | 40
30. A dressing gown | 38
31. Children's friends round for tea/a snack once a fortnight * | 37
32. A night out once a fortnight (adults) | 36
33. Friends/family round for a meal once a month | 32
34. A car | 22
35. A packet of cigrettes every other day | 14
Note: * = for families with children
% of N = % classing item as necessity
Source: Mack and Lansley, 54
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Table A5.1 The Base Year for Population Projection,Taiwan Area






All ages 19 135 283 9 934 843 | 9 200 440
0-4 | 1 891 998 975 863 | 916 135
0 359 409 185 469 | 173 940
1 j 367 955 189 847 | 178 108
2 ! 378 102 195 033 j 183 069
3 388 547 200 358 | 188 188
4 1 397 985 205 156 | 192 829
5- 9 2 009 574 1 034 817 | 974 757
10-14 ! 1 815 035 932 719 | 882 316
15-19 1 912 802 980 840 | 931 962
20-24 [ 1 998 968 1 023 941 j 975 027
25-29 1 884 245 962 374 j 921 871
30-34 1 673 025 854 427 | 818 598
35-39 1 095 542 561 769 | 533 77 3
40-44 | 908 135 464 215 j 443 920
45-49 i 853 665 432 019 | 421 646
50-54 795 078 428 865 j 366 213
55-59 1 764 266 453 213 | 311 053
60-64 585 571 341 120 | 244 451
65-69 395 149 220 087 | 175 062
70-74 288 336 151 934 | 136 402
75-79 | 158 285 73 905 | 84 380
80+ | 105 609 42 735 | 62 874
Note: 1) The population aged 0 to 4 were adjusted by the
multipliers of Beers Ordinary Formula.
2) Based on registered population aged 5 years and
over.
Source: CEPD, 1986b: 20
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Table A5.2 Estimates of Total Fertility Rates and Age Specific
Fertility Rates, Taiwan Area, 1955-1985
Total
Age Specific Fertility Rates
















1955 6 530 | 50 | 273 | 341 | 295 | 219 | 103 | 25
1960 5 750 48 | 253 | 333 | 255 | 169 | 79 | 13
1965 4 825 | 36 | 261 | 326 | 195 | 100 | 41 | 6
1970 4 000 40 | 238 | 293 | 147 | 59 | 20 | 3
1975 2 830 j 37 | 194 | 215 j 83 | 27 j 8 1 2
1976 3 075 | 38 | 213 | 240 | 87 | 28 | 8 I 1
1977 2 700 37 | 194 | 206 | 73 | 23 | 6 1 1
1978 2 710 | 36 | 194 | 213 | 73 | 20 | 5 | 1
1979 2 660 ! 35 | 194 | 209 | 72 | 18 | 4 1 0
1980 2 515 | 33 j 180 | 200 | 69 | 16 | 4 1 1
1981 2 455 j 31 1 176 | 197 | 69 | 14 | 3 1 1
1982 2 320 | 29 | 166 | 186 | 66 | 14 | 3 1 0
1983 2 155 | 26 | 154 | 174 | 62 | 13 | 2 1 0
1984 2 050 23 | 144 | 168 | 60 | 13 | 2 1 0
1985 1 900 | 21 | 135 | 155 | 55 | 12 | 2 1 0
Note: T.F.R.= 5 times (Age-Speific-Birth-Rates)
Source: CEPD, 1986b: 21
Table A5.3 Projections of Total Fertility Rates and Age Specific



























High 1 1 1 1 1 1
1985 1 900 | 21.0 135.0| 155.01 55.0 | 12.0 | 2 .0 | 0


















1985 1 900 | 21.0 135.0| 155.01 55 .0 | 12.01 2 .0 | 0
1990 1 825 | 20.6 126.4| 145.1| 56.8 | 13. 8 | 2.3 | 0
1995 1 750 20.2 117.7 | 135.2| 58 .6 | 15. 5 | 2.7 | 0
2000 1 750 j 20.2 117.7 | 135.2) 58 .6 | 15. 5 | 2.7 | 0
2030 1 750 |
|




















1985 1 900 | 21.0 135.0| 155.0| 55 .0 | 12. 0 | 2.0 | 0
1990 1 750 | 20.2 117.7 | 135.2| 58 .6 | 15.5( 2.7 | 0
1995 1 600 19.5 100.5 | 115.5| 62 .2 | 19. 0 | 3.3 | 0
2000 1 600 19.5 100.5| 115.5| 62 .2 1 19.0 | 3.3 | 0
2030 1 600 j 19.5 100.5| 115.51 62 .2 | 19.0 | 3.3 | 0
Source: CEPD, 1986b: 22
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Table A5.4 Assumptions of Life Expectancy, Taiwan Area
1 1985 1 1995 1 2010












o| 70.80 | 75.80 | 71.87 | 77.68 | 73.00 | 79.50
l| 70.31 75.27 71.37 | 77.15 72.49 78.95
5 j 66.61 71.53 | 67.62 73.31 68.68 j 75.03
10 j 61.77 66.64 62.70 68.30 63.69 69.90
15 j 56.91 61.73 57.77 63.27 58.68 j 64.75
20 j 52.22 56 .86 51.44 58.28 | 53.84 | 59.64
25 j 47.60 | 52.04 48.32 53.34 | 49.08 54.59
30 j 42.97 47.22 43.62 48.40 j 44.98 49.53
35 j 38.36 42.42 | 38.94 43.48 40.15 44.50
40 | 33.84 | 37.68 j 34.38 | 38.62 | 35.42 39 .52
45 j 29.46 | 33.00 j 29.91 | 33.82 30.84 | 34.62
50 | 25.25 28.45 25.43 | 29.16 26.43 j 29.84
55 | 21.21 j 24.07 21.53 | 24.67 22.20 25.25
60 j 17.37 | 19.88 | 17.63 20.38 | 18.18 20 .85
65 j 13.83 15.97 14.04 | 16.37 14.48 i 16.75
70 | 10.69 | 12.43 10.85 | 12.74 11.19 | 13.04
75 j 8.04 9.39 8.16 | 9.62 8.41 9.85
80 | 5.98 6.97 6.07 7.14 6.26 7.31
85 j 4.70 | 5.36 4.77 5.49 j 4.92 | 5.62
Source: CEPD, 1986b: 23
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Table A5.5 Total Population Projections and Components of Change,
Taiwan Area, 1985-2030
1 Total Net | 1 Natural | 1 Natural














High Projection 1 1 1
1985 | 19 135 | 1.4 | 344 | 92 253 | 18.0 | 4.8 13.2
1990 j 20 394 | 1.2 | 358 | 107 251 j 17.6 | 5.3 12. 3
1995 | 21 575 | 1.1 | 351 | 123 228 | 16.3 | 5.7 10. 6
2000 | 22 658 1.0 | 351 | 139 212 | 15.5 j 6.1 9.4
2005 | 23 677 | 0.8 | 353 | 155 198 | 14.9 | 6.6 8.4
2010 | 24 560 0.7 | 339 | 177 162 | 13.8 | 7.2 6.6
2015 | 25 260 0.5 | 325 | 198 127 | 12.9 | 7.9 5.0
2020 | 25 800 | 0.4 j 318 | 222 96 | 12.3 | 8.6 3.7
2025 | 26 192 0.3 | 316 | 2 50 66 j 12.0 j 9.5 2.5
2030 | 26 417 | 0.1 | 314 j 285 29 j 11.9 | 10.8 1.1
Medium Projection 1 1 1
1985 | 19 135 | 1.4 | 344 | 92 253 | 18.0 | 4.8 13.2
1990 j 20 357 | 1.2 | 345 | 107 237 | 16.9 | 5.3 11.7
1995 | 21 434 j 0.9 j 325 j 123 202 j 15.2 | 5.7 9.4
2000 | 22 384 | 0.8 | 324 j 138 185 j 14.4 j 6.2 8.3
2005 j 23 263 | 0.7 | 324 j 155 170 j 13.9 | 6.7 7.3
2010 j 24 005 | 0.6 j 310 j 177 136 j 12.9 | 7.4 5.6
2015 | 24 552 | 0.4 | 291 j 197 94 j 11.9 | 8.0 3.8
2020 | 24 907 | 0.2 j 277 j 221 56 j 11.1 | 8.9 2.3
2025 | 25 085 | 0.1 j 270 j 249 22 j 10. 8 | 9.9 0.9
2030 | 25 079 j -0.1 j 266 j 283 17 | 10.6 j 11.3 -0.7
Low Projection 1 1 1 1
1985 | 19 135 | 1.4 | 344 | 92 253 | 18.0 | 4.8 13 .2
1990 j 20 320 | 1.1 | 331 | 107 224 | 16.3 | 5.3 11.0
1995 | 21 293 | 0.8 | 299 | 123 176 | 14.0 | 5.8 8.3
2000 | 22 110 | 0.7 | 296 | 138 158 | 13.4 | 6.2 7.2
2005 | 22 849 | 0.6 j 295 | 154 141 j 12.9 j 6.8 6.2
2010 | 23 451 | 0.5 j 282 j 176 106 | 12.0 j 7.5 4.5
2015 | 23 853 | 0.3 | 260 | 197 63 | 10.9 | 8.3 2.7
2020 | 24 040 j 0.1 | 241 j 220 20 j 10.0 | 9.2 0.9
2025 | 24 023 j -0.1 | 229 | 248 19 | 9.5 | 10.3 -0.8
2030 | 23 811 | -0.3 | 222 | 282 60 | 9.3 j 11.8 -2.5
Source: CEPD, 1986b: 7-9
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Table A5.6 Distribution of the Projected Population by 3 Broad
Age Groups, Taiwan Area, 1985-2030
1
1






(%)Year| All | 0-14|15-64











1985 119 135 1 5 717 | 12 471 947 29.9 65.1 5.0 45.8 7.6 16.6
1990 j 20 394 | 5 642 13 520 1 233 27.7 66.3 6.0 41.7 9.1 21.9
1995 j 21 575 j 5 374 14 628 1 572 24.9 67.8 7.3 36.7 10.7 29.3
2000 j 22 658 j 5 212 15 602 1 844 23.0 68.9 8.1 33.4 11.8 35.3
2005 j 23 677 | 5 208 16 384 2 085 22.0 69.2 8.8 31.8 12 .7 40.0
2010 j 24 560 j 5 171 17 101 2 289 21.1 69 6 9.3 30.2 13.4 44.3
2015 j 25 260 | 5 076 17 608 2 576 20.1 69.7 10.2 28.8 14.6 50.7
2020 | 25 800 j 4 919 | 17 623 3 258 19.1 68.3 12 .6 27.9 18 .5 66.2
2025 j 26 196 j 4 781 17 424 3 986 18 .3 66.5 15.2 27.4 22 .9 83.4
2030 j 26 417 | 4 710 j 17 065 4 642 17.8 64.6 17.6 27.6 27.2 98.6
Medium Projection
1985|19 135 | 5 717 | 12 471 947 29.9 65.2 5.0 45.8 7.6 16.6
1990 120 357 I 5 605 13 520 1 233 27.5 66.4 6.1 41.5 9.1 22.0
1995 j 21 434 | 5 234 j 14 628 1 572 24.4 68.3 7.3 35.8 10.7 30.0
2000 j 22 384 j 4 938 15 602 1 844 22 .0 69.7 8.2 31.6 11.8 37.3
2005 | 23 263 | 4 831 16 347 2 085 20.8 70.3 9.0 29.6 12 .8 43.2
2010 j 24 005 | 4 755 16 961 2 289 19.8 70.7 9.5 28.0 13.5 48 .1
2015 j 24 552 | 4 641 17 336 2 576 18.9 70.6 10.5 26.8 14.9 55.5
2020 j 24 907 | 4 436 17 213 3 258 17.8 69.1 13.1 25.8 18.9 73.4
2025 j 25 084 | 4 223 16 875 3 986 16.8 67.3 15.9 25.0 23.6 94.4
2030 125 079 | 4 072 16 365 4 642 16.2 65.3 18.5 24.9 28.4 114 .0
Low Projection
1985|19 135 | 5 717 | 12 471 947 29.9 65.2 5.0 45.8 7.6 16.6
1990 j 20 320 j 5 568 13 520 1 233 27.4 66.5 6.1 41.2 9.1 22 .1
1995 j 21 293 j 5 093 | 14 628 1 572 23.9 68.7 7.4 34.8 10.7 30.9
2000 122 110 | 4 664 | 15 602 1 844 21.1 70.6 8.3 29.9 11.8 39.5
2005 | 22 849 | 4 454 j 16 310 2 085 19.5 71.4 9.1 27.3 12 .8 46.8
2010|23 451 j 4 341 j 16 821 2 289 18.5 71.7 9.8 25.8 13.6 52 .7
2015|23 853 | 4 214 j 17 064 2 576 17.7 71.5 10.8 24.7 15.1 61.1
2020 | 24 040 | 3 980 j 16 802 3 258 16.6 69.9 13.6 23.7 19 .4 81.9
2025 j 24 02 3 j 3 7111 16 326 3 986 15.5 68.0 16.6 22.7 24 .4 107.4
2030 j 23 8111 3 495 | 15 674 4 642 14.7 65.8 19.5 22.3 29.6 132.8
Source: CEPD, 1986b: 11-13
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Table A5.7 Economic Indicators
Population Per Per 1,000 Inhabitants
in Capita
Country million GNP ,us$ Telephone Television Motor Vehicle
1986 1986 1984 1984 1984
Taiwan 1981 18.1 2 286 210.6 219.7 44.3
1982 18.4 2 389 236.0 223.0 50.2
1983 18.7 2 583 269.2 229.0 56.7
1984 19.0 2 838 277.6 231.8 64.0
1985 19.2 2 931 293.5 236.3 69.8
1986 19.3 3 142 311.9 77.0
1987 19.4 5 000
Australia 15.8 11 460 536 428 541.1
Austria 7.6 9 230 476 306 402.3
Belgium 9.9 9 130 430 304 360.5
Canada 25.6 12 280 664( '83) 460 567 .3(* 83)
Denmark 5.1 11 540 749 366 334.8
France 55.4 10 480 600 369 409.5('82)
Germany,W. 60.7 11 400 599 354 437.0
Italy 57.2 6 390 426 288 395.0('83)
Japan 121.5 10 100 535 560 363.8
Sweden 8.4 12 440 890( '83) 387 397.3
Switzerland 6.5 16 250 810 370 423.5
UK 56.6 9 180 524 457 322 .7('83)
USA 241.0 14 080 789("81) 646 701.7('83)
Source: UN, 1986
CEPD, 1987b












Australia 3.6 1.9 | 1.8 8.3
Austria 2.9 1.7 1.3 6.2
Belgium 2.9 1.5 1.3 5.6
Canada 3.9 2.5 2.0 9.9
Denmark 3.7 2.7 1.6 5.2
France 3.3 2.2 1.6 8.1
Germany,W. 3.6 2.2 1.5 6.8
Italy 2.0 1.5 1.2 6.9
Japan 3.2 1.9 2.4 5.6
Sweden 4.0 3.3 1.7 6.2
Switzerland| 5.2 2.9 j 1.6 6.6
UK 2.9 1.9 2.0 5.6
USA 4.5 3.7 2.8 12.2
Source: Calculated from Table 5.1 by author
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Table A6 International Population by Age Groups
Country year |
1





Australia 1981 | 25.0 | 65.3 | 9. 7 I 38.8
Belgium 1981 | 20.0 j 65.6 | 14. 4 1 72.0
Canada 1983 | 21.9 j 68.1 | 10. 0 1 45.7
France 1983 | 21.8 i 65.0 | 13. 2 1 60.6
Germany, W. 1982 | 16.9 ! 68.1 j 15. 0 1 88.8
Italy 1981 | 21.4 | 65.0 | 13. 6 1 63.6
Japan 1985 j 21.6 68.2 | 10. 2 1 47.5
Korea 1983 | 32.2 63.8 | 4. o 1 12.4
Netherland 1981 | 21.8 | 66.6 | 11. 6 1 53.2
New Zealand 1981 | 26.7 1 63.4 | 9. 9 1 37.1
Sweden 1984 | 18.7 ! 64.7 j 17. 1 | 93.7
UK 1984 | 19.5 1 65.7 | 14. 9 1 76.3
USA 1981 | 22.2 | 66.2 j 11. 6 i 52.3
Source: l.UN, 1984: 316; 2.SBMCA, 1986; 3.CS0, 1986; 3.SS, 1986.
354











C -14 15 -64 65+
1961 | 7 498 |*7 520 1 664 4 946 888
1962 | 7 542 |*7 562 1 639 4 995 908
1963 | 7 581 |*7 604 1 619 5 036 927
1964 j 7 628 j *7 661 1 607 5 073 948
1965 | 7 695 |*7 734 1 613 5 114 968
1966 | 7 773 1*7 808 1 626 5 154 992
1967 | 7 843 |*7 868 1 643 5 182 1 018
1968 j 7 893 |*7 912 1 655 5 196 1 041
1969 j 8 004 1 7 968 1 671 5 248 1 086
1970 | 8 081 1 8 043 1 682 5 396 1 003
1971 | 8 115 1 8 098 1 687 5 287 1 141
1972 j 8 129 1 8 122 1 689 5 274 1 167
1973 | 8 144 1 8 137 1 688 5 261 1 196
1974 j 8 177 1 8 161 1 693 5 258 1 225
1975 | 8 208 1 8 193 1 697 5 260 1 251
1976 | 8 236 1 8 222 1 695 5 267 1 274
1977 j 8 267 1 8 252 1 687 5 279 1 301
1978 | 8 284 i 8 276 1 668 5 293 1 324
1979 | 8 303 I 8 294 1 641 5 316 1 345
1980 | 8 318 1 8 310 1 615 5 340 1 362
1981 | 8 323 1 8 320 1 586 5 359 1 378
1982 | 8 327 1 8 325 1 556 5 376 1 395
1983 | 8 331 1 8 329 1 534 5 387 1 410
1984 | 8 343 1 8 337 1 521 5 397 1 425
1985 | 8 358 1 8 350 1 512 5 392 1 454
1986 j 8 382 1 8 370 1 505 5 400 1 477
1987 j 8 414 1 8 398 1 501 5 420 1 493
Source: SS, 1977-89
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Table A7.2 Population in Sweden
Change and Comparision
Net Natural |




0/00 000 0/00 1 000 0/00 | 000 0/00
1961 1 5.9 31 4.1 | 105 13.9 1 74 9.8
1962 44 | 5.2 30 4.0 | 107 14.2 | 77 10.2
1963 39 | 6.1 36 4.8 | 113 14 .9 1 76 10.1
1964 46 | 8.8 46 6.0 | 123 16.0 | 77 10.0
1965 68 | 10.0 45 5.8 | 123 15.9 | 78 10.1
1966 77 | 9.0 45 5.8 | 123 15.8 | 78 10 .1
1967 71 | 6.3 42 5.3 | 121 15.4 j 80 10.1
1968 50 j 5.3 31 3.9 | 113 14.3 | 82 10.4
1969 112 | 8.6 24 3.1 j 108 13.5 | 83 10.5
1970 77 | 9.8 30 3.8 | 110 13.7 | 80 10.0
1971 34 j 4.3 32 3.9 | 114 14.1 | 83 10 .2
1972 14 j 1.9 28 3.5 | 112 13.8 | 84 10.4
1973 15 | 1.5 24 3.0 j 110 13.5 j 86 10.5
1974 32 | 3.9 24 2.9 | 110 13.5 | 86 10.6
1975 32 | 3.9 15 1.9 | 104 12 .7 j 88 10.8
1976 28 | 3.3 8 0.9 | 98 12 .0 1 91 11.0
1977 31 | 3.7 8 1.0 | 96 11.6 | 88 10.7
1978 17 | 2.1 4 0.4 | 93 11.3 | 90 10.8
1979 19 j 2.3 5 0.6 | 96 11.6 i 91 11.0
1980 15 j 1.8 5 0.6 | 97 11.7 | 92 11.1
1981 5 | 0.6 2 0.2 | 94 11.3 | 92 11.1
1982 4 1 0.5 2 0.3 | 93 11.1 1 91 11.0
1983 3 1 0.4 1 0.1 | 92 11.0 1 91 10.9
1984 12 j 1.5 3 0.4 j 94 11.3 j 90 10.9
1985 15 | 1.9 4 0.5 | 98 11.8 j 94 11.3
1986 24 j 2.8 9 1.0 j 102 12 .2 1 93 11.2
1987 32 j 3.9 11 1.4 | 105 12 .5 | 93 11.1
Source: SS, 1977-89
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Table A7.3. Population in Sweden
Composition and Comparision (%)











19611 22.2 | 66.0 | 11.8 33.6 18.0 | 51.6 | 53.4
1962 j 21.7 | 66.2 j 12.0 32.8 18.2 | 51.0 | 55.4
196 3 | 21.4 | 66.4 | 12.2 32.2 18.4 | 50.6 I 57.2
196 4 | 21.1 | 66.5 | 12.4 31.7 18.7 | 50.3 | 58.9
196 5 j 21.0 | 66.5 j 12.6 31.5 18.9 | 50.5 j 60.0
1966 | 20.9 | 66.3 j 12.8 31.6 19.3 | 50.8 | 61.0
1967 | 21.0 | 66.1 | 13.0 31.7 19.6 j 51.4 | 61.9
1968 j 21.0 | 65.8 j 13.2 31.9 20.0 | 51.9 | 62.9
196 9 | 20.9 | 65.6 j 13.6 31.8 20.7 | 52.5 | 65.0
1970 | 20.8 | 66.8 | 12.4 31.2 18.6 | 49.8 | 59.6
19711 20.8 | 65.2 j 14.1 31.9 21.6 | 53.5 | 67.7
1972 | 20.8 | 64.9 | 14.4 32.0 22.1 | 54.2 | 69.1
197 3 j 20.7 | 64.6 | 14.7 32 .1 22.7 | 54.8 I 70.9
1974) 20.7 j 64.3 | 15.0 32 .2 23.3 | 55.5 | 72.4
1975 j 20.7 | 64.1 | 15.2 32 .3 23.8 | 56 .0 I 73.7
1976 | 20.6 | 64.0 | 15.5 32.2 24.2 | 56.4 I 75.2
1977 | 20.4 | 63.9 I 15.7 32.0 24.6 | 56.6 | 77.1
1978 j 20.1 j 64.0 j 16.0 31.5 25.0 j 56.5 j 79.4
1979 j 19.8 | 64.0 | 16.2 30.9 25.3 | 56.2 | 82.0
1980 | 19.4 | 64.2 | 16.4 30.3 25.5 | 55.8 | 84.3
19811 19.1 | 64.4 | 16.6 29.6 25.7 | 55.3 j 86.9
1982 | 18.7 | 64.6 | 16.8 29.0 26.0 | 54.9 | 89.6
1983 j 18.4 j 64.7 | 16.9 28.5 26.2 | 54.7 | 91.9
1984 j 18.2 | 64.7 j 17.1 28.2 26.4 | 54.6 j 93.7
1985 j 18.1 | 64.5 | 17.4 28.0 27.0 j 55.0 | 96.2
1986 | 18.0 j 64.4 I 17.6 27.9 27.4 | 55.3 | 98.1
1987 j 17.8 | 64.4 I 17.7 27.7 27.5 j 55.2 | 99.5
Source: SS, 1977-89



































19611 52 807 | 1 1 313 5.9 | 944 | 17.9 | 632 | 12.0
1966 j 54 643 | 1 I 336 6.1 | 980 | 18.0 | 644 j 11.8
1967 | 54 959 | 316 1 5.7 | 345 6.3 | 962 | 17.6 | 617 [ 11.3
1968 | 55 214 | 255 1 4.6 j 291 5.3 j 947 | 17.2 | 656 | 11.9
1969 j 55 4611 247 1 4.5 j 261 4.7 | 920 j 16.6 j 660 | 11.9
1970 | 55 632 j 171 i 3.1 j 249 4.5 | 904 j 16.31 655 | 11.8
1971 j 55 92 8 j 296 1 5.3 | 257 4.6 j 902 j 16 .2 | 645 | 11.5
1972 | 56 097 | 168 1 3.0 | 160 2.9 | 834 | 14.9| 674 | 12.1
1973 | 56 22 3 | 126 I 2.2 | 110 2.0 | 780 | 13.9 j 670 | 12. 0
1974 j 56 236 | 13 1 0.2 | 71 1.3 | 738 | 13.2 | 667 j 11.9
1975 j 56 22 6 | -10 j-0.2 | 35 0.6 | 698 j 12.5 | 663 | 11.8
1976| 56 216 j -10 j-0.2 j -5 0.0 | 676 | 12.1 j 6811 12.2
1977 j 56 190 | -26 j-0.5 | 2 0.0 | 657 j 11.8 j 655 | 11.7
1978 | 56 178 | -12 j-0.2 j 22 0.4 | 687 | 12.3 | 667 j 12.0
1979 | 56 240 | 62 1 1-1 1 59 1.0 | 735 j 13.11 676 | 12.1
1980 j 56 330 j 90 1 1-6 1 92 1.6 | 754 j 13.5 | 662 | 11.8
19811 56 352 | 22 1 0.4 | 74 1.3 | 7311 13.0 | 656 | 11.7
1982 j 56 306 | -46 j-0.8 j 56 1.0 | 719 j 12.8 j 66 3 | 11.8
1983 | 56 347 | 41 1 0.7 | 62 1.1 | 722 | 12.8 | 659 j 11.7
1984 j 56 460 | 113 1 2.0 j 85 1.5 | 730 | 12 .9 | 645 | 11.4
1985 | 56 618 | 158 1 2.8 | 80 1.4 | 751 j 13.3 j 6711 11.9
1986 | 56 76 3 j 145 1 2.6 j 94 1.7 | 755 | 13.3 j 6611 11.6
1987 | 56 930 | 167 1 2.9 j 132 2.3 | 776 | 13.6 j 644 | 11.3
Source: CSO, 1970-89
358
Table A8.2. Population in UK Rate and Comparision
1, 000 % [Dependency Ratios Aging
Year 1 Index







1901 12 421 74 007 1 809 32.5 62.8 4.7 |51.7 1 7.5 | 59.3 14.6
1911 12 968 26 867 2 247 30.8 63.8 5.3 j 48.3 j 8.4 I 56.6 17.3
1931 11 174 31 447 3 418 24.3 68.3 7.4 | 35. 5 j 10.9 I 46. 4 30.6
1951 11 325 33 433 5 466 22.5 66.6 10.9 | 33.9 j 16.4 j 50.2 48.3
1961 12 336 34 184 6 189 23.4 64.9 11.7 | 36.1 j 18.1 j 54.2 50.2
1971 13 387 34 821 7 307 24.1 62.7 13.2 j 38. 4 j 21.0 j 59. 4 54.6
1975 13 129 35 192 7 894 23.4 62.6 14.0 | 37.3 | 22.4 j 59.7 60.1
1976 12 897 35 323 7 998 22.9 62.8 14.2 | 3 6. 5 j 22.6 | 59.1 62.0
1977 12 607 35 481 8 102 22.4 63.1 14.4 | 3 5. 5 | 22.8 | 58.3 64.3
1978 12 323 35 641 8 214 21.9 63.4 14. 6 j 3 4. 6 | 2 3. 0 | 57. 6 66.7
1979 12 069 35 854 8 318 21.5 63.8 14.8 | 3 3. 7 j 2 3. 2 j 56.9 68.9
1980 11 828 36 079 8 428 21.0 64.1 14.9 j 32.8 j 22.8 j 55. 5 71.3
1981 11 602 36 278 8 472 20.6 64.4 15.0 | 32.0 | 2 3. 4 j 55. 3 73.0
1982 11 365 36 473 8 468 20.2 64.8 15.0 j 31-1 | 2 3.2 | 54.4 74.5
1983 11 170 36 764 8 417 19.8 65.3 14.9 | 30.4 | 22.9 | 53. 2 75.3
1984 10 997 37 079 8 383 19.5 65.7 14.8 j 29.6 j 22.6 j 52.2 76.2
1985 10 896 37 163 8 557 19.2 65.6 15.1 | 2 9. 3 j 23.0 j 52. 3 78.5
1986 10 799 37 281 8 683 19.0 65.7 15.3 j 29.0 | 2 3. 3 j 52. 3 80.4
1987 10 747 37 369 8 814 18.9 65.6 15.5 | 28.8 | 2 3. 6 j 52. 4 82.0
Source: CSO, 1970-89
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N 0/00 N | 0/00
1
N 0/00 N | 0/00
1
1920 55 963 1 2 026 36.2 1 422 | 25.4
1925 59 737 861 14.6 913 115. 3 2 148 36.0 1 235 i 20.7
1930 64 450 989 15.6 950 114.7 2 135 33.1 1 185 i 18.4
1935 69 254 945 13.8 1 012 j 14.6 2 182 31.5 1 170 j 16.9
1940 71 933 553 7.8 886 j 12.3 2 110 29.3 1 224 i 17.0
1945 71 998 - 1691 22.9 -245 | 33.1 1 902 26.4 2 147 j 29.8
1950 83 200 1 427 17.5 1 510 118.1 2 417 28.1 907 110.9
1955 89 276 1 036 11.7 1 061 111.9 1 769 19.4 708 i 7.8
1960 93 419 777 8.4 911 | 9.8 1 624 17.2 713 j 7.6
1965 98 275 1 093 11.3 1 099 jll.2 1 811 18.6 712 1 7.1
1970 103 720 1 184 11. 5 1 211 ill.7 1 932 18.6 721 i 6.9
1975 111 940 1 367 12. 4 1 242 jll.l 1 948 17.0 707 i 6.3
1976 113 094 1 155 10.3 1 160 110. 3 1 866 16.2 707 i 6.2
1977 114 165 1 071 9.5 1 081 1 9-5 1 781 15.4 700 i 6.0
1978 115 190 1 025 9.0 1 034 | 9.011 730 14.8 696 j 6.0
1979 116 155 965 8.4 974 | 8.4 1 663 14.1 689 i 5.9
1980 117 060 906 7.8 894 i 7.6 1 616 13.5 722 i 6.2
1981 117 902 842 7.2 823 j 7.0 1 549 12.9 725 j 6.1
1982 118 728 826 7.0 808 j 6.8 1 529 12 .8 720 j 6.0
1983 119 536 808 6.8 789 j 6.6 1 52 4 12 .6 735 i 6.2
1984 120 305 769 6.4 758 j 6.3 1 507 12.4 749 j 6.2
1985 121 049 744 6.2 714 i 5.9 1 452 12.0 738 i 6.1
1986 121 672 623 5.2 630 j 5.2 1 396 11.5 767 | 6.3
1987 122 264 591 4.9 620 i 5.1 1 371 11.2 751 j 6.1
Source: SBMCA, 1982-88
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Table A9.2 Population in Japan Age Groups and Ratios
000 0/0 Dependency Ratio Aging
Index
Year 0-■14 15-64 65+ 0-14 15-64 65 + A/B C/B A+C/B C/A
1920 20 416 32 605 2 941 36.5 58.3 5.3 62.6 9.0 71.6 14.4
1925 21 924 34 792 3 021 36.7 58.2 5.1 63.0 8.7 71.7 13.8
1930 23 579 37 807 3 064 36.6 58.7 4.8 62.4 8.1 70.5 13.0
1935 25 545 40 484 3 225 36.9 58.5 4.7 63.1 8.0 71.1 12.6
1940 26 369 43 252 3 454 36.1 59 .2 4.7 61.0 8.0 69.0 13.1
1945 26 477 41 821 3 700 36.8 58.1 5.1 63.3 8.8 72.2 14.0
1950 29 428 49 658 4 109 35.4 59.7 4.9 59.3 8.3 67.5 14.0
1955 29 798 54 729 4 747 33.4 61.3 5.3 54.4 8.7 63.1 15.9
1960 28 067 60 002 5 350 30.0 64.2 5.7 46.8 8.9 55.7 19 .1
1965 25 166 66 928 6 181 25.6 68.1 6.3 37.6 9.2 46.8 24 .6
1970 24 823 71 566 7 331 23.9 69.0 7.1 34.7 10.2 44.9 29.5
1975 27 221 75 807 8 865 24.3 67.7 7.9 35.9 11.7 47.6 32.6
1980 27 507 78 835 10 647 23.5 67.4 9.1 34.9 13.5 48. 4 38 .7
1981 27 603 79 272 11 009 23.4 67.2 9.3 34.8 13.9 48.7 39.9
1982 27 254 80 089 11 350 23.0 67 .5 9.6 34.0 14.2 48.2 41.6
1983 26 907 80 904 11 672 22.5 67.7 9.8 33.3 14.4 47.7 43.4
1984 26 504 81 776 11 956 22.0 68.0 9.9 32.4 14.6 47.0 45.1
1985 26 033 82 506 12 468 21.5 68.2 10.3 31.6 15.1 46.7 47.9
1986 25 434 83 368 12 870 20.9 68.5 10.6 30.5 15.4 45.9 50.6
1987 24 753 84 189 13 322 20 .2 68.9 10.9 29.4 15.8 45.2 53 .8
Source: SBMCA, 1982-88
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Table A10.1 Industry of Employed Old People Aged 65 and over
Industry | %
1.Agriculture,forestry,fishery,graziery and hunting | 40.45
2.Mining and quarrying |
3.Manufacturing | 14.61
4.Water, electricity and gas |
5.Construction | 2.24
6.Commerce j 26.97
7.Transportation, storage and communication | 1.12
8.Finance,insurance,real estate,industry and commercel
services | 2.24
9.Government,community and individual services | 14.61
Total 89 000
Source: DGBAS, 1985b
Table A10.2 Occupation of Employed Old People Aged 65 and over
Occupation | %
1.Professional,technical and related workers | 5.62
2.Administrative,executive and managerial workers | 1.12
3.Superintendents and clerical workers | 6.74
4.Sales workers | 16.85
5.Services workers | 15.73
6.Farmers, loggers, graziers, fishermen, hunters and |
related workers | 40.45










F=Chronic Live Disease and Cirrhosis
G=Diabetes Mellitus
H=Bronchitis, Emphysema and Asthma




M=Ulcer of Stomach and Duocenum
N=Suicide
0=Septicaemia
Table All.1 The Ten Leading Causes of Deaths by Age Groups
Both Sexes 1984











1 B B B | B | B I D 1 D I D
22.43 24.03 22 .86| 20.45| 16.0l| 14.31| 14.58| 13.33
2 A A D D ! D 1 B K B
21.90 16.24 13.83| 14.45| 15.51| 11.86| 6.10 | 6.67
3 D D A I A I E K 1 B I C
11.30 12.00 12 .49| 8.20 | 6.26! 5.05 | 5 .76 | 5. 00
4 C E E E A 1 E H A
5.19 5.36 5.86 | 5.75 | 5.83 | 4.59 | 4.07| 5. 00
5 E G H H I H j A I A | L
4.89 4.61 4 . 4 5 | 5.25 | 5.58 | 4.06 | 4.07| 3. 34
6 G H G | K K H E ! F
4.75 4.21 3.86 | 3.37 | 3.42 | 3.98 | 3.73 | 3.33
7 F C c I G 1 I j I j I | E
3.49 3. 62 2 .74 | 2.53 | 2.38 | 2.14 | 2 .711 3.33
8 H J I C G c c K
3.35 3.59 2 .64 | 2.50 | 2 .22 | 1.68 | 2.03 | 3.33
9 J F J I | c 1 M | M | H
3.10 2.70 2 .49 | 2.12 | 2.ll| 1.15 | 1.35 | 1.67
10 I I K J 1 M | G F N
2 .47 2.63 2 .46 | 2.09 | 1.64 | 0. 99 | 1.02 | 1. 67
Subtotal 82 .87 78.99 73.68| 66.71| 60.96| 49.81| 45.42 | 46.67
































Sources: 1) DOH, 1985:88-89
2) MOI, 1985a
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1 A I B I B I B I D | D 1 D 1 F
23 - 55| 22.25| 20 .86 j 18.68| 14 .78| 16.20| 17 .711 15.39
2 B I A I A I D j B B 1 A j C
20.66| 17.59| 14.25 j 13.88| 13.72| 11.81| 8.33 | 15.39
3 D | D I D I A I A I K | B I H
10.94 j 11.20| 12.90 j 9.72 | 7.43 | 6.25 | 6 .2 5 | 7.69
4 C j E E j H H | E | H | D
5.811 5.27 | 5.ll| 6.00 | 6 .93 | 5.33 | 5 .21 j 7.69
5 E H H I E j E j A I K I A
4 .63 | 4.79 | 5.09 | 5.49 | 6 .08 | 5. 32 j 4 .17 | 7.69
6 F J J K | K I H | F -
4.0l| 4.60 | 3.77 | 3.72 | 3 .82 | 5.09 | 3.13 j -
7 j ! c c I c c 1 I | c -
3.96 j 4.28 | 3.19 j 3.22 j 2 .97 | 3.24 | 3 .13 | -
8 H I F j K j J I c 1 I ! -
3.72 j 3.27 | 2 .76 | 3.00 | 2 .8 3 j 2.31 | 2.08 | -
9 G I G I G I I j G I M | E | -
3.16 | 3.20 j 2 .70 | 2.30 | 2.19| 1.39 j 2 .08 | -
10 I I j I j F M j J P 1 -
1.87 | 2.37 | 2 .36 j 1.96 j 2 .12 | 1.16 j 2 .08 | -
Subtotal 82.31| 78.82 j 72.99 j 67.97 | 62 .87| 58.10| 54.17| 53.85
Others 17.69 j
Female
21.18| 27.0l| 32. 03 | 37.13| 41.90 | 45 - 83| 46.15
1 B I B I B I B I B I D 1 D | D
25.52 j 26.73| 25.07| 21.95| 17.45| 13.37 j 13.07| 14. 89
2 A A | D D D B I K I B
19.02| 14.17| 14 .87| 14.92 | 15.97| 11.88| 7.03 j 8. 51
3 D j D 1 A I A I E j K I B I A
11.92 j 13.23| 10 .55| 6.90 | 6.38 | 4. 46 | 5.53 | 4.26
4 G 1 G ! E j E | A I E j E j K
7.511 6.76 | 6 .70 j 5.98 j 4.82 | 4.23 | 4.52 | 4.26
5 E j E j G I H I H I A I H I L
5.36 | 5.49 j 5.14 j 4. 61 | 4 .73 | 3. 43 | 3.52 | 4.25
6 c 1 H | H j G I K 1 H I I E
4.11 j 3.34 | 3.75 | 3.10 | 3.17| 3. 43 j 3.01 j 4.25
7 I 1 I | I | K G I I j A | N
3.51 j 3.02 | 2 .9 4 | 3.07 | 2.23 j 1.60 j 2.011 2.13
8 H I c i c 1 I I | C | Q 1 C
2 .69 j 2.61 | 2 .2 4 | 1.94 | 2 .10 | 1.37 | 1.51 j 2.13
9 F ! J 1 K I c 1 c M j B 1 -
2 .59 | 2.05 | 2 .12 | 1.89 | 1.56 j 1.03 | 1.51 j -
10 J 1 F | F j M j M G I c I -
1.61 j 1.83 j 1.97! 1.75 j 1.34 j 1.03 | 1.511 -
Subtotal 83 .84| 79.23| 75.35 j 66.14| 59 . 7 5 | 45.83| 43 .22| 44.68
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